

2011

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Publication details

Lauchs, MA, Keast, RL & Le, VK 2011, 'The motivation and structure of corrupt police networks: theorising the dark side of the 'thin blue line', *15th Annual Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management (IRSPMXV)*, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, 11-14 April, IRSPM.

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The Motivation and Structure of Corrupt Police Networks: Theorising the Dark Side of ‘Thin Blue Lines’

By

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Abstract

In recent times considerable research attention has been directed to understanding dark networks, especially criminal and terrorist networks. Dark networks are those in which member motivations are self rather than public interested, achievements come at the cost of other individuals, groups or societies and, in addition, their activities are both ‘covert and illegal’ (Raab & Milward, 2003: 415). This ‘darkness’ has implications for the way in which these networks are structured, the strategies adopted and their recruitment methods. Such entities exhibit distinctive operating characteristics including most notably the tension between creating an efficient network structure while retaining the ability to hide from public view while avoiding catastrophic collapse should one member cooperate with authorities (Bouchard 2007). While theoretical emphasis has been on criminal and terrorist networks, recent work has demonstrated that corrupt police networks exhibit some distinctive characteristics. In particular, these entities operate within the shadows of a host organisation - the Police Force and distort the functioning of the ‘*Thin Blue Line*’ as the interface between the law abiding citizenry and the criminal society.

Drawing on data derived from the Queensland Fitzgerald Commission of Enquiry into Police Misconduct and related documents, this paper examines the motivations, structural properties and operational practices of corrupt police networks and compares and contrasts these with other dark networks with ‘bright’ public service networks. The paper confirms the structural differences between dark corrupt police networks and bright networks and suggests. However, structural embeddedness alone is found to be an insufficient theoretical explanation for member involvement in networks and that a set of elements combine to impact decision-making. Although offering important insights into network participation, the paper’s findings are especially pertinent in identifying additional points of intervention for police corruption networks.

INTRODUCTION:

Networks have become a core component of society's institutional architecture (Castells 1996). Baker (1992) noted that networked forms are particularly suited to projects and problems that are unique, requiring speed and flexibility of exchange and action and where monitoring occurs internally. These unique network properties have been conscripted for use across a variety of settings and human activities. They are used to deliver social services, formulate and/or influence the creation of policies and reform agendas, create innovative processes and products through clustering, build and enhance build supply flows and exchanges. All of these networked forms have, as a core operating principle, a normative conceptualisation that networks are inherently good and will unproblematically produce public value or collective good. However, as a number of theorists have stressed (O'Toole and Meier, 2004; Raab and Milward, 2003; Milward and Raab, 2006), networks do not always function as prescribed and can exhibit a number of characteristics that move outcomes away from public value to private gain.

The usefulness of the network form of organising has not been confined to initiatives focused on deriving public value/benefit. Increasingly, it is understood that the activities of gang and other criminal activities, as well as terrorist organisations are performed through decentralised network arrangements. Police corruption also has been acknowledged as fitting within the network paradigm. Collectively, these forms can be described as illegal, covert and focused on meeting the objectives of the in group over broader societal goals. Thus, Raab and Milward (2003:5) argue that networks can be possessed of either 'bright' or 'dark' properties and explain the difference as follows:

"Dark" in that respect refers to networks that are both covert and illegal according to the social and political environment they act in and "bright" networks on the contrary refer to networks that are overt and whose actions are in accordance with the legal framework of states they act in.

Over the past ten years there has been considerable academic attention directed toward understanding the antecedents, formation, functioning and effectiveness of bright networks. This focus has provided important insights to guide the design, operation and monitoring greater insight into how they work and managed.

The recent amplified research into dark networks has also been instrumental in delivering practical insights to guide the detection and disruption of criminal activities (Raab and Milward, 2003; Morselli, 2009).

A key focus of the research undertaken in both bright and dark contexts has been on uncovering their structural properties, operating functions and strategies. The contribution generated from the structural perspective has been critical as it highlights the ways in which differential structures and positions within structures can constrain or enable the action of networks and their members. It can be argued, however, that structure and position aside, people and organisations have a level of self-determination that can overcome structural positional embeddedness and shape their own individual uptake and engagement in a range of activities including networked arrangements (Deci and Ryan, 2002). Schmidle (2009) extends this position and argues that individuals engage in a range of positions or frames that justify their actions within or without the context of their roles.

This paper examines bright (social services networks) and dark (corrupt police networks) in Queensland, Australia to understand the drivers or mix of drivers that might explain why people engage in these forms. The paper will provide insights into the structure and dynamics of their operation by unpacking the topology of their interconnections and member positions. It will also interrogate the motivations of participants in each of these networks to begin to understand the connection between network structure and uptake. By combining these foci the paper aims to develop a preliminary theory which informs dark and bright network motivations for engagement.

BRIGHT AND DARK NETWORKS EXPANDED: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

Social networks form when people interact, exchange information, goods and affect. Through these ongoing exchanges, trust, mutuality and reciprocity are developed. This, when coupled with a set of common norms maintained through peer pressure, social approval and sanction (stigma), serve to bind individuals to a collective unit or a form of 'social organisation' (Kooiman, 1993). The characteristic ability of networks to be inclusive, flexible in their operation and thus quick to respond, coupled with the collective knowledge means that networks can be leveraged to benefit individuals, groups or businesses or society at large.

Business, government and the not-for-profit sectors have all been quick to seize the many apparent benefits and opportunities of working through networks. For the latter two, in particular, there has been a strong adoption of networks as an alternative, or supplementary vehicle to the hierarchy to respond to the many of the persistent and intractable social problems – the 'wicked issues' (Rittel and Webber 1973) as well as the emergence of new compound problems, such as climate change. These problems are complex, multi-faceted and require a suite of expertise, knowledge, resources and commitment, that is well beyond the capacity of any one organisation (and often sector) working alone. In this way, the capacities/capabilities of including both the tangible resources and the social and human capital of networks are able to be leveraged for the benefit of participating agencies through more responsive and better integrated service outcomes for their clients, or by generating greater efficiencies due to reduced overlap and duplication of effort. Such networks are generally described as 'bright'; in that they have been formed to meet a public/social good, function overtly and that their actions align with the legal and ethical frameworks of their jurisdictions (Milward and Raab, 2005).

Networks have evolved to take a number of forms and functions and not all networks are alike (Agranoff, 2006; Keast et al, 2004; 2007). With the human services arena, networks are predominantly used as mechanisms to achieve integration; linking together and aligning human activities, resources and expertise to deliver public benefit outcomes (Provan and Milward, 1995; Keast et al, 2007; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). The emphasis on the coordination task leads to the adoption of a suite of generally acceptable structural properties. First, because these networks are goal oriented, they exhibit a moderate to high level of density and centrality. A level of cohesion is needed to ensure that members are all 'on the same page' and working together. The higher level of connection also translates to a lower average path distance between the members, indicating a level of efficiency in negotiating the system. A further feature of bright networks is their reliance on a central body of people or organisations to coordinate flows of information and actions. Provan and Milward (1995) referred to this as the 'administrative core'. The public benefit focus means that bright networks require transparency in decision making and activities. Their function as service referrals and providers also means that human service networks will have multiplex exchanges: referrals, joint planning and resource and information. Together these characteristics build a solid presence and the network can become an organisational form in its own right. In this way, bright networks are often visible, conducted under the eye of multiple funders and monitoring bodies, and are accountable to government and community.

The application of networks as mechanisms for public benefit has led to a normative conceptualisation of such networks as inherently 'good' in terms of both their relevance and application. In relation to the former (Milward and Raab (2005: 5) noted networked approaches "...are almost exclusively seen as solutions to problems and not as problems in themselves". As several authors have noted (Portes, 1997; Keast and Brown, 2002; O'Toole and Meier, 2004; Raab and Milward, 2003), even legitimate, bright networks can also have a dark side, where the network achievements can come at the cost of other individuals or groups. Another group of dark networks are formed for specific anti-social functioning. Criminal, drug trafficking, terrorist and corrupt police networks would fit such a label. Each of these entities operates outside of the attention of mainstream society.

Dark networks exhibit varying degrees of 'darkness'. For example at the darkest end of the spectrum, would be a paedophile network that wishes to operate completely outside the gaze of the public. Slightly less dark is a drug dealing network which operates outside the observation of the general public and law enforcement, yet still needs to be found by customers. A terrorist network thrives on publicity of its cause and actions but its membership and management are cloaked in secrecy. A police corruption network falls to the darker range of the scale. It exists secretly within a public agency, the Police Force, yet it strives to keep its operations completely hidden from view while disguising the illicit operations of the people who pay bribes for its service.

The *particularism* of networks, that is, banding together to pursue particular or common interests, is a key element of network disadvantage since it can lead to exclusivity rather than an inclusive approach (Taylor and Hodggett 1994). Taken to the extreme, such inclusivity renders networks as essentially private rather than public entities and therefore not exposed to greater scrutiny or subject to external accountability regimes. Because of this, networks can be secretive and invisible in their operation and endeavours. This opaque nature of networks and their lack of accountability, coupled with values and norms that support clandestine actions and goals, can provide a foundation for corruption. Granovetter (1992:45) points out that " networks can create their own norms at odds with the outside world to the point where they become a 'law unto themselves". In such a context, illegal activities can take on the aura of normality within which members protect each other from the sanctions of the outside world.

Corrupt Police Networks: The Dark Side

Police are an essential part of the Australian justice system and are the frontline actors in keeping the peace and social stability and cohesion. Public officials, such as police, who place their own interests before those of the public have been able to corrupt a system in which they are supposed to act as agents of the public will (Lauchs 2007). It is increasingly understood that corrupt police activity operates within a network system, which shares many of the characteristics of 'dark networks'. It is well established in criminology that drug trafficking operations rely on kinship and friendship networks to protect themselves from penetration by law enforcement agencies; they only deal with people they know and trust (Edwards and Levi 2008; Kenny, 2007; Morselli 2001). Similarly, for their survival, corrupt police networks (CPN) rely on a core set of relationships re-enforced by an entrenched police culture of exclusivity and silence. A key point of departure (from most other dark networks) for CPN is that they exist within the shadows of an official organisation.

CASE CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

Commencing in the 1980s, successive Queensland governments and community agencies have responded to increasing demands for more integrated and responsive policy development and service delivery with a suite of integration initiatives, many of which featured horizontal or networked governance aspects. Such networked approaches have sought to bring together previously dispersed and often competitive agencies and sectors and capstone government projects such as the Cape York Indigenous Partnerships, Community Renewal and Child Safety Zonal Partnership Networks and the homelessness services networks. The Queensland network orientation and expectation was aptly described in the Future Directions project as developing: "... networks of individuals, businesses and communities that tackle problems together" (Old Government, 2005:1). Queensland Police Service (QPS) frequently had a membership role in many of these networks, and, in several situations, developed a networked approach of its own. While overwhelmingly focused on providing public benefit, as the following will demonstrate even the 'thin blue line' of the police force can be distorted.

The Joke:

By the 1950s, officers of the Queensland Licensing Branch (QLB) within the Queensland Police Force (QPF) had established a successful and ongoing network protecting of illegal gambling in return for monthly payments. This

system was known as *The Joke*. Corruption took the form of payments being made from bookmakers, prostitutes and operators of illegal gambling games to officers from the QLB in return for protection. The protection was reciprocal: payers would be warned of raids by non-corrupt officers and the payers would provide low level employees for token arrests for the payees so that they could record satisfactory 'clean up rates' for vice crimes in Queensland. QLB staff paid money to officers outside the Branch in an extended layer of protection. In effect, senior police were extorting protection money from the QLB in return for protecting their illegal activity from probity investigations. If the Wood Commission definitions are applied, the corruption was both *systemic*, in so far as it was self-perpetuating within the QLB and *entrenched*, because the corrupt officers had alliances in place to defend their corrupt network from inquiries or interference (Wood 1977). The history of the Joke can be broken into two stages: the First Joke, the Whitrod period, when an honest police commissioner forced its closure, and the Second Joke, when it was re-established after his resignation

This Queensland experimentation in both dark and bright networks provides many examples from which to examine their structure, operation and member motivation.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology occurs in two phases and draws on a mixture of data gathering tools and analytical forms. First, social network analysis (SNA) is used to distil the patterns of exchanges and the overall structural composition of the networks. Network analysis is an empirical tool which can be used to measure, visualise (map) and analyse the ties between people, groups and organisations (Scott 1991). It plots relationships between individuals or entities by representing them as nodes and showing their relationships by linking nodes with lines. Lines can have different depictions to indicate characteristics of links including frequency and method of contact. The nodes and lines form a network map that reveals relationships between members of the network such as gate keeping (controlling the network), liaisons and core and periphery members. In so doing, it uncovers the often hidden or opaque patterns of interaction and enables the underlying structure of relationships to become more apparent (Cross, Borgatti and Parker 2002).

In addition to the visual representation, network metrics, mathematical calculations or measures, will be used to gain deeper insights into the actual texture and operation of the networks. The metrics applied to this study include:

- Density: - a measure of the number of actual connections compared to the total number of possible connections. The higher the density ratio - the higher the level of cohesion within a network. Density values range from 0 to 1: the closer the score to 1 the higher the level of connection.
- Centrality: - gives an indication of how concentrated a network is – do a small number of people control the flow of resources, or is it distributed more widely through a number people. This measure provides useful insights into where influence and power maybe concentrated, or to the location of blockages or key flow points. The centralisation score is expressed as a percentage and can vary for 0 (every member is connected to every other member) to 100 (all members are connected to only one member). A high centralisation score indicates that some network actors have many more connections than others.
- Average Path Distance: - is an indication of how easy it is to navigate around the network. This measure provides insights into how close or removed certain actors are and as a consequence their level of knowledge of flows.

Data Sources

Network Data: The data sources for the dark (corrupt police) networks and bright (human services) networks have been secured through two different sources. Due to its contentious and legally sensitive nature, the

principal data sources for the police corruption networks were the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) into Police Misconduct in Queensland and the auto-biography by Herbert and Gilling (2004), the former a key figure in the corruption. Content analysis of both documents were undertaken to distil three key variables of bribes, corrupt support which are central to police corruption: bribes, transference of bribes and corrupt support. The relational data derived from the content analysis were collated and arrayed into matrices for each of the key variables identified above. From this starting point, network maps were constructed using UCINET6, a social network analysis program.

For the bright networks data was derived through a network linkage questionnaire administered to members of seven networks. The questionnaires were structured to provide insights into four key service variables: information sharing; joint programming; joint services and funding.

Qualitative Data: To tap into the motivation or drivers for involvement in networks two approaches were used. For the dark networks, a content analysis was conducted of key documentation including the Fitzgerald Report and autobiographical publications. For bright networks, Insights into the motivations for network involvement were secured through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In total, 65 interviews, 14 focus groups and 120 questionnaires were conducted over 10 years across seven networks operating within the Queensland human services (child safety and homelessness) arenas. This data was subjected to manual thematic analysis to identify key themes. Leximancer text analysis was used as a confirmatory analytical tool.

A key departure for this study is that it draws on existing or historical sets of dark and bright network data with which to build its comparisons and insights. Nonetheless, there are limitations, particularly with the police misconduct data. First, the data sources are imperfect and rely on evidence produced at police inquiries and reminiscences of participants, thus neither source of data is complete. Moreover, the latter can be highly unreliable. However, these are the only sources available. Secondly, network maps may plot relationships that have been identified by a third party without the benefit of confirmation. Thus the appearance of a name on a map may imply a type of relationship that never existed. In view of this, network maps should be interpreted cautiously and only in connection with the accompanying commentary in which the details of relationships can be expanded.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Differentiating Network Structural Properties

Bright Network Structure

The overall goal of bright networked service models is to coordinate exchanges between the organisations within a service system. The individual SNA metrics (density, centrality and average path distance) reveal that there are a spread of integration levels, ranging from 0.12 0.3670, where 1 = a fully integrated system. This result suggests that there is a reasonable level of connection between each of the member agencies in the network and that there is a level of coherence in their actions. The spread of coordination levels evident also lends support to the proposition that networks are differentiated (Agranoff, 2006; Keast et al 2004; 2007) and all of the agencies in a service network do not need to be fully connected to deliver on their stated aims. Indeed, the context in which networks operate, the history of working together, ideological differences and the type/level of coordination desired will likely produce different network structures. These differences, in relation to centralisation, between child safety (shaded) and homelessness services (unshaded) is evident in Table 1 presented below.

Table 1: Human Services Network Metrics (aggregated across all variables)

Network	Density	Centralisation	Av Path Distance
1	0.2120	29.51%	1.897
2	0.1351	25.16%	2.237
3	0.1256	28.16%	2.110
4	0.1910	30.43%	1.938
5	0.3670	63.080%	1.5
6	0.1496	55.92%	1.2
7	0.3660	60%	1.33

When aggregated the SNA data demonstrated consistently modest to mid levels of integration with an average case density measure (across all variables) of .02188, where 1 = a fully connected system.

Also the high centralisation scores revealed that most initiatives were organised around few core bodies, either because of their hold on resources, a prescribed coordination function or tradition. An average path distance measure of 2.3 is also indicative of a level of connection between actors, suggesting that most people within the network are only a few steps removed from each other. The networks all revealed a relatively high centrality score (25-63), indicating that there is a core group of agencies acting as an 'administrative core' or 'hub' coordinating the flow of exchanges and the activities of the network members. Clustering co-efficient measures however, indicate that as well as coordination by the 'core' agencies there are usually sub-sets which provide a supplementary integration framework (or safety –net).

Dark Network Structure (The Joke)

The Queensland police corruption network (*the Joke*) exhibited a low overall density measure (across aggregate ties: bribe; payment and corrupt support). This result highlights the low degree of connection between the various actors operating within this network. A loosely-coupled network is a necessary feature for a clandestine entity such as the *Joke* which operated under the radar screen of legitimate authority for over 50 years; with players from different areas connecting the network (i.e. if it was too dense the corruption would be more recognisable). Another consequence of its confidential nature was the network's broken up/destructured format; with layers of independent 'cells' of activity undertaking the work of the network under the distant 'steering' of the distributed core i.e. the Bagman and the organiser. The clandestine nature of the network and its relative lack of visibility were also facilitated by the few links or exchanges that occurred between members. Overall, only three exchanges (bribe, payment and corrupt support) occurred and most transactions were conducted independently of the others thus reducing the risk of detection. The looseness of the structure was both an advantage and a point of vulnerability. The loose connections meant that it was difficult to trace the threads of activity; but if one of the few central players was removed the network and the information held between the remaining members became disconnected.

A further measure indicating the structure and operation of the network is the average path distance. That is, how easily it is for members to make contact or exchanges with others. In this case the *average distance among reachable pairs = 1.000*. This means that amongst those people who are connected, on average they only need to travel one path/edge to reach another actor they are not connected to. This finding is partly a feature of the relatively small size of this network. However, it does point to the fact that there is little distance between actors and therefore it is unlikely that those involved, even those on the peripheries were not aware of the activities of the whole network.

Table2: The Joke Network Metrics (aggregated across all variables)

	Density	No. of Ties	Av Path Distance
Bribe	0.0204	9	1.002
Joke Payment	0.0272	12	1.2
Corrupt Support	0.0567	25	.0824

This network analysis has revealed two strategic characteristics of the *Joke*. First, Jack Herbert, the organiser, held a central position in the network. Whilst not having exclusive control of the movement of money, he was the conduit for most of the payments and the repository of the intelligence about participants. This value is corroborated by his importance as a protected witness in the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) into the corrupt network. The second, and more important, discovery is the role of multiple layers of protection in ensuring the survival of the network. This was alluded to in the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) but the report did not explicitly identify the nature of the protection that occurred. The protection took two forms: protection provided by senior police officers including police commissioners who could control inquiries into misconduct and corruption, and political alliances with powerful individuals in the network who could obfuscate the work of reformers.

Overall the results of the analysis of both the bright and dark network structures have conformed to the structural and positional postulations outlined in the relevant literature. To expand, the bright networks were moderately dense, quite highly centralised, administrative core, and multiple exchanges (Provan and Milward, 1995). These properties led to a higher level of visibility and transparency. By contrast, the *Joke* was decentralised and loosely coupled, with layered cells of function; perfect conditions for a dark network (Milward and Raab, 2006; Hejnova, 2010).

Structural Positions:

The results above show that both network forms, to a greater or lesser extent, are embedded within a pattern of relationships and that network actors (nodes) occupy a range of various positions within the meshed structure. These structural properties (density of connection and position) can create conditions which can impact on the way in which actors adopt the operating norms and behaviours of network types, both bright and dark. The higher overall density of the HSNs (their higher level of connectivity) presents a greater opportunity for network members to see themselves as part of a 'larger' system of agreed action and because of the closeness they are more likely to participate in actions (rewards and sanctions) which re-enforce this pro-social socialisation. Dense networks are also more likely to have frequent and thicker flows of communication, facilitating the transference of these core cultural requirements. This, coupled with the higher level of centrality, has proven successful in coalescing network members around common goals and, for re-enforcing and checking that the culture of the network is retained as the basis for action.

By contrast, the looser connections and layered 'cell like' composition of the *Joke* produce a format that allowed it to operate within and under the 'radar' of a formalised organisational structure such as the QPS. A surface analysis would suggest that the looseness of the connections and the weak communication flows would make the CPN difficult to organise and less susceptible to a culture promoting and supporting illicit behaviour. However, the opposite was the case with the CPN; drawing on and extending the police culture of mateship and solidarity (CMC, 2004: 4) to build a unique culture which more closely bound those involved through a mesh of secrecy, solidarity and inclusion (Padraic and Haken, 2005). Thus, although the CPN was loosely connected, since members worked in dispersed cells, in which they generally only know the immediate members of the chain, the minimum distance between the members of the layered cell like entities (average path distance: 1) meant that there was close peer association, socialisation and sanctioning if necessary.

Table 3: Summary of Network Characteristics: Bright and Dark

Network type	Actors & organisation	Structure		
		Ties	Topology	Participation
Bright <i>Overt:</i> <i>efficiency as</i> <i>core outcome</i>	Distribution of tasks among actors is transparent & directional; clear boundaries; clear structure; smaller size	Formal & informal; multiplex ties/exchanges	Dense connections; centralised; meshed under-layer of connection (sub-network)	Motivated by resources or professional norms & shared values; public interest
Dark <i>Clandestine:</i> <i>Secrecy over</i> <i>effectiveness</i>	Distribution of tasks & exchanges opaque & unidirectional; structure within organisation;	Informal; unidirectional; single exchange	Loose connections; decentralised; dispersed layered cells	Motivated by self interest; relies on existing inter-personal/organisational network

Overall, the network analysis has highlighted the differences in topology and positional structure between dark and bright networks. Isolating the structural and positional properties of the two different network types is an important contribution that may provide network administrators and public policy makers with important, previously unavailable, information and insights with which to maximise bright network operations and disrupt or destroy dark networks. Missing from the discussion above and the overall network equation, is an understanding of how and why network actors are motivated and decide to become involved in networks.

Motivations

This section further interrogates the qualitative data to better understand what drives and maintains actor involvement within the two network groupings.

Bright Network Member Motivations

Interview and focus group data demonstrated that decisions to form and participate in human services networks were driven by two main motivations categorised as instrumental and altruist. The former, instrumental where more dominantly displayed, particularly by governmental network members. For government, networks present as a useful tool or instrument through which they can achieve goals that have proven difficult to meet using conventional service delivery modes (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). Government personnel, therefore, were often engaged in network activity as a 'condition of their formal' role. Many respondents acknowledged the inability of government working alone to respond to the various needs and often intractable problems of society. This highly instrumental approach is encapsulated in the following statement: "Networks are a good way for government program areas to tap into the skills, expertise and on-ground capacities of community organisations – we can use these to make our job easier".

The push toward networks and government involvement in networks is strengthened by imprimatur by the Premier who demanded that at all levels of government personnel were to 'work together to achieve the government's policy agenda across various areas" (Government Representative, Interview). This network motivation was further re-enforced by institution processes such as the strong centralised direction, a targeted agenda and strict report regimes as well as pay incentives (O'Farrell, 2002; Keast et al., 2006). To a lesser degree, not-for-profit network members also exhibited a pragmatic rationale for their uptake and subsequent involvement in networked arrangements:

It helps us to deliver better services to our clients. Through the network people know what others have and how to access, and people are more prepared to go the extra distance to help out and stick to a problem (Network 3: Interviewee: Community).

The motivation here is more sharply pointed toward client service outcomes, rather than meeting overall organisational targets. Several respondents tracked their involvement in networks to the need to respond to crisis situation and the realisation that they had to 'work differently'. On this it was stated: "We are doing this because we have to! We can't continue to work in the old [siloe]d] ways" (Network1: Interviewee: Government).

Despite the presence of instrumental motivations for networks working and the subsequent participation of members, across the sector there was also strong evidence of a more altruistic motivation for engagement. That is, respondents indicated that they joined networks because of a desire to do their work better or change the systems in which they operate.

At the end of the day, we are in this to fundamentally change the way we work together and create new systems so that people in this area will be better off (Network 4 Interviewee: Community).

Altruism was particularly evident in three network cases and was often linked to the notion of "doing this because it is the right thing to do" (SIP, 2004). Thus, in these networks, members were looking to transcend territorial or organisational turf barriers based on a concern for others and society in general (Krebs and Miller, 1985). Within the SIP project, for example, a regional philosophy of 'working together for each us' was promulgated as part of the institutional history and narrative for participating communities, enmeshing members in a culture and ethos of public value network work that was hard to escape or break (Stories of SIP, 2003).

Dark Network Member Motivations

Documentary analysis revealed that police participation in corruption is based on two factors: greed and group inclusion. Police officers were motivated by money. A fundamental of international studies on corruption is that government officials who are not paid a sufficient wage to meet their daily needs will often turn to corruption to supplement their income (Van Rijckeghem & Weder 2001). It was certainly true that monetary pressure was an indicator of a police officer's likelihood of participation in corruption. A key *Joke* actor, Jack Herbert (the Bagman) used to target officers who were married with children and a mortgage, as he had been when recruited (Herbert and Gilling, 2004, 54). But the motivation was not the necessity of survival but the desire for comfort. He later admitted that he simply "liked the money" and many of his decisions were driven by obtaining it: "My weakness, as usual, was money." (Herbert and Gilling, 2004: 110). Indeed, as the evidence very clearly supports, Herbert continued taking money long after his financial difficulties were over and reached a point where he took home twice as much in bribes as he did in salary (Herbert and Gilling, 2004: 68-69).

Trevor Haken in New South Wales (NSW) also indicated that he enjoyed receiving and spending the money. In his statements, however, he placed greater emphasis on the fact that he would have been excluded from the 'in crowd' if he had not participated in police corruption. To join the in-crowd you had to drink and take bribes. You also had to show you were "keen"; you had to make arrests of the bad guys (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 57). The Criminal Investigation Division, of which he was a member, had a reputation for working hard and playing hard. He noted that the majority of the money was spent on socialising with his other bent officers, working under the premise that "You're not a real cop until you've worked pissed." (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 160) Both Queensland and NSW police evidenced classic in-group behaviour by using derogatory labelling for out-group members; in Queensland they were 'the enemy' (Herbert and Gilling, 2004: 52) and in NSW they were 'squareheads' (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 26). In both cases in-group members would only work with out-group members if it was necessary in order to protect the system or a briber.

In this way, the data reveals that the CPN actors displayed inherently instrumental drivers or motivations for their engagement in and uptake of dark network activities: the dual extrinsic elements of money and association. Both these officers however, developed sophisticated rationalisations and stories to justify their engagement in the CPN activities and to align their corrupt actions to better match the bright police goals of protecting and serving.

These rationalisations were based on two central themes: (a) the inevitability of vice and (b) the ability of the police to protect while accepting this inevitability.

They saw the offences they protected as victimless crimes (Herbert and Gilling, 2004, 56). This was especially when dealing with gambling and prostitution where there was a significant public acceptance of their existence.

Thus a further, more altruistic motivation of public protection and controlling the spread of vice was presented as an explanatory frame for their actions. The rationalisation, if not genuine belief, was that the police were the only ones who really knew how to deal with crime. They did not trust the justice system and thought it was valid to do anything including fabrication of evidence, to put the bad guys away and keep order in society (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 20-21). "The view of police... was that it was better to let something exist (that is, gambling and prostitution) and to have some control over it rather than drive it into the hands of people they could not control." (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 66) Deals were done with acceptable crooks and the police took payments. They saw themselves as being restrained in what they asked for. They were extortionists, greedy cops were 'closed down' (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 154); sensible police were simply getting their compensation – "the spoils of war" – for keeping control of the crooks (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 172)

This is not to say that no serious police investigations took place. Some crimes were not acceptable and therefore were outside of the scope and influence of the *Joke*. Though in most cases exclusion was decided by the failure to pay bribes rather than a refusal by police to engage with specific criminals. In undertaking their informal or expanded 'civic role' both Herbert and Haken admitted that police made their own judgements of guilt and used 'verballing' (aggressive interviewing) and planting of evidence to ensure convictions. In fact, Herbert noted that police who did not take bribes had no qualms about verballing (Herbert 1988, 15339). They also saw their corrupt relationships with criminal elements as essential in gaining intelligence to make arrests: "...police without associations with criminals were not effective" (Padraic and Haken, 2005: 141). In short, corruption made them better at their job. By seeing themselves in this light, corrupt police were able to rationalise their decision to be involved in dark network activities, and in so doing, assumed a predatory role over the public that they were sworn to protect.

Overall it could be argued that the members of bright human services networks were motivated by both intrinsic and extrinsic drivers. The instrumental approach to network involvement and participation is explained by a mix of motivations including the aspiration to deliver quality service outcomes and in a more cost effective manner (intrinsic) as well as the more self-interested desire for financial reward in the form of incentives and/or increased organisational legitimacy (extrinsic). At the same time, there was a higher order, intrinsic motivation characterised by: 'doing the right thing'. By contrast, CPN members were motivated by greed and peer inclusion.

Thus, despite their structural embeddedness, network actors have shown themselves to be rational decision makers. Notwithstanding their motivations, the bright network members, for example, clearly made considered decisions regarding their involvement. This decision making was exemplified by the acknowledgement that: "... we are going out of a limb here [participating in the network] without legitimate organisational support (Network 2: Focus Group1) and "... even though government was pushing this line, we decided to get involved early and shape it ourselves (Network: 3 Interview). As highlighted above, the CPN members were quite frank in accepting personal responsibility for the decisions made to engage in corrupt activities.

It is interesting to note, however, that members of both the bright and dark networks conceived of themselves as 'stewards' advancing public benefit, and presented themselves as engaging in network work as a consequence of this. For bright network members this stewardship role was centred on developing processes that guided their shared higher purpose for community good and which institutionalised this for the future (Van Slyke, 2007). By contrast, the CPN members were able to rationalise and justify their continued anti-social action as

contributing to the overall public good. Arguably, the bright networks are more closely aligned with conventional expectations of stewardship. Each of the case groups nonetheless demonstrated that the development of shared assumptions and behaviours set the 'rules of engagement' or the operating context for the network. In turn this shaped and rationalised the actions they took.

CONCLUSION

Networks have long been part of the way that society is organised with both bright and dark forms occupying the institutional architecture. This paper extends the existing network research by including corrupt police networks within the dark realm and providing empirical evidence to reaffirm the delineation between these and bright networks. The study has found bright networks to be visible, centralised and that members are motivated to participate based on instrumental drivers such as the need to address critical social problems or aspirations to do the right thing. Dark networks, by contrast, are loosely structured, decentralised and members are motivated primarily by the desire for money (greed) and, to a lesser extent, a desire to 'belong' to close peer groups. Thus, while the network structure and the members' position created conditions favourable for uptake of the specific network behaviour, the results point to a more complex process of individual decision-making forged from the cultural context in which they operate and the positions adopted to rationalise behaviour. Together, these elements form an extended theoretical foundation explaining motivation and uptake in networks.

Identifying the specific structural and motivational properties of both bright and dark networks and comparing these impacts important insights which can be used to facilitate operations in the former and destroy them in the latter. The 'shady " blue line networks, which have evolved from persistent police corruption, present as an important area for further understanding since their predatory behaviour represent an aberration from the moral obligation of police to protect

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