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Regenerating integral theory and education: postconventional explorations

Gary P. Hampson
Southern Cross University

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Postconventional Explorations

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Postconventional Explorations

Gary P. Hampson

Bachelor of Arts (Honours), Graduate Certificate (Strategic Foresight)

A study submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
School of Education
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Australia

February 2010
THESIS DECLARATION

I certify that the work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original, except as acknowledged in the text, and that the material has not been submitted, either in whole or in part, for a degree at this or any other university.

I acknowledge that I have read and understood the University’s rules, requirements, procedures and policy relating to my higher degree research award and to my thesis. I certify that I have been duly guided by the rules, requirements, procedures and policy of the University.

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to facilitate the (re)generation of integral theory and integral education theory through exploring and enacting postconventional modalities emerging from worldviews and paradigms beyond modernity and formal thought. Its quest sits in service to humanity-within-biosphere, with particular reference to education. The format involves a collection of published papers (one co-authored) cohered through an extensive introduction, interleafs, and conclusion. A generative critique of Ken Wilber’s integral theory is given, notably through a focused engagement with postformal thought. This leads to an ecology of academic fields being brought into play to help generate new types of integral thinking. Such exploration also helps develop postformal theory or postconventional poetics.

In addition to postformal thought, fields include complexity theory, critical theory, ecosophy, futures studies, hermeneutics, poetics and poststructuralism. Each variously contributes to the postconventional ensemble which is cohered through creative transdisciplinarity: complexity theory supports an emergent research process and a partly decentralised format; critical theory emphasises the contrast between the modern-formal developmental level and that beyond; Guattari’s ecosophy complexly integrates biospherical, social and conceptual domains; futures studies complements historical awareness regarding temporal contextualisation; hermeneutics foregrounds construct-awareness; poetics enables an enactment of the metaphor “text as music”; whilst poststructuralism precipitates a de-centerialisation and “dialecticisation” of integral theory in addition to a querying of certain textual conventions.

Contexts of integral studies and integral education are addressed, both theoretically through Ernest Boyer’s scholarship of integration, and historically through the identification of a Western genealogy including Classical, Hermetic, Neoplatonic, Renaissance, Humanist and Reconstructive Postmodern moments. Additionally, planetary consciousness is effected through Native American, Islamic and counter-hegemonic perspectives. Critiques include address of modernistic “economies of truth” including economism, technicism and atomism, Wilber’s orientation toward Green thinking, Richard Slaughter’s perspective on Causal Layered Analysis, and Wilberian integral education theory. Valorisations are given to “complexities of truth” including archetypes, “eco-logics,” holarchies, “nanotextology,” open systems, spiritual orientations, and vision-logic. Cross-level education is addressed in relation to content (knowledge, curricula), occasion (identities, pedagogy) and system; for each, a critical contrast is identified between approaches and interpretations following a modern atomistic template and those arising from more integrative sensibilities with respect to complexities of identity, peer relationalities and contextualisations.

The study contributes to numerous discourses including integral studies, postconventional studies, philosophy of education, critical education, ecology, futures studies, and transdisciplinarity entailing the meta-dialogue between art and science. Framed as an ethical “conceptual concerto,” this creative academic artefact offers “passion for the possible.”
I wish to thank Professor Anne Graham for her supervision of my five year process. I have benefited from her intuitive and persistent faith in me, her skilful facilitation and her thoughtful feedback. Thank you, Anne.

I also wish to thank my critical friend, mentor and collaborator, Jenny Gidley, for her invaluable encouragement, generative dialogue and editorial support—all embraced within a unique quality of friendship. It sometimes feels as if our two Ph.D.s form one complex unit. Thank you, Jenny, for also having the insight that I could undertake a Ph.D. in the first place! Thanks also to the support offered by my other friends and family.

I wish to thank the Integral Review community for their noetic nurturing, including their setting up of an online forum to discuss my paper Integral re-views postmodernism: The way out is through. Many thanks also goes to Markus Molz—our shared intellectual passionate engagements have helped maintain my enthusiasm and direction. Thanks also to Sohail Inayatullah for his encouragement.

I thank Ken Wilber for his inspiring rough guide to the Kosmos and for his part in my journey that has subsequently resulted.

And, thank you, indeed, to all those original thinkers and creators that have gone before me, those upon whose work I am building, whose wor(l)ds I am re-generating. In addition to a host of academics and philosophers, this includes such figures as William Blake for exemplifying the importance of expressing one’s unique potential (among other things), and Jon Anderson & Yes (among a great many other musical composers and artists) for creating lyrics and music that accords with my soul—thus assisting in my creative becoming!

Last but not least, perhaps it is also fitting to thank (or even dedicate this study to) whichever muses have assisted! No doubt there is an ecology of them, although I seem drawn to specifically thank Eros for creative inspiration and Hermes for inspiring transgression.

Blessings.
PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED IN THE STUDY

Published


In Press


Submitted

6. Hampson G. P. (Submitted 3 Dec 09\(^1\)) “Education beyond modern atomism” Educational philosophy and theory.

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\(^1\) Not yet addressed by journal with respect to possible acceptance (as of 12 February 2010).
STATEMENT REGARDING CONTRIBUTION OF OTHERS

The paper, "Elements of the Underacknowledged History of Integral Education," arose from a general background of collaboration involving an intense process of sharing, co-inspiring and co-designing, conditioning not only Elements but also the two solo pieces Markus Molz and I contributed to the book, Integral Education: New Directions for Higher Learning (“Western-Islamic and Native American Genealogies of Integral Education” on my part and “Contemporary Integral Education Research: A Transnational and Transparadigmatic Overview” on Molz’s part). It also produced a draft of a general theoretical framing which cohered the approach taken by all three pieces (as yet unpublished). Molz and I had devised a variety of ways of “cutting the cake” regarding the material as a whole, including offering the editors of the book an innovative “sub-book” entity involving five short pieces variously authored between Molz and myself. Although this was not eventually accepted, its spirit nonetheless remains in the coherent nature of the three pieces. Both Elements and the unpublished theoretical piece were jointly authored, the former foregounding Molz’s work, the latter foregounding mine. Specifically, the general orientation of contribution toward the paper is as follows: the major part of the research of Elements was conducted by Molz; the major part of the introduction, editing, languaging and design of Elements was undertaken by myself. Within that general orientation, research regarding anarchist-socialist (Bakunin / Kropotkin) and Aurobindean approaches was undertaken by each of us in similar measure: by coincidence this had occurred independently from each other prior to this collaboration and led to synergistic understanding and text regarding the respective sections.

Signed by author…………………………………………………

Signed by supervisor…………………………………………………

Also see Appendix I.
OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY AUTHOR RELEVANT TO THE STUDY

In Press


Published


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OVERTURE

0.1
Orientation
OVERTURE

“This fusion of insight is all that we imagine”
(Anderson, 2001).

0.1. ORIENTATION

The Overture serves as an extended introduction to the study. It comprises four sections, namely, § 0.1 Orientation, § 0.2 Integral Studies, § 0.3 Instruments for Postconventional Exploration, and § 0.4 Re-view. § 0.1 Orientation provides an overview to the study. § 0.2 Integral Studies firstly addresses theoretical and historical contexts of integral studies; it then discusses contemporary integral and integral education approaches; In Context sections identify connections between the material and the study. § 0.3 Instruments for Postconventional Exploration elucidates academic fields which inform the study; for each, an introduction to the discourse is followed by an In Context section describing relations between the area and the study. § 0.4 Re-view briefly summarises the Overture.

The transdisciplinary character of the study warrants an extensive introduction so as to adequately describe and position the study’s multiple discursive influences, and to thwart possible charges of inadequate depth or dilettantism (Nissani, 1997). Rather, a multiperspectival “fusion of horizons” (Gadamer, 1975/2004) is required. Such extensiveness is particularly the case due to the exceptional breadth of integral theory. Alternative conceptualisations (noting multiperspectivality as a postconventional feature) are as follows: either § 0.1 Orientation and § 0.2 Integral studies serve as an introduction, the latter offering as an extended—creative (Montuori, 2005c)—literature review, or § 0.1 Orientation alone serves as the introduction; the proceeding sections then act as post-introductory material. § 0.2 serves as a primary “re-view” (noting the postconventional intensification of the term re-view—see Verse One), whilst § 0.3 Instruments for postconventional exploration establishes secondary (transdisciplinary) re-views, with § 0.4 reflexively capturing a “re-view of the reviews.” (A liminality is perhaps effected.) It should also be noted that the title Overture accords with the study’s methodology of creative transdisciplinary (Giri, 2002) (§ 0.3.5.1 Creative transdisciplinarity)—whilst noting such methodology is attentive to avoiding “methodolatory” (Montuori, 1998).
§ 0.1 Orientation comprises the following subsections:

- § 0.1.1 Aim. An articulation of the primary aim of the study is given.
- § 0.1.2 Departure. The point of departure of the study is identified in relation to Ken Wilber’s integral theory and postconventional thinking.
- § 0.1.3 Emergence. Consequences arising from focused engagement with postconventionalities are introduced. These comprise address of postconventionality, process, format, contextualisation, criticality, languaging, deterritorialisation and coherences, respectively (§§ 0.1.3.1 - 0.1.3.8).
- § 0.1.4 Navigation. A description of the study’s organization is provided.

0.1.1. Aim

The study seeks to facilitate the (re)generation of integral theory and integral education theory through exploring and enacting postconventional modalities emerging from worldviews and paradigms beyond modernity and formal thought.2

2 “(Re)generation” can be identified as a poststructural term (see § 0.3.3.2.1 Poststructuralism in context) in that both “regeneration” and (new) “generation” are allowed for. Such terminology can also be understood in relation to postformal logical modalities, ones involving the included middle (e.g., both/and; liminality). “Regeneration” suggests a normative positioning in relation to that which is deemed unsatisfactory in some way (and also resonates with the autopoiesis of integral theory and educational renewal), whilst “generation” is not reliant on a protagonist but focuses more on the creation of an artefact. Whilst a decision has been made with respect to the study’s title to err toward “regeneration,” “(re)generation” is more apt for general use in the study. Additionally, it is also pertinent to indicate here that the study also effects a particular poststructuralist perspective with respect to footnotes—one which allows for their more substantive use than might be expected conventionally. This format allows for the main text to be read firstly without footnotes, then secondly (after a hermeneutic circle—see § 0.3.1.3 Hermeneutics) with footnotes—enabling more in-depth consideration. A similar poststructural exploration regarding the shifting of potential value-weightings of the main body of text ↔ secondary body of text binary is also effected with respect to appendices. For further discussion, see § 0.3.3.2.1 Poststructuralism in context.
This quest sits in service to the regeneration of *humanity within biosphere*, with particular reference to education.

The study develops and employs an interpretation of Boyer’s (1990) scholarship of integration. The legitimisation of *expansive* inquiry such as that of the study is indicated by Alfonso Montuori’s (In press) critique of the default expectations of mainstream research, including critique of the dangers of hyper-specialisation and insufficient creativity.

**0.1.2. Departure**

The study’s point of departure pertains to Ken Wilber’s (1995, 1997b, 2000d, 2006b) integral theory\(^3\) also known as AQAL\(^4\) or IOS.\(^5\) The theory involves many elements. The study predominantly addresses the element of (individual-and-collective\(^6\)) developmental levels,\(^7\) focusing on the transition from the modern-formal-conventional level—also known as the Orange “value Meme”\(^8\) (Beck & Cowan, 1996) or simply *Orange* (“altitude”\(^9\)) (Wilber, 2006b)—to that beyond. In keeping with much of the postformal developmental psychology

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\(^3\) It is beyond the scope of this study to substantively explore discourses beyond the Anglophone sphere.

\(^4\) An acronym for “all quadrants, all levels,” which is short for *quadrants, levels/waves, linesstreams, states and types*.

\(^5\) Integral Operating System.

\(^6\) One of the characteristics of Wilberian integral theory is the lock-step association between, on the one hand, *individual* psychological developmental levels such as those of Piaget (1947/2001) (up to formal operations) and postformal psychologists (beyond formal operations)—see, e.g. Cook-Greuter (2005)—and on the other hand, socio-cultural structures of consciousness such as those identified by Gebser (1949/1985).

\(^7\) This focus contrasts with the tendency in the literature to foreground Wilberian *quadrants*.

\(^8\) “Orange vMeme” for short; this refers to use by Wilber IV of the developmental schema of Spiral Dynamics (Beck & Cowan, 1996). “Wilber IV” is in reference to the manoeuvre by Wilber to divide the development of his work into five phases: Wilber I to Wilber V, respectively.

\(^9\) Using “Wilber V” languaging.
literature (see § 0.3.1.1 Postformal thinking), Wilber identifies a series of stages or levels beyond Orange. In ascending order, these include the sequence Green, Yellow / Teal, and Turquoise. From the perspective of individual psychological development, such levels are collectively referred to as “postformal” or “postconventional”: levels beyond formal operations (Piaget, 1947/2001) or conventional reasoning (Cook-Greuter, 2005)).

In keeping with Beck and Cowan’s (1996) Spiral Dynamics, Wilber (2000d) refers to levels up to and including Green as “first tier” and those beyond as “second tier.” His interpretation of this distinction is to foreground it. He achieves this partly through valorising integral as second tier whilst emphasising a critique of Green through such manoeuvres as his firm placement of both postmodernism / poststructuralism and deep ecology as Green (and therefore sub-second tier), and through his construct “the mean green meme” (Wilber, 2000d).

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10 Similarly framed to pre-Orange stages / levels.
11 Yellow is a Wilber IV signifier; Teal is from Wilber V.
12 The study does not substantively differentiate between postformal and postconventional.
13 An allowance is given for there to be multiple perspectives regarding relations between formal operations and postformal operations. The main implication in the current study indicates that postformal operations are more advanced. Yet, through postformal reasoning, the two might be adequately identified as being held in dynamic dialectic or similar.
14 Links with Spiral Dynamics are strongest in Wilber IV.
15 See Verse One for another interpretation.
16 The study acknowledges both differences and similarities between “postmodernism” and “poststructuralism.” The use of “postmodernism / poststructuralism” refers to their similarities.
17 Deep ecology is spearheaded by Naess. Ecosophy is a key postconventional instrument used in the study; the two uses of the term ecosophy the study calls upon are those by Naess and Guattari, respectively. See § 0.3.3.1 Ecosophy for further discussion.
18 See Verse One for a discussion of “meme” versus “vMeme.”
To date—with notable exceptions\textsuperscript{19}—Wilberian integral discourse has tended to have a centripetal tendency, often concerning itself with \textit{application} of Wilberian theory rather than regarding contextual or critical engagement with integral theory. Additionally, Wilber often tends to eschew complex languaging (as found in some poststructuralist discourse, for example) in favour of “direct” statements sometimes involving polemics (McDermott, 1998).

Discourse on integral \textit{education} inclusive of Wilberian integral theory has been slowly emerging over the last decade: it is still relatively nascent.

From this general reference point, the following can be stated: The study’s point of departure comprises a focused engagement with indicative features, modalities, paradigms, and worldviews identified as post-Orange. This includes the panorama of postformal or postconventional understandings as well as, or including, such items as ecology and poststructuralism.

\textbf{0.1.3. Emergence}

Over the course of the research, various consequences have arisen from such engagement. These include: an increased understanding of postconventionality;\textsuperscript{20} a radically emergent research process;\textsuperscript{21} a partly-decentralised thesis format, effected through a contextualised Ph.D.-by-publication; and an exploration of postconventional languaging. In terms of generative critique of content, emergent directions include: address of undue modernistic tendencies in Wilberian integral theory; address of insufficient contextualisation of Wilberian integral theory; and a desire to re-balance Wilber’s structural framing of postconventionality


\textsuperscript{20} A multiperspectival approach suggests the legitimacy of both \textit{postconventionality} and \textit{postconventionalities}. Each term differently reveals-and-conceals.

\textsuperscript{21} Such an emergent research process can be understood in reference to such methodologies as intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 2000) and organic research (Clements, 1998). The study tends not to use the term-concept, \textit{methodology}, in accordance with Montuori’s (1998) critique of “methodolatory.”
by (i) de-emphasising the juncture between first and second tier (notably between Green and beyond), (ii) increasing emphasis of the juncture between Orange and beyond—the “critical” or “post/conventional” juncture, and (iii) de-emphasising—or effecting certain transversalisations regarding—postconventional stages or levels. An elaboration of these directions follows.

0.1.3.1. Postconventionality

Regarding postconventionality, a focused engagement with post-Orange modalities has led not only to the consideration of such postformal features as dialectics, multiperspectivalty, construct-awareness and context-dependency, but also to a wide range of academic areas being brought into play. In keeping with the spirit of creativity in postconventionality, these are identified as “instruments” suitable for postconventional exploration. These instruments can be loosely organised around five attractors (see § 0.3). The attractors, along with accompanying instruments, are as follows:

- **intensifying postconventionalities**: postformal thinking, complexity theory and hermeneutics;
- **intensifying the post/conventional juncture**: critical theory;
- **transversing postconventional levels**: ecosophy, poststructuralism and poetics.

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22 “Critical” in the sense both of critical theory and of that of significance.

23 Most instruments perform multiple functions; this schema merely indicates the primary attractors for the respective instruments.

24 More specifically, postformal features take on “new life” from being merely “described objects” to “methodological instruments”; postformal complexity is used as a point of departure for a line of flight toward complexity theory; and the postconventional feature of construct-awareness (Cook-Greuter, 2005) is strengthened through hermeneutics, poststructuralism and poetics.

25 The study problematises imaginaries which cast too strong a universalism upon the stages-“nature” or levels-“nature” of postconventional thinking. Rather, it allows for the possibility of the imaginary of stages / levels as sitting alongside similarly legitimate (context-dependent) imaginaries which do not so readily differentiate such stages or levels. Specifically, the study uses Cook-Greuter’s (2002, 2005) levels-based schema in Verse One.
• foregrounding temporality: genealogy and futures studies; and
• cohering the ensemble: the scholarship of integration (Boyer, 1990), entailing creative transdisciplinarity (Giri, 2002).

Postconventional engagement has led to generative critiques of integral theory (see Verses One and Two) and integral education theory (see Appendix II). These can be understood as a form of autopoiesis in the sense that (postconventional) material from integral theory itself is used to problematise aspects of its construction. Taking postconventionalities “to heart,” a Pandora’s box—or “baroque explosion”—of complexities appears. The resulting situation is one that cannot be neatly contained, partly due to the open, complex characteristics of postconventional modalities, partly due to the myriad relationships between them, and partly but otherwise adopts more trans-level framings. Ecosophy, poststructuralism, poetics, complexity theory and postformal thought itself each variously indicate the potential validity of such trans-level identifications.

26 The study’s genealogical approach sits in relation to ecosophy through the notion of ecosystem-through-time.
27 Valorising integral studies.
28 Regarding “verses,” see § 0.1.3.6 Languaging and § 0.3.3.1.1 Text as music.
29 Substantial appendices (A, B and C) are also found in Verse One.
30 Autopoiesis or self-organisation is a complexity theory idea discussed in § 0.3.1.2 Complexity theory. The whole manoeuvre in the current instance can more accurately be understood as having both autopoietic and “poietic” elements in that I, as theoretician, am acting upon the material (poiesis), yet simultaneously from the perspective of the content, the manoeuvre I am making pertains to an autopoiesis.
31 From a postconventional perspective, conventional containment often becomes undue constraint. In contrast to “economies of truth” (allowing polysemous resonance of “economy” to indicate both undue address of economics or economism, and also undue “frugality” of thought, as in the atomistic templates underlying technicism, scientism and literalism), postconventional reasoning more aptly entertains “complexities of truth” in which complexities or radical relationalities variously permeate all scales from that of micro-identities to that of macro-systems (whilst noting that context-dependent simplicities can simultaneously sit within such complex imaginaries). Correspondingly, “integral” is identified as an open attractor rather than as a closed container.
because the very languaging of discussion comes under scrutiny and is potentially transformed.

This lack of simple containment pertains not only to the features themselves but also the way that they are schematised together. Whilst Wilber’s integral assumes a series of postformal levels arranged according to a hierarchy of complexity (as per a model of hierarchical complexity (Commons & Richards 1984; 2002)), this is not the only type of theoretic coherence: postformal researcher, Gisela Labouvie-Vief (1992), for instance, offers the possibility of a more complex or blurred picture, one not involving a series of postformal levels. Most strongly, perhaps, are Jenny Wade’s (1996) comments regarding the pertinence of a holonomic perspective which “alters the structure of developmental theories that purport to address [postformal] levels” (p. 202, original emphasis). Theorising may become “poeticising” (see § 0.3.3.3 Poetics). The current study’s intention in this regard is to facilitate conversation between levels-schemas and non-levels-schemas partly through foregrounding the latter in relation to Wilber’s use of the former (whilst acknowledging levels-schemas through the use of Cook-Greuter’s (1990, 2008) work).

An understanding has been sought that each postcoventional modality or instrument should be identified sufficiently richly, that the resultant ecosystem of instruments involves both synergistic harmonies and vibrant intra-contestabilities—such as between postmodernism and ecology (see, for example (Gare, 1995)), and that apt contextualisations of such instruments (as with integral studies) potentially involve interpenetrating perspectives. The study identifies such layered applications of radically relational templates as contributing to “eco-logics.” Eco-logics can be understood in relation to Guattari’s (1989/2000) three-domain integrative conceptualisation of ecosophy, specifically regarding the mental or

32 The study attempts a reconstructive postmodern (post- or trans-Pythagorean) interpretation of “harmony,” one which honours the term whist de-/re-constructing its meaning.
33 This key harmony–contestability dialectic within the postconventional ensemble helps generate new, critical ways of thinking in relation to the global problematique.
34 The current example follows the three-layered schema elucidated in Verse Six and in § 0.2.6 Integral Education, namely, that of identity, connectivity, and contextuality.
35 Biospherical, social and psychological.
noetic register (conceptual ecology). Radical relationality can also be understood in relation to deep dialogue (Gangadean, 2008).

0.1.3.2. Process

A specific consequence of postconventional engagement is that a substantive accord has been sought between object of inquiry and approach to inquiry. Notably, in keeping with complexity theory, the study has been allowed to radically emerge, which is to say that a processual dialectic between agency (will or intent) and adaptation (allowance or “communion” (Wilber, 1995)) has been effected, resulting in more interest given to contingencies than might be conventionally expected.

Emergence can also be identified in relation to the creative process. Regarding creativity, Roland Benedikter (2005b) suggests that “the daimon of postmodernity senses that there is a level of creativity from which everything else depends; and it wants to get in touch with this level” (§ IV: The positive aspects of postmodernity). Such a sense of, and quest for, creativity—a quintessential postconventional feature—has permeated my journey. Synergistically, I have sought throughout the study to maintain engagement with—and encourage vectors in accordance with—the affective postconventional qualities of “wonder, passion, hope, and conviviality” (Montuori, 2008, p. 9)—an adaptive interpretation of Montuori’s “creative inquiry,” (Montuori, 1998) even “joy of inquiry” (Montuori, 2008).

A predominant sense of exploration also indicates an interest in openings to dialogue rather than in attempts toward the final word: the study points to multiple dialogic vectors of pertinence (including that between integral and postmodern).

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36 There is also an association between relationality and connectivities between first and second person perspectives. What is the subject(ivity) that the relation reaches from? and What is the subject(ivity) that the relation reaches toward?

37 The study acknowledges this entails certain philosophical queries left unanswered. This includes that regarding the tension between “the notion of freedom [and]…an intellectual intuition of the Absolute as the unconditioned totality and unity of the cosmos” (Gare, 2005, p. 89). Nonetheless, it is hoped that bridges might have been formed to better facilitate such dialogues.
0.1.3.3. Format

The research process of radical emergence has led to, or been synergistic with, the employment of a Ph.D.-incorporating-publications format involving six papers, necessarily involving particularities which stretch discussion centrifugally toward multiple “openings to dialogue.” Such employment can be understood as an expression of the complexity theory feature of open system, one which effects a balance between, on the one hand, a centralised or centripetal conceptual structure (as per conventional organization)—a closed system seeking comprehensiveness over a small territory—and on the other, a dispersed or centrifugal conceptual sensibility with multiple lateralisations.

This balanced or middle way can be understood in terms of the topology of a decentralised network (Davis & Sumara, 2006) in which each paper uniquely contributes to the whole in a conventional sequential manner; simultaneously, a holographic geometry allows for each paper to variously represent the whole, to have legitimate independent identity that connects to the whole non-sequentially, more “locally” and/or in a “scale-free” manner. The dialectical balance can also be identified in terms of the scholarship of integration—a modality forming a contrast to conventional scholarship of discovery templates (see § 0.2.1 Theoretical context: The scholarship of integration). Such an integrative modality points to the legitimacy of the study’s interest in seeking to sufficiently indicate address of a large and, to some degree, ambiguously-bounded (Davis & Sumara, 2006) conceptual territory.

0.1.3.4. Contextualisation

The scholarship of integration valorises salient contextualisation; integral theory is not immune to such consideration. Addressing the insufficiency of contextualisation of integral theory and integral education theory in the literature, the study offers a multilayered

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38 Pieces which already have published format (Verse One and Two) have been reproduced as per publication. The remainder (Verse Three to Six) have been formatted with respect to the current thesis. Verse Six has (as of 12 February 2010) the status of a submitted paper.

39 Textual “fragments” are also valorised both by Kierkegaard (1943/1992) and by Adorno (1944/1997).
contextualisation. This includes the immediate context of integral studies which embraces a Western genealogical ecology of different integral streams\(^\text{40}\) (from around 1830) such as Stankevich Circle integral, anarchist socialism, Catholicism, and those of Steiner, Aurobindo, Gebser, Sorokin, Wilber and László (see § 0.2.3 “Integral,” and Verse Five). Larger contexts comprise both that offered through planetary consciousness—including, for example, indigenous integral perspectives (Verse Four)—and also that offered through an extension of the aforementioned Western genealogy to embrace a longer-standing Western integrative / integral thought or philosophy including Antiquarian, Hermetic, Neoplatonic, Renaissance, Humanist and Reconstructive Postmodern moments (§ 0.2.2 Historical context: A Western genealogy of integral philosophy and Verse Four).

0.1.3.5. Criticality

In counterbalance to the particular blurring between postconventional levels, or liminality between integral studies and complex-integrative theorising, a normative sharpness has been effected with respect to the juncture between the modern-conventional worldview and that beyond. The salience of this critical post/conventional juncture is evidenced by the study’s research into global futures (Verse Three, informed by “the two apocalyptic specters of global climate change and the Sixth Mass Extinction now underway” (Kelly, In Press, §1 ¶2)) and education (Verse Six, informed by the understanding that “our…piecemeal…learning is deeply, drastically inadequate to grasp realities and problems which are ever more…transversal…and planetary” (Morin, 2001, p. 29)) and is identified in relation to integral theory in Verses One and Two, and in relation to integral education theory in Appendix II: A Critique of Wilberian integral theory. It is also variously expressed in literature identifying the need for global mindset shift (Benedikter, Forthcoming; Gangadean, 2006b; Gare, 1995; Gidley, 2008; Harman, 1988; Montuori, 1999; Selby, 2002).\(^\text{41}\)

The resultant combination regarding both the sharpening of the post/conventional juncture and the blurring of Green and beyond accords with a Gebserian understanding of integral in contrast to a Wilberian one (see Verse One). In this regard, the study seeks to regenerate integral theory through strengthening enacment of the Gebserian integral-aperspectival

\(^{40}\text{Streams which have employed the term integral.}\)

\(^{41}\text{Also see the forthcoming special issue of Futures on global mindset change.}\)
structure of consciousness; its emphasis on the aesthetic (see, for example, § 0.3.3.3 Poetics) accords with this. Additionally, as Verse One indicates, even Wilber’s own concept, vision-logic, can be used to strengthen this critical/transversal configuration, through deepening its import.

Relations between the worldviews of modernism and post-modernism / trans-modernism, respectively, can be understood “holarchically,” which is to say that the modern-conventional worldview can, for many purposes, be effectively identified as nested within the postmodern-postconventional-integral worldview. Thus, atomism and “economies of truth” can be identified as partialities in relation to “eco-logics” and “complexities of truth,” respectively (see Verse Three).

As part of this critical emphasis, the study attempts to address undue modernistic tendencies in integral studies. This includes a critique of:

- the atomisation of integral such that integral streams insufficiently dialogue with each other;
- undue aggrandisement, including the employment of economistic templates, such as the “branding” of Wilberian integral theory;
- integral theory as a closed, top-down conceptual system rather than one which includes bottom-up, rhizomatic and / or open systemic (dialogical) aspects; and
- technicist languaging: an assumed conventional / representational paradigm—with insufficient apprehension of the dialectic between “representation-again” and “presentation-anew” (see § 0.3.1.3 Hermeneutics).

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42 Holarchy signifies a nested hierarchy (Koestler, 1972; Wilber, 1995).
43 A finer understanding would take into account the “traces” of modernism that cannot be sublated.
44 From the perspective of postconventional levels, this is a transversalisation of levels.
45 “Orange pathology” in Wilberian terms.
0.1.3.6. Languaging

In contrast to a conventional perspective on languaging, the study explores the postconventional feature of construct-awareness (Cook-Greuter, 2005), a feature which indicates the significance of postmodernism’s linguistic turn. Arran Gare (2005) identifies such understandings with respect to:

the role of non-mathematical concepts and forms of explanation, the limits of univocal concepts, the role of analogy, metaphor, metonym and narrative in language, thinking and comprehending, and of the complex relationship and interdependence between abstract thought, imagination and ‘pre-predicative’ experience such as ‘feelings’ and other forms of ‘tacit knowledge’ (p. 89).

A consequence of such post-modern alignment is that the study’s languaging sometimes includes text which problematises the expectation of writing as talking in favour of writing as writing (Derrida, 1967/1997). This includes the extended use of qualifiers (eg. parentheses, footnotes); it also includes such contracted punctuations as “/” (beyond “or”: for example, “post/modern” signifying modern and/or postmodern), neo-syntactical constructions such as Gangadean’s (2008) “((…/…/…))” (differentiating egomental and deep-dialogical levels) and my “~” (signifying a dialectical relationship). Furthermore, the signified is allowed to slide in relation to the signifier: exploration of the significance of the signifier is signalled through the prioritisation of term over presumed semantic vector (Derrida, 1967/1997). For example, an interest in Naess’s “ecosophy” leads to an interest both in Guattari’s “ecosophy” and an etymological interest in the term itself (and thence to Sophia, for example). To a degree, terms are allowed to play on their own terms. An extension of this play is supported by a poetic influence (see § 0.3.3.3 Poetics). This includes an exploration of the metaphor text as music (see § 0.3.3.3.1.1 Text as music), leading to an identification of the study as a

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46 The modern (conventional) perspective on languaging sits in relation to Descartes’ notion regarding “clear and distinct ideas” (Gare, 2005, p. 63) in contrast to the inherent complexities of language.
47 Also see “nanotextology” (Verse One).
48 Such an idea contributes to certain “stylistic” manoeuvres as exemplified in § 0.3.3.3 Poetics.
“conceptual concerto” in which, for example, chapters become verses and the introduction becomes an overture. Certain asymmetries (or ecologies of similarities-and-difference) stem from this aesthetic template, including variations of style and content. The textual “timbre,” for instance, may vary among verses to suit the context of publication: a contrast can be seen, for instance, between the more experimental style of Verses One and Four and the more formal style of Verses Two and Six. Additionally, both critique and construction are offered, sometimes within the same verse (such as in Verses Three and Six). The study’s expressive use of green, yellow and turquoise paper (playfully suggestive of respective vMemes whilst simultaneously facilitating clarity of thesis format) further signifies postconventional aesthetic exploration.

Additionally, a post-representational paradigm leads to an occasional use of semantic multiperspectivity: semantic clusters, family resemblances (Wittgenstein, 1953/2001), close-knit conceptual ecosystems; these may sometimes be configured as (inferring an ecology of) explicit metaphors (in the italicised format, *x as a, x as b*, etc.) Each term in the cluster variously reveals-and-conceals that which is attempted to be signified. An example would be the following ecology: *that beyond modern atomism, eco-logics, complexities of truth, postformal poetic ecosophy, poetics of complex integration, postmodern-postconventional-integral, trans-modernism, ensemble of postconventional modalities.*

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49 A classical structure can be identified for both; Verse Two maintains such classicality into the fabric of the text through its *analytical* style whilst Verse Six employs a classical structure to hold a more exploratory *scholarship of complex integration*.

50 Such use of colour can also be understood both through the study’s interest in postconventionality as a “baroque explosion”—partaking of the vector *Intensifying postconventionalities* (see § 0.1.3.1 Postconventionality)—and also through poststructuralist manoeuvres regarding binaries (§ 0.3.3.2 *Poststructuralism*): in this case, *simplicity~complexity* or even *straight~queer*. It also sits in reference to Gidley’s (2008) Ph.D. Perhaps, holarchically, postgraduate or academic education can be more inclusive of certain features in primary education? The study’s slight play with font can similarly be understood.

51 Acknowledging inevitable slippage between signifier and signified.
0.1.3.7. Deterritorialisation

Following on from an intensification of the postformal feature of dialectics and its relationship with poststructuralism—both through an apprehension of a Derridean deconstruction of binary oppositions as being associated with postformal dialectics and also through deterritorialisation (Deleuze & Guattari, 1972/2004)—the study enacts a certain postconventional “dialecticisation” (Verse One) and deterritorialisation with respect to integral (Verses Three and Six) and also in relation to “eco-logics” (Verse Six). The manoeuvres facilitate types of postconventional integral sensibility without referring to the term “integral,” and eco-logical schemas identified through a via negativa, respectively.

The address of integral studies through postconventional engagement also opens up the possibility of (furthering) postformal / postconventional theory or, what might be termed from a postconventional perspective, “postformal poetics” or “postconventional poetics.” Deterritorialisation additionally indicates significance of the study with regard to areas beyond that of integral studies. The study contributes, for instance, to the philosophy of education, critical education, ecology, futures studies, transdisciplinarity, as well as the meta-

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52 In contrast to a poststructuralist rejection of the term dialectics (as part of its distancing from Hegelianism), the study seeks to breathe new life into the term/idea such that relationalities can be seen between Hegelian dialectics and poststructuralism’s valorisation of the Other (and, indeed, with Socratic dialectics and with the Daoist Taijitu). Dialectics is conceived as open and multilayered: it is inherently indeterminate, where absolute deductive resolution is not possible. It sits in reference to such vectors as Chinese dialectical epistemology (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), Bakhtin’s dialogism (Baxter & Montgomery, 1966), dialectical operations (Basseches, 1894) and interpretations of Hegelian dialectics (Beckwith, 1984/5). In this, it differs from its more absolutist (historical) “origin” of dialectics as the logic of Parmenides and Zeno (Gare, 2005).

53 Verse Three can be understood as intensifying the critical juncture between the modern-formal level and that beyond; the construct postformal poetic ecosophy found there can also be understood as transversing postconventional levels. Verse Six can also be understood as intensifying the aforesaid critical juncture, whilst its construct that beyond modern atomism can similarly be identified as transversing postconventional levels.
dialogue(s) between the arts, humanities, theology, education, social science and natural science.  

0.1.3.8.  Coherences

In bringing integral studies (which is inherently integrative) into substantive conversation with postconventional modalities (which involve particular valorisations of the contingent), new perspectives on integration / coherence have emerged. Such perspectives can be held openly and multiperspectivally as contributing to a greater understanding.

Firstly—after Gödel’s (1931/1992) incompleteness theorem (a reading of which indicates the impossibility of consistent comprehensiveness)—integration or coherence should be understood in relation to its Other, its dialectic: dispersion, nebulosity, indeterminancy, tentativity (also see Nicolescu (1998)). Coherence becomes a complex open system (in which neither undue tightness nor undue dissolution should normally occur). Apt forms of such complexity include aesthetic integrations (“art-e-facts” such as conceptual concerto), and those derived from organically-inclusive metaphors such as ecosystem. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem helps thwart neo-Pythagorean (Gare, 2006) and “inert” (Whitehead, 1967) imaginaries which stem from closed system templates: mathematics both has its place and “should know its place” (by its own “reckoning”!).

Secondly, a multi-scalar interpretation of integration leads to the identification of a dimension of integrative scales including both panoramic and local coherences. Panoramic coherences indicate that even such wide-ranging meta-theories as Wilberian integral theory are able to be contextualised. Local coherences include particular content clusterings, as well as address of small-scale linguistic integrations. Archetype would be an example of a small-scale (or possibly meso-scale) coherence.

54 This listing pertains to conventional categories. Postconventionally, spirituality might be more suitable than theology, whist social science and natural science might be better identified as human, biospherical and physiospherical sciences; or more strongly, a problematisation of the sharpness of differentiation between art and science.
Thirdly, coherences might serve conventional or critical (counter-hegemonic) purposes. Regarding the latter, the “togethering” of unexpected elements (or use of elements in unusual contexts\(^{55}\)) could serve to awaken awareness. *Art-e-fact*, for example, plays with the liminality between *art* and *fact*, thus countering literalist positivism which would seek to dissociate the two. The allowance of polysemy often serves a similarly generative function; indeed, the term *coherence* itself evokes address both of content (coherence as integration) and semantics (coherent meaning).

Apropos, the scholarship of integration as involving the identification\(^{56}\) of “new topologies of knowledge” (Boyer, 1990, p. 19) can be forwarded on the proviso that such topologies are identified complexity, ideally with a long-range view regarding ethical or critical contexts.\(^{57}\) An exemplification of this perspective is given in Verse Six’s address of education.

One perspective regarding coherence of the study runs as follows: In terms of dominant orientations, the modality of the study can be identified as pertaining to the scholarship of complex integration; its major theoretical interests are those of integral / integrative theory, integral / integrative education theory, and postconventional poetics; its philosophical orientation can be said to be that of Western integral philosophy whose latest expressions are those of reconstructive postmodernism (including integral studies) calling upon (alter-modern) German Humanism and (pre-modern) Hermetic Neoplatonism; its epistemology can be understood as a creative form of transdisciplinarity calling upon complexity theory and postformal reasoning; its normative direction can be understood in terms of critical theory and futures studies informing an ecosophical worldview; whilst it entertains a certain poetic or poststructural sensibility countering that of undue technicism and prosaicism.

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\(^{55}\) Such as, reflexively, the adaptation of *together* as verb.

\(^{56}\) “Identification” can be understood in relation to the dialectical unit, *construction–discovery*.

\(^{57}\) “New” and “knowledge” can be similarly “postconventionalised”: regarding *new*, see § 0.2.2 *Historical context: A Western genealogy of integral philosophy*, notably vis-à-vis reconstructive postmodernism; regarding *knowledge*, see, eg. § 6.3.1 *Education beyond modern atomism: Content and identity*. 
0.1.4. Navigation

The format of the study involves six papers (four journal articles and two book chapters). Four are solo-authored and are either published or accepted for publication; one is co-authored\textsuperscript{58} and is accepted for publication; one is solo-authored and is submitted for publication (see Front Matter: Publications Included in the Study). Each paper serves as a chapter; the chapters are identified as “verses.” The main body of the study is thus constituted by the sequence, Verses One to Six. The verses are organised into two sections or “movements,” each comprising three verses. Movement A addresses postconventional integral whilst Movement B addresses postconventional integral education. “Bookending” the verses are the current Overture (serving as an extended introduction) and the concluding Cadenza. Between each verse is an “intermezzo”: an interleaf containing “vertical” and “horizontal”\textsuperscript{59} links. The former link the proceeding verse or movement with the study’s aim; the latter link the preceding and proceeding texts.

MOVEMENT A. Postconventional Integral

This movement explores postconventional integral theory, including a deterritorialisation toward the criticality of eco-logics.

Verse One. Exploration. This verse—Integral re-views postmodernism: the way out is through (a particularly extended work)—explores an ecology of postconventionalities in relation to integral theory, and in so doing establishes the foundational direction for the study. This involves detailed address of two adjacent developmental levels given in Wilber’s integral theory, namely, the formal / modern / Orange vMeme level and the postformal / postmodern / Green vMeme one. A problematisation of the necessity of Wilber’s framing of that beyond the formal-modern level is given. Specifically, a substantive undervaluing of the Green vMeme is identified. From this understanding, new directions for integral theory are indicated: ones toward a fuller realisation of postformal modalities / complexities of truth / eco-logics—such as (i) ecology / ecosophy (biospherical, social and conceptual registers, \textsuperscript{58}Co-authorship in this context can be understood as a postconventional manoeuvre. \textsuperscript{59}“Vertical” indicates hierarchical relations between subordinate verses and the superordinate study-as-a-whole; “horizontal” indicates heterarchical relations between verses-as-peers.
including genealogy as ecosystem through time), (ii) languaging-awareness (including a foregrounding of conceptual metaphor, poetics and poststructural sensibility), (iii) complexity theory, (iv) dialectics, and (v) creativity. Verse One contains three appendices: Appendices A, B and C. These are located within the verse.^[60]

**Verse Two. Further exploration.** This verse—*Futures of integral futures: an analysis of Richard Slaughter’s analysis of Causal Layered Analysis*—further explores an ecology of postconventionalities with regard to integral theorising, extending the critique of Wilber’s integral theory identified in Verse One. This is effected through inquiring into the application of Wilber’s integral theory in the field of futures studies, specifically through focusing on a symbolic text—that of Richard Slaughter’s discussion of the futures methodology of Causal Layered Analysis^[61] in relation to Wilber’s integral theory. The furthering of directions for a more postconventional integral theory is indicated. These include a foregrounding of (arche)types (including types of integral), a foregrounding of the inclusion of detailed gap-diving in integral theorising, a dialogical “integrially-engaged” approach, the imaginary of interpenetrating integrative approaches, and the possibility of “mixed ecologies” of holarchies (nested hierarchies), rhizomes (heterarchies) and animalisations (dynamic entities).

**Verse Three. Critical deterritorialisation toward eco-logical futures.** This verse—*Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy*—extends the prior exploration of postconventional reasoning. It formalises insight and theorising regarding the post/modern juncture. In so doing, it deterritorialises integral theorising through addressing the potential regeneration of human culture as indicated through the valorisation of “ego-logical” scenarios (an ecosophical direction). In relation to the prior verses, this verse further clarifies that, in terms of human culture as a whole, the key critical contrast at the present time is that between the Orange vMeme and beyond, not between the Green vMeme and beyond as foregrounded by Wilber. This contrast is developed theoretically: the former developmental level is critiqued as suffering economies of truth (with necessary shadow sides stemming from the partialities of “being economical with the truth”) whilst that beyond economies of truth—postconventionality—is valorised as comprising complexities of truth.

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^[60] Appendices to the study as a whole are numbered I, II and III and are located at the back.

^[61] A methodology which includes *inter alia* a valorisation of conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).
(with a minimisation of shadow). The former (stemming from an overregard for Occam’s razor) includes modern atomism, economism and prosaicism; the latter can be complexly cohered as *postformal poetic ecosophy* in which, holarchically, *postformal* embraces *formal*, *ecosophy* embraces *economy*, and *poetics* embraces *prosaics*. Postformal poetic ecosophy is identified as facilitating the possibility of “eco-logical” or ecosophical futures, ones duly acknowledging the well-being and well-becoming of psyche, society and biosphere.

**MOVEMENT B. Postconventional Integral Education**

This movement explores postconventional integral education theory (specifically emphasising genealogy) including a deterritorialisation toward the criticality of eco-logics.

**Verse Four. Exploring genealogy.** This verse—*Western-Islamic and Native American genealogies of integral education*—explores an aspect of integral education theory in response to postconventional considerations, specifically the notion of a plurality of (interpenetrating) integrals, each with their own genealogies (or conceptual ecosystems through time). A reading of the ecology of Native American integral education is given. This is followed by a more involved interpretation of the genealogy of Western(-Islamic) integral education (up to the first decades of the nineteenth century) involving the two broad streams of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, their antiquarian origins and the four historical renaissances in the Abrahamic (European / Middle East) region. A wide range of general educational directions is indicated including *expanding the space of the possible* through numerous creativities, interconnectivites, and “gnoseology.”

**Verse Five. Further exploring genealogy.** This verse—*Elements of the underacknowledged history of integral education* (co-authored with Markus Molz)—further develops the notion of an *ecology / genealogy of integrals*, this time in specific relation to European-oriented education. Specifically, Catholic integral education is identified as a continuation of the Aristotelian stream identified in Verse Five; socialist (including anarchist), Aurobindean and Gebserian integral educations are also discussed. Educational features indicated include lifelong learning (and beyond), consideration of the whole human being (particularly focusing on inner qualities), myriad connectivities, address of the contemporary situation, respecting the uniqueness of learners, and a non-dogmatic, experimental sensibility.
Verse Six. Critical deterritorialisation toward eco-logical education. This verse—Education beyond modern atomism—clarifies a key theoretical contrast between economies of truth (based upon the template of modern atomism) and complexities of truth (based upon a prospective template of radical relationality: eco-logics) with respect to education. In so doing, it deterritorialises integral theorising whilst strengthening theorising regarding the post/modern juncture. Modern atomism is theorised as comprising tendencies toward simple identity, arelationality and acontextuality; whilst that beyond modern atomism is identified as involving complex identity, substantive relationality and contextuality. Educational implications of this schema are elucidated through the three domains of knowledge / curriculum, human identity / pedagogy, and education system. Critiqued features include the overvalorisation of pieces of information, homo economicus, education as engineering, conveyor belt processes, pedagogy as transmission, techno-preneurs, scientism, the myth of neutrality and narrow interpretations of “outcomes.” Valorised features include currere, homo complexus, education as artform, ecologies of knowledge, pedagogy as involving rich relationship, cross-system engagements, and contexts involving telos, theoria and ecosophy.

Intermezzi. Between each verse is an intermezzo—the six intermezzi are numbered from α (alpha) to ζ (zeta), respectively. Intermezzi help the reader navigate the study by providing cross-study links, of both a “vertical” and a “horizontal” nature. “Verticality” addresses connectivity between whole (study) and part (the particular verse/movement in question)—hierarchical relationships between superordinate and subordinates; “horizontality” addresses local connectivities between parts (between adjacent verses/verses or movements/movements)—heterarchical relationships between “peers.”

Appendix I. This serves as a conventional appendix. It provides evidencing including that regarding acceptance for publication of unpublished papers.

Appendix II. This text—A critique of Wilberian integral education theory—is able be interpreted as an integral part of the study (if so desired by the reader) and may be aptly read

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62 The withholding of the term eco-logics from the text of Verse Six can itself be understood as a deterritorialisation—of eco-logics, in this instance.

63 “In what way do the verses/movements contribute to the study’s aims?”

64 “What connection or narrative flow can be identified in relation to the two adjacent texts?”
either during § 0.2.6.4 Integral education: in context or at the beginning of Movement B (as introduction to postconventional integral education). It corresponds to the character of the critique given in Verses One and Two, mirroring generic integral theory concerns in the area of integral education theory.

Appendix III. As per Appendix II, Appendix III: Centrifugus: A dissipative structure is postconventional in that it is able to be interpreted as integral to the study—in this instance, as dialectical relation to § 7.2 Centripetus.

References. In addition to the references integral to each paper, a reference list pertaining to the study as a whole has been provided.

Footnotes are numbered with respect to each section (for example, Overture, Verse Three, Intermezzo ζ) rather than in relation to the study as a whole.

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This concludes § 0.1 Orientation. The study next addresses integral studies; this is followed by an elucidation of instruments for postconventional exploration.
OVERTURE

0.2

Integral Studies
0.2. INTEGRAL STUDIES

This section firstly introduces two generative contexts\(^{65}\) of integral: the scholarship of integration and a genealogy of integral philosophy, respectively. It then addresses contemporary integral studies, focusing on Wilber’s integral theory and integral education.

0.2.1. Theoretical context: The scholarship of integration

“New topologies of knowledge”

(Boyer, 1990, p. 19).

The scholarship of integration is one of four types of scholarship identified by Ernest Boyer as part of his 1990 report from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching entitled Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate (Boyer, 1990).\(^{66}\) The other three are the scholarships of discovery, application and teaching respectively. Of all the types, Boyer considered the scholarship of integration the most important (Rice, 2005, p. 32). Yet it appears to have had the least uptake by the academy as an overarching construct (Braxton, Luckley, & Helland, 2002; Rice, 2005). David Scott (2005, p. 48) suggests that this is because it requires integrative epistemologies such as found in the emerging discourses of integral and holistic studies—a relatively rare occurance.

Hermeneutically, a narrow interpretation of the scholarship of integration might seek to delimit its legitimate domain through a conventional or technical mindset.\(^{67}\) Conversely, a broad interpretation might seek to reflexively employ the scholarship of integration and so identify integrations involving interpretations, contexts and connectivities in relation to the term and/or idea itself, thus positioning the scholarship of integration as a postconventional open system. The “width” of the scholarship of integration is indeed pertinent: whilst Dauphinée and Martin (2000) focus on biomedical and behavioural sciences, they more generally point to C. P. Snow’s The Two Cultures of “scientists” and “literary intellectuals” as representative of the need for integrative dialogue across the academy. Indeed, they attribute a

\(^{65}\) The scholarship of integration indicates the significance of contextualisation.

\(^{66}\) Also see Boyer (1996a, 1996b).

\(^{67}\) Neo-Pythagorean (Gare, 2006) unity, for example, rather than diversity-in-unity.
positive role for such a quest, positing that “cross-pollination, even between seemingly far-flung disciplines, can optimize the chance of integrating the discoveries of disparate fields and ultimately, solving problems that appear intractable from the perspective of one isolated field” (Dauphinée & Martin, 2000, p. 882). To facilitate this, they identify the need for mutual respect and high quality creative thinking. They also relate the scholarship of integration to the ability to respond to critical present and future needs.

Address can be given to purposes, processes, form and character of the scholarship of integration—as follows. According to Boyer (Boyer, 1990), a key *purpose* of the scholarship of integration centres around meaning enhancement. He indicates that scholarship of integration scholars are those “who give meaning to isolated facts” (p. 18) with a view to “illuminating data in a revealing way” (p. 18), effecting the possibility of “more comprehensive understanding” (p. 19). Noting that “specialization, without broader perspective, risks pedantry” (p. 19), Boyer also indicates possible purposes of the scholarship of integration as including the furthering of authenticity and the quest for wisdom. The scholarship of integration may also involve “educating nonspecialists” (p. 18).

The *processes* by which the purposes of the scholarship of integration are enabled include critical analysis, interpretation, contextualisation, connectivity, pattern recognition, and the asking of such questions as “What is yet to be found?” (p. 18)

The *form* the scholarship of integration takes includes *that beyond disciplinarity*: “making connections across the disciplines” (p. 18) and “doing research at the boundaries where fields converge” (p. 19). Boyer mentions multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity but also indicates the address of *subdisciplines*—“placing the specialities in larger context” (p. 18). The form is, however, framed more generically than in reference solely to disciplinarity in that the scholarship of integration is identified in relation to integrative studies in general. This includes “putting [facts] in perspective” (p. 18), “placing the specialities in larger context” (p. 18), identifying “larger intellectual patterns” (p. 19) and constructing “new topologies of knowledge” (p. 19).

The *character* of the scholarship of integration permits wide-ranging, transgressive, complex and/or aesthetic forms of integration. In this regard, Boyer cites Geertz (1980) as identifying such integrations as “philosophical inquiries looking like literary criticism…scientific
discussions looking like belles letters *morceaux*…histories that consist of equations and tables or law court testimony…theoretical treatises set out as travelogues” (Geertz, 1980 cited in Boyer, 1990, p. 19).

The scholarship of integration has been addressed in relation to engineering (Feisel, 1998); whilst from a different angle, the liberal arts have been identified as somewhat in sympathy with this form of scholarship (Braxton et al., 2002). Elsewhere, the scholarship of integration dimension of educating non-specialists has been foregrounded (Hathaway, 1996). A critical dimension of the scholarship of integration is brought to bear by Rita Johnston (1998) who differentiates between managerial integration and scholarly integration. A critical approach to the scholarship of integration could also address its potential appropriation by dominant political and epistemological ideologies. Politically, economicist appropriation might seek to use the scholarship of integration in the interests of competitive advantage (whether of institution or nation) rather than in the interests of the planet as a whole or other ethical goal; whilst epistemologically, neo-Pythagorean (Gare, 2006) appropriation might seek to deny forms of integration other than reductive (specifically, mathematico-reductive) forms.

An inference can also be made regarding the potential role of the scholarship of integration in connecting the scholarships of integration, discovery, application and teaching themselves which are “separate yet overlapping” (Boyer, 1990, p. 19) and which form “an interdependent whole” (Boyer, 1990, p. 19).

**0.2.1.1. In context**

The modality of the study as a whole is that of the scholarship of integration—as interpreted complexly (rather than through neo-Pythagoreanism (Gare, 2005), for example68). The

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68 Gare (2005) indicates the association between Neo-Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism. The study acknowledges this: a differentiation could perhaps be identified between a “traditional Neoplatonism” (Gare, 2005, p. 65) and the study’s interest in a radical or open Neoplatonism; the latter maintains openness to indeterminacy / Mystery, dialogue, process and noetic evolution—“interest in the temporal realm” (Gare, 2005, p. 65). Accordingly, the broad stream of Neoplatonic thought allows for a dimension with respect to the general value given to mathematics; the current study valorises mathematics as a *partial* epistemology, one which
particular expression of the scholarship of integration enacted in that of creative transdisciplinarity. The scholarship of integration also informs particular verses. For example, it explicitly coheres *Verse Six: Education beyond modern atomism*; it explicitly seeks to (postconventionally) generate “new topologies of knowledge” (Boyer, 1990, p. 19). It can be differently seen in *Verse Four: Western-Islamic and Native American Genealogies of Integral Education* as contributing to a more poetically integrative text within which there is the generation of new topologies.

The study identifies that the scholarship of integration can be used to valorise integral / integrative thinking. It can simultaneously serve to problematise address of integral / integrative thought which is insufficiently cohesive in enactment. Thus, Wilber’s integral is both valorised and problematised by the scholarship of integration.

The scholarship of integration feature of contextualisation is foregrounded both with respect to integral theory / integral education theory and also in relation to the study as the whole (the verses being amply contextualised by the Overture etc.).

Purposes of the study pertain to such scholarship of integration interests as the enhancement of meaning (extending this through hermeneutics—see § 0.3.1.3 Hermeneutics) and the quest for wisdom (extending this through postformal thought—see § 0.3.1.1 Postformal thinking). Toward these ends it employs such processes as critical analysis, interpretation, contextualisation, pattern recognition, and the development of new connectivities—all scholarship of integration features. The “educating of non-specialists” is, to a degree, accomplished in the Overture at least insofar as introducing various pertinent academic fields; other than that, the interest of the verses do not pertain to that particular scholarship of integration vector but rather sit in relation to the cross-specialist vector. Such transversalisation pertains to creative “cross-pollination, even between seemingly far-flung disciplines” (Dauphinée & Martin, 2000, p. 882) in service to the critical present and future needs.

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contributes to a greater whole—in service, for example, of aptly apprehending the “creativity of nature” (Gare, 2005, p. 65). Also see footnote 11.
As indicated above, Boyer indicates the (potential) postmodern nature of the scholarship of integration through citing Geertz (1980); the study accords with such liminal interests. Is not this theoretical treatise (re)presented as a postmodern concerto?

0.2.2. Historical context: A Western genealogy of integral philosophy

The scholarship of integration valorises the scholarly address of integral approaches. It also facilitates new connectivities in relation to such approaches. One such relation pertains to (potential) genealogies of integral approaches. Moreover, connectivities may not only be regarded atomistically, but may also be identified at the micro scale with respect to the “interior” identities of terms, ideas etc.—including that of “integral.” In what way could one adequately come into useful and authentic relationship with “integral”? How much should one privilege the term, the signifier itself? Or in what ways could one identify ecologies of ideas associated with, or (potentially) signified by, the term? The hermeneutic (Gadamer, 1975/2004; Heidegger, 1927/1962; Ricoeur, 1981) mission not only requires discovery but also interpretation and construction.

Two key contemporary propagations of “integral” are those stemming from Aurobindo (Aurobindo, 1914/1960; The Mother, 2002) and Wilber (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006; Wilber, 1995, 1997b), respectively. There are many uses of the term which identify integral as automatically inferring Aurobindo (Ryan, 2005), and, in the other camp, integral as signifying a Wilberian orientation (Murray, 2009; Slaughter, 2008b). Yet the term has a far wider history, and it is the contention of this study not only that such historical address is fruitful but also that it can be substantively developed by identifying yet wider genealogies of ideas in relation to both historical and contemporary usage. Wilber calls upon (and, to some degree, mis-appropriates) Gebser’s (1949/1985) use of the term (from mid-twentieth century)—vis-à-vis Gebser’s “integral-aperspectival” structure of consciousness; the current study indicates much older usages of integral approaches, ones sitting in relationship to German humanism (including Goethe’s classicism, Schlegel’s romanticism and Hegel’s idealism). The genealogy

69 See Verse One.

70 See Verses Four and Five regarding usage in 1829 by Fourier and in the 1830s by the Stankevich circle.
offered in the current section furthers such consideration by inquiring into the precedents of this late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century nexus.

Both Aurobindo’s and Wilber’s integrals involve substantive coherings of Western and non-Western traditions. Whilst the current study firmly acknowledges such non-Western elements—and indeed valorises non-Western integral approaches such as those of Native America (see Verse Four)—it is beyond the study’s scope to further explore this potentially fruitful area. Rather, given the academic tradition in privileging the referencing of Western thought—and in light of this study being an artefact for doctoral purposes in the Western Academy—I have chosen instead to strengthen integral’s Western modality—through identifying a genealogy. Wilber’s (1995) magnum opus Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, infers such a genealogy, albeit without identifying it as integral per se. Due to differences in approaches to integral between Wilber and myself (as substantively developed in the study), my genealogy differs somewhat. Sharing in common a furthering of German Idealism and Neoplatonism, mine indicates a weightier critique of the Enlightenment and its concomitants whilst more strongly valorising Jung, Romanticism, the Renaissance, Hermetism, and an aesthetic sensibility.

In keeping with the main interests of the study, I have also limited the Overture’s discussion of the genealogy to that which pertains to Hermetic-Neoplatonism rather than including Aristotelian integral. This quest sits in reference to Hanegraaff’s identification of the need for “an attempt to unravel the Neoplatonic and Hermetic threads within various western esoteric synthesizes, including those belonging to the romantic period” (Hanegraaff, 1998, p. 253). The other integral stream interwoven throughout the pre-modern Western genealogy is that pertaining to Aristotelianism, especially the Thomist Aristotelianism of scholasticism and contemporary Catholic thought (see Verses Four and Five). The reflexive complexity that might be involved in substantively addressing this stream is exemplified by considering the degree to which the contemporary Academy itself (and thus the myriad expectations involved in producing this dissertation) perpetuates scholastic values and Aristotelian sensibility such as through the categorisation of the material world (although the Neoplatonic interest in Pythagorean explanation would also be pertinent to add to the picture).

One intent of my approach is to further the legitimisation of the notion of archetype—a complexly integrative Gestalt, cluster or coherence. Whilst Wilber seeks to keep archetype
“in its place” in the “mythic” developmental level below the developmental level of rationality, my narrative suggests a more nuanced dialectic (or intimate, complex complementarity) between archetype (including myths and metaphors) and rationality/ reason. Reason certainly informs archetype yet metaphor also enables reason. There is a certain liminality or flux between them. (This is not to say that for certain contexts one or the other should be more dominant.) Dialectically-speaking, if the level of archetype is unduly marginalised then its shadow side (Jung, 1938/1975) might appear. Faivre (1995), for example, indicates that the West’s (and therefore world’s) problematique is conditioned by unconsciously enacting Prometheus. He further suggests that “a god, like a child, should not be left alone when he or she plays” (Faivre, 1995, p. 70) specifically that “Prometheus without Hermes is dangerous” (Faivre, 1995, p. 70). Indeed, a balanced pantheistic ecology is surely desirable (Neville, 1989).

One might say that an aspect of this Hermetic-integral balance is that between “philosophy” and “spirituality,” if one takes “philosophy” and “spirituality” as being interpreted through a conventional or modern atomistic lens. Each of the different integrals of Solovyov, Aurobindo, Maritain and Wilber, for example, variously assume a coherence between philosophy and spirituality—through sobornost, Hindu templates, Catholicism, and Buddhism-syncraticism respectively (see Verses Four and Five). The following genealogy continues this tradition (whilst also allowing for integral approaches which do not identify in this manner, including anarchism).

Such spiritual–philosophical fusion is an example of the meta-dialogic character of Hermes (Jung, 1943/1970) and sits in contrast to conventional Western fragmentation of the two stemming from the Enlightenment’s rejection of religious dogma. The Hermetic-integral character is one neither of religious dogma nor of the metaphysical, scientistic dogma of Cartesian-Newtonian empirico-rationality. Such regulatory fundamentalisms are instead replaced by attractors of more organic noetic quality. Indeed, the Hermetic-integral character indicates a problematisation of the notion of a singular, fixed tradition itself (Faivre, 1995). It should be identified not as “an invariable doctrinal body, but a perpetual rebirth” (Faivre, 1995, p. 71), a living tradition, one necessarily fuzzy, open to

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71 The study acknowledges Neville’s (1992) cautions regarding Hermes; nonetheless, it tends to explore the relatively praiseworthy side of Hermes.

72 Indeed, notwithstanding the present section, the dissertation does not foreground spirituality per se.
ongoing interpretation whereby interpretations can be understood complexly—as overlapping and sometimes contesting (as is the case between Wilber’s and mine).

Apropos, the following narrative identifies a Western genealogy of integral (spiritual) philosophy incorporating Hermetic, Neoplatonic, Renaissance, Humanist and Reconstructive Postmodern moments (each of which reflect divergent aspects of this noetic evolution), highlighting the role of the Renaissance and its sensibility of Hermetic-Neoplatonism (Schmidt-Biggemann, 1996). One should perhaps imagine here that the Renaissance acts as a central attractor surrounding which are both prior and later iterations each variously “resounding the Renaissance.” Two key prior resonances are Hermetism and Neoplatonism; two subsequent re-soundings are German humanism and reconstructive postmodernism (cohered as § 0.2.2.4 Post-Renaissance). Altogether, the genealogy provides a coherence to certain pre-modern, modern and post-modern understandings. This is in accord with the general tenor of integral theorising. Integrally-engaged continental philosopher Michael Schwartz, for example, suggests that the “philosophy to come” will integrate

the modern gift of the radical reflexivity of thought with the pre-modern concern for acceding to, resting in, and emerging anew from the silence and stillness that is the very source of logos – this philosophy to come birthing and nourishing, again and again, a critical wisdom profoundly responsive to what is (Schwartz, 2005).

0.2.2.1. Hermetism

“And as all things were by contemplation of one, so all things arose from this one thing by a single act of adaptation”

(Hermes Trismegistus: The Emerald Table, cited in Linden, 2003)

The term Hermetism is identified by Faivre (Faivre, 1998) as referring to pre-Renaissance address of Hermes Trismegistus, whilst Hermeticism more comprehensively includes the broader range of Western esotericism following Renaissance thought (Hanegraaff, 1998). Hermes Trismegistus is a mythologised character involving a fusion of the Ancient Greek god Hermes and the Ancient Egyptian god Thoth. Goodrick-Clarke describes Hermes-Thoth as

“rather like a Bodhisattva who has attained immortality but remains in the human world as a channel for the divine” (Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, p. 18).

Various texts written between the first century BCE and third century CE—notably the Corpus Hermeticum of the second and third century CE—were ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus (Faivre, 1998). “Hermetism” refers to this literature (Hermetica).

Key themes include particular relations between human and divine (partnership between humanity and God) that can be described as a form of monism or nonduality (the world as spiritual), involving holography as meta-phor/physics (“as above, so below”), a living universe, and depth (the world as infused with divine symbolism), such that it is possible for the human individual or collective to (directly) regenerate, redeem or transmute themselves toward the divine (alchemy as transformation toward potential); levels of reality are also posited through the notion of spiritual intermediaries (Goodrick-Clarke, 2008).

The most famous phrase from the Hermetica stems from “That which is above is like to that which is below, and that which is below is like to that which is above, to accomplish the miracles of one thing” (Linden, 2003, p. 28)—macrocosmos reflected in microcosmos, indicating (from the contemporary perspective) Hermetic holography or fractal geometry. This understanding not only bridges the spiritual and material, but as Jung indicates, heralds the assemblage of all conceivable opposites (Jung, 1943/1970)—one could say an archetype of dialectics or nonduality (noting that both Aurobindean and Wilberian integrals explicitly valorise the nondual regarding spirit and matter). This includes that between ego and id, eros (life, creativity, desire, sexuality) and thanatos (death), passion and reason (Faivre, 1995). In contrast to the dominant modern (post-eighteenth-century) episteme of “solipsism, atomization, [and] incommunicability,” (Faivre, 1995, p. 70) the Hermetic offers “the path of otherness, of living diversity, of communication of souls” (Faivre, 1995, p. 70)—a substantively relational template-sensibility that accords with contemporary (post-mid-twentieth century) academic interest in such items as “relativity, pluralism, polarities, [and] polysemy” (Faivre, 1995, p. 49).

Hermetism proved to be a robust stream of thought, forming part of the prevailing theological paradigm in the Middle Ages in the West (and also in classical Islamic civilisation) (Faivre, 1998), even though it was marginalised by Aristotelian scholasticism. Its mainstream popular
interest can be evidenced at least as late as Isaac Newton’s prolific output of Hermetic and alchemical writings (Linden, 2003). Newton’s and Kepler’s Hermetic orientation also potentially facilitate a deconstruction of the technicist anti-Hermetic Newtonianism of modernism.

0.2.2.2. Neoplatonism

“The musician we may think of as being exceedingly quick to beauty, drawn in a very rapture to it. ...This natural tendency must be made the starting-point to such a man...he must be led to the Beauty that manifests itself through these forms; he must be shown that what ravished him was no other than the Harmony of the Intellectual world and the Beauty in that sphere”

(Plotinus: The First Ennead § Third Tractate. On dialectic [the upward way], #1.)

Neoplatonism pertains to spiritual philosophy evolving from the thought of Plotinus (3rd century CE). As the term indicates, a main source of inspiration for Plotinus was Plato, foregrounding Plato’s metaphysical and mystical aspects (Bussanich, 1996). However, it is also the case not only that “the Metaphysics of Aristotle is extensively employed” (Gatti, 1996, p. 11) too, but also that Plotinus’ understanding diverges from Plato’s in significant ways. Stamatellos identifies, for example, that “Plotinus seems to accept Heraclitus’ position that the everlastingness of becoming is expressed in the form of an endless cosmic flux” (Stamatellos, 2007, p. 127). Neoplatonism thus supports theoretical approaches entailing creative becoming. This understanding could be identified as (part of) radical Neoplatonism (noting, in this instance, that “radical” etymologically relates to “root” or origin) that may be distinguished from (what might be termed) “traditional” Neoplatonic interpretations where this is not the case.

In terms of its major schema, Goodrick-Clarke identifies that:

Neoplatonic thought is characterized by the idea that there exists a plurality of spheres of being, arranged in a descending hierarchy of degrees of being. The last and lowest sphere of being comprises the universe existing in time and space perceptible to the human senses. Each sphere of being derives from its superior by a process of

74 Traditions can sometimes develop in manners which differ from original impulses.
‘emanation,’ by which it reflects and expresses its previous degree. At the same time, these degrees of being are also degrees of unity, whereby each subsequent sphere generates more multiplicity, differentiation, and limitation, tending toward the minimal unity of our material world (Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, p. 21).

As part of this schema, a key Neoplatonic orientation—in some ways analogous to God—is that of the One: O’Meara describes the One as “beauty above beauty” (O’Meara, 1993, p. 99) whilst Tarnas identifies that the One “is infinite in being and beyond all description or categories” (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 84-5). Tarnas goes on to narrate that:

The One, also called the Good, in an overflow of sheer perfection produces the ‘other’—the created cosmos in all its variety—in a hierarchical series of gradations moving away from this ontological centre to the extreme limits of the possible. The first creative act is the issuing forth from the One of the divine Intellect of Nous, the pervasive wisdom of the universe, within which are contained the archetypal Forms or Ideas that cause and order the world. From the Nous comes the World Soul, which contains and animates the world, is the source for the souls of all living beings, and

75 As indicated in footnote 4, distinction between traditional and radical Neoplatonic approaches could be envisaged, one differentiating between a “traditional” interest in a via negativa (“traditional” Christian) framing (The One as better than The Many, Original Sin, humanity as fallen, the concept of temptation, etc.) and a via positiva (Hermetic / Renaissance / panentheistic / nondual) framing (The One and The Many as both good, Original Blessing, humanity as in participatory dialogue with the Divine, notions regarding freedom and adventurings of the soul, etc.). A dialectic between the two can be seen in the notion that multiplicity leads to both to “the beginning of strife, yet also the possibility of logos, the relation of one thing to another” (Gare, 2005, p. 68). As Gangadean indicates, it is this “relational power of Logos that opens the space-time in which the world, reality, and existence may proceed. It is this infinite relational power of Logos that makes discourse possible” (Gangadean, 2008, p. 132).

76 Gare (2005) traces Neoplatonic interest in number as archetype (through its identification of The One) to Pythagoras. Nonetheless, a differentiation can be made between Pythagoreanism and the range of Neoplatonic relationships to this vector (as per previous footnote).
constitutes the intermediate reality between the spiritual Intellect and the world of matter” (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 84-5).

Aspects of this understanding still permeate contemporary integral thought, including Wilber’s valorisation of hierarchy, intellect and Spirit. In contrast to the Wilberian orientation, however, Tarnas’ reading also indicates the relevance of archetypes and *anima mundi* for integral thought. In keeping with Wilberian integral, however, lies Plotinus’ identification of the nondual: that “the soul is one with the One” (Rist, 1967, p. 227). Moreover, the One is paradoxical: it is “everything and nothing, everywhere and nowhere” (Bussanich, 1996, p. 38). Indeed, Bussanich continues that “the One is the center of a vibrant conception of reality many of whose facets resist philosophical analysis” (Bussanich, 1996, p. 38). This points to the *transrational* aspect of Neoplatonism, a theme picked up in the German romantics, Hegel’s idealism, Aurobindo’s transpersonal path, Gebser’s integral-aperspectival structure of consciousness, and in Wilber’s schema: “In Plotinus’ thought, the rationality of the world and of the philosopher’s quest is but the prelude to a more transcendent existent beyond reason” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 84). Consequently in Neoplatonic-integralism, as Hines concludes, “intelligence is intuitive” (Hines, 2009, p. 118): intelligence has “a completely natural and unforced quality” (Hines, 2009, p. 120) where “being, knowing, and doing [form] a harmonious union” (Hines, 2009, p. 120)—a fractal reflection, perhaps of the Neoplatonic view of the world as imperfect-yet-harmonious (Tarnas, 1991). This view of intelligence reminds one of recent texts on human potential (such as Maslow’s (1971) *self-actualisation*) and postconventional thought (such as Cook-Greuter’s (2008) *unitive consciousness*). Yet more strongly, knowing is identified with gnosis in contrast to reason: Hines (2009) (controversially or postconventionally) indicates that “reason…is only for those who lack intelligence. Intelligence is knowing; reason is an attempt to know” (p. 196).

As with much Ancient Greek ethical theory, Neoplatonism carries a normativity in the form of well-being or “eudaimonia”—“that which makes life satisfying, successful, complete” (O’Meara, 1993, p. 100): specifically, it holds an interest in spiritual emancipation and its possibility for humanity (Tarnas, 1991), notably through “the quest to maintain the integrity of the soul” (Blumenthal, 1996, p. 89). The aim is less to *see* spiritual realities than to *embody* such realisations: “For Plotinus, “the aim of the mystic is not a *seeing*, but a *being*” (Rist, 1967, p. 221). Such being requires wide awareness, receptivity and trust of *that beyond*
reason as Rist observes: “To proceed beyond Νους is to take a leap, and in a sense it is a leap into the unknown” (Rist, 1967, p. 220). It “is a tremendous demand of the self” (Rist, 1967, p. 220) yet simultaneously “simply” requires substantive accord with the One—a (Zen-like) one-pointedness or singularity of consciousness (Hines, 2009).

0.2.2.3. The Italian Renaissance

“Man is the intermediary between creatures, ...he is the familiar of the gods above him as he is the lord of the beings beneath him; ...by the acuteness of his senses, the inquiry of his reason and the light of his intelligence, he is the interpreter of nature, set midway between the timeless unchanging and the flux of time; the living union (as the Persians say), the very marriage hymn of the world”

(Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, “Oration on the Dignity of Man”)

The greatest regeneration of Hermetism and Neoplatonism took place in fifteenth century Italy. The city state of Florence (in the first instance) witnessed the self-proclaimed flourishing of a new consciousness—a radical enlightenment (Gare, 2005)—which Tarnas describes as “expansive, rebellious, energetic and creative, individualistic, ambitious and often unscrupulous, curious, self-confident, committed to this life and this world, open-eyed and sceptical, inspired and inspirited” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 231). The newfound sense of human dignity and the exalted place of humanity in the cosmos—as straddling the mortal and immortal—was exemplified by Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man. Humanity was now identified to a large degree as self-created—“as a sculptor gives form to a statue” (P. J. W. Miller, 1965, p. xv).

Such Hermetic-Neoplatonic spirit gave rise to the birth of modern science (Tarnas, 1991): 77 “Kepler confessed that his astronomical research was inspired by his search for the celestial ‘music of the spheres’” (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 294-5) whilst Newton’s law of gravitation was

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77 This proved to be a double-edged sword, however. Whilst modern science has achieved many successes, scientism (its excessive, inapt and/or de-contextualised use—in relation to an ecology of approaches)—has been a major player in the facilitation of the current global problematique.
“modeled on the sympathies of Hermetic philosophy” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 295). Paradoxically, Gare notes that “modern science [simultaneously] developed in reaction to and in opposition to Renaissance culture, both the civic humanism that had developed in the Renaissance and the more radical ideas of the ‘nature enthusiasts’ who had celebrated nature as divine” (Gare, 2005, p. 57): the legacy of Hermetic-Neoplatonism is a complex yet fertile one. Complicit in such fertility was the radical relationalism and syncretism in Renaissance thought. Such “determined ‘decompartmentalization’” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 230) included the notion of Greek philosophy (including Hermetism and Neoplatonism) and the Judeo-Christian tradition as jointly expressing a single spiritual philosophy (P. J. W. Miller, 1965).

Radical relationality also surfaces in Renaissance dialectics,

its simultaneous balance and synthesis of many opposites: Christian and pagan, modern and classical, secular and sacred, art and science, science and religion, poetry and politics (Tarnas, 1991, p. 229).

Abrams (1971) furthers this identification of defragmentation and connectivity, ascribing to the Renaissance

an integral universe without absolute divisions, in which everything is interrelated by a system of correspondences, and the living is continuous with the inanimate, nature with man, and matter with mind; a universe, moreover, which is activated throughout by a dynamism of opposing forces (p. 171).

Syncretic integration also fostered the polymathic ideal of *homo universalis* as exemplified by the broad scholarship at Marsilio Ficino’s Academy. The general sensibility was one of “a tolerant eclecticism, an open-minded, receptive attitude” (P. J. W. Miller, 1965, p. x) whether with regard to philosophico-spiritual traditions or across the range of scholarly and artistic interests. This united into such singularities as Pico della Mirandola’s complex philosophy involving an integral knowledge uniting both spirit and matter (P. J. W. Miller, 1965) in which “a truth about any one part immediately reverberates through the whole, and discloses truth about every other part” (P. J. W. Miller, 1965, p. x). Here can be identified both a sense

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78 Newton also adopted a *Thomist-Aristotelian* critique of Descartes (Gare, 2005).
of holography and that of hermeneutic circling (see § 0.3.1.3 Hermeneutics). Further to this, a depth to the world was imaginatively identified through finding “archetypal meaning in each concrete fact” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 215). Such quest for hidden depths can be seen in such poststructural methods as Causal Layered Analysis (discussed in Verse Two). Altogether, in contrast to the perceived stultifications of the scholasticism of the time, the novel infusion of the Platonic and Neoplatonic

offered a richly textured tapestry of imaginative depth and spiritual exaltation. The notion that beauty was an essential component in the search for ultimate reality, that imagination was more significant in that quest than logic and dogma, that man [sic] could attain a direct knowledge of things divine (Tarnas, 1991, p. 212).

0.2.2.4. Post-Renaissance

Hermeticism—not in its lunatic fringe of goldmakers, practicing magicians, and spiritual libertines, but in its central premises and outlook—had been a reputable, indeed an almost universally accepted part of the intellectual universe. During the course of the seventeenth century this mode of thought had been displaced by philosophies based on the new science (Abrams, 1971, p. 170).

Following on from the material success of the Enlightenment and Scientific Revolution in establishing their orientations as the dominant modus operandi, Hermetic-Neoplatonic-integral has been forced into a counter-cultural location regardless of whether it intent is counterhegemonic or integrative. From the dominant perspective, even terms such as esotericism and romanticism have evoked a reflex of derision in the modern era. From a more neutral perspective, the stream can be identified as a radical epistemological challenge (to both secular and religious orthodoxies) to such an extent that even the conventional idea of epistemology is problematised (what identity and power is ascribed to knowledge? what relations with proxemic concepts? what of gnosis?).

The evolution of Hermetic-Neoplatonic ideas79 can also be discerned in its newfound address of relationalities between “deductive Neoplatonic and Hermetic forms of absolute knowledge

79 Also see Gidley (2008) regarding the development of Hermeticism / Neo-Hermeticism.
or gnosis with an empirical estimate of the natural order based on observation” (Goodrick-
Clarke, 2008, p. 234). Noetic development can also be seen in the extension of the syncretic
impulse to encompass Eastern and indigenous spiritual traditions (in keeping with a growing
apprehension of the world).

Inspiring Blake and Hegel alike, a significant post-Renaissance figure—one exemplifying the
counter-cultural location—is that of Jakob Böhme whose ideas can be identified as a response
to a hardening of Lutheran orthodoxy: “His works present an esoteric psychology of the
individual soul and its union with divinity through the mediation of Sophia (Wisdom)”
(Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, p. 87). His works also heralded a sense of post-literalism, an interest
in the spirit and *logos* of things in contrast to the law of the letter: “The Word is not received
as an external force but as a result of the Holy Spirit acting within the believer” (Goodrick-
Clarke, 2008, p. 89). Such spirit seeded such paths as Quakerism (Goodrick-Clarke, 2008, p.
89).

Böhme\(^8\) spearheaded the regeneration of Renaissance spiritual humanism and Hermetic-
Neoplatonism in the German nexus of classicism, romanticism and idealism in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Hanegraaff, 1998). Abrams (1971) notes:

The basic categories of characteristic post-Kantian philosophy, and of the thinking of
many philosophical-minded poetics, can be viewed as highly elaborated and
sophisticated variations upon the Neoplatonic paradigm of a primal unity and
goodness, an emanation into multiplicity which is *ipso facto* a lapse into evil and
suffering, and a return to unity and goodness” (p. 169).

\(^8\) In contrast to later thinking, Böhme’s “cosmogony entails something that modern minds
find particularly hard to imagine: a dynamic process that *unfolds outside of time*”
Here, Hanegraaff (1998) furthers Böhme’s thinking that “the full archetypal symbology of
esoteric ‘transmutation’ is definitely not exhausted by…temporal manifestation” (p. 261). The
significance of this understanding in relation to modern, Romantic and integral conceptions of
temporality and transformation could be fruitfully furthered.
In particular, romanticism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century (notably in Germany and Britain)—the romantic period—exhibited such key characteristics as:

- organic unities in which the whole is more than the sum of the parts;
- the primacy of process, temporal consciousness;
- helixes of development-and-return;
- the value of diversity;
- imagination as a creative force;
- valorisation of the symbolic;
- Kosmic autopoiesis; \(^{81}\)
- the significance and liminality of philosophy and literary plot; and

Tarnas identifies a yet greater genealogy of Romantic thought—whether counter-Enlightenment or in service of Enlightenment/Romantic synthesis—including Nietzsche and twentieth century movements. In his account can be discerned an overlapping range of themes (in keeping with that presented above for the romantic period)—as follows.

A salient context is the hegemony of secular science and the marginalisation of Romanticism (including the under-legitimisation of the subjective). In discussing this scientism, Tarnas (1991) observes that:

> The Romantic pointed out that even the reality constructed and perceived by the scientific mind was at bottom symbolic, but its symbols were exclusively of a specific kind—mechanistic, material, impersonal—and were interpreted by scientists as uniquely valid. (pp. 368-9).

This insight sits in relation to such contemporary approaches as Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003) understanding of metaphor. Tarnas continues:

> From the Romantic’s perspective, the conventional scientific view of reality was essentially a jealous ‘monotheism’ in new clothes, wanting no other gods before it.

\(^{81}\) Using a contemporary complexity theory term.
The literalism of the modern scientific mind was a form of idolatry—myopically worshiping an opaque object as the only reality, rather than recognizing that object as a mystery, a vessel of deeper realities” (p. 369).

In contrast stood Goethe’s approach which involved integrative dialogue between science and art through realizing their unity as spiritual manifestations. A valorisation of the genus of art (music, literature, drama etc.) was seen as critical. Indeed, the artistic was elevated to an exalted role—the discipline of imagination facilitating spiritual emancipation (Tarnas, 1991). Nietzsche’s elevation of art included the ideal of realizing one’s life as art “within which he [sic] could forge his character, embrace his fate, and recreate himself as heroic protagonist of the world epic” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 370). This idea rested on the significance of will, and also the notion that truth must be interpreted and created. Nietzsche’s valorisation of creativity (also represented in his identification of the ecology or dialectics between Apollonian and Dionysian archetypes) can be related to the general Romantic notion (as systematised by Hegel) that God is a “numinous creative force within nature and within the human spirit” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 373) (added italics). This is one of the markers contrasting the Romantic valorisation of the spiritual “against [the] enforced belief, moralistic constriction, and hollow ritual” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 372) of traditional religion. Yet tradition was not discarded: rather, it was seen as “a repository of collective wisdom” (Tarnas, 1991, pp. 371)—an example perhaps of Hegelian paradox.

The late nineteenth century writings of Nietzsche brings us to the plurality of twentieth century counter-modern, trans-modern or post-conventional approaches including hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology, “post-mechanistic philosophical and theoretical biology” (Gare, 2005, p. 89), anthroposophy and depth psychology. The complexity of the twentieth century situation has led to the efficacy of separate consideration of indicative noetic instruments suitable for postconventional exploration—in § 0.3. Nonetheless, I will set the tone by ending the current section with address of reconstructive postmodernism as an expression of the philosophic genealogy currently under discussion.

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82 It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to capture the full range of potential approaches, whether of the twentieth century or, indeed, of Hermetic-Neoplatonic / Romantic / Western Esoteric approaches in general (including Rosicrucianism, Freemasonry, Theosophy and Anthroposophy).
What exactly might be understood by *reconstructive postmodernism*? David Ray Griffin (2002, p. vii) has promoted the term as an advancement on *constructive postmodernism*. Arran Gare’s (2002b) *cosmological postmodernism* can also be identified as reconstructive postmodernism in that it, too, is identified as forming a binary with poststructuralist or deconstructive postmodernism. From another angle, integral theorising can be understood as a form of reconstructive postmodernism in that it seeks to go beyond the modern (whilst aptly including it) in a cohesive manner. From all perspectives, reconstructive postmodernism includes not only modern elements but also pre-modern ones. The inclusion of German Humanism can be understood as an example of an “alternative modern” (or “alter-modern”) form of philosophising—alternative to the more hegemonic Cartesian-Newtonian stream, whilst Hermetic-Neoplatonism can be identified as stemming from pre-modern sensibilities.

Address will first be given to Griffin and Gare. Griffin (2002) identifies reconstructive postmodernism as “a diffuse sentiment…that humanity can and must go beyond the modern” (p. vii), where the modern worldview is identified in relation to “Galilean-Cartesian-Baconian-Newtonian science” (p. vii). Griffin differentiates between re/constructive and deconstructive (or relativistic) postmodernisms, inferring a complex relationship between them such that they both share the idea that “a massive deconstruction of many received concepts is needed,” yet the deconstruction “is not so totalizing as to prevent reconstruction” (p. ix). The vector of this reconstruction is toward “a new unity of scientific, ethical, aesthetic, and religious intuitions” (p. ix) involving “a creative synthesis of modern and premodern truths and values” (p. x). It does not reject science per se but rather *scientism*, the overregard for—or overapplication of—science, in relation to other domains or orientations. A similar understanding is provided by Gare’s (2002) differentiation between poststructuralist and cosmological postmodernisms. The genealogy of reconstructive / cosmological postmodernism can be understood as stemming from such “postmodern” figures as Vico, Herder, Goethe, Schelling, (Gare, 2002), then branching out (as an alternative to the poststructural or deconstructive stream) through Hegel, Pierce, James, Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne (Gare, 2002; Griffin, Cobb, Ford, Gunter, & Ochs, 1993). After Whitehead, the metaphysical orientation of reconstructive postmodernism can be described as process

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83 A range of views could be given regarding the degree and the way the “modern” might be included (if at all) in such a reappraisal.
panexperientialism, “the view that the most fundamental units of reality are momentary, experiential events” (Ford, 1993, p. 90);⁸⁴ its epistemology is that of radical empiricism wherein “sense-perception comprises only a fraction of what is given in direct experience. Each of us has direct, first-hand experience of the world beyond ourselves which far exceeds what is given by the senses” (Ford, 1993, p. 90). Cartesian commitment to determinable knowledge (Gill, 2000) and consequential human as machine metaphors are problematised (Gunter, 1993). Rather, after Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (Gill, 2000), life involves “acts that are free and unpredictable” (Gunter, 1993, p. 135). Indeed, on the understanding that “we have an individual piece of nature that we know from within as well as without” (Griffin, 1993, p. 203) such “postmodern animism” (Griffin, 1993, p. 201) indicates that the whole of “nature is comprised of creative, experiential events” (Griffin, 1993, p. 202)—a form of panentheism. For example, Griffin (1993) notes that

Hartshorne’s philosophy is the idea that the basic psychic qualities—such as feeling, memory, desire, and purpose—are ‘cosmic variables,’ capable of infinite scope, both above and below their human forms (p. 202).

Reconstructive postmodernism legitimises such “speculative” philosophising. The imaginative quality of reconstructive postmodernism is also perhaps exemplified by Shaviro’s (2009) comment that “Whitehead both exemplifies, and encourages, the virtues of speculation, fabulation, and invention” (p. xiii).

0.2.2.5. In context

The current study variously explores the complex relationships between particular premodernisms, modernisms and postmodernisms. Specifically, it can be identified as being in keeping with the Hermetic-Neoplatonic stream as broadly, dynamically, speculatively identified. Such an identification points to the interest in links being made between Hermetic-Neoplatonism and contemporary postconventional approaches.

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⁸⁴ This is not to infer that there cannot be a radical dialectic between being and becoming, or between the One and the Many.
The study accords with the radical relationality of Hermetism. A topologised template of relationality is also foregrounded in Verse Six’s schema which looks beyond the arelationality of modern atomism.

An important vector is that Hermetic-Neoplatonism problematises the modernist dissociation between philosophy and spirituality. Consider the following historical hypothesis. *The tendency to react in extreme to the abusive social manifestations of The Church prior to The Enlightenment was unfortunate: it appears that the baby of authentic spirituality was thrown out with the irrational bathwater of Church politics and Church enactments such as the Inquisition. The violence entailed in the throwing out of all myths carried its dialectical shadow: the fabric of violence was perpetuated—through, for instance, belief in non-dialectical logic—and the myth (or overextension) of reason took the place of religious myths. Transpersonal realisations were delegitimised. An alternate modern stream more in keeping with the Italian Renaissance would have perhaps been a preferable scenario.* The study carries the general Hermetic-Neoplatonic fusion of philosophy and spirituality.

The study also problematises modernism’s underacknowledgement of important pre-modern traditions. For example, scholasticism carries certain values and understandings which could form a healthy counterbalance to current economistic excesses. *Where is the locus of research legitimation? And who decides?* This study sits in reference to certain pre-modern values and sensibilities (within a reconstructive postmodernism) including the inherent value of scholarship and scholarly values (such as where in contest with bureaucratic or economistic values).

The study sits in reference to the “radical epistemological perspective” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 433) identified above. It orients toward a post-modern recursion of Humboldt’s ideas toward the university, a revitalisation and re-enactment of the ideals of the university—both regarding the organic totality of knowledge (where “organic” is interpreted as including the metaphor of “ecosystem”) and regarding an authentic and socially empowered community of scholars. The study (Movement B) valorises education in relation to a re-foregrounding of such features as living ideas, play, Sophia, and Bildung—a fuller legitimisation of the aesthetic paradigm, of the place and ecosophical value of the arts and humanities and their contribution to science and gnosis. The study also engages with the Neoplatonic understanding regarding intuition, such as in its emergent research process. Renaissance-like dialectics is also effected.
Additionally, the sensibility of broad scholarship found in Marsilio Ficino’s Academy is echoed.

The study contends that “humanity can and must go beyond the modern” (Griffin, 2002, p. vii). It generally takes a similar approach to that of Griffith and Gare regarding relationship to poststructural postmodernism, whilst seeking “a creative synthesis of modern and premodern truths and values” (Griffin, 2002, p. x). In so doing, it critiques modernism’s scientism and approaches derived from human-as-machine metaphors. Instead, it valorises the contemplative and critical wisdom traditions of pre-modernity, panexperientialism, and the significance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem (Goldstein, 2005). Certain tendencies toward process philosophising (Whitehead, 1979) are also employed, such as where emphasis is given on (ongoing, workable) theorising and Deweyian “ends-in-view” rather than a sense of finalised, conclusive theory.

Whilst Griffin makes the case that relativistic postmodernism is a form of “hypermodernism” because it is still based on sensationism, nonanimism and atheism—and thus should be rejected along with modern philosophy (Griffin, 1993), the current study allows for more exploration among the various modalities: modern analytical modes of philosophising (such as in Verse Two and Appendix I) are used in addition to creative modes (such as encountered in Verse Four); and indications toward the legitimacy of particular features arising from the work of such figures as Neitzsche, Levinas, Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida are given.

In terms of the study’s exploratory nature, one notes that,

Pico della Mirandola called himself an explorator. His explorations extended over the whole of philosophy, but were directed by a definite purpose: the discovery of the unity of truth in a harmonious philosophic and religious order (P. J. W. Miller, 1965, pp. pp. xxv-xxvi).

Could not the current offering be seen as a regeneration of such exploration?

Lastly, Hines’ theme that “reason…is only for those who lack intelligence. Intelligence is knowing; reason is an attempt to know” (Hines, 2009, p. 196) is intimated in the study through address of gnoseology in relation to epistemology (Verse Four). Furthermore, the
idea that “the search for meaning, as opposed to facts, is as elusive today as it was two thousand years ago” (Hines, 2009, p. 305) supports the study’s use of the scholarship of integration and its valorisation of meaning enhancement.

Where is Love now? Is it not time for another renaissance?

0.2.3. “Integral”

Integral—meaning “of or pertaining to a whole”—entered the English vocabulary (from Latin integer) in 1471. In terms of an integral orientation or worldview, historian Charles Taylor indicates that the notion is related to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century nexus of German romanticism and idealism: “integral truth” as pertaining to Hegel’s Idea, for instance (Taylor, 1975, p. 335). Developments following on from this German nexus include a Russian interpretation of integral in addition to various radical developments in European education. With regard to the former there can be discerned a “distinctive intellectual tradition centred on the pursuit of integral knowledge, bringing together religious, psychological, ontological, cosmological, ethical, metaphysical, sociological, and biological knowledge” (Post, 1954/2002, p. xvi) in combination with sobornost (deep mutual cooperation). This Russian interpretation included those influenced by the Stankevich circle in the 1830s, figures such as Feodor Dostoyevsky, Prince Peter Kropotkin, and Vladimir Solovyov, and the twentieth-century sociologist, Pitirim Sorokin (Post, 1954/2002). With regard to European education, the term was used in reference to Fourier’s (1829) harmonic education, the enacted utopian education of Godin (1871) and the anarchist approaches of Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Robin in the late nineteenth century (Molz & Hampson, forthcoming). A separate integral orientation has been that in relation to the Catholic church and Thomist-Aristotelianism, such a Maritain’s integral education for integral humanism in 1943 (Verse Five). Additionally, Gidley (2007b, 2008) identifies the significant but underregarded contribution to integral understanding by Rudolf Steiner.

From a different—but overlapping (Gidley, 2008)—direction, Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1914/1960) and The Mother (1978/2002) (a.k.a. Mirra Alfassa) used the term integral in the early twentieth century to describe a type of complete yoga or knowledge. Sorokin described this as the “ideological integration of several religious, philosophical, and scientific currents of the East and the West” (Sorokin, 1954/2002, p. 373). The Aurobindean stream of integral
understanding seeded the establishment of the human potential-oriented Esalen Institute (California) in 1962 via the work of Michael Murphy, and also the California Institute of Integral Studies in 1968 via Haridas Chaudhuri. A key feature of Aurobindean stream of integral is, relative to academic conventions, the foregrounding of regard for the subject, the inquirer. This is exemplified by the participatory approach of Ferrer, Romero, and Albareda (2005, 2006).

A separate usage of the term integral from the mid-twentieth century was that of Jean Gebser (1949/1985, p. xxix), who described integral-aperspectival as an emergent structure of consciousness which embraced the range of previous structures (archaic, magic, mythic and mental). Gebser’s integral approach can be identified both in relation to his overall schema of five structures of consciousness and also specifically to the emerging fifth (integral-aperspectival) stage of consciousness. Gebser foregrounds aesthetic considerations. (See Verse One.)

More recently, integral theorising has been popularized through the particular approach of Ken Wilber, an approach named by its proponents as simply (capitalised) “Integral Theory.” Wilber’s theory forms the main point of departure of this study and will be discussed in detail below in the following section which addresses the institutionalization of integral.

0.2.4. Institutionalisation of integral

Four key institutional concretisations regarding integral studies are the California Institute of Integral Studies (C.I.I.S., CA, US), the Integral Institute (CO, US), the Integral Theory Department at John F. Kennedy University (CA, US), and the Wilberian orientation of the Master of Management (Strategic Foresight) at Swinburne University—formerly Masters in Strategic Foresight in the Australian Foresight Institute—(Victoria, Australia). Mention should also be made of Next Step Integral, whose “main emphases are: integral education, integral parenting, integral ecology and integral community, with a central focus on application” (http://nextstepintegral.org/) and Pacific Integral (http://www.pacificintegral.com/), a college which calls upon Wilber’s integral. C.I.I.S. (founded 1968) is a private institute of higher education whose historical roots pertain to Sri Aurobindo. The Integral Institute (founded 1998) is a think-tank set up by Ken Wilber. J.F.K.’s recently instituted Integral Theory Department is located within the School of Holistic Studies; the program director of the Masters in Integral Theory (inferring Wilberian integral) is Sean Esbjörn-Hargens. The Strategic Foresight course at Swinburne (offered now for about a decade) was initiated by Richard Slaughter (whose approach I address in Verse Two). I undertook a Graduate Certificate course in Strategic Foresight here (at the time, the Australian Foresight Institute) under the tutelage of Jennifer Gidley who has since become a close friend and collaborator.

Three peer-reviewed journals which perhaps exemplify the spread of contemporary integral thought are ReVision: A Journal of Consciousness and Transformation, Journal of Integral Theory and Practice (formerly AQAL: Journal of Integral Theory and Practice) and Integral Review: A Transdisciplinary and Transcultural Journal For New Thought, Research and Praxis, respectively. ReVision (founded 1978), edited by Jürgen Werner Kremer, includes an orientation transversing numerous integral approaches (including indigenous-integral and what might be identified as a deterritorialised integral) stemming from a predominantly Aurobindean point of departure. The Journal of Integral Theory and Practice (founded 2006) is the official academic journal of Wilber’s Integral Institute, and is edited by Ken Wilber and Sean Esbjörn-Hargens. It solely addresses Wilberian-integral. Integral Review (founded 2005), edited by Jonathan Reams, can be regarded as adopting a transversal-integral approach.

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85 This can be understood in terms of the Wilberian Lower Right quadrant.
from a post-Wilberian point of departure. Verse One of this dissertation was published in 
*Integral Review*; the journal thence organised a successful online forum to discuss my paper. 
The non-peer-reviewed website *Integral World: Exploring Theories of Everything* 
(http://www.integralworld.net/)—created and maintained by Frank Visser—is also a key 
player in discussing Wilberian integral. It includes articles by scholars Roland Benedikter 
(2005a, 2005b) (discussing postmodern spirituality), Mark Edwards (2003, 2004a, 2004b, 
2005, n.d.-a, n.d.-b), and Jeff Meyerhoff (author of online book *Bald Ambition: A Critique of 
Ken Wilber’s Theory of Everything*).

0.2.5. Wilber’s integral theory

Ken Wilber has been key in popularising integral, and has had much popular success in 
relation to his numerous books—from *The Spectrum of Consciousness* (Wilber, 1977) via his 
magnum opus *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality: The Spirit of Evolution* (Wilber, 1995) and the more 
succinct *A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and 
Spirituality* (Wilber, 2000b) (a key reference for the aforementioned Strategic Foresight 
course) to the more recent *Integral Spirituality: A Startling New Role for Religion in the 
Modern and Postmodern World* (Wilber, 2006). His academic papers—such as (Wilber, 1975, 
1980, 1993, 1997b)—include the first mention of “integral” in 1997 (Wilber, 1997b). He has 
also written on his website *Ken Wilber Online,* notably including “excerpts” from Volume 
Two of the Kosmos Trilogy (where *Sex, Ecology, Spirituality* is identified as Volume One). 
Wilber regards his own work as having progressed through five stages (*Wilber I-V*).

0.2.5.1. Holons and holarchy

Wilber draws upon Koestler’s (1967, 1972) holon theory. A holon is simultaneously a whole 
and a part. A vertical arrangement of holons thence comprises a “holarchy” or nested 
hierarchy in which (reminiscent of Hegel’s System (Hegel, 1807/1977)) holons “transcend-
and-include” lower holons (Hegelian “sublation”). In terms of process, the vector of 
transcending-and-including is identified by Wilber as Eros (creative wisdom); that of 
ascending-but-excluding, Phoebos (the pathology of fear); descending-and-including is

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86 http://www.integralworld.net/meyerhoff-ba-toc.html
87 http://wilber.shambhala.com/
identified as Agape (compassionate embrace); whilst descending-but-excluding is Thanatos (the pathology of death). One overarching holarchy is the (Neoplatonic) Great Chain/Nest of Being in which the physiosphere is nested within the biosphere which is in turn nested within the noosphere (according to levels of complexity).

Linking holarchic verticality with temporality (following on from trends in German humanism) produces development/evolution.

0.2.5.2. Developmental levels

Wilber foregrounds the notion of developmental levels (structures, stages, “waves”—of “altitude”) with respect to both individual development and social evolution. These address pre-conventional / pre-modern, formal / modern, and post-formal\(^{88}\) / post-modern levels. Wilber IV foregrounds the identification of such levels with Spiral Dynamics (Beck & Cowan, 1996) which addresses levels in relation to “value memes” (“vMemes”), each of which is identified by a colour. Those pertinent to the current study comprise according to Wilber (2000b) (in ascending order):

“First tier” levels\(^ {89}\)

- Red—(part of) “tribal”— includes address of egocentricm, archetypal beings, feudalism, and “be here now” new age narcissism;
- Blue—“traditional”—(re-identified by Wilber V as Amber) includes address of fundamentalism, literalism, right-and-wrong, the law, and the mythic;
- Orange—“modern”—includes address of The Enlightenment, science, hypothetico-deduction, the economy, corporations, liberal self-interest;
- Green—“postmodern”—address of postmodernism, anti-hierarchy, deep ecology, diversity, caring;

“Second tier” levels

\(^{88}\) See, e.g. Wilber (2000a).

\(^{89}\) “Beige” and “purple” form two levels prior to Red; these do not form part of the study’s interest.
• Yellow (re-identified as Teal under Wilber V): spontaneity, holarchy;
• Turquoise—“integral”—universal holistic systems.

For cultural evolution, Wilber mainly draws upon Gebser’s (1949/1985) structures of consciousness—archaic, magic, mythic, mental, integral, respectively. Wilber foregrounds the distinction between first and second tier. He also emphasises the significance of differentiating between pre-rational/pre-conventional (pre-Blue/Orange) and trans-rational/post-conventional levels: not to do so is, according to Wilber, to suffer from “the pre/transfallacy” (Wilber, 1980). “Vision-logic” pertains to post-conventional levels.90

0.2.5.3. Quadrants and concomitants

Wilber identifies each holon as having individual and social aspects, and also interior and exterior aspects—leading to a fourfold set of quadrants, namely, individual-interior (Upper Left), individual-exterior (Upper Right), collective-interior (Lower Left) and collective-exterior (Lower Right). This fourfold schema is similar to Schumacher’s (Schumacher, 1977) “four fields of knowledge” (although Wilber does not adequately reference Schumacher in this regard (Gidley, 2008)). The horizontality of the quadrants complements the verticality of developmental levels. Horizontally, holons engage in a dimension of agency (maintaining integrity or identity) and communion (relating with other holons heterarchically). The four holonic perspectives “tetra-mesh,” yet each maintains its own integrity such that each has its own type of legitimacy claim. These are:

• Upper Right—objective—truth;
• Upper Left—subjective—truthfulness;
• Lower Right—interobjective—functional fit; and
• Lower Left—intersubjective—justness.

The two right hand quadrants can be fused to facilitate correspondence between the four quadrants and “The Big Three” (vis-à-vis Plato and Kant), namely,

90 For a seminal hermeneutic analysis of Wilber’s developmental levels in relation to Steiner’s and Gebser’s, see Gidley (2008).
• I, Art, the Beautiful;
• We (including You), Ethics, the Good; and
• It, Science, the True.

An extension of the quadrants is to regard their “insides” and “outsides.” This produces the Eight Zones or Primordial/Native Perspectives, ones which correspond with particular methodological orientations exemplified by:

• phenomenology (inside of individual interior);
• structuralism (outside of individual interior);
• hermeneutics (inside of social interior);
• ethnomethodology (outside of social interior);
• cognitive science (inside of individual exterior);
• empiricism (outside of individual exterior);
• social autopoiesis (inside of social exterior); and
• systems theory (outside of social exterior).  

0.2.5.4. Other

In addition to quadrants and levels, AQAL signifies lines, states and types.

Lines (or streams) are relatively independent domains exemplified by Gardner’s (Gardner, 1993) notion of multiple intelligences. Lines exhibit development. Wilber categorises types of lines into cognitive lines (after Piaget or Kegan), “self-related” lines (vis-à-vis identity and ethics), and capacities (eg. musical talent). Wilberian theory states that “cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for development in the self-related lines and appears to be necessary for most of the capacities” (Rentschler, 2006, pp. 19-20).

States pertain to temporary characteristics. For individual humans, major states are those of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, meditation, and (other) peak experiences (or altered states).

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91 See, e.g., http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptD/part1.cfm/
More local or “phenomenal” states include emotions, impulses, images, etc. Weather would be an example of a state with respect to a Lower Right quadrant.\(^{92}\)

Wilberian types are “horizontal styles.” Schemas of individual human types include Myers-Briggs typology and the Enneagram. In the Lower Left quadrant, types may exhibit as cultural types or cultures.\(^{93}\)

Reference is also made to nonduality. “Nondual” can indicate the conjunction of Form and Emptiness; it can also indicate the simultaneity of origin or ground of evolution with its *telos*.

**0.2.5.5. Critique**

A fine summary of critique toward Wilber’s work is presented by Gidley (2008). Drawing on over twenty references, she offers the following critiqued directions:

- technicalities pertaining to Wilber’s integral and transpersonal theories including the scientific validity of his proposed spiritual methods;
- his undue privileging of Eastern traditions; conversely, his American-centric bias;
- the polemical character of some of his interactions with critics; and
- perceptions about his undue self-inflation and insufficiency of self-reflection.

She further adds her own critiques, specifically,

- his “glossing over primary sources, which in some cases leads to inaccuracy” (p. 522);
- “his attention to detail in citing sources is often insufficient to back up his arguments…[such as in relation to] postmodernism, or romanticism” (p. 522); and that
- “the rhetorical and polemical nature of some of his writing detracts from the scholarship” (p. 522).

Nonetheless, Gidley evaluates Wilber as making a “seminal contribution to contemporising and initiating a broad theoretic framework for integral thinking” (p. 522)—one worthy of

\(^{92}\) [http://integralinstitute.pbworks.com/AqalGlossary](http://integralinstitute.pbworks.com/AqalGlossary)

\(^{93}\) [http://integralinstitute.pbworks.com/AqalGlossary](http://integralinstitute.pbworks.com/AqalGlossary)
doctrinal consideration. Such overarching evaluation can frame the address given to Wilber in my dissertation.

**0.2.5.6. In context**

In terms of research process, the study’s point of departure was Wilber’s integral theory and its potential use for educational transformation.⁹⁴ A critique of Wilber’s integral theory emerged through the research process leading to post-Wilberian and postconventional integral theorising—material which forms the major leitmotif of the study—expressed in myriad ways.

The study’s post-Wilberian stance embraces understandings and emphases from other integral approaches such as the foregrounding of Gangadean’s (Gangadean, n.d.) critical distinction between “/(ego-mental)/” and “((deep dialogical))” enactments, noting the inherent complexity yet ecosophical necessity of the latter.

Through contextualisation (supported by the scholarship of integration), *integral theory is called to locate itself*—something that, to date, it has not done sufficiently.⁹⁵

Despite my critique, there are numerous elements of Wilber’s contributions with which I am in agreement. These do not require elaboration for our purposes here; nevertheless, they include:

- The often-useful division of the phenomenal universe into “the physiosphere (matter), the biosphere (life), and the noosphere (mind)” (Wilber, 1995, p. 7). In

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⁹⁴ I had been involved in Wilber discussion groups during the late 90s and first half of the 00’s; I was also an executive committee member of the Integral Education group during 2005-6, and a voluntary futures consultant to the Integral Institute in 2005.

⁹⁵ Although Wilber (1995) discusses numerous discourses in his magnum opus, *Sex Ecology, Spirituality*, he does not contextualise integral theory per se in relation to a genealogical stream of integral thought but rather foregrounds the originality of his own integral thought. In a similar fashion to the under-identification of integral theory with its *genealogical* context, his text also under-identifies with its *contemporary* context.
terms of complexity, it can be useful to understand the biosphere as being nested within the noosphere. (A critique of the fundamentalisation of this perspective, however, could be given.)

• In terms of complexity, it can be useful to understand individual and social phenomena such as organism and ecosystem as operating at the same level (as per Wilberian four-quadrant holon theory). (A critique of the fundamentalisation of this perspective could nonetheless be given.)

• “One of the most urgent tasks of postmodernity—arguably, the most urgent—is the development and establishment of a genuine environmental ethics” (Wilber, 1995, p. 517). “The planet…is headed for disaster… If the Earth is…our body and blood, then in destroying it we are committing a slow and gruesome suicide” (Wilber, 1995, p. 4). Regarding the destruction of the biosphere, “the real problem is how to get people to internally transform from egocentric to sociocentric to worldcentric consciousness” (Wilber, 1995, p. 514).

• “Neither Gebser nor I…see the emergence of the aperspectival worldcentric’ structure as being a sure thing… Not only does evolution…meander more than progress; not only, when it does progress, is there always “the dialectic of progress”; there is also the ever-lurking possibility that the whole thing…will take a wrong turn that includes us; that the stresses induced by the differentiation of the noosphere and the biosphere will make the whole system unsustainable” (Wilber, 1995, p. 191).

• (After Gödel etc.) “deconstructionists…almost always miss the punch line: if you don’t want to be a complete self-contradiction, then you must rest in infinity” (Wilber, 1995, p. 502).

• The cohering of Western and Eastern (spiritual) philosophies.

• “The other world is this world rightly seen” (Wilber, 1995, p. 509).

One might also indicate shared assumptions between the study and Gebser’s (1949/1985) integral structure of consciousness, such as with regard to:

• The “awaring” of truth can be achieved by both physics and poetry (p. 505).

• Regarding Jung, “the concept of the archetype may be regarded as an incipient manifestation of the aperspectival world” (p. 401).

• “Open thinking” and “open philosophy” (p. 407).
“Creativity as an originary phenomenon” (p. 311). Creativity as arational. “Since creativity is a potency or energy it cannot be grasped systematically and at best can be perceived systatically. Since it is a potency which only rarely manifests itself in its full strength, the requisite empirical evidence for comparison is unusually limited.” (p. 311); Socrates’ daimon; Plato’s eros; I Ching’s valorisation of creativity. “It is the full effectualizing of creativity alone which enables man [sic] to realize or ‘recover’ in consciousness the pre-given actualities” (p. 315).

I am bounding address of Wilber to the written word, notably published material.

0.2.6. Integral education

“A new worldview could create a new reality. Transformation is possible”

(R. Miller, 1990, p. 159).

“Integral education” can be understood post-atomistically, which is to say that an identification can be made regarding its complex (emergent, rich and partly indeterminate) identity (at the micro level), its relationality with likeminded signifiers/approaches (at the meso level), and pertinent contextualisations (at the macro level)—exemplified in this instance as integrative education contexts. Integral education can, in short, be regarded ecosophically, that is, as an evolving noetic ecosystem within which salient orientations (such as those toward wisdom, The Good, or the ineffable Tao) can be attempted.96

The introduction to integral education thus takes the form:

• Integrative contexts of integral education;
• Relationalities regarding integral education; and
• “Micro” identities of integral education—

96 It merits noting that due to its already-integrative “nature,” the actual identity of integral education is intimately linked across the macro, meso and micro levels. The micro level is thus labelled “micro identities” to save confusion.
0.2.6.1. Integrative contexts of integral education

Firstly, regarding contexts:

The above account on a genealogy of integral thinking in the West can equally serve as that of integrative thinking regarding education insofar as it addresses the university and academy. As part of this broad church one can include philosophy of education literature such as that on Aquinas (Hampsch, 1959) and Spinoza (Puolimatka, 2001). The 1960s and 70s witnessed an interest in integrative education including address of educational foundations (Jones, 1963), disciplines (Conklin, 1966), liberal education (Winthrop, 1967), curriculum (Pring, 1971), social science (Musgrave, 1975) and holistic education (Zigler, 1978).

In terms of the use of the term integral education, Verses Four and Five provide an elucidation. In summary, the term has been used at least since 1829 in reference to a socialist approach (Fourier, 1829, Vol. 1). It has also been used within the Catholic stream, as in Maritain’s adage integral education for integral humanism (Maritain, 1943). Aurobindean integral education is currently represented in such institutions as the Californian Institute of Integral Education and the Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education (Pondicherry, India). Additionally, since the late 90s, Wilberian integral education has emerged.

A comprehensive elucidation of interpretations of integrative education is beyond the scope of this contextualisation. Besides transdisciplinarity (and interdisciplinarity) discussed in a later section (§ 0.3.5.1 Creative Transdisciplinarity), the following list nonetheless provides an indication of the literature.

Contemporary philosophy of education literature addresses various perspectives toward integration in education. Lamb (2001) engages with the holistic education paradigm, including a discussion of four advocates and their approaches for “education of the whole child,” namely, R. K. Elliott’s education and human being, Gareth Matthews’s philosophy of childhood, J. M. Heaton’s ontology and play and Jürgen Moltman’s theology and joy, respectively. He concludes that “education cannot afford to neglect the whole child” (Lamb, 2001, p. 216). Tellings (2001) indicates directions of a meta-analysis of integration in
educational theories, whilst the integrative philosophy of education of Michael Serres is furthered by Zembylas (2002) in service “of freeing ourselves from the force of traditional educational approaches and making education a site of creative thought and imagination” (p. 501). Additionally, geographical integration beyond “idolatrous” nationalism toward “an allegiance to justice and humanity” (Golmohamad, 2009, p. 484) is advanced in the literature. The concept of Bildung, originating during the seminal period of German humanism (part of the broad genealogy of integrative education) is also of contemporary interest—see eg. Løvlie (2002), C. Thompson (2006), Vinterbo-Hohr & Hohr (2006), Wimmer (2003).

Doll (1987) calls upon numerous post-Newtonian features including quantum physics, open systems and paradigms of complexity and transformation to offer foundations for a post-modern curriculum integration. Restructuring for Integrative Education: Multiple Perspectives, Multiple Contexts (Jennings, 1997) promotes integrative education from a number of theoretical perspectives which orient toward the question of how education can be restructured to better accord with the complex ways in which students create meaning and learn. Integrative education has also been discussed both by Clark (1988) and by Berkout and Wielemans (1999), the latter in relation to education policy. Shoemaker (1989) includes discussion of nine integrative educational models, whilst Cushner, McClelland, and Safford (2008) foreground the integration through diversity (with regard to students)—vis-à-vis nationality, ethnicity, race, religion, gender, class, language, sexual orientation, and ability levels. In a complementary way, Integrative Learning and Action: A Call to Wholeness (Awbrey et al., 2006) addresses the diversity of cognitive, aesthetic, emotional, spiritual, kinesthetic intelligences, particularly as oriented toward a collaborative global society.

0.2.6.2. Relationalities regarding integral education

Secondly, relationalities will be addressed.

Integral education is an emerging field, one which bears many similarities with likeminded approaches. Indeed, the blurred boundaries between “integral” and “likeminded” in this regard are such that in discussing contemporary integral education approaches, Molz (Molz, In Press) favours the phrase “integral and likeminded educational approaches” in contrast to merely “integral educational approaches.” This indicates how a clear-cut distinction between relationalities to integral education and relationalities within the identity of integral education
cannot be made. His identification of approaches indicative in this regard (suitably attendant to the planetary rather than merely North American situation) include:

1. anthroposophical education;
2. holistic education;
3. neohumanist education;
4. transdisciplinary education;
5. education according to Critical Realism; and
6. integral education according to Wilber’s AQAL model (Molz, In Press).

Molz also forwards the work of the German Commission of Humanistic Psychology and Pedagogy and valorizes “singular voices” such as that of Parker Palmer. In terms of meta-approaches, he identifies those who “synthesize influences from different streams” including the work of Gidley, Edwards, Molz, and myself.

Gidley’s (2007a, 2009, In Press) approach is worth expanding on here. It involves a contrast between, on the one hand, formal, mainstream education—based on epistemological reductionism—and, on the other, “postformal-integral-planetary pedagogies” (Gidley, 2009, p. 539) or “postformal educational approaches” (Gidley, 2009, p. 535). These include:

1. aesthetic and artistic education;
2. complexity in education;
3. creativity in education;
4. critical and postcolonial pedagogies;
5. environmental/ecological education;
6. futures education;
7. holistic education;
8. imaginative education;
9. integral education;
10. planetary/global education;
11. postformality in education;
12. postmodern and poststructuralist pedagogies;
13. soul/spirituality in education;
14. transformative education;
15. noetic education;
16. contemplative education; and
17. wisdom education (Gidley, In Press).

Gidley critiques mainstream education for being technicist (employing a factory model template) and for being unduly under the sway of audit culture, whilst postformal approaches are identified as supporting “evolution of consciousness” (Gidley, 2009, p. 539) and cohered through “delicate theorising” around a “mandala” (Gidley, In Press) of four directions—respectively: love, life, wisdom and voice. With regard to love, Gidley (2009) points to “discourses that include notions of conscious, active spiritual development” (p. 537) (including contemplative pedagogies, “being in love with learning and teaching” (p. 542) and “the heart of a teacher’s gaze” (p. 540)); life orients around “discourses that resist the static, deadening nature of formal thinking and enact more mobile, life-enhancing, postformal thinking” (p. 538) (including complexity theory, organic templates and “imagination as conceptual vitality” (p. 543)); Gidley identifies wisdom to be found in “discourses that identify increasing creativity, complexity and multi-perspectivality” (p. 538) (including dialectics and engaging with “the many faces of the muse” (p. 547)); whilst voice is connoted by “discourses that integrate by crossing linguistic and paradigmatic barriers” (p. 539) (including “sensitivity to linguistic, cultural and paradigmatic contexts” (p. 539)). As a whole, she describes good education as being an art, and contrasts this with a “narrowly defined science of education” (p. 534).


Miller (2000) describes holistic education in terms of an attitude of openness and caring, responsive to particular contexts.
0.2.6.3. “Micro” identities of integral education

Thirdly, in addition to those covered in contexts and relationalities above, specific (“micro”) identities of integral education can be categorised as:

- those arising from historical usage of the term;
- those in the Aurobindean tradition;
- those in the Wilberian tradition;
- and other, including those in the anthroposophical tradition (Gidley, 2007a; Molz & Gidley, 2008).

In terms of integral education as arising from historical usage of the term, Verse Five indicates that one characterisation in this regard involves the following themes:

1. a lifelong and lifewide practice across formal and informal learning opportunities;
2. engagement with dimensions and aspirations of the whole human being in a dynamically harmonious way;
3. cultivation and facilitation of inner qualities (for all ages and in all domains of life);
4. connectivity, such as that between disciplines; occupations; cultures; theory and practice; private and public; beauty, truth and goodness;
5. engagement with the challenges and opportunities of the given era (regarding, for example, governance, technology, social justice, ecology);
6. respect for the evolving freedom and uniqueness of the learner —education as self-determined, unfolding in an emancipatory way along individual trajectories;
7. facilitation of a non-dogmatic, critical, experimental and experiential enjoyment of being, becoming, doing, relating and caring.

Forwarding this schema for contemporary usage, Molz (In Press) adds,

8. “the requirement of an explicit account of spirituality” (p. 425).

Contemporary discourse directly identified with Aurobindean integral education includes Ryan (2005) who provides an overview of the lineage, Subbiondo (2005), Wexler (2005), Grand (2005), and McDermott (2005), the last of whom discusses the relationship between
the orientations of Aurobindo and Emerson. Following Aurobindo (1914/1960), the lineage involves “The Mother” (1978/2002), Indra Sen (1952) and Haridas Chaudhuri (1977). Common characteristics identified by Subbiondo regarding the above lineage comprise:

- “convergence of East and West;
- integration of mind, body, and spirit; and
- identity of opposites” (Subbiondo, 2005, p. 22).

Wexler (2005) furthers that “Chaudhuri emphasized two things: educating the whole person and educating about the total human situation” (p. 30). Details include:

- “deep learning…foregrounded as an explicit outcome” (Wexler, 2005, p. 31);
- spirituality—often as expressed through “the belief that learning best occurs when students’ internal lives are engaged” (p. 31);
- being “explicit about questions of meaning and purpose” (p. 31);
- integrative approaches to educational content such that courses are oriented “around issues of importance rather than around single disciplines” (p. 32);
- integrative questions including such directions as
  - “How does this fit with what we learned before?
  - What are some possible solutions?
  - How would this seem from the perspective of _____?
  - How does this theory connect with your experience?” (p. 33).

*Wilberian* integral education could be generally described as “an approach to education that (i) integrates the strengths of traditional, modern, and postmodern educational theoría and praxis by incorporating first-, second-, and third-person perspectives and (ii) is committed to vertical growth and horizontal integration within both students and teachers” (Esbjörn-Hargens & Zeitler, 2007, p. v). The leading proponent of this orientation is Sean Esbjörn-Hargens (In Press). Tom Murray’s conceptualizing also stems from the Wilberian orientation (see Appendix II), whilst Renert and Davis (In Press) use Wilber’s integral theory as an—one might say—“orienting generalization,” in relation to *mathematics for teaching*. Much Wilberian discourse tends to focus on employing the four quadrants and/or eight native perspectives (Davis, In Press; Fischler, 2007; Heikkinen, In Press), sometimes with some reference to developmental levels (Crittenden, 2007; Feldman, 2007), sometimes with
contextualization of regarding other integral approaches (Gidley & Hampson, 2008). Jonathan Reams’ (2007) detailed discussion on (Wilberian theory) states in education is a noteworthy exception to the focus on the four quadrants.

Esbjörn-Hargens’ approach to higher education explicitly seeks to incorporate twenty aspects arising from AQAL, namely,

- four quadrants of the AQAL framework;
- four general levels of developmental altitude;
- four lines of psychological development, specifically, cognitive, emotional, moral, and kinesthetic lines;
- four states of awareness; and
- four general typology approaches to learners (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006).

In terms of other types of integral education approaches, mention should be made both of Gidley’s identification of Steiner’s anthroposophical education as integral education, and also of Bronson and Gangadean’s (2006) linking of integral education with Gangadean’s Deep Dialogue.

Particular address should also be given to the comprehensive integral education approach of Ferrer et al. (2005, 2006). This approach differentiates between “horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions, ones that could be identified as pertaining to content and process, respectively. Horizontal dimensions address “the way we integrate knowledge” (Ferrer et al., 2005, p. 117), whilst vertical dimensions regard “the way we integrate multiple ways of knowing” (p. 117); the latter are regarded as critically under-regarded.

In terms of the horizontal, a number of aspects are elucidated. These include motivation (including harmonisation, the creation of new fields of inquiry and “fostering cognitive and psychospiritual development of researchers and readers” (Ferrer et al., 2005, p. 119)), orientation (basic or applied), and methodology (including emic, etic, and first, second and third person, perspectives; and overarching epistemologies such as Buddhism or Western science).
With respect to the vertical dimension, the authors indicate that this “can reconnect education with its transformative and spiritual potential” (Ferrer et al., 2005, p. 119)—not only for individual students but also with respect to “faculty, and institutions” (Ferrer et al., 2005, p. 119). Exemplifying an approach which emphasises multiple ways of knowing throughout all stages of inquiry and learning, they put forward a participatory model of integral transformative education schematised around the metaphor of the four seasons (autumn as the body, planting; winter as the vital, gestation; spring as the heart, blooming; and summer as the mind, harvesting). Through this, they indicate that mainstream education unduly marginalises the “feminine” seasons of winter and spring, those involving more hidden processes (winter) and that of giving birth (spring). They contrast the participatory model with both “mind-centered/intellectualist,” and “bricolage/eclectic” approaches, approaches which they identify as insufficiently addressing the vertical.

0.2.6.4. In context (with the study)

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss detailed relationships among the aforementioned ecology of integral education approaches, various indicative connectivities with the study can nonetheless be given.

Like Gidley I am forming a critical contrast between modern-formal mainstream approaches and postformal approaches. A further similarity is that I am calling upon a range of discourses in support of this. Moreover, we both critique scientism (though not science) in education whilst valorising education as an art. Additionally, one vector of my “poetics” (§ 0.3.3.3 Poetics)—poetics as theorising (somewhat analogous to Gidley’s (In Press) “delicate theorising”)—sits in relation to a pre-Pythagorean interpretation of theoria, that of theory as

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98 The metaphor is of merit, although consideration of tropical or sub-tropical regions would inspire different vectors. For example, what might be made of the Wet and Dry seasons of Australia’s “Top End” or of the monsoons of the Indian subcontinent? the seemingly endless hours of cool summer and endless hours of winter in northern Scandinavia? Additionally, the question arises: even in temperate lands, does not harvest traditionally occur in the autumn rather than in the summer (further noting the term harvest is derived from the Old English term haerfest, meaning “autumn”)?
curiosity (Gare, 2005), a vector seeking richer semantic depth than mere ex-plan-ation (Gare, 2005).

Regarding connections to the approach of Ferrer et al., both “horizontal” and “vertical” dimensions are addressed: the study’s object of inquiry pertains to postconventional integrality (the horizontal dimension), whilst the research process adopted also pertains to postconventional integrality (the vertical dimension). With regard to the latter, both masculine and feminine components can be discerned through such discussion as that of intuition, surrender to emergence and the dialectics between passive and active principles (see § 0.3.1.1 Postformal thought, § 0.3.3.2 Poststructuralism, § 0.3.5.1.1 Creative transdisciplinarity: in context, § 1.3 Thinking dialectically about integral theory § 6.3.1 Education beyond modern atomism: Content and Identity). The study adopts a different interpretation of Boyer’s scholarship of integration to that of Ferrer et al. in that the study allows for vertical integration to form part of the scholarship of integration.

As a whole, the full ecology of approaches comprise an identification of integral education which form both a point of departure for the study’s address of education and also form a fresh integrative perspective toward integral education. In addition to this general relationship between this study and integral education, the analysis of Tom Murray’s (2009) paper (as a representative case of Wilberian integral education theory), given in Appendix I: A critique of Wilberian integral education theory, acts as a spur to highlight more specific relationships. A summary of the dis/agreement offered in Appendix I runs as follows.

The current study accords with such understandings as:

- education’s multifaceted nature with respect to the aspects of being human, different orders of consideration, and multiple ways of knowing;
- the valorisation of inner realities; and
- the coherence of perspectives.

The study simultaneously critiques such directions as:

- the undervaluation of the Green vMeme, including a misidentification of “progressive” educational approaches;
• an underregard for the prospect of Orange pathology, including undue agency, universalism and simplification;
• an overemphasis on structuralism (the Lower Right quadrant);
• an overregard for the cognitive developmental line;
• an underregard for the arche-type of descent; and
• an overregard for Wilberian integral in relation to other integral approaches.

The study seeks to regenerate integral theory and integral education theory: an identification of integral theory and integral education theory and their contexts is thus pertinent. This section has provided an exposition of integral theory and integral education theory and an articulation of its local (integral studies / integral education studies) and larger (integrative studies and integrative education) contexts. An indication has also been given regarding a critique of the Wilberian configuration of post-modernism / post-conventionality. The following section provides an exposition of various academic fields or “instruments” suitable for developing this critique toward a reconstruction or regeneration of integral theory and integral education theory.
Instruments For Postconventional Exploration
0.3 INSTRUMENTS FOR POSTCONVENTIONAL EXPLORATION

“The concern is...to stimulate a kind of solidarity...some shared...flowing ground, dense perhaps and lavic...’poetic listening’...’new alliances...the exploratory adventure’”


The following section begins to further aspects of integral theory particularly pertinent to the study. These pertain to those approaches or “conceptual instruments” that can be identified as postconventional or are particularly suitable for postconventional exploration. Specifically, four general directions or “attractors” can be identified, namely:

1. intensifying postconventionalities;
2. intensifying the post/conventional juncture;
3. transversing postconventional levels; and
4. foregrounding temporality.

These are followed by coherence through creative transdisciplinarity.

The first point of departure addresses postformal thought as construed by integral theory, namely that arising from developmental psychology. An inclusion of the different use of “post-formal” as used in education opens up further possibilities, including strengthening the pertinence of employing critical theory and poststructuralism, whilst the postconventional features of complexity and construct-awareness from psychology precipitate a line of flight involving complexity theory and hermeneutics, respectively. Consequently, the first section comprises focus on postformal thought, complexity theory and hermeneutics (critical theory and poststructuralism are addressed later).

The second point of departure focuses on—and strengthens—the juncture between conventional and postconventional levels. This strengthening is represented by critical theory. The third point of departure maintains focus of that beyond the conventional developmental level through addressing understandings which transverse postconventional stages and/or problematise the notion of always having to maintain an imaginary of postconventional stage differentiation. These comprise ecosophy, poststructuralism and poetics. Notably, they soften
or problematise the distinction between Green and post-Green levels. Ecosophy’s initial raison d’être is Wilber’s undue placement of deep ecology (Naess’ “ecosophy”) in Green (a reading which ignores its “second tier” features). The integrative nature of Guattari’s ecosophy further strengthens ecosophy’s transversing of Green and post-Green, whilst also indicating the sometimes integrative nature of poststructuralism. Verse One’s analysis of text by Derrida as pertaining to a post-Green developmental level indicates the problematisation of Wilber’s singular placement of Derrida (as exemplifying poststructuralism) in Green. Additionally, poetics transverses postconventional levels through it emphasis on wide-ranging aesthetic, linguistic and symbolic dimensions.

Fourthly, temporality potentially associated with the post/conventional juncture is foregrounded through direct address of the field of futures studies. This is followed by a final section on creative transdisciplinarity (including discussion on both transdisciplinarity and creative inquiry) which coheres the ensemble or ecology of instruments for postconventional exploration.

The four general directions should not be seen as categories in which the instruments are contained, but rather as attractors for which only the primary vectors of the instruments are aligned. The instruments have greater import than the four general directions might indicate.99

For each section, a general introduction to the conceptual instrument is followed by an In Context section relating the instrument to the study.

0.3.1. Intensifying postconventionalities

This section comprises an address of postformal thought, complexity theory and hermeneutics. Postformal or postconventional thought leads the ensemble of instruments, the characteristic of complexity found in postformal thought leads to consideration of complexity theory, whilst the postconventional feature of construct-awareness indicates the validity of hermeneutic exploration.

99 If interpreted from a conventional perspective, perhaps.
0.3.1.1. Postformal thinking

Postformal thought addresses advanced positive psychological development (toward human potentials) and can be understood in relation to such approaches as humanistic psychology (Maslow, 1971), transpersonal psychology (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993), psychosynthesis (Assagioli, 2000; Ferrucci, 1982) and the human potential movement in general. The term postformal first appeared in developmental psychology with regard to possibilities of going beyond Jean Piaget’s developmental stage of “formal operations.” Klaus Reigel (1973) was the first to posit a stage beyond formal operations. He referred to it as dialectical operations. Two years later, Patricia Arlin (1975a) posited postformal operations as a variant theory. The term postformal has been in use ever since and refers to a number of theoretical approaches which seek to either (a) posit another stage or stages, level or levels, in addition to those elucidated by Piaget; (b) problematise Piaget’s theory but not developmentalism per se; or (c) problematise developmentalism as a whole. Much of the discourse surrounding the term has been within American developmental psychology, notably in the “Positive Adult Development” research community. This has ranged from the mathematical representations of Michael Commons and Francis Richards’ (1984, 2002) Model of Hierarchical Complexity to the critical reflections of John Broughton (1984).

The term *postconventional* first appeared in developmental psychology with regard to moral stages of development. Lawrence Kohlberg (1973) identified the “postconventional, autonomous or principled level” (p. 631)—that beyond the pre-conventional and conventional levels—as having two stages, namely, the *social-contract legalistic orientation* and the *universal-ethical-principle orientation* (Kohlberg, 1973). The term *postconventional* was later used more broadly (synonymous with “post-autonomous”) by Susanne Cook-Greuter (1990, 2000, 2002) to incorporate four stages (two “general systems stages” and two “unitive stages”) beyond pre-conventional and conventional developmental levels but below the “post-postconventional, ego-transcendent” level. Cook-Greuter identifies *postconventional* as synonymous with *postformal* (Cook-Greuter, 2000). Cook-Greuter (2008) identifies that:

The third tier is called postformal or postconventional because it goes beyond the modern, linear-scientific Western mindset and beyond the conventions of society by starting to question the unconsciously held beliefs, norms and assumptions about reality acquired during socialization and schooling (p. 4).

Cook-Greuter foregrounds the importance of language construct-awareness in postconventional thought, noting that:

Kegan, Basseches, and Cook-Greuter comment on the fundamental language problem inherent in meaning making and scientific theorizing no matter how many systems are integrated and at what level of hierarchical complexity (Cook-Greuter, 2008, p. 10).

Another notable postformal researcher is Jan Sinnott (1988). Her understanding of postformal thought foregrounds an ecology of postconventionalities including balance, big picture thinking, body, complexity, context, dialectics, generativity, heart, healing, ill-structured

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101 Cook-Greuter’s reference to “tier” is in relation to her own schema rather that of Spiral Dynamics.

102 See Verse One for further discussion on Cook-Greuter’s work.
problems, metasystemic reasoning, mind, social interaction dependency, spirit, synthesis, systems, unification, and wisdom (Sinnott, 1998). Adopting the eloquent metaphor of music to communicate a higher, integrating, level of her theory, she brings together “individualistic” and “normative” research investigations as “melody” and “chords” respectively (Sinnott, 1998). Of particular significance is her direct inclusion of certain philosophical and “new science” correlations—notably, existentialist, interactionist, humanist and “postmodern structuralist” philosophical perspectives; and relativity, quantum, chaos and complexity theories. She also describes a postformal relationship between lived process and multiple or indeterminate “truths.”

One reading of postformal thought as a whole is given by Marchand (2001) who characterises postformal thought as potentially constituted by

- dialectical epistemology;
- relativistic epistemology;
- contextualism;
- dialectical operations;
- problem finding;
- self-reference; and
- regard for the life cycle of the subject

whilst Broughton’s (1984) critique of Piaget and forwarding of critical theory could be seen as a bridge toward the use of the term postformal (or more precisely, post-formal) in the field of education, namely that of Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg (1993), as discussed below.

The notion of postformal as complex surfaces throughout the literature; this is exemplified by Commons and Richards’ (1984, 2002) Model of Hierarchical Complexity (also see Michael Lamport Commons & Ross (2008)) which indicates that complexity increases as the level of postformal thought increases.

Creativeness is another postformal feature found throughout the discourse. Creativeness also forms a substantive part of Maslow’s (1971) understanding of the farther reaches of human nature.
With regard to “post-formal” as used in education, Kincheloe and Steinberg posited a socio-cognitive theory regarding post-formal thinking, describing it as the socio-cognitive expression of postmodernism. In addition to features identified above with the developmental psychology discourse, Kincheloe and Steinberg included: critical theory, genealogy, etymology, structuralism, metaphoric cognition, ecological thinking, deconstruction, nonlinearity, holistic causation, and power-awareness. This genealogical thread is still current in the educational literature and provides a differing perspective to the developmental psychology discourse, yet provides substantive synergies with the current study’s postconventional perspective(s).

With regard to the use of “postformal” as pertaining to both psychological and education discourses, in addition to the current study, one should note the work of Jennifer Gidley (In Press), including her combined term, *postformal-integral-planetary*.

### 0.3.1.1.1. In context

In keeping with Cook-Greuter, the study does not substantively differentiate between the terms postformal and postconventional.

With respect to the type of salience regarding postconventionalities, the study contends that—given their oft-identification as developmentally more advanced than conventional thought—it would be of benefit to explore their enactment.

The study is informed by—and engages with—an open, ecological system of postconventional modalities, variously exploring numerous elements of such an ecology, including dialectics (and paradoxical thinking), big-picture thinking including metasystematic reasoning, reflexivity, complexity, problem-finding (“noetic environmental scanning”), contextualism, process metaphysics, embodiments, multiperspectivality

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103 “Open” both in the sense that the list does not aim to be comprehensive (even if that were possible) and in the sense that the identification of each postconventional modality can be understood as open.

104 See also § 0.3.1.2 Complexity theory.

105 See also § 0.2.1 Theoretical context: The scholarship of integration.
(including multi-levelled understandings), generativity, spirituality, healing, heart, wisdom and address of “ill-structured” or “ambiguously bounded” problems.

The study also furthers postconventional theory or postconventional poetics. Firstly, it indicates the strengthening of links between such modalities as discussed in positive adult developmental psychology and similar modalities occurring in other discourses. For example, dialectical thinking is opened up through regard for the various types of dialectics, including that of Laozi and Zhuangzi, Socrates, Hegel and Marx. Likewise, a significant perspective on postformal developmental levels is that they pertain to a hierarchy of complexity (Commons, 2008). If this is the case, the study suggests that a direct address of complexity (as a postformal feature) through complexity theory would be in order.

Secondly, it indicates the potential generativity of applying postconventional modalities on themselves—through an interpretation of reflexivity. For example, what would happen if dialectics were applied to itself? (A more complexified and nuanced dialectics, perhaps? Perhaps baroque “excess” is sometimes a useful counterbalance to moderation? Perhaps “the dialectics of dialectics” catering for both Hegel (1807/1977) and Kierkegaard’s (1843/1992) Either/Or?) What if context-dependency itself was context-dependent? (Contexts where universals are apt, perhaps?) What happens if balance is applied to itself? A plethora of other relationships are also indicated. For example, what if a developmental perspective were context-dependent? (Verse One allows for both postconventionality as schematised into stages and postconventionality as not staged.)

The study also allows a certain coherence between psychology’s postformal and that of education—lending further validation of poststructuralism and critical theory as “instruments for postconventional exploration.”

In keeping with Sinnott, the study uses musical metaphors (see § 0.3.3.1.1 Text as music).

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106 See also § 0.2.2.4 Post Renaissance.
107 See also § 0.2.2 Historical context: Western genealogy of integral philosophy.
108 Or the poetics of postconventional theory.
The study accepts as a working direction the intimate connections between individual and social perspectives implicit in AQAL’s four quadrants; nevertheless, for the post-Orange situation it problematises the way in which “postformal” (individual domain beyond Orange as formal thinking) is located as both Green and post-Green whilst “postmodern” (social domain beyond Orange as modernism) is located only in Green. In Verse One’s “re-view of postmodernism” the study attempts to better valorise “postmodernism” in various ways, including exploring its genealogy (thus identifying integral theory as in keeping with—reconstructive—postmodernism) and more intimately linking it with postformalism / postconventionality as a whole.

In terms of my research process, as with creative transdisciplinarity, a dialectic can be identified vis-à-vis passive and active aspects of the relationship between this open system of postconventionalities and myself: on the one hand there has been the (passive) allowance or reception of the play of contingency and resultant improvisation, on the other hand, there has also been an attempt to consciously employ postconventional features in a pertinent manner.

As indicated above, the study identifies complexity theory as a postconventional feature. The emphasis given to complexity theory in the study (in addition to its conventional separation from postformal thought) indicates the salience of addressing complexity theory in its own right—as follows.

0.3.1.2. Complexity theory

There are numerous ways that academic inquiry into complexity has been framed in the twentieth century. These include cybernetics (Wiener, 1961), general systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1976), complexity science (Waldrop, 1992), and complexity theory (Byrne, 2001)—focusing on the study of nonlinear dynamical systems (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009) / dissipative structures (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977) / autopoietic systems / synergistics (Édri, 109 Perhaps the following understanding of Kate Bush (in Ariel: The Architect’s Dream) might give a clue to this paradoxical wisdom? “That bit there: it was an accident. But he’s so pleased: It’s the best mistake he could make” (Bush, 2005)! Perhaps the designing Architect of the Matrix needs his dialectic, the intuitive Oracle?
Such complexity studies mostly also include address of chaos and catastrophe theories, which are often incorporated within complexity theory. Key seminal authors (with their major themes) include:

- Ludwig von Bertalanffy (Bertalanffy, 1950, 1976), founder of Systems Theory;
- Kenneth Boulding (Boulding, 1956, 1978) on ecodynamics;
- Gregory Bateson (1972/1987) on the ecology of mind;
- Fritjof Capra (1982) on deep ecology;
- Niklas Luhmann (1984/1995) on social systems;
- Erich Jantsch (1980) on the self-organising universe;
- Ilya Prigogine (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984) on dissipative structures and self-organisation;
- Benoit Mandelbrot (1983) on fractals;
- Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana (1972/1980) on autopoiesis and cognitive science;
- Edward Lorenz (1963, 1993) on chaos theory; and

Complexity theory is transdisciplinary in that it provides overarching constructs which may be used across a wide variety of disciplines including the physical and life sciences, social sciences, humanities and arts. Such constructs include attractor, autopoiesis (self-organisation), bifurcation, catastrophe, chaos, connectedness, dynamism, emergence, feedback, fractal, hysteresis, nonlinearity, open system, recursion, scale-free network and sensitivity to initial conditions.

Complexity can be understood as being located in the intermediate, liminal or dialectical space between order and randomness (see, for example, Édri (2008, p. 201)), involving complex, diverse internal relations (see, for example, Manson (2001)). Perspectives vary with regard to the degree of quantification deemed legitimate in relation to complexity. At one pole, one of the original roots of complexity was mathematics. Byrne notes, however, that although “the programme of chaos/complexity in science is clearly quantitative” (Byrne, 2001, p. 54) there are inherent limits to quantification including mathematical limits such as those established by Gödel (Byrne, 2001). At the other pole, it can be argued that complex
systems are inherently non-computable (Mikulecky, 2007, p. 31). Other complexity theorists allow for both “hard” and “soft” complexity science (Davis & Sumara, 2006), noting that mathematics can both reveal and obscure (Osberg & Biesta, 2004).

Complexity can also be identified as a paradigm. This may be seen as a perspective on complexity theory / science (Dimitrov, 2005), or more strongly as either a problematisation of Occam’s razor (and thus analytical science)—such as the understanding that

\textit{when two theories have equal explanatory power} there is no particular reason to prefer the simpler other than convenience—it may be that the more complex turns out to more [sic] useful in the future (Edmonds, 2007, p. 66)—

or as the positing of a new set of tenets, such as Edgar Morin’s (2005, 2007) complexity paradigm. More generally, complexity can also been considered philosophically—as indicated by an adaptation of Edmonds’ working definition of complexity as

that property [of x]…which makes it difficult to formulate its overall behaviour, even when given almost complete information about its atomic components and their inter-relations (Edmonds, 1999, p. 7).

Within such broad parameters, multi-levelled schemas can assist in analysing the complexity of complexity. A perhaps unrivalled one in this regard is Boulding’s nine-level hierarchy of complexity. Boulding’s schema pertains to both material and ideational systems. Each level represents a different order of complexity: “Adjacent levels in the hierarchy differ in complexity not merely in their degree of diversity of variability but in the appearance of wholly new system properties” (Pondy & Mitroff, 1979, p. 6). The levels are as follows:

1. \textit{Frameworks}. Only static structural properties are represented…
2. \textit{Clockworks}. Noncontingent dynamic properties…
3. \textit{Control systems}. Control system models describe regulation of system behavior according to an externally prescribed target of criterion…
4. \textit{Open systems}. … an open system maintains its internal differentiation (resists uniformity) by ‘sucking orderliness from its environment’… In an open system, what we might call the Law of Limited Variety operates…
5. *Blueprint growth systems*. Level 5 systems do not reproduce through a process of duplication, but by producing ‘seeds’ or ‘eggs’ containing preprogrammed instructions for development…

6. *Internal image systems*. …The essential characteristic of level 6 systems (and models of them) is a detailed awareness of the environment acquired through differentiated information receptors and organized into a knowledge structure of image…

7. *Symbol processing systems*. The system…[is] conscious of itself…

8. *Multi-cephalous systems*. ‘social organization,’ a collection of ‘individuals’ acting in concert…

9. [Systems of unspecified complexity] (Pondy & Mitroff, 1979, p. 6-9)

Additionally, complexity theory can be variously contextualised. Discussion of its relationship with postmodernism / poststructuralism, for example, is frequently generative. For example, Cilliers (2002) notes that “a number of theoretical approaches, loosely (or even incorrectly) bundled together under the term ‘postmodern’...have an implicit sensitivity for the complexity of the phenomena they deal with” (p. viii). He offers that “Saussure’s ‘structural’ model of language remains a landmark in the study of complex systems” (p. 37), particularly in light of “Derrida’s transformation of the system...[which provides] us with an excellent way of conceptualising the dynamics of complex systems from a philosophical perspective” (p. 37). In a nutshell, Davis and Sumera (2006) state that “although [poststructuralist] discourses arose independently of complexity discourses, they rely on very similar understandings of the dynamics and characters of certain sorts of phenomena” (p. 68). A more general contextualisation comprises locating complexity as one of a number of non-positivist paradigms. This framing is often normative or critical. In educational research, Cohen, Manion, & Morrison (2007), for example, position complexity alongside interpretive, critical, and feminist research by way of offering substantive alternatives to positivism. Further contributions to complexity in education can be found in the journal *Complicity* and in Davis and Sumara’s (2006) seminal *Complexity and Education*.

With regard to constructs used in complexity theory, the following further elucidates autopoiesis, attractors, fractals, hysteresis and emergence.

- **Autopoiesis.** “Self-organization is a process that occurs when a system is in a state of high entropy, or far-from-equilibrium conditions, and takes on a structure that allows
the system to operate in a more energy-efficient manner. The structure does not require the intervention of outside agents; rather it is often characterized as *order for free*” (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 23) (original italics). Mainzer (2007) likens autopoiesis to Aristotle’s notion of *entelechy*.

- **Attractors.** “An attractor can be seen as a box of space in which movement could take place or not. When an object, represented by a point, enters the space, the point does not leave, unless a strong enough force is applied to pull it out. An attractor, like a magnet, has an effective range in which it can draw in its objects, known as its *basin*” (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 6). Attractors can be fixed, oscillating, or chaotic, and orbit around a point, curve or fractal space (“strange attractor”). A chaotic attractor “has three primary features: unpredictability, boundedness, and sensitivity to initial conditions” (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 12).

- **Fractals.** “Fractals are geometric structures with noninteger dimensions.” (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 16). The type of scale-free qualities they exhibit can be categorised as either involving geometric (exact) self-similarity or statistical (organic) self-similarity (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 17).

- **Hysteresis**—or system “memory.” “Hysteresis is formally defined as the lagging of changes in an effect behind changes in its cause over time. It gives rise to what is called a hysteresis loop” (Guastello & Liebovitch, 2009, p. 118).

- **Emergence.** Emergence can have micro and macro scaling. Emergence signifies the arising of higher orders such that new levels contain novel aspects: “order, vast and generative, arises naturally” (S. A. Kauffman, 1995, p. 25).

- **Open system.** In sympathy with open source philosophy, the (24 Jan 2010) Wikipedia account of *open system* seems eminently usable: “An open system is a system which continuously interacts with its environment. The interaction can take the form of information, energy, or material transfers into or out of the system boundary, depending on the discipline which defines the concept. An open system should be contrasted with the concept of a closed system which exchanges neither energy, matter, or information with its environment.”

The evolutionary emergence of ontological levels, each of which cannot be reduced to lower levels, has highly significant implications for academic inquiry into phenomena, when it is understood that such levels require consonant epistemological levels. Let us picture the following four ontological levels (eg. four of Boulding’s nine above, four of Schumacher’s
(1977) *adaequatio* levels, or, indeed, Wilber’s forwarding of Neoplatonic holarchy), where each letter indicates the emergence of an irreducible higher order aspect:

1. a
2. a + b
3. a + b + c
4. a + b + c + d

For *adaequatio*, these levels (1 - 4) require a corresponding epistemological schema:

1. α
2. α + β
3. α + β + χ
4. α + β + χ + δ

Should an attempt be made to address ontological level 2 by α without β, a category error will occur. Such is the case where organic (living) phenomena (including human beings) are addressed only through epistemologies derived from (Newtonian) physics. The level of epistemological complexity required for the study of human beings is even greater: χ and δ also needs to be enacted.\textsuperscript{110} Even in the macro *inorganic* world, “nonlinear complex systems cannot be reduced to special natural laws of physics, although its mathematical principles were discovered and at first successfully applied in physics” (Mainzer, 2007, p. 1).\textsuperscript{111} When we move to the next ontological level, as early as “the 18\textsuperscript{th} century Kant showed that self-organization of living organisms cannot be explained by a mechanical system of Newtonian physics” (Mainzer, 2007, p. 5) because

\textsuperscript{110} Even this schema is a simplification: physical phenomena can be divided into *macro* and *quantum* domains where macro domains can be addressed by classical (Newtonian) mechanics. Moreover, even in the macro domain it has been proved that “trajectories in the phase space of classical mechanics are neither completely regular nor completely irregular, but they depend very sensitively on the chosen initial states” (Mainzer, 2007, p. 2)!

\textsuperscript{111} Whilst, certainly, “the quantum world itself is neither conservative nor linear in general” (Mainzer, 2007, p. 3).
biological evolution is emergent in two senses. The first is epistemological, meaning that we cannot from physics deduce upwards to the evolution of the biosphere. The second is ontological... organisms [and the biopshere, human culture etc.] cannot be deduced from physics (Kauffman, 2008, p. 3)—

for “the agency that arises with life brings value, meaning, and action into the universe” (Kauffman, 2008, p. 72). Indeed, the creative agency that arises with human—and cetacean (Hampson, 2005)—life requires epistemologies which accord with such creativity (including the intellect and reflexivity). A poetics of the human realm is required. Yet social science appears to be a laggard in this respect. Despite such approaches as Dimitrov and Hodge’s (2002) social fuzziology, social science as a whole appears to still be unduly influenced by physical theories (Mainzer, 2007): radical complexity remains post-conventional.

0.3.1.2.1. **In context**

Gare (2005) indicates that most complexity theorists “have ignored the deeper philosophical implications (p. 62). The current study seeks to utilize such implications in service of postconventional exploration—as follows. It sits in reference to the complexity characteristic of emergence in that I have (radically) allowed emergence to take place with regard to the research process. The study has been allowed to grow organically, responding to certain internal and external contingencies such as the possibility of writing for the Integral Education: New Directions for Higher Learning (Esbjörn-Hargens, Reams, & Gunnlaugson, In Press) or the synchronicities with the Futures special issue on global mindset change (Verse Three) and the special issue of Futures responding to a previous special issue on (Wilberian) integral futures (Verse Two). An associated aspect of emergence comprises following intuition(s) or directions motivated by passion. Associated with emergence is autopoiesis (self-organisation or self-making): through emergence, the study has undertaken a certain bottom-up autopoiesis. This can be understood as forming a dialectic with top-down poiesis, the making of the dissertation by the “conscious I.” Also, in Verse One: Integral Reviews Postmodernism: The Way Out Is Through, an autopoiesis of Wilber’s integral theory has led to the postconventional theorising used in the study. Additionally, an autopoietic system maintains itself through hysteresis; in this regard, the study is informed by such questions as: To what degree are efforts to aptly transform mainstream school education thwarted by hysteresis, the weight of institutional inertia?
The complexity characteristic of the attractor is also used in the study—as a postconventional feature which contrasts with the (conventional level) imagery of the container. “Attractor” allows for the focus implicit in the metaphor of container without the necessity of the either/or logic of in or out. It rather facilitates the possibility of gradation or soft focus: a (probabilistic) range of “orbital distances” between attractor and items of inquiry, opening up potential dialogue with Other (as that which might be at great distance from the attractor).

The study also employs the non-Euclidean complexity theory geometry of fractal space. The theoretical schema developed in Verse Six: Education Beyond Modern Atomism, for example, involves three scales which can be understood in relation to this geometrical template. Additionally, the degree to which the various verses form microcosmoses in relation to the whole can also be identified with respect to fractal or holographic geometry. This quality of the scale-free produces a somewhat “decentralised” network (Davis & Sumara, 2006), one that can be contrasted both with the centralised network of conventional research and, at the other extreme, with a thoroughly rhizomatic (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987) narrative. Davis and Sumara identify that “the decentralized network, which consists of nodes nodding into grander nodes, usually on several levels of organization, is the ‘fingerprint’ of a complex unity” (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 88).

Lastly, complexity theory’s notion of open system is foregrounded. This can be understood as an exemplary postconventional feature, forming a contrast with closed system (as conventional). It is the openness of systems which allow them to dialogue with that beyond themselves (in myriad ways). In relation to Pondy and Mitroff’s (1979) schema identified above, the study’s interpretation of open system is holonic (Koestler, 1972) such that it signifies level 4 (“open systems”) and beyond, not merely level 4 alone. Indeed, oftentimes the complexity of the open system discussed is that of level 7 (“symbol processing systems”).
0.3.1.3. Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics can be denoted as pertaining to *theories of interpretation* (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 18). 

“Theory” can be interpreted either technically (“a methodical exposition of rules governing the interpretation of texts” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 18)) or philosophically (“analyzing the originary phenomenon of interpretation or understanding” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 18)), whilst “interpretation” can be understood as either the process of *making intelligible that which is unfamiliar* or in relation to a wider definition involving language as a whole (Grondin, 1991/1994). The genealogy of hermeneutics includes numerous historical moments including post-Aristotelian times, the advent of Christ, the Middle Ages, the reformation, seventeenth century rationalism, the Romantics, and nineteenth century historicism (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 20). Regarding the twentieth century, the writings of Heidegger, Gadamer and Ricoeur feature strongly. This introduction focuses on the work of Heidegger and Gadamer.

Heidegger revolutionised hermeneutics by philosophically expanding its domain—a process Grondin (Grondin, 1991/1994) describes as “universalisation” and “radicalisation”: “making sense of things …[became] a fundamental aspect of existence for a being that understands itself in time, and whose own being is concerned with being” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 20). Heidegger radicalised hermeneutics through “demonstrating its universal embeddedness in the care structure of Dasein” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 94) where Dasein signifies *existence* or *being (in-the-world)*. Such being-in-the-worldliness entails contingency—“ineluctable thrownness and historicity” (Grondin, 1991/1994) which Heidegger interprets as a *positive* ontological characteristic—one leading to “Dasein’s increased awareness of the possibilities at its disposal” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 107). (The foregrounding of contingency can be traced back to Stoicism (Gare, 2005).) Such a conception also has implication for the nature of understanding. Understanding from a Heideggerian perspective involves a kind of *dwelling in, a being at home with or knowing one’s way around* (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 93). As such, understanding is an *art*. Furthermore, the process of understanding involves a type of hermeneutic circling: to a new circumstance this involves the bringing forth and working with

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112 Broader uses of the term are also found—a condition Grondin (1991/1994) describes as a “vast amorphousness.”
that which one inevitably brings with one. Heidegger differentiates such circling from the “vicious circle” of formal logic, stating:

What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way. This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential *fore-structure* of Dasein itself. It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even of a circle which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. … The “circle” in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 195).

This can be described as a *virtuous* circle (also see Morin’s (1977/1992) complex *method*).

Following in Heidegger’s footsteps, Gadamer too critiqued the overapplication of technical ways of thinking. He also built upon the notion of the hermeneutic circle through applying the idea to historicism itself (which had been acting under the impression that it had to achieve certainty and objectivity in the same manner as the physical sciences). Through this, he identified a new modality of legitimacy for the human sciences, one which took “into account the ontological fore-structure of understanding” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 111) (i.e. that which precedes the manifestation of understanding). Grondin elaborates that Gadamer warns us to be attendant to our own biases so that the *otherness* of the text can present itself;

on the other hand, Gadamer does not fall into the positivist extreme of calling for a negation of the prejudice structure of understanding in order to let the thing speak for itself without being obfuscated by subjectivity (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 112).

Grondin finds an accord between Heidegger and Gadamer in this respect of being located *between* “the positivist dissolution of the self and Nietzsche’s universal perspectivism” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 112). Understanding is both *reproductive* and newly *productive* (Grondin, 1991/1994). Following on from an ecology of vectors regarding understanding as according to Gadamer—namely, understanding as intellectual grasp, practical know-how, agreement, application and translation (Grondin, 2002, pp. 36-46), respectively—understanding is also substantively *intersubjective*. Charles Taylor (2002) forwards Gadamer’s idea of intersubjectivity as validity claim for the human sciences (also
see § 0.2.5 Wilber’s integral theory regarding truth legitimacy for the Lower Left quadrant). Firstly, Taylor differentiates between knowing an object and understanding with an interlocutor: the first is unilateral, the second, bilateral. Moreover, in contrast to the goal of knowledge as “attaining some finally adequate explanatory language, which can make sense of the object, and will exclude all future surprises” (Taylor, 2002, p. 127), coming to an understanding remains substantively without such prospect of finality: there are different interlocutors with whom different understandings arise, and our present interlocutors can change. Yet more profoundly,

coming to an understanding may require that I give some ground in my objectives. The end of the operation is not control, or else I am engaging in a sham, designed to manipulate my partner while pretending to negotiate. The end is being able in some way to function together with the partner, and this means listening as well as talking, and hence may require that I redefine what I am aiming at (Taylor, 2002, p. 127).

Here we see a dialectic, an open interpenetrating system. In short, understanding in the human sciences is fundamentally an art, one “stemming from an instinctive sense of tact, for which there are no definable rules” (Grondin, 1991/1994, p. 108). This clearly has a bearing on education, such as with respect to learning and pedagogy: the necessity of a mechanical (technicist) imaginary is substantively problematised. Gadamer understands understanding as involving the fusion of horizons such as that between text and interpreter or between present and past (Gadamer, 1975/2004). Gadamer elaborates that

*the fusion of horizons that takes place in understanding is actually the achievement of language.* Admittedly, what language is belongs among the most mysterious questions that man [sic] ponders. Language is so uncannily near our thinking, and when it functions it is so little an object, that it seems to conceal its own being from us (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 370) (original italics).

Relationships to humanism from Heidegger and Gadamer are pertinent, not least because of Heidegger’s influence on subsequent French philosophers. In contrast to Heidegger—who critiques humanism as stemming from Plato’s notion of “idea” as a fixed essence, one complicit with the cultural over-extension of both intellectualisation and
technology—Gadamer valorises humanism (one attentive to the role of disjuncture) (Grondin, 1995) through indicating (through Grondin’s explanion) that for humanism, it is precisely the “essence” of mankind [sic] not to have an essence since it is able to surpass any fixed essence one could assign to it (Grondin, 1995, p. 119) (added emphasis).

Instead—after Herder (in contrast to Kant)—there are no scientific rules possible for the human sciences. Rather, it is a matter (following Hegel) of emphasising “the general characteristic of Bildung: keeping oneself open to what is other—to other, more universal points of view” (Grondin, 1995, p. 119). With echoes of the valorisation of context-dependency in contemporary postformal psychology literature, Grondin (1995) indicates Gadamer’s viewpoint that what distinguishes our humanity, is not a rational capacity that would catapult us into a divine world of pure ideas. Rather, it is the ability to go beyond our own particularity by taking into account the heritage that can help us grow above and beyond our limited selves (p. 119-120).

For Gadamer (1975/2004), beyond the illegitimate claims of scientism lies wisdom—one involving bildung (culture), sensus communis (after Vico), judgment (as context-dependent), taste (as mode of knowing) and play (as “the mode of being of the work of art itself” (Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 102)).

0.3.1.3.1. In context

The study attempts to work with the will and wiles of language. It creatively explores the linguistic turn (and beyond) with reference to hermeneutics, poststructuralism and poetics.

The study accords with the above statements regarding the legitimate directions for the human sciences. Understanding is both reproductive and newly productive (Grondin, 1991/1994).

113 “Metaphysics, humanism and the essence of technology form an intertwined whole for Heidegger” (Grondin, 1995).
Indeed, the study valorises the importance of understanding over, say, the memorisation of information. Understanding is understood as an art ultimately “without criteria” (Shaviro, 2009) (also see § 0.3.3.1.1 Text as music). Understanding involves dwelling in, being at home with, knowing one’s way around—noting “eco-” as home and familiar habitat. The intersubjective nature of “coming to an understanding” requires openness to listening and openness to possible future developments: understanding as an open system. As such, the study also accords with the critique of technicism that is offered by Heidegger and Gadamer. It valorises Bildung (in reconstructive postmodern guise), and in general follows a Gadamerian interpretation of the role of the humanities as part of the transdisciplinary (and postconventional) quest toward wisdom. At a meta-level, it seeks the fusion of horizons of a range of discourses (noting “fusion” as complex). Additionally, the study attempts to be attentive to both the local languaging of discourse communities and the possibility of transversing such localities.

0.3.2. Intensifying the post/conventional juncture

The following section addresses critical theory as an instrument which pertains to the juncture between the formal-conventional-modern level and that beyond.

0.3.2.1. Critical theory

Critical theory can be identified in relation to the Institute of Social Research, established in Frankfurt in 1923 (sometimes differentiated into first and second generation) and to the work of Habermas (third generation). This section focuses on the original impulses of critical theory rather than on the later iteration by Habermas. The former comprised The Frankfurt School—Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal and Friedrich Pollock—and its associates, including Erich Fromm (Held, 1980). It gained significant traction in the Anglphone world after it moved to the U.S. before World War Two (1934, returning to Frankfurt in 1953), and has remained a vital force ever since, including further evolution and dialogues with other traditions such as postmodernism (Giroux, 1991; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1993). The philosophical heritage that critical theory draws upon is that of German idealism, including its temporality (historicism and futures-orientation) and its

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114 With no finality—Hegelian “bad infinity” as good, perhaps?
address of “the nature of reason, truth and beauty” (Held, 1980, p. 15). Critique, too, forms part of this genealogy—

from a concern with the conditions and limits of reason and knowledge (Kant), to a reflection on the emergence of spirit (Hegel), and then to a focus on specific historical forms—capitalism, the exchange process (Marx)” (Held, 1980, p. 16).

The purpose of critical theory can be said to be twofold. Firstly, it “is concerned to investigate (aspects of) the social world ‘in the movement of its development’” (Held, 1980, p. 184). Through this, it seeks to help “create the precondition for [the] alteration [of historical conditions]” (Held, 1980, p. 204), for although philosophy cannot directly transform these conditions, critical theory indicates that it can help facilitate preconditions for such transformation.


In terms of critical theory’s role in education, it has been a major theoretical player, as indicated by the traction of the work of such figures as Henry Giroux, Stanley Aronowitz, Michael Apple and Michael Peters. The work of Paulo Freire should also be mentioned as a key figure in critical pedagogy. Giroux (2001) comments that, “the real issue is to reformulate the central contributions of critical theory in terms of new historical conditions, without sacrificing the emancipatory spirit that generated them” (p. 41). At the same time, due regard
should be given for classical understandings (Giroux, 2001, p. 168). Gutek indicates that “Critical Theory focuses on two related elements in education: critique and reform” (Gutek, 1988, p. 323). The account below is organised accordingly.

Regarding critiqued items in critical education: to a degree, there is a recognition of “new times, old pedagogies” (McWilliam & Dawson, 2008, p. 5); yet there is also a recognition of worsening conditions through economism. One general understanding is that of hidden curricula (Gatto, 1992; Lynch, 1989) or the “grammar of schooling” (Tyack & Tobin, 1994): “the norms and values that are implicitly, but effectively, taught in schools and that are not usually talked about in teachers’ statements of end or goals” (Apple, 2004, p. 78). Indeed, Giroux goes as far as to ironically comment on the “not so hidden curriculum organized around markets and militarization” (Giroux & Giroux, 2006, p. 23)(added italics).

Overprioritised market ideologies—economism—feature strongly as a critiqued item. This includes “the commodification of schools and intellectual knowledge” (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xvi) and “the proposition that the interests of business should drive nearly all aspects of schooling” (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xvi) such as the notion that reading and writing are instrumentally regarded as necessary ‘skills’ for the job market (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xvi). Giroux (following Bill Readings) suggests that the consumer-oriented educational corporation is more concerned with accounting than accountability. More strongly, he forwards Adorno’s understanding that market identities and relationships represent a prohibition on thinking itself (Giroux, 2001, p. xxiii). Militarism, too, is implicated (Giroux & Giroux, 2006).

A general critique of the overuse of positivist or technicist epistemologies is also identified. Positivism tends toward the undue “consensus theory of science” (Apple, 2004, p. 83) for example. Michael Apple (2004) elaborates that in addition to the undue separation of fact and value, “the atomistic, positivistic, and strict empirical frame of mind so prevalent in our thought…has difficulty with the critically oriented notion of the necessity of a plurality of, and conflict about, ways of looking at the world” (p. 124). Technicism is also critiqued such as indicated in such languaging as “‘input-output,’ ‘predictability,’ and ‘cost-effectiveness.’” (Giroux, 1988, p. 1), the undue prioritisation of technology (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xvi) or prepackaged curricula (Apple, 1995, p. 130-1). In general, education is seen to be “suffering from narrative sickness” (Freire, 1970/2006, p. 71): education as bank (Freire, 1970/2006, p. 72) and schools seen as a private good (Giroux, 2001, p. xxii) in which the teacher is a “dutiful technician or de-skilled corporate drone” (Giroux, 2001, p. xxii). Kincheloe (2008)
summarises the critical perspective as education being too formal, intractable, decontextualised, universalistic, reductionistic and one dimensional.

Conversely, valorised items in critical education orient as follows. Firstly, education is seen as pertaining to the whole of the culture or society, not simply that part of society which is schooling (Giroux, 2005). In terms of identities of education as a whole, critical education identifies as important the asking of big questions such as “what schooling is for” (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xviii); it also offers some answers—notably, that we need to “[rethink] the language of schooling” (Giroux, 1988, p. 1) “toward a language of critique and possibility” (Giroux, 1988, p. 175). Education should be seen (among other things) as an end in itself (Aronowitz, 2001)—indicating that curricula should be valued “for their pleasures and for their role in student empowerment” (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xvi). This involves learning as a joyful activity (Aronowitz, 2001, p. xviii) and forms of teaching that are inclusive, caring, respectful, economically equitable, and whose aim, in part, is to undermine those repressive modes of education that produce social hierarchies and legitimate inequalities while simultaneously providing students with the knowledge and skills needed to become well-rounded critical actors and social agents. (Giroux, 2001, p. xxvi)

In terms of the place of education in society, education should be understood as forming part of the public sphere (S. Aronowitz, 2001, p. xviii). Regarding identities of educators and students, there is a valorisation of teachers as “transformative intellectuals” (Giroux, 1988, p. 121) and both teachers and students seen as “subjects” and “re-creators” (Freire, 1970/2006, p. 69). The epistemological identity of critical education could be summarised as “concrete utopianism” (Giroux, 2001, xxi) involving process of dialectics (Giroux, 1981, p. 114) or “dialogics” (Freire, 1970/2006, p. 87) and complex integration (Apple, 2004).

0.3.2.1.1. In context

In contrast to the Wilberian foregrounding of the criticality of the juncture between Green and Yellow/Teal vMemes, the study “regenerates” the criticality of the juncture between Orange (modernism) and that beyond. Such an emphasis is similar to the general direction given by the critical theory of Horkheimer and Adorno. In general, this entails seeking to help “create
the precondition for [the] alteration [of historical conditions]” (Held, 1980, p. 204). In keeping with critical theory the study critiques technicism, scientism, economism, narrow pragmatism, and reductionism in general, whilst—also in keeping with Horkheimer and Adorno’s critical theory—particular valorisations are given toward metaphysics, integrative thinking, the art of dialectical thinking, complexity, multiperspectivity, dialogicality between subject and object, the identification of interests, and congruence between content and style.

The current study also sits in accordance with the items critiqued and valorised in the above account of critical education. Critique includes that toward hidden (and not so hidden) curricula, especially regarding economicist and positivist ideology; valorised features include the asking of big questions, the value of joy, educators as transformative intellectuals, and an interest in emancipatory spirit.

0.3.3. Transversing postconventional levels

The following section locates ecosophy, poststructuralism and poetics as instruments which transverse such postconventional levels as Green, Yellow (Teal) and Turquoise. Ecosophy, for example, simultaneously expresses Green thinking whist also includes address of hierarchies;\textsuperscript{115} particular text produced by Derrida’s appears to pertain to the post-Green level of the Magician (see Verse One) whilst Wilber locates poststructuralism as Green,\textsuperscript{116} indicating the aforementioned transversalisation of poststructuralism; whilst Poetics attempts a yet-wider transversal integration across ontological, epistemological and methodological domains.

0.3.3.1. Ecosophy

Ecosophy was coined separately by Arne Naess (1989) and Félix Guattari (1989/2000), about 130 years after Haeckel’s 1869 identification of ecology. The concept of ecology is intimately connected with that of relationality. Indeed, Roszak (1995) identifies that “in contrast to the

\textsuperscript{115} Ecological thinking involves both hierarchical and heterarchical considerations.

\textsuperscript{116} How can deconstruction be identified as first tier when Derrida’s text is identified in relation to the second tier?
atomistic materialism of nineteenth-century physics, ecology is the study of connectedness” (p. 7).

For Naess—Norwegian philosopher and advocate for the deep ecology movement—ecosophy refers to particular personal orientations toward deep ecology (for instance, he labels his own orientation *Ecosophy T* (Naess, 1989)): it is thus intrinsically pluralistic. In his usage, *ecosophy* is differentiated from *ecology* partly through the former’s incorporation of values.117 Regarding distinction between deep ecology and shallow ecology, Naess, Glasser, Drengson, Devall, and Sessions (2005) comment:

> what characterizes the deep movement (in relation to the shallow) is not so much the *answers* that are given to “deep questions” but rather *that* “deep questions” are raised and taken seriously (p. 29) (original emphasis).

They note that depth “must include not just systematic philosophical deepness, but also the ‘deepness’ of proposed social changes” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 22) because, in contrast to the genealogical streams of both Western Romanticism and traditional Eastern approaches, “the dominant modern Western trend has been unrealistic and self-destructive” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 91). Naess’ *Ecosophy T* (further) indicates the potential spiritual depth of ecosophies through his identification of the “fundamental norm” of Self-realization (Naess et al., 2005, p. 52). Naess et al. state both “that the higher the levels of Self-realization attained by a person, the more any further increase depends upon the Self-realization of others (Naess et al., 2005, p. 52) and that “plants and animals also have a right to unfolding and self-realisation” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 165).118 Deep ecology can be understood as a quintessential futures-oriented approach in that it has “a long-range maximal perspective of time and place,” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 43) such that “any short-range solution should cover at least the next fifty years”

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117 Naess indicates ecosophy, unlike ecology, would not be studied academically due to this inclusion of values. Critical approaches, however, *do* explicitly include values, and thus ecosophy can be academically embraced with reference to critical theory.

118 “In Naess’s view one can arrive at wide-identification by drawing on a broad diversity of philosophical or religious ultimate premises, with roots ranging from Christian Stewardship to the Gaia Hypothesis to Naess’s own ontologically inspired ‘Self-realization!’” (Glasser et al., 2005).
Naess et al., 2005, p. 17); and indeed, “a thousand years has...to do with the problem of today” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 19). Ecosophy can also be understood as an integrative approach in that it refers to a variously multi-leveled or hierarchical^{119} “total view” (Naess et al., 2005, p. 17). In so doing, it potentially calls to mind ecosophy’s suffix Sophia (wisdom).^{120}

Whilst Naess’s usage of ecosophy foregrounds that which is commonly identified as “environment,” Guattari’s (1989/2000) usage (less common in Anglophone discourse) explicitly transverses three domains: he explains that ecosophy is “an ethico-political articulation...between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations and human subjectivity)” (pp. 41-2). It emphasises, in part, the socio-political—specifically in response to disequilibria caused by “Integrated World Capitalism” (pp. 41-2) whose decentred sites of power include “structures producing signs, syntax and...subjectivity” (p. 47). Regarding environment, Guattari states that “if no remedy is found, the ecological disequilibrium...will ultimately threaten the continuation of life on the planet’s surface” (p. 27). In relation to the socius, he identifies “Third World...pauperisation” (p. 29) involving the “long-term establishment of immense zones of misery, hunger and death” (p. 31)—now including parts of the materially developed world. He also identifies oppressive marginalisation and unemployment, noting that “young people...are crushed by the dominant economic relations” (p. 33). Regarding the domain of the individual, he mentions such malaises as “loneliness, boredom, anxiety and neurosis” (p. 28) and identifies the prevalent standardization of behaviour as an “ossification” (p. 27). He evaluates the whole crisis as a type of contraction and developmental regression—“a sort of general movement of implosion and regressive infantalization” (p. 27)—a regression toward the pre-conventional surely pointing yet more strongly to the need for postconventional thinking.

Transversing the three domains of environment, socius and psyche can be identified a range of features including artistry, complexity, creativity, dissensus, ethics, evolution, many-sidedness, mutuality, openness, and transversality. Guattari also explicitly differentiates the

^{119} Naess’ embrace of hierarchical understanding problematises Wilber’s conceptualisation of the Green developmental level.
^{120} Such as in relation to the spiritual-philosophical approach of sophiology found in Vladimir Sergeievich Soloviev’s “Great Synthesis” of “integral reason and sobornost” (spiritual community) (Bischof, 2005).
three domains. For instance, regarding *environmental ecology*, “anything is possible—the worst disasters or the most flexible evolutions” (p. 66); *social ecology* “will consist in developing specific practices that will modify and reinvent the ways in which we live” (p. 34); whilst *mental ecology*

will lead us …[in part] to search for antidotes to mass-media and telematic standardization, the conformism of fashion, the manipulation of opinion by advertising, surveys, etc. Its ways of operating will be more like those of an artist (p. 35)—

a poetic sensibility is called for. In addressing mental ecosophy, Guattari valorises a host of features such as the *included middle* of postformal logic, organic metaphors, “creative proliferation” (p. 55), the drama of multiplicity (pluralism) and the baroque. Of the three ecological registers, Guattari identifies a significant undervaluation of mental ecosophy.

Two general directions of mental ecosophy can be furthered—one descriptive, the other normative. Descriptively, mental ecosophy relates to the *radical relationality* (and deep dialogue) of conceptual ecologies. This includes cross-level connectivity such as, for example, conceptualising “a psyche the size of the Earth” (Hillman, 1995). Normatively, mental ecosophy asks such questions as “would an enlightened humanity clear-cut the forests?” (Montuori & Combs, 2004, p. 227) (original italics), and indicates that the future of life on Earth depends on whether the richest fifth of the world’s people, having fully met their material needs, can turn to non-material sources of fulfilment (Durning, 1995).

### 0.3.3.1.1. In context

Ecosophy plays a multidimensional role in the study. It is identified as a quintessential postconventional vector. But it is also used to meta-cohere postconventionalities. It is a theoretical interest of the study; it also acts as a normative (postmodern: dynamic,

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121 The baroque here can be understood in a larger context—see eg. Deleuze (2006), MacLure (2006).
indeterminate, evolving) *telos*. The study endeavours to bring together Naess’ and Guattari’s “ecosophies” in a novel way whilst furthering the term’s etymology. The study particularly focuses on the under-addressed *noetic* register (the differently revealing “mental ecosophy” / “ecologies of mind” / “conceptual ecosystems”)—including the development of a theoretical schema regarding eco-logics or radical relationality (supported by Roszak’s (1995) identification of ecology as the study of connectedness). In terms of normativity, it indicates the salience of identifying the well-being and well-becoming of bodymind (including psyche), human culture, and biosphere.

Ecosophy substantively informs the worldview of the study in the combined senses of Naess and Guattari. At a simple level, Naess’ deep ecology can be interpreted as forming part of Guattari’s more general schema across the three registers.

The current study directly manifests social ecosophy in terms of the valorisation of socio-cultural diversity—as per postcolonialism, equivalent to the health or robustness of an ecosystem being reliant on biodiversity (and that of decentralised or elaborately holographic noetic complexity)—through reference to both Native American culture and to Islamic culture. The study is also informed by the Chinese form of dialectics (Taoist Taijitu). It should also be noted that integral theorising itself (whether Aurobindean, or Wilberian, for instance) substantively incorporates non-Western elements—the Aurobindean stream in part stems from particular Hindu orientations, whilst Wilber foregrounds particular Buddhist understandings (in addition to Hindu schemas). Moreover, integral theorising (in potential at least) attempts to addresses and enact complex *global* perspectives.

### 0.3.3.2. Poststructuralism

“*Postmodernism is in open conflict with fundamentalist trends in our world (we can include market fundamentalism in that equation as well)*”

*(Sim, 2005, p. 12).*
Of all the attractors in this study, poststructuralism is perhaps the trickiest to clearly articulate. This is not least because many of those labelled as “poststructural” have not identified with the term. Indeed, it would not be out of keeping to entitle this section “poststructuralism,” particularly in light of the paradoxical aspects of Derrida’s deconstruction. Furthermore, Derrida understands poststructuralism to be an Anglophone-originated term referring to a group of mainly French authors, one inclined toward *deconstruction as method*, a vector Derrida (1985) distances himself from. Perhaps it is better to interpret Derrida’s writings as having a complex relationship with the term *poststructuralism*, especially in light of his position toward structuralism and phenomenology wherein he signals not only the phenomenology of structures but also the *structure* of phenomenological origins (Derrida, 1967/2001, p. 210). Indeed, as the study indicates Derrida’s texts tend toward inherent complexity—a feature or sensibility the study tends to valorise (albeit in a different way to Derrida such that atoms and clarity may also be entertained as special cases of inherent complexity). Such complexity can also be understood in relation to the play of difference, a feature shared across perhaps all poststructural writers. This difference may manifest as a non-mechanised type of dialectics such as can be identified in relation to Levinas with regard to the valorisation and ever-presence of the Other. Through the play of difference the study links the Other to the notions of indeterminacy and mystery. The play of difference also appears in the philosophising of Deleuze (1968/1994) and in that of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), whilst in Foucault it surfaces in the role of disjuncture and contingency in historical development (Flynn, 1994) in relation to progressive notions—a contrast to Wilber’s less contingent trajectories. An analogous dialectic could perhaps be seen in Nietzsche’s (1872/2009) address of Apollonian and Dionysian forces which bring order and chaos into tango.

Additionally, poststructuralism can be identified as foregrounding the status of metaphor in philosophical discourse:

> It is not difficult to see a tradition ordered around the value of presence would be wary of metaphor, which speaks obliquely, exploits lateral connections, insinuates things

Indeed, a critique of Derrida is that his writing is unclear and too tricky. But perhaps through postformal reasoning such trickiness can at times be interpreted as significant as the wiles of the Trickster (Conroy & Davis, 2002)?
without really saying them, suggests ideas without making them explicit (Bennington & Derrida, 1993, p. 119).

Yet Paul de Man (1978), for example, states that “all philosophy…is dependent upon figuration, to be literary and…all literature is to some extent philosophical” (p. 30). The current study, however, would not regard this as a “condemnation” (p. 30) but rather a valorisation of liminality and, like Lakoff and Johnson (1999), an indication of due embodiment.

0.3.3.2.1. In context

Relations between poststructural langauging and the study have been addressed in § 0.1.3.6 Languaging.

The study includes address of power interests. This is often accompanied through supporting marginalised voices—including that of the subservient partner in binary oppositions or dialectical units. This may yield unexpected asymmetries such as the different lengths of these sections on *academic discourses as instruments*. (Should not each instrument be ascribed a different sensibility?) There may also occasionally be irony to the form. For instance, poststructuralism strongly tends toward the valorisation of *difference* and *the non-integrative*, yet the Boyer’s scholarship type which is most marginalised is the scholarship of integration. Apropos, poststructuralism’s interest in de-marginalisation in this instance could actually serve to valorise integration! Such is the delight of paradox.

Such an idea heralds the study’s sensibility as tending away from notions of absolute certainties or truths. This may take the form of context-dependency, multiperspectivality, or complex identifications which contain dynamic intra-contestations and openings to Other. A common motif in the study is [sic!] “…can be identified as…” rather than “is.”

The study perhaps contextualises (a simple identification of) poststructuralism through reflexively addressing poststructuralism’s interest in valorising a certain form of relativism: by employing this manoeuvre, it suggests that there may well be certain contexts in which

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123 Auto-deconstruction!

Colebrook (2001) identifies Deleuze’s quest as not merely being interdisciplinary, but in seeking to transform each field brought into play—an interpenetrative dialogue yielding an authentic transdisciplinarity. Intent toward the fields brought into exploration in this study is similar—as illustrated by the following postconventional instrument identified, namely, poetics.

0.3.3.3. Poetics

A critical poetics transcending both the empire of reason and the asylum of un-reason has become an urgent concern for a number of contemporary thinkers. (Kearney, 1998, p. 9)

Poetics—as I am using the term—is not an academic field as such, but rather draws upon a number of fields—including Hermetic-Neoplatonic romanticism, postformal thinking, complexity theory, ecosophy, hermeneutics and poststructural literary theory—to form a coherence around the term. The following presents an overview of this coherence—through poetics as expressed as ontology, epistemology and methodology, respectively—followed by “gap-diving” (Roy, 2006a) into Bachelardian poetics as exemplary.

In terms of poetics as ontology, poetics problematises the necessity of a sharp separation between cosmos and psyche—or, indeed, between ontology and epistemology; instead, it ascribes a “field-likeness” as occurring between the two (Mathews, 2007), a “hidden hand” between science and poetry124 (Camus, 2008) where metaphysics can meet metaphor in an elaborate and dynamic union. As Abbs (1989) indicates:

124 Relations between poetry and the poetic may be understood holarchically, which is to say that poetry forms a subset of poetics.
The music of poetry has the power to free language from its general bureaucratic servitude to literal meaning and one dimensional denotation. It opens language to the innate creativity of the speculative and questing mind and makes it a prime target of exploration. In this it joins the other great force of metaphor—for in the act of creating metaphor we carry across meanings, references, associations from one level to another, from one order to another. Metaphor is a major vehicle for metaphysical thinking. In both words—metaphor and metaphysics—the meta refers to a crossing over. Through the creation of metaphor we hold up other intangible worlds for contemplation, for speculation, even for revelation (p. 113).

Poetics achieves this through identifying “axes of meaning” (Mathews, 2007) (also see § 0.5.3.1 Creative Transdisciplinarity). Although focusing on metaphor, Abbs infers a valorisation of metaphysics in his text. Others, however, might seek to fundamentalise the place of metaphor in relation to metaphysics. Bennington, however, warns of attempts to do this (thus having implications for such identifications as integral as “post-metaphysical” (Wilber, 2006)), noting that “any attempt to exceed metaphysics which appeals to the concept of metaphor to do so can only fail, because this concept is essentially a metaphysical one” (Bennington & Derrida, 1993, pp. 125-6): “metaphor is itself a metaphor” (Bennington & Derrida, 1993, p. 126). The converse—the fundamentalisation of metaphysics without linguistic realisation—would be equally problematic. Rather, the two dialectically dance together. Such correspondences might be understood by way of complexity theory’s notion of elaborate fractals (Davis & Sumara, 2006), in which metaphysics and metaphor are placed onto the same non-Euclidean plane.

The pertinence of the meta-dialogue between metaphor and metaphysics is also indicated by Jung. In this regard, postformal researcher, Labouvie-Vief (1992) forwards Jung’s understanding that “human experience always remains intimately tied to the symbolic” such that “out of the dialogue between the rational sign and the nonrational symbolic individuals can activate the ‘transcendental function’” (p. 216).

Additionally, due regard for such understandings as Jung’s synchronicity facilitates identification of cosmic poetry which pulls us into its world as we simultaneously apply our wor(l)ds onto it. Affirmatively, poetics is “an exploration of the human powers to make (poiesis) a world in which we may poetically dwell” (Kearney, 1998, p. 8) (original italics).
One discovers oneself in the world. And such discovery occurs afresh, as a substantive refreshment, a pressing of the computer’s refresh button: Gadamer (through Baker) indicates that “the poetic text positively brings the past down to us as something contemporaneous with us” (Baker, 2002, P. 143), and so I demonstrate the poetic here and now. Through such palpability, consciousness can realize a (re)generation: human text as a timeless flowering like “a becoming of language which demands perpetual rebirth” (Kearney, 1998, p. 111). The necessary differentiation between discovery and creation is problematised. For the scholarship of integration, new knowledge arises from new creation, new meaning from new coherings. Poetics can also be identified as poststructural both in that it offers generative defamiliarisation and that the threat of difference is not domesticated; poetics is/as complex, operating as (or at the level of) an open (onto)semantic system.

In terms of poetics as epistemology, Aristotle’s (335BCE/1996) Poetics addressed the structural characteristics of tragedy. This can be taken as a example of the more general case of poetics as addressing the structural characteristics of art. Yet what constitutes the boundaries of art? Heidegger offers a perspective regarding nature as art in addition to human nature producing art (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Still further, the German romantics positioned the entire cosmos as art(ful). If poetics pertains to theories of art, then, through such expanded notions of art, poetics can refer to theories regarding all phenomena, i.e. theory in general. The perspective given toward such theorising, however, issues forth from aesthetic (holarchically including technical forms) rather than merely technical templates. Such an understanding accords with Heidegger’s discussion regarding the full potential of technê as occurring only when due regard is given toward poiesis (Heidegger, 1954/1977). Epistemological poetics thus comprises an artful approach to theorising—theorising as poetics—stemming from a way of knowing which regards the world aesthetically—and, we might add here, aesthetics as inclusive of ethics: whereas anaesthetic infers numbness, aesthetic connotes “enlivened being”: ethics is poeticised, postformalised: “responsibility” transforms from moral imperative to the ability to respond (Sacks, 1986/2004). There is “an alliance of the poetic with the political” (Dillon, 1996, p. 199). A socio-cultural poetics would thus be expected to involve a more nuanced form than socio-cultural theory. Social science enters the more complex arena of the humanities; science learns art. Furthermore, poetic

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125 Theorising as poetics can also be identified as sitting in relation to Gidley’s (2009) delicate theorising.
epistemologies inherently embrace poiesis: a dynamic, co-arising intimate dialogue occurs between how we know and what we create. Motivated by passion for the possible, it can offer (alternative) visions. We can bring forth a poetic viewpoint, and create (an interpretation of) a reality. As we write and read, conceptual metaphors are complexly “worlded” together. Creativity forms an important part of poetic epistemology. What play of form? What play of text? What form of play? In-forming?

In terms of poetics methodology, a general via negitava framing is that poetics lies beyond instrumentalism; it can “counter the linguistic closure that arises as a result of the occlusion by the global economic language” (Conroy, 2004, p. 39). Gitlin and Peck (2005, 2008) further this criticality—the significance of changing the text itself not only the object(ive) of the text—in relation to a critical poetics of education. The regeneration of education not only entails arguments in favour of regeneration, but “argument” itself has to open itself into that to which it is pointing. If education should be more inspiring, then the text used to communicate this should be inspiring itself! The fractal realisation of “nanotextology” (see Verse One)! In terms of a positive framing, this can be identified as poetic dwelling. The preferred ideological future arrives “home” through the link of the textual mapping in the present: a dual-level-register-ecology of preferred place. An echo of eco.

A useful perspective for exemplifying poetics comprises Gaston Bachelard’s (1958/1994) “poetics of space”. This can be analysed in relation to four vectors: phenomenology, primary characteristics, anthrocosmics and semantic depth, respectively. Regarding phenomenology, Bachelard (1958/1994, p. 3) foregrounds poetics as pertaining to a phenomenological approach, one attentive of details. Regarding primary characteristics—Bachelard (1958/1994) explains that, in relation to the poetics of a house (as metaphor for inhabited space in general),

we must go beyond…description…to the primary virtues, those that reveal an attachment that is native in some way to the primary function of inhabiting (p. 4).

In other words, a discernment is necessary to assess key features. Regarding anthrocosmics: in keeping with Mathews’ (2007) identification of (onto)poetics as involving “field-likeness” between psyche, cosmos and meaning, Bachelard (1958/1994) refers to poetics as involving “anthrocosmic ties” (p. 4) between “reality” and “virtuality” (p. 5). Lastly, in terms of
semantic depth, Bachelard refers to “the psychological elasticity of an image that moves us at an unimaginable depth” (p. 6). As with an image, so with a word, a theory, an inquiry, a person, a dolphin, a dialogue, a world.

0.3.3.3.1. In context

Poetics variously surfaces throughout the study. It forms part of postformal poetic ecosophy in Verse Three: Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy; it acts as a semantic attractor in relation to the development or complexification of the concept of theory such as in the move from integral education theory to integral education poetics; and it generally infuses the text with a sense of the poetic—to varying degrees. Specifically,

- the study allows for certain liminalities—anthrocosmics—between ontology and epistemology;
- the sensibility of the study’s languaging tends toward semantic depth. It gestures toward an “artistic transcription of philosophy” (Bennington & Derrida, 1993, p. 121). This counters undue economicist or positivist closure;
- in its critique of Wilber’s overgeneralised languaging (in matters investigated here), the study valorises detailing as forming a necessary dialectic with generalisation;
- poetics is intended to harmonise (or ecologise) with the ethical: the study has transformative-aesthetic intentions;
- the study often employs consciously metaphorical constructions, mostly in the format \( x \text{ as } y \)—for example, researcher as poet (see Lakoff and Johnson (1999, 2003) regarding conceptual metaphor); and
- poetics valorises education—and therefore this study—as (an) art, enables the identity of researcher as poet or composer—(transgressively) sculpting or dramatising postconventional poetics; creation as knowledge, knowing as creating…

0.3.3.3.1.1. Text as music

Poetically, Abbs (2003) describes “one formula for metaphysical poetry” as “incongruous matter. Disjunctive structure. An encompassing frame. The thread of music” (p. 124) (original italics) through which “there can be metaphysical cadences, metaphysical tones and textures” (p. 128, n. 34). Apropos, a poetic perspective on the study is that of an allowance of
disjuncture within an encompassing musical “text-compass,” themes “(in)congruating” in the many (native) directions of an integral philosophising through a poetics of textual music.

Music? A particular aesthetic direction the study takes is indeed a light exploration of text as music. Such a framing attempts to subtly raise awareness toward a fuller range of textual qualities (mostly inclusive of explanatory intentions), shifting attention from conventional contracted address (comprising the “flat” surface of ex-plan-ation) toward the more inclusive (postconventional) address of whole-text communication “frequencies”—as this section on Poetics exemplifies. The general direction is in keeping with the postformal call for aesthetic paradigms in education—and thus in research. The aesthetic or poetic has the potential to convey adequate complexity to match postconventional expectations. Conventions are included, and patterns produced, yet the overall result—a unique art-e-fact—is non-formulaic, an outcome not readily assimilated by the particle-ism of modern atomism, the particularism of economism, or the particular analytical expectations of logical positivism.

Lest overstatements of the case be made, one should note that whilst the musical metaphors signal difference, such difference may sometimes be merely that of increased awareness of that which already exists rather than something new created. Moreover, the study only carries a light exploration of the poetic rather than an enactment of a substantively poetic form.

There will now be a breakdown into composition structure, composition process, and musical elements.

Regarding composition structure: Within the general metaphor of music, there are a number of features arising from a collection of specific (or sub-)metaphoric directions—as follows.

The general framing can be playfully interpreted as study as conceptual concerto.

**Instruments.** I am regarding the academic fields I drawing upon as (eg. musical) “instruments” suitable for postconventional exploration. This is perhaps a doubly transgressive manoeuvre—first, in that these discourses are brought into a transversal playing field, and second, that “instruments” can be regarded as a play on “instrumentalism,” a term

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126 A lateral connection here is that Fox and Sheldrake (1996) discuss angels as “musical in nature.”
often used in relation to more technicist or economistic ends: the study effects a postconventional move from reductive instrumentalism to creative instruments!

Overture. The extended introduction of the study is identified as an overture. This accords with the sub-metaphoric direction of study as opera (foregrounding dramatic qualities in the structure and/or text carried by the multiperspectivality of an ecology of voices). Overtures introduce that which is to follow, variously inclusive of proceeding material. In the case of overture as study’s introduction, the drama of the study’s argument is emphasised through identifying the study’s aims and indicating critical contrasts between the study and Other (such as that which has gone before—as evidenced by literature reviews\footnote{Noting the possibility of literature re-view as creative (Montuori, 1998).}).

Movements. The study’s sections are identified as movements. (They can be simultaneously\footnote{Using both/and postconventional logic.} identified as attractors—see § 0.3.1.2 Complexity theory.) This accords with study as symphony (foregrounding overall coherence via complexity). “Movement” also conveys process philosophising (Whitehead, 1979; Gare, 2002), an emphasis on a dynamic ends-in-view (Dewey, 1997) rather than that of “the final word.”

Verses. Verses represent chapters. In addition to verse’s association with conversation and versatility, the notion of verse accords with study as song in that, etymologically, verse signifies a line or section of a canticle (song) or psalm (sacred song) and is derived from versus (to turn or bend—regarding the activity of ploughing line after line). Verse has multiple resonances. If the study is a(n epic) song then it can be seen to have both lyrical (noetic etc.) and musical (affective etc.) components. Perhaps it also suggests that it is “well-versed” in its material? Perhaps it also indicates a multiverse of understandings which nonetheless cohere into one universe (or holographic representation thereof)? Perhaps it intimates that to produce a Ph.D. one just has to “plough on”?

Intermezzo. Between each verse is written an intermezzo. An intermezzo is a short piece connecting two larger pieces on either side of it. This accords with study as instrumental piece in several movements or sections.
Cadenza. The study’s conclusion is identified as a cadenza—an elaborate flourish, often containing improvisation, occurring at or near the end of a concerto, in this case a conceptual concerto. Like all terms, cadenza reveals-and-conceals. Specifically, it somewhat conceals the summarising aspect found in the term conclusion, yet better reveals the dramatic quality of reaching the end, and of the intensification of argument (§ 7.2 Centirpetus) found there.

Now turning our attention to composition process: Using the text as music lens, the study’s composition process can be offered through four general directions—as follows.

Classical: composition by design. The classical music metaphor indicates the consciously complex design of the study. One is perhaps reminded of Esbjorn-Hargens’ (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006) Wilberian “integral by design” vector here. Occasional references are also made to the baroque and romantic. Baroque (Deleuze, 2006)—also see MacLure (2006)—is used in part to signify an exaggeration of contrasting poles such as transcendence and immanence, centre and periphery, or stillness and motion. The rhythmic nature and relations to the tonic of much of Bach’s work, for example, indicates a central constancy or “stillness” of change whilst counterpoints, elaborations, ornamentations indicate extensions or “orbiting” movements. Romantic music can be associated with Romantic philosophy such as in the valorisation of affective qualities.

Jazz: composition by improvisation. Montuori’s (2003) thought as jazz comes to mind here—the foregrounding of contingent or emergent qualities in the creative process.

Rock/pop/dance/techno: composition through topologising. Unlike the complexity of classical music and of jazz, rock / pop and dance / techno tend toward the repetition of simplified motifs. This metaphoric direction indicates purposes of clarity—perhaps even dramatisation—of argument.

World/folk: composition through honouring authentic voices. Transversing the other vectors one can entertain directions stemming from world or folk music regarding authenticity, hermeneutics, and a sense of planetary consciousness.

Of course, genre hybrids or liminalities are also possible and often desirable.
We now move on to explore the study’s text as music in terms of musical elements, namely, instrumentation, motifs, melody, harmony, rhythm, and mood/style.

**Instrumentation.** The instrumentation of a transdisciplinary conceptual concerto involves the various sets of “instruments” found in the overlapping set of academic fields brought into play in the study. Each instrument has its own tonal qualities or “colour palate” (to change metaphors to the visual), and range of possibilities.

**Motifs.** Motifs (themes) and leitmotifs (dominant themes) are to be found throughout the study. These can either be with respect to content (such as “a critical contrast between Orange and post-Orange”) or style (such as leaving strands of thought open as invitations for further dialogue and exploration—as befits the postconventional inclusion of speculative elements).

**Melody and harmony.** The linear narrative flow of the study can be regarded as its melody, whilst one interpretation of harmony is that of *semantic harmony:* enactments of the “poetics of transgression” toward terms such as employing “economy” in both senses of parsimony and economics—a postconventional/poststructuralist manoeuvre.

**Rhythm.** Tempos can vary from a contemplative *andante* through a perhaps-unnoticed *moderato* to the fast pacing of an *allegro.* Moreover, time signatures can vary. Specifically, as the standard 4/4 (or 2/4) time signature can be likened to walking, so conventional text could be understood in terms of comfortably *talking.* But—as Derrida (Derrida, 1967/1997) has indicated—the expectation of *writing as talking* can be problematised. What if text took on a 3/4 or 6/8 time signature? It might become lilting, jaunty, swinging, waltzing, playfully graceful, “descendedly” spiritual or of a rhyming poetic nature. For example, in Verse 3 (§ 3.3.3 *Poetics*) I write with a sense of triplets and recursion (three “its”; the three terms, psyche, meaning and cosmos, respectively; and again, world, word, ourselves; an elaborative iteration of wor(l)d and that of (onto)poetics/poetry; also noting the alliteration of lies, likeness and alive, that of poetry, pulls, perspective, and that of cosmic, comprising, cosmos, come):

Instead lies a cosmic poetry which ‘pulls us into its question, its repose, its regard’ an *ontopoetics* comprising a ‘field-likeness’ between psyche, meaning and cosmos, a
perspective opening up a ‘world hidden within the world’ such that the world, the word and ourselves may come yet more alive.

Conversely, a text that regularly “lost a beat”—as in the case of a 7/8 time signature—might come across as dense and insistently interruptive of full explanation in its reaching for the next point, perhaps like a characterisation of twentieth century poetry, terse, oblique. Consider:

*accordance*—from *accordare*—literally means ‘being of one heart’ (noting two semantic harmonics of *being*) whilst an aphesis of such *accord* is a musical ‘chord.’ ‘Verition’ might suggest we should not (merely) quest “truth,” but rather, a *heartfelt accordion of truth*. Habits of our heart, harmonics of our text, de-/re-constructed” (Verse 1, p 142).

Lastly, a 5/4 or 9/8 (which might feel like “gaining a beat” compared to 4/4) might indicate constantly pausing for reflection—a narrative punctuated by frequent pauses such as expressed through extensive footnoting129 (or parentheses), or even a study structure punctuated by intermezzo. Consider the following:

From this particular ecological perspective, [footnote 35], there are six intertwined genealogical branches of *integral*: those aligned with Aurobindo, Gebser, Wilber, Gangadean, László and Steiner (in respective chronological order of first usage [footnote 36]), among which there are varying degrees of commonality and contestation in various dimensions. [footnote 37]. As such, we may regard the above as an outline of some “semiotic attractors” within a (necessarily complex and dynamic) hermeneutic ecosystem [footnote 38].” (Verse 1, p. 121.)

*Mood / style. Affective shifts permeate the study. Given Verse One’s experimental* (*sperimentale*) *nature, passages from this verse will be used to illustrate mood/style. The verse can perhaps be identified as being played *ardente* or *con brio* (passionately / with spirit); hopefully it is also *con bravura* (with skill) and in a sufficiently *espicativo con deciso* 129 Such as this.
(explanatory, decisive) style\textsuperscript{130} ma non troppo (but not too much) given its postconventional intent: as a dialectical spice to explanation and decision, occasional items are left leggiero (with a light touch), interrogativo\textsuperscript{131} or even misterioso.\textsuperscript{132} Some sections are analitico (analytical),\textsuperscript{133} some are animato con energico (lively, energetic)\textsuperscript{134} whilst yet others have more of a riflessivo (reflective) sensibility.\textsuperscript{135} A particular motif is the inclusion of scherzando (playful) tendencies,\textsuperscript{136} whilst other passages lean more grazioso (gracefully) ... “beautifully situated in the liminal world of a generative, postformal flux gestured by a postmodern-integral dialectic” (Verse One, p. 127). Additionally, some quotations might intimate a grandioso.\textsuperscript{137} There is perhaps also a sense of the accelerando or intensificando in the journey from § Thinking Critically About Integral Theory (pp. 135-139) to § Thinking Complexly About Integral Theory (Verse One, pp. 139-147). Such crescendos can reach climaxes of espressivo mood—witness:

a masculinist straight-jacketing of meaning—from, shall we say, French fries (delicately-sautéed postmoderne)—to McGiveMeGiveMeGiveMeU.S.NewNewsNewsweakNewspeakFreedomNowNowNow

\textsuperscript{130} For example, “the term, beyond, can infer a number of possibilities. My default interpretation of the term in this article is in reference to Wilber’s ‘transcend and include’” (Verse One, p. 110, n. 5)

\textsuperscript{131} As a question; for example, “how might interrelationships between lines be adequately conceptualised? As conceptual ecologies?” (p. 173)

\textsuperscript{132} For instance, regarding relations between the main text and the Deleuze and Guattari quotation on p. 148, there is no explication of possible links—such as the connection to Wilber’s (1995) understanding of IOUs to the Kosmos.

\textsuperscript{133} For example, § Constructive Deconstruction, pp. 131-135 and § A discourse analysis, pp. 163-168.

\textsuperscript{134} § Thinking Critically About Integral Theory pp. 135-139.

\textsuperscript{135} Appendices B and C.

\textsuperscript{136} I type the following: “I type the following: I suspect I might be the type of person that loves to type” (p. 173), noting that “ludic research could explore the transition from boomeritis to bloomeritis!” (p. 152).

\textsuperscript{137} Grandly: “you could not discover the limits of soul, even if you travelled by every path in order to do so” (p. 110).
“Freedom” fries?—contributing to an exponential escalation of the prison population of concepts?—a suppression of freedom in the name of freedom? (Verse One, p. 137)

0.3.4. Foregrounding temporality

Along with genealogy (stemming from ecosophy), futures thinking emphasises *temporal* aspects of postconventionality. Indeed, from an integrative stance, scenarios of possible futures can be understood as extensions of particular genealogical streams.

0.3.4.1. Futures thinking

The genealogy of futures studies can be traced back to at least Ssu-Ma Ch’ien (2nd Century B.C.E.), Augustine (4th Century C.E.) and Ibn Khaldun (14th Century C.E.) (Galtung & Inayatullah, 1997). Whilst Ibn Khaldun established a coherent theory of social change (Fuller, 1988), it was August Comte who first expressed such an idea in a more formalized, scholarly fashion (Bell, 1997). Futures studies developed in the latter half of the 1950s through such institutions as the Centre for Prospective Studies founded by Gaston Berger, the Association Internationale de Futuribles founded by Bertrand de Jouvenel, books such as Fred Polak’s (1961/1973) *The Image of the Future*, the “first-generation” American futurists in the mid-1960s such as Herman Kahn and Wendell Bell, and the influential report on the environment by the Club of Rome in 1972—*The Limits to Growth* (Meadows, 1974). It has continued to develop through such organizations as the World Future Society and the World Futures Studies Federation. Futures studies can be understood as a *transdisciplinary* academic field whose object of inquiry is the open system of possible futures. Within such a notion, probable, plausible, and preferred futures can be identified. Preferred futures explicitly embraces normativity, and can be situated in relation to *critical* and/or *vision-based* futures. The subfield of normative futures—which can be philosophically traced back to Leibniz (Masini, 2006)—can itself be placed within an understanding of different traditions in futures studies—whether schematised as (i) prognosis-oriented, (ii) desirable vision-oriented, (iii) mixed (Masini, 2006); (i) predictive-empirical, (ii) cultural-interpretive, (iii) poststructural-critical (Inayatullah, 2002); or (i) empirical, (ii) critical-normative, (iii) (multi)cultural, (iv) prospective-empowering, (v) integral (Gidley, 2004). Furthermore, *depth* of address in futures

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studies can be understood both in terms of Richard Slaughter’s levels comprising (in increasing depth) (i) pop futurism, (ii) problem-oriented work, (iii) critical futures studies, (iv) epistemological futures (Slaughter, 2004), and also in terms of Sohail Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) methodology comprising (in increasing depth) (i) litany, (ii) policy, (iii) worldview, and (iv) myth/metaphor layers (Inayatullah, 1998). Futures thinking is also applied to a host of different eco-socio-cultural domains.

### 0.3.4.1.1. In context

In terms of futures studies traditions, the current study can be located in relation to normative (preferred / critical / vision-based) futures and integral futures; in terms of depth of address, the study can be located in relation to epistemological futures and the worldview and metaphor layers of CLA. Regarding domains of inquiry, the study addresses both generic and educational futures. More detailed descriptions of this study in terms of futures traditions, depth and domains follows.

Regarding traditions, the study addresses normative and integral futures. Normative and integral futures can be seen to sit in co-holographic relationship with each other: that is to say that integral futures can embrace normative futures (as located within its integrative understanding, such as in relation to developmental considerations) whilst simultaneously normative futures can embrace integral futures (being one of a number of alternative theoretical schemas that present themselves as preferred to the status quo). The critical futures aspect of the study’s orientation is expressed in its normative contrast between two worldviews and their paradigmatic templates or sensibilities, whilst the integral futures aspect of the study’s orientation manifests both in relation to the valorisation of the scholarship of integration, and with respect to the development of integral / education theorising (including explicit regard for integral futures per se in Verse Two: Futures of integral futures: An analysis of Richard Slaughter’s analysis of Causal Layered Analysis).

Regarding epistemological futures, the study prioritises depth. In terms of Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis, the study focuses on worldview and metaphoric layers in contrast to litany and policy layers. The general framing of the study’s critical contrast between two worldviews is elucidated in Verse Three: Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy, whilst Verse Six: Education beyond modern atomism can be understood as
exploring the metaphor layers of these worldviews: post- / atomism as metaphoric template / sensibility. Worldview and metaphor are not entirely distinct, however, and both layers may be found entwined within the various sub-narratives of the study. The study’s interest in epistemological depth accords with Steve Fuller’s critique of the ideology of “knowledge management” in favour of “the grain of the last 2500 years of Western thought, which has valorised the pursuit of knowledge ‘for its own sake,’ regardless of its costs and benefits” (Fuller, 2001, ¶ 1).

Regarding specific futures domains, the study addresses educational futures. A key differentiation is that between futures in education and futures of education (Gidley, 2004; Gidley & Hampson, 2005). The current study pertains to the latter. Educational futurist David Hicks forwards Kemmis, Cole and Suggett’s (1983) three “meta-orientations within education as being the vocational-neoclassical, the liberal-progressive, and the socially critical” (Hicks, 2002, p. 321). The current study aligns with the socially critical (where this is understood as holistically embracing progressive concerns regarding psyche, society, and environment—see eg. Fien, (1993), Orr, (1991), Richardson, (1990)), in keeping with both Hicks and other educational futurists such as Beare and Slaughter (1993), Ivana Milojevic (2002) and Jennifer Gidley (2000, 2002, 2004; Gidley & Hampson, 2005). My furthering of “eco-logical” futures can also be identified as an example of “alternative futures”—one of “six foundational concepts” of educational futures (Inayatullah, 2008). As with such authors, the futures orientation of the current study includes postmodern, ecological and critical elements within its integrative approach. As such, there is both a critique of modernism and understandings both that “crucial to a liberation pedagogy is a concerted effort to identify dissenting authentic images of the future” (Inayatullah, 2002, p. 111) and that “if all education is for the future, then surely exploration of the future needs to play a more central role in education” (Hicks, 2002, p. 328).

0.3.5. Cohering the ensemble

The last section discusses transdisciplinarity—particular via creative interpretation—as an instrument which is able to cohere the ensemble of discourses so far presented. Creative transdisciplinarity can be understood as an expression of the scholarship of integration.
0.3.5.1. Creative transdisciplinarity

What we need is not interdisciplinary teams, but transdisciplinary concepts; concepts which serve to unify knowledge by being applicable in areas which cut across the trenches which mark traditional academic boundaries (Checkland, 1976 cited in Lang, 2009, p. 74).

Creative transdisciplinary (Giri, 2002) is an interpretation of—or variation on—transdisciplinarity, one that emphasises the creativity required to adequately enact transdisciplinarity. It can be identified as being “informed by a kind of thinking that is creative, contextualizing, and connective (Morin’s ‘complex thought’)” (Montuori, 2005a, p. 154). The account below introduces transdisciplinarity emphasising its creative aspects.

Regarding the need for transdisciplinarity, Charles Camic and Hans Joas (2003) note that “leading social thinkers in America and in Europe have…issued calls for intellectual synthesis as an antidote to fragmentation” (p. 3). Futurist Anthony Judge (1991) urges that “there is a desperate need for new ways of integrating insights from a wide range of disciplines which have little respect for one another” (§ 0: Introduction) and that “any governing or controlling system must be at least as complex as the system it seeks to govern. Simplifying reality to simplify the decision process is a dangerously unsustainable way forward” (Judge, 1991) (§ 4.1 Interlocking insights). In this regard, Beggs (1999) pointedly identifies that “the seriousness and pervasiveness of environmental problems suggest that disciplinary cooperation alone will always be inadequate, while the complexity of ecological phenomena militates against disciplinary fusion” (p. 190).

What can be aptly identified as transdisciplinarity? In her review of the field, leading interdisciplinarity scholar Julie Thompson Klein (2004b) identifies the origin of transdisciplinarity in relation to the first international conference on interdisciplinary research and education in 1970 which defined it as “a common system of axioms for a set of disciplines” (p. 515). Jean Piaget coined the term transdisciplinarity (Gidley, 2008); key figures were Edgar Morin (Gidley, 2008) and Erich Jantsch. Klein (2004b) notes that signification of the term has since widened to encompass comprehensive paradigms such as Marxism, broad interdisciplinary fields such as cultural studies, and synoptic disciplines such as philosophy. Two streams currently stand out. The first pertains to Basarab Nicolescu’s
usage which centres around “three pillars” comprising complexity, multiple levels of reality and the logic of the included middle, and involves multidimensionality, transculturalism, ethics, spirituality and creativity. The second “highlights the convergence of transdisciplinarity, complexity, and trans-sectorality in a unique set of problems that do not emanate from within science” (p. 516) and focuses on post-reductionist science and “Mode 2 knowledge production” characterised by complexity, hybridity, non-linearity, reflexivity, and heterogeneity (Gibbons et al., 1994). As Edgar Morin (1977/1992, 2008) indicates, such complexity demands a new meta-dialogue between humanistic and scientific cultures—one that honours both poles, not just “hard” science. As such, the epistemological challenge involves moves toward complex coherence rather than uni-layered unity. As Klein (2004b) reports, philosophy, hermeneutics and education are central to this quest. Transdisciplinary issues are exemplified by that of ecological sustainability.

To elaborate a little: The term transdisciplinarity sits in reference to disciplinarity. Etymologically, discipline comes from the Latin discipere (“to grasp intellectually, analyze thoroughly”—literally “to take apart”) via discipulus (“pupil”) and disciplina (“instruction given to a disciple”). Its etymological roots are thus entwined with separation, analysis—and so somewhat similar to science’s root, scindere (“to cut, divide”). Disciplinarity can be seen as manifesting most strongly during the period 1850-1950, a period Giri (2002) identifies as “the modern world” (p. 104). Heilbron (2003) identifies that “the standard image of this disciplinary order is that of a universe neatly divided in a large number of only slightly overlapping areas, each one being the speciality of a particular group of professional experts” (p. 23-24). As such, disciplinarity can be seen as a form of modern atomism (see Verse Six): it classifies both the world and its observers through “the erection of rigid boundaries” (Giri, 2002, p. 104). Such atomism is synergistic with discipline as perspectival (Giri, 2002).

Disciplinism—the undue influence of discipline (in contrast to identifying discipline in dialectic with post-disciplinary modalities)—can be seen as inadequate in a number of ways. Firstly, “disciplinarian thinking seems to be unable to cope with the complexity which is overwhelming us” (Finkenthal, 2001, p. 3)(original italics). Finkenthal (2001) traces this back to Aristotle’s understanding that the categorisation of disciplines is caused by the essential qualities of the inquiry’s objects. However, the question remains: what if the essence of the particular object was irreducibly complex? Secondly, an overregard for “high-status knowledge” (Bowers, 2000) tends to lead to “the regretful erosion of insights from traditional cultures as they are progressively ‘civilized’. Their insights and languages are progressively
lost as informed elders die out” (Judge, 1991, § 1.3 Inaccessibility of knowledge and insights). Altogether, such atomistic disciplinism can lead to a loss of collective memory (Judge, 1991).

In contrast, trans, signifying “across, over, beyond”, points to transdisciplinarity as involving understanding across and/or beyond separation. Within such a general conception, integrative studies scholar Klein states that the term has multiple meanings (Klein, 2004a) and that three specific indications can be given: firstly, that transdisciplinarity involves a substantively different structure of knowledge to that offered by disciplinary perspectives, secondly that key features (after Christian Pohl) can include problem-orientation, process-orientation, practice-orientation and participation, and thirdly, that a particular orientation involves qualities of mega-scale, complexity and elusiveness (Klein, 2004a, p. 5). Klein identifies Marxism, phenomenology, systems studies, structuralism, sociobiology, and feminism as falling within transdisciplinarity’s gambit.

Basarab Nicolescu, who has focused on a particular interpretation of transdisciplinarity, has developed a more specific understanding. Following this thread, the International Center for Transdisciplinary Research and Studies was founded in 1987, and the Charter of transdisciplinarity was adopted by the first World Congress of Transdisciplinarity in 1994. For Nicolescu (2008), transdisciplinary is simultaneously “between” “across” and “beyond” disciplines; it complements disciplinarity (p. 148); and “its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge” (p. 2). Such “unity” is facilitated not by classical logic but by multivalent logic with its included middle; such “knowledge” is primarily “in vivo” rather than “in vitro” (p. 3), where in vivo knowledge involves correspondence between external and internal worlds, the inclusion of values, “harmony between mind, feelings and body,” and an orientation toward understanding, wonder and sharing rather than a narrower interpretation of knowledge, power and possession.

Nicolescu’s conception also involves paradigmatically different “levels of Reality,” levels which cannot be legitimately reduced to each other—thus in this sense, transdisciplinary is pluralistic. Although Nicolescu names macrophysical (classical) microphysical (quantum), and “cyber-space-time” levels, he also says this conceptualisation is necessarily incompletely determinable. Nicolescu’s transdisciplinarity is thus a complex integrative modality (as defined in the following section): “the total system is gödelian in nature: it is forever open”
He also uses the notion of different levels to effect resolutions of contradictory pairs, but differentiates levels of Reality from mere “levels of organization” (p. 2). The Charter of Transdisciplinarity also indicates transdisciplinarity as dialogic (p. 151), “transcultural” (p. 150) (multicultural), “multireferential and multidimensional” (p. 149), and substantively interested in reconciling science with social science, the humanities, the arts and spirituality (p. 149), without “an excess of formalism” (p. 149). Nicolescu’s conception is in harmony with Klein’s (2004b) observation that such “transdisciplinary vision…is transcultural, transnational, and encompasses ethics, spirituality, and creativity” (p. 516); and that its purpose includes “elaboration of a new language, logic, and concepts to permit genuine dialogue” (p. 516).

Nicolescu’s transdisciplinarity is closely aligned to Edgar Morin’s work which, among (many) other things (Montuori, 2004), extends complexity theory paradigmatically. Like Nicolescu, Morin (2008) foregrounds the significance of quantum mechanics for “demolishing a purely mechanistic conception of the universe” (p. 27). Four key features of complexity can be discerned. Firstly, the notion of system or organisation “produces or favors the emergence of a certain number of new qualities that are not present in the separate parts” (p. 25). In terms of transdisciplinarity as system, we might address the transversal “cosmo-physico-bio-anthropologic relation” (p. 30); or in the case of ecology, “the ecologist is like the conductor of an orchestra who takes into account the disequilibriums, regulations, and the irregularities of ecosystems, and who calls on the specific competencies of [various specialists]” (pp. 27-8). Here, orchestration is the higher level or emergent quality. Secondly, there is circular causality which transforms “vicious circle” into “virtuous or productive circle.” One example is hermeneutic circling whereby depth of understanding is facilitated by moving between the whole and the parts; another is the autopoietic (self-organising and self-producing) loop “where the effects and the products become necessary to the production and to the cause of that which causes them and which produces them” (p. 25): human beings, for instance, are “product-producers” (p. 25) who “embody regeneration at every moment” (added emphasis) (p. 25). Thirdly, Morin indicates the efficacy of the dialogic—or postformal dialectic (atemporal dialectical unit)—such as in the way life-and-death come together. Fourthly, he refers to holography in which the whole is found in the part, such as society

\[139\] Also see the discussion of (postformal) dialectics in § 0.3.1.1 Postformal thought and Verse One.
forming part of the individual: “it is in our singularity that we carry the totality of the universe within us” (p. 27).

Transdisciplinarity can be identified as postconventional in a variety of ways regarding its objects/subjects of inquiry, its “outputs,” and its internal characteristics. Regarding the first item, transdisciplinarity addresses the “swamp of important problems” (Klein, 2004a, p. 4) in Lebenswelt, the living world. “In focussing on problems that exist in society, the researcher aims to contribute to their solution” (Wickson, Carew, & Russell, 2006, p. 1049).

Conceptions can stretch further than a conventional interpretation of “problems” or “society” might entail—ones even toward “discovering the meaning of life” (Giri, 2002). If such purpose seems nebulous, such nebulosity is legitimate in that objects/subjects of inquiry of creative transdisciplinarity include “research problems…that are defined from complex and heterogeneous domains” (Lawrence & Despres, 2004, p. 399) and/or those that are ambiguously bounded (Davis & Sumara, 2006).

Transdisciplinarity’s outputs (to use a technical metaphor) include “creative innovations in performativity narratives, characters, genres, modes, and aesthetics” (McWilliam, Hearn, & Haseman, 2008, p. 248) (in addition to more conventional outputs, or a mixture of the two); whilst the (internal) characteristics of transdisciplinarity include the following:

- **Postformal logics; epistemologico-ontological levels.** The underlying logic of (creative) transdisciplinarity is the logic of the included middle (Nicolescu, 2005): multivalent (postformal) logics. Transdisciplinarity includes paradoxes and a plurality of ontological levels (Wickson et al., 2006) such as that of the physiosphere, biosphere and noosphere. Due to harmonic correspondences between ontology and epistemology, these may be regarded as epistemologico-ontological levels.\(^{140}\)

- **Liminality.** Transdisciplinary may give us “a picture of ‘blurred genres’” (Giri, 2002, p. 104) (and/or) where problems exist “in the ‘indeterminate zones of practice’” (Klein, 2004a, p. 4). “For discovering the meaning of life, Heidegger states, it is important for us to move in strange lands” (Giri, 2002, p.111), “to abandon one's home and the world and be a vanaprasthee, a wanderer in the woods” (Giri, 2002,

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\(^{140}\) Held delicately.

- **Complexity.** Complexity leads transdisciplinarity to seek *coherence* (as open system) rather than *unity* (as closed system) (Wickson et al., 2006, p. 1053). Analogously, Nicolescu identifies *unity-amidst-diversity* (Nicolescu & Voss, 2002), a conception which requires “identifying and communicating patterns across diverse disciplines and discourses” (Wickson et al., 2006, p. 1053). The complexity of creative transdisciplinarity may manifest as hybridity, nonlinearity, reflexivity (Lawrence & Despres, 2004).

- **Meta-paradigmaticality.** Creative transdisciplinarity is “meta-paradigmatic rather than exclusively intra-paradigmatic” (Montuori, 2005a, p. 154). It seeks to prepare the ground for emergent syntheses (Giri, 2002) such as Gidley’s (2008) *postformal-integral-planetary*. One framing of such meta-paradigmaticality is that of “ecologicality.”

- **Ecologicality, dialogicality.** Transdisciplinarity involves ecological (vertical and horizontal) networks of interconnectivities: “in the relational field of transdisciplinarity disciplines are dependent on each other for their identity” (Giri, 2002, p. 113). This involves “the virtue of dialogue” (Giri, 2002, p. 108) and a sensibility of “pilgrimage” (Giri, 2002, p. 108). “For Sunder Rajan, ‘each perspective or point of view is such only as a member of a community of points of view; this is a community and not a collection, for each perspective, from within its own resources, refers to the possibility of others’’” (Rajan, 1998 cited in Giri, 2002, p. 106). Dialogic philosophers in the 20th century include “Buber, Bakhtin, Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Gadamer, Habermas, Richard McKeon, Richard Rorty…In sociology, this turn reaches its height in Donald N Levine” (Camic & Joas, 2003, p. 5); such authors as Montuori, Gare, Gangadean, Benedikter, Gidley and Molz may be added to this list. The metaphor of *transdisciplinarity as ecosystem* is furthered by Judge (1991).
• **Creativity.** “‘Border crossing with a difference’—as an act of creation rather than one of violation” (Giri, 2002, p. 104) requires (after Koestler (1970)) “original thought, vision, and modes of scholarly engagement” (McWilliam et al., 2008, p. 252). Archetypally, this can be framed as the requirement of engaging with the *Eros of research* or “the Eros of learning” (Nicolaescu, 2005).

• **Vitality, passion.** The aforementioned creative Eros is one of vitality, passion and dynamism. It is the antithesis to “sterility” (Giri, 2002, p. 104), a quality problematised in the transdisciplinarity literature.

*Processes*¹⁴¹ of (creative) transdisciplinarity include the following:

• **Inquiry-driven.** Transdisciplinarity is often inquiry-driven rather than discipline-driven, where inquiry is identified “as a creative process that combines rigor and imagination” (Montuori, 2005a, p. 154), even including “useful ignorance” (McWilliam et al., 2008, p. 252)(original italics),¹⁴² noting that the inquiry may be a complex open system and therefore have ambiguous boundaries (Davis & Sumara, 2006) and entertain emergence.

• **A dialectic between reason and intuition:** “The problem of the paradox and the conceptual creativity [transdisciplinarity] requires might encourage…researchers to employ both logic and intuition in their research approaches” (Wickson et al., 2006, p. 1055).

• **Interpenetrative or deep dialogue** (Gangadean, n.d.). Transdisciplinarity involves the “deep interpenetration” (Giri, 2002, p. 105) of perspectives which requires “the creation of new languages and approaches” (Russell, 2005, p. 36): “Rather than simply accepting a body of knowledge as ‘fact’ and applying it to a research problem, this dimension of reflection requires [transdisciplinarity] researchers to deconstruct

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¹⁴¹ To a degree, the separation between characteristics and process is arbitrary: each carry aspects of the other.

¹⁴² “Useful ignorance becomes a space of pedagogical possibility rather than a lacuna” (McWilliam et al., 2008, p. 252).
and rebuild bodies of knowledge through exposure to one another” (Wickson et al., 2006, p. 1054). A useful instrument for such regeneration is that of metaphor, enabling conceptual patterns from whichever academic field to be usefully “re-read” (Judge, 1991).

A conception that can further creative transdisciplinarity is Montuori’s (1998) creative inquiry. Its general “goal is to make the academic transformative and to ground the transformative in the academic” (Montuori, 2006, p. 5). It seeks to create a “creativogenic” environment through apt, experimentation-generated form rather than through dissociated form, or form which is already established. Its key dimensions include connectivity, complexity, problem finding, tolerance of ambiguity, independent judgment, and intrinsic motivation. It is inspired by research on creativity such as Barron’s “ecology of creativity” (Pirto, 1997), Koestler’s (1970) “bisociation,”, Tarthang Tulku’s (1977) thinking, and Montuori’s (1998) own experience as a jazz musician. It is associated with the differentiation of knowledge into two contrasting types: instrumental and capacity-building. Responding to what Montuori sees as the “methodolatory” of instrumental knowledge, creative inquiry is positioned as premethodological. It enables “positions” to be “entertained together” (Montuori, 1998, p. 30), forming “an ongoing creative dialogue between terms that have historically been torn asunder” (Montuori, 2006, p. 11).

0.3.5.1.1. In context

“True transdisciplinarity resists pigeon-holing. It is...a new epistemological construct... It is inescapably plural”

(Macdonald, 2000, p. 244)

This study specifically seeks theoretical development through transdisciplinarity (Lawrence & Despres, 2004). At the micro-level, this includes the use of transdisciplinary concepts such as ecosophy, postconventionality, open system and poetics. At a larger scale, the study offers a creative transdisciplinary “fusion of horizons” (to call upon Gadamer)—or, perhaps, coherence of horizons—with respect to the ecology of discourses introduced in this Overture. An attempt has been made to act from locations which variously honour each field without unduly foregrounding any one. Engagement with particular fields has been context-dependent, intuitive. There has been an attempt to identify harmonies whilst not ignoring
inter-contenstations (although some might be downplayed in certain contexts). Each field potentially both informs and is informed by.

The study regards transdisciplinarity as substantively contributing to the meta-conversation between the sciences and the humanities. Such meta-conversation, however, is identified ultimately as an art—one including “scientific” elements yet one that cannot be legitimately contained by science (also see § 0.3.1.3 Hermeneutics). There is indeed a necessary “elusiveness” (Klein, 2004a, p. 5).

The study accords with Basarab Nicolescu and Voss’ (2002) interpretation of transdisciplinarity which focuses around the quintessentially postconventional features of complexity, multiple levels, and the logic of the included middle (also in reference to Gödel). The study also enacts transdisciplinarity as a form of Mode 2 knowledge production characterised by complexity, hybridity, non-linearity, reflexivity, and heterogeneity (Gibbons et al., 1994). Furthermore, it responds to transdisciplinarity as sitting in relation to a “unique set of problems that do not emanate from within science” (Klein, 2004b, p. 516)—as concern for the well-being of “body-mind” (Dewey, 1928, p. 5), planet and education indicates.

Morin’s (2008) comments on transdisciplinarity are also pertinent and are again quintesstentially postconventional. The study, for example, employs a dialogical consciousness (Morin, 1977/1992) throughout as part of its furthering of mental ecosophy (Guattari & Negri, 1990). The study addresses Morin’s comment on ecology above regarding the musical metaphor of orchestration through extending the metaphor beyond that of orchestration (see § 0.3.3.1 Text as music). It also valorises the identification of embodying “regeneration at every moment” (Morin, 2008, p. 25) through adopting regeneration as a leitmotif—regenerating integral theory, integral education theory, education (and other fields), postconventional theory, postconventional education theory, psyche, human culture, and planet.

The creative aspect of transdisciplinary engagement includes the courage to let emerge arising from the conviction of intuition. It also includes the dialogical or dialectical process between such passive “hermeneutic listening” (Davis, 2004, p. 177) and the more active processes of conscious design. Yet from where does creative inspiration come? In attempting
to respond, one can perhaps name Eros as the creative vector of the universe (Wilber, 1995), but ultimately, such questions lead me further toward the acceptance of Mystery.

Following on from Giri’s (2002) call “for the practice of creative transdisciplinarity…a deep interpenetration of disciplinary perspectives” (p. 105), the current study coheres the radical construction of creative transdisciplinarity, and identifies itself as enacting it. By ‘radical’ here I mean that even items such as transdisciplinarity, creativity and creative transdisciplinarity should not be constrained by undue notions of conceptual territory. Transdisciplinarity could become siloistic, too. (It thus forms an object of inquiry to complexly integrate along with other domains.). Both creativity and transdisciplinarity require vitality, passion, imagination—they therefore allow for theorising that has qualities of wilderness (perhaps thus wilderness, origin); the notion of theory as poetics facilitates the apt injection of such qualities.

The current study’s creative and emergent approach resonates with the above understanding. It has often been “unruly, unmanageable, mysterious” (I would add intuitive) and enjoyable. I have “dived in”. I have remained passionate. And the “definition” of what I have been doing has indeed organically emerged over time such that it has only been in the final stages that I have more fully been able to articulate and “tightly match the problem with the trajectory [my] research has taken” (McWilliam et al., 2008, p. 251).

In terms of Montuori’s creative inquiry, its principles suggest the reflexive possibility of allowing creative variations of the approach itself. Montuori’s emphasises the creative process of improvisation and its direct relation to self (re)creation. Mine instead foregrounds the creativity of the completed artefact and its indirect relation to self (re)creation: subjective expression formalised as artform.

Creative transdisciplinary identifications vis-à-vis the study’s epistemology include researcher as poet, an artful approach to theorising or poetics, and epistemology as poiesis (a dynamic, co-arising dialogue between how we know and what we create).

Altogether, through authentic transdisciplinarity I find myself, like Montuori (2005a), with a sense of “intellectual homelessness” (Montuori, 2005a, p. 148). Yet perhaps this nomadic existence has its own unique animated sense of place? Another echo of eco?
OVERTURE

0.4

Re-view
0.4. RE-VIEW

The Overture has sought to provide an extended introduction to the study. The Orientation section has provided an overview including address of aims and significance; integral theorising has been addressed with respect to integral studies as a field and also with respect to contexts of integral; and an ensemble of instruments for postconventional exploration have been introduced and brought in relation to the context of the study.

More specifically with respect to the orientation: the aim of the study is to facilitate the (re)generation of integral theory and integral education theory through exploring and enacting post-conventional modalities. The study sits in service to the regeneration of human culture (existing within the biosphere), with particular reference to education. Its main point of departure is Wilber’s integral theory. Its substantive theoretical content pertains to the regeneration of integral theory and generation of integral education theory as understood through worldviews, paradigm modalities and features beyond modernism and formal thought. The study seeks to facilitate shifting integral theory and integral education theory beyond Wilber’s framing toward more ecosophical and poetic conceptions, ones more in accord with postconventional and post-modern understandings. Such complex coherences or “eco-logics” can be conceptually embraced by a rich interpretation of Boyer’s scholarship of integration. As part of this quest, the study explores epistemological enactments of the emerging paradigm(s). It has, for example, a complex, emergent structure (incorporating an ecology of published papers), enacts a degree of deterritorialisation toward the conceptual material, and encourages a certain poetic sensibility toward languaging. A creative transdisciplinary approach is adopted, one which indicates the radical significance of a metahermeneutic conversation stretching from the physical sciences to the arts. A critical contrast between the worldviews of modernism-formalism and that beyond modernism-formalism is effected both to assist in clarity of understanding and to counterbalance Wilber’s underacknowledgement of this juncture, whilst a certain blurring of Green and post-Green levels is effected to counterbalance Wilber’s undue differentiation between Green and post-Green.

Discourses (conceptual “instruments” or “attractors”) brought into play to assist in the study’s quest include those focusing on an intensification of postconventionalities (postformal
thought, complexity theory and hermeneutics), intensifying the post/conventional juncture (critical theory), transversing postconventional levels (ecosophy, poststructuralism and poetics), that foregrounding temporality (futures thinking) and cohering the ensemble (creative transdisciplinarity).

Such discourses inform—and are informed by—the six verses or chapters of the study (interlinked through brief “intermezzi”) arranged into two movements or major sections, namely, Postconventional Integral and Postconventional Integral Education, respectively. In the Movement A, Verses One and Two focus on exploring postconventionalities in relation to Wilber’s integral theory. Verse Three deterritorialises integral theory, furthering the direction of (postconventional) eco-logical futures through highlighting a critical contrast between the “economies of truth” of conventional thinking (including atomism and economism) with the “complexities of truth” (“eco-logics”) of postconventional thinking. In Movement B, Verses Four and Five develop (postconventional) eco-logical thinking through genealogy (or temporalised ecosystem). Corresponding to the Overture’s genealogical context of integrative thinking, these verses extend integrative-integral education theory through historical and cross-cultural perspectives. Verse Six also extends integrative-integral education theory (incorporating a deterritorialisation), this time through consolidating theoretical features in relation to the critical contrast between conventional atomistic thinking and that beyond (i.e. postconventional or eco-logical thinking). Finally, the Cadenza offers summarising and concluding “flourishes,” openings to future research, and a perspective on the study’s significance from multiple points of view including the study’s substantive contributions to integral studies, postconventional poetics, the scholarship of integration, postmodernism, complexity theory, ecosophy, futures studies, and the philosophy of education.
MOVEMENT A:

Postconventional
Integral

Verses:
One, Two, Three
Movement A: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Movement A’s focus comprises integral and/or postconventional theorising without reference to education. Three verses (1-3) form part of Movement A. The first two use exploratory ecologies of postconventional lenses upon integral theorising—specifically with respect to the post/modern juncture (the juncture between the modern/conventional level and that beyond)—whilst Verse Three consolidates understanding of the aforesaid juncture without explicit reference to integral theory (signalling postconventional/poststructural derritorialisation whilst still potentially contributing to integral theory). Movement A stands in service to regenerating integral theory—through regenerating the post/modern juncture—and, in so doing, contributes to the generation of postconventional/postformal theory/poetics.

Verse One: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Verse One: Integral re-views postmodernism: the way out is through pertains to the exploration of postconventional modalities with regard to Wilberian integral theory.

Verse One: Horizontal connections (from Overture to Verse One)

Whilst the Overture sets the scene for the entire study, Verse One plunges into the territory—and one might say: not in a shy way. It is an extended work which—partly through example—indicates the potential complexity of the ecosystem of postconventionalities. The general orientation comprises a particular vector of critique framed within a general appreciation of integral theorising as a whole. The said vector of critique comprises a problematisation of the necessity of Wilber’s framing of, and engagement with, post-Orange developmental levels. Specifically, this entails: Wilber’s undervaluing of the Green vMeme, his undervaluing of the criticality of the transition between Orange and Green, his overvaluing of the transition between Green and Yellow/Teal, the imaginary that AQAL is
uncontestably Turquoise, and the Cartesian theoretical fabric with respect to the sequence of developmental levels. All of these can be understood as emanating from certain Orange (modernistic) “pathologies” (to use Wilber’s language).

Wilber’s conceptualisation of post-Orange is problematised by inquiry into numerous postconventional features including ecology and deconstruction which indicate that Wilber’s over-simplified characterisation and location of them (as sub-second tier) is in error. Specifically, he undervalues postmodernism (too strongly equating it with relativism) and ecology (too strongly equating it with heterarchy). Whilst the study does not necessitate the problematisation of a nuanced series of developmental levels (as indicated by Verse One’s use of Cook-Greuter’s framework), it nonetheless indicates that a more complex post-Orange imaginary might well be in order, one not involving Wilber’s unilinear developmental framework. For example, ecosophy and poststructuralism—in addition to postconventionality and vision-logic—substantively straddle Green and post-Green.

Furthermore, given the territory pointed to and the claims of the highly evolved nature of Wilberian theory, the verse indicates that enactments of post-Orange modalities are underutilised. The verse argues that Wilber’s integral approach suffers from undue modernistic enactments at the expense of postconventional ones (irrespective of pronouncements to the contrary). Clearly, Wilber’s integral approach is a meta-systematic one. Yet what are the characteristics and sensibilities of, and manoeuvres operating within, this system? The verse creatively indicates how such postconventional features as dialectics, complexity, criticality, ecology, construct-awareness and reflexivity can substantively enhance integral theorising. This includes the call for integrative approaches such as integral theory not to fall prey to the fundamentalising tendencies of a closed system template or unwarranted reductive integration. Rather, explicit regard should be given for theorisation or poetics concerning complex matters to remain sufficiently complex partly through from apt senses of open system—ones deeply open to dialogue, and to Other in general (at multiple levels, including that of the word). Such a radical sense of open system toward integral can be used to contribute to the legitimisation of the creative approach adopted by the study as a whole.
Hampson, G. P. (2007)

“Integral re-views postmodernism: The way out is through”

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4  
pp. 108-173  
(extended work)
Integral Re-views Postmodernism: The Way Out Is Through

Gary P. Hampson

Abstract: In this article I re-evaluate the potential contribution of postmodernism to integral theory via integrally-derived perspectives. I identify a premature foreclosure: the underappreciation of postformal modes of thinking (cognitive development beyond Piaget’s formal operations). I then enact certain forms of postformal reasoning in relation to integral theory. This includes an engagement with such perspectives as complexity theory, conceptual ecology, vision-logic, dialectics, genealogy, critical theory, and construct-awareness. A major theme concerns the dialectical relationship between reconstruction and deconstruction—partly explored through a developmental assessment of contra-indicative discourse by both Wilber and Derrida. Although the territory is complex, the relationship between current Wilberian theory and postmodernism is clearly problematised. I posit that a deeper engagement with postmodernism can lead to an autopoietic deepening of integral theory.

Keywords: autopoiesis, construct-awareness, Derrida, dialectics, Gebser, Green vMeme, integral theory, postformal, postmodernism, recursion, vision-logic, Wilber

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**Introduction**

*You could not discover the limits of soul, even if you travelled by every path in order to do so; such is the depth of its meaning* (Heraclitus, 42).

Integral theory\(^1\) has the potential to be a valuable conceptual tool for a host of purposes. Its potential would be thwarted or skewed, however, if it is found lacking in sufficient rigour or coherence. Ken Wilber’s integral theory, AQAL, has popular appeal, and is panoramic in scope with a firm sense of order. As such, AQAL is a powerful player in the *integral* terrain, and Wilber’s theoretic contributions need to be duly considered to advance integral theory in general. In part, this means they need to be brought into adequate dialogue with other pertinent contributions (whether they be termed *integral* or not). Further, the conceptual terrain AQAL broadly *maps* needs to be *explored* in careful detail (Roy, 2006a). From an integral background,\(^2\) I have been exploring such terrain. What follows is a pertinent *bricolage*\(^3\) chronicling a journey from *viewing* postmodernism—as given—to *re-viewing* postmodernism afresh. Notably, it would seem that certain sections of the integral community hold ideas concerning postmodernism that may well be partial truths at best. I hope this exploration can help dispel any falsity in such pertinacious myths.

In terms of the terminology I am using here, I note that *postmodernism* is a highly contested term, such that it can even be seen to have contradictory meanings. I will not be using the term to infer certain features that might elsewhere be attributed to “late capitalism,” for instance. (Late capitalism is still capitalism and should therefore remain mapped within AQAL’s Orange vMeme—*modernism*.) Instead, my use of the term in this article is intended at the outset to signify AQAL’s Green vMeme, thus including both collective and individual dimensions. The collective dimension is sometimes referred to simply as *postmodernism* in certain contexts and *poststructuralism* in others,\(^4\) whilst the individual dimension refers to *postformal* thought: cognitive development *beyond*\(^5\) Jean Piaget’s *formal operations*\(^6\) (formal operational thought uses if-then linear logics and evidence-citing to make its *arguments*). The potential area is vast and a comprehensive review could not be adequately accomplished in one article. Nevertheless, sufficient openings can be offered to identify and further this liminal terrain. Specifically, the

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1. I am using the term *theory* broadly to connote *theoretic narrative*.
2. Including (a) familiarisation with Wilber’s corpus (1995-present), (b) being a member of two face-to-face Wilber discussion groups (2000-2005; London & Sydney) and originator of a third (2001-2002, London) (c) completing a postgraduate course in integral futures (Swinburne University, Melbourne, 2003) (d) core involvement with the Integral Education Forum (2004-2005), (e) participating in an Integral Transformative Practice seminar (2005, Colorado), (f) consulting for the Integral Institute (2005, Boulder)
4. It is sometimes taken as the *philosophical* expression of postmodernism, for instance. Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault are often called poststructuralists, although it is important to note that this is not an identification which they themselves adopted.
5. The term, *beyond*, can infer a number of possibilities. My default interpretation of the term in this article is in reference to Wilber’s “transcend and include.”
6. For an important historical marker in the development of this field, see Commons, Richards, & Armon (1984); for a salient contemporary review, Susanne Cook-Greuter’s (2007) website is worth exploring.
following idea is explored: The way to deepen integral theory is through postmodernism (by explicitly thinking postformally), not against it. 7

The Logic of Integral Vision

In terms of honouring integral theory, many elucidations could be given. Here, I simply wish to highlight the logos of logic: There is logic to integral vision—in all senses of the word. Firstly, integral conceptualisations foreground the significance of formal reason. Secondly, in this current era—perhaps aptly seen as “the best of times…the worst of times”—there is sense or logic in developing an integral vision—as an eco-social imperative. 8 Thirdly, integral theory carries the promise of cohering postformal logics.9

A commonly held default understanding is that integral and postmodern signify very different beasts. In such a characterisation, postmodern connotes incredulity toward grand narratives (à la Lyotard10), and a privileging of particularity, sensibility, nonlinearity, flux, liminality, and divergence (via Derrida’s différences and déconstruction). In contrast, integral connotes the credibility of (certain) grand narratives, and a privileging of universality, content, linearity, structure, definition, and convergence (coherence and construction). Such a characterisation is reinforced by Wilber’s foregrounding of the decisive differentiation between AQAL’s Green vMeme and those Wilberian vMemes which are theorised as transcending it.11 Such is the given

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7 To adequately address the many facets of the subject matter, this article is necessarily relatively lengthy, and also features a few unorthodox “stylistic” elements. Due consideration should be thus given to this with respect to the reader’s mode of participation (as discussed & facilitated below).

8 This might be regarded (dialectically) as the logic of—an integral—logos or text

9 On a more personal note, I wish to honour the contribution that Wilberian integral theory has made in my intellectual development. As such, the critique below is not meant to infer an opposition to integral theory, but rather to open up possibilities of deepening it. This process necessarily involves both deconstructive and reconstructive elements, yet I enact both from constructive desire. I will no doubt sometimes stray from the appropriately wavy course I seek to find and follow, but when I do, I hope to be able to discern unruly attachment, and bend my ear toward peers’ and colleagues’ comments!

10 Lyotard’s (1984) necessarily-translated words are: “In contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture—the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation” (p, 37). In this quotation, Lyotard appears to be describing his understanding of the status of certain discourses of which he was aware at the time he was writing. From the statement alone, it is unclear whether Lyotard’s affective perspective on this information is detached, appreciative or regretful. It would, of course, be illogical for the statement to be interpreted as a totalising narrative concerning the fate of all grand narratives. As such, even from this iconic—perhaps infamous—statement, there is window of opportunity in which integral narratives, which appropriately defer to postmodern considerations, might be open to legitimation from such a nominally futile perspective.

11 Wilber’s Green vMeme includes: postmodernism, which he often refers to as “extreme postmodernism” or “deconstructive postmodernism;” relativism, often referred to as “extreme relativism”; and deconstruction. Its placement—along with all the preceding vMemes—as being located in the “first tier” (of Spiral Dynamics theory) is foregrounded by Wilber, partly through his catchy—fun but derogatory—phrase, “mean green meme.” In contrast, the proceeding “second tier,” starting with the Wilberian Teal vMeme (formerly known in AQAL as the Yellow vMeme) is mostly rendered as substantively offering the solution to Green’s failings and excesses.
integral view of postmodernism. It is not, however, the only possible one: Wilberian integral theory itself can be used to identify a different perspective on postmodernism.¹²

**Revisioning Integral Logic**

Integral theory can be used to re-view postmodernism by way of foregrounding the latter’s theoretic agency rather than adopt the default prioritisation of its mapping as object of study. In so doing, postmodernism may reflect back upon integral theory and open up new ways of thinking. In other words, the “way out” from the modern world(view) to integral level(s), integral understanding, integral participation, is *through* including the full contribution that the Green vMeme can offer.

A key to this re-viewing lies in postformal cognition—mapped in AQAL as lying within the upper (i.e., individually- rather than socio-culturally-related) quadrants¹³ of the Wilberian Green and post-Green vMeme developmental levels. Put simply, a more distinctive differentiation could be drawn between the object of inquiry and the type of thinking used to inquire. When the commonly-held default interpretation of postmodern—as object of inquiry—is regarded, what kind of operation is being performed? Specifically, what developmental level of cognitive mode is being employed to realise such a perspective? Postmodernism, or integral theory—as objects of inquiry—can be viewed from different developmental perspectives, but, to date, in terms of developmental considerations, Wilberian theory has foregrounded the locating of objects of inquiry rather than the developmental locating of modes of inquiry (epistemologies or methodologies). Whilst Wilber’s Integral Methodological Pluralism (Eight Native Perspectives) differentiates epistemologies or methodologies horizontally—according to zones or quadrants—it remains unclear which *vertical* developmental levels or waves these perspectives operate from.

In terms of reflexivity, moreover, Wilber (1995) briefly states the following.

> What I am trying to do in this book, and what you are trying to do as you read it (or other similar books), is use vision-logic; not just reasonably decide the individual issues, but hold them all together at once in mind, and judge how they fit together as a truth-vision. In other words, vision-logic is a higher holon that operates upon (and thus transcends) its junior holons, such as simple rationality itself (p. 185).

Here, Wilber states that he is trying to use vision-logic, but he does not state whether he is using “early,” “middle,” or “late” vision-logic.¹⁴ Nor does he substantively elaborate upon which

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¹² By differentiating between, on the one hand, the participatory stance Wilber enacts in relation to AQAL, and, on the other hand, alternative modes of engagement with AQAL interpretations (such as the autopoiesis I am offering here), I am suggesting a manoeuvre that might facilitate a bridging between AQAL and the participatory integral approach identified by Ferrer, Romero and Albareda (2005).

¹³ For an explanation of Wilber’s four quadrants—a central feature of his integral theory, AQAL, see Wilber (2000a, pp. 67-72) Note will also be made here that Wilber has elaborated the four quadrants into the eight native perspectives (see 2006b).

¹⁴ “Where the green meme [sic] uses early or beginning vision-logic in order to grasp the numerous different systems and contexts that exist in different cultures, second-tier thinking goes one step further and begins to *integrate* those pluralistic systems into integral and holistic spirals and holarchies (Beck and Cowan themselves refer to second-tier thinking as operating with holons)…”
particular postformal cognitive modes he is employing, or explicitly demonstrate such usage. How dialectical is AQAL? In what way complex? What is its relationship to critical theory (see for instance, Anderson, 2006) and critical thinking? How reflexive is it? What genealogies and conceptual ecologies are employed? How (much) has it embraced the linguistic turn? Important questions—which this article does not attempt to answer, but rather, put on the map.15 In other words, the aim of this article is not to comprehensively assess integral theory—specifically AQAL—by means of postformal thinking, but rather to open up discursive spaces or Deleuzian “lines of flight.”16

A consequence of Wilber’s minimal reflexivity on postformal thinking (rather than the copious mapping of postformal thinking) is that there has been a substantive underappreciation or premature foreclosure regarding the potential contribution that postmodernism—in all its guises (not only pluralism, for instance)—might make to integral theory. By re-viewing the contribution of postmodernism or the Wilberian Green vMeme from this different integral perspective—the perspective of postformal cognitive modes—a potential inversion can be identified between the inquiring subject and the object of inquiry, where the inquiring subject changes from a default “integral” thinker (in which AQAL mapping is the primary operation) to a postmodern one (as a postformal thinker) whilst the object of inquiry changes from postmodernism to integral theory in order for integral theory to discern and digest this new reflexivity, and thence to be able to proceed more coherently. The bigger theoretical context all the while remains integral theory: AQAL is being applied upon itself, enacting a certain autopoiesis via the participation mode of the researcher. A theoretic re-searching. New questions arise such as: What new understandings of integral theory might arise from explicitly detailing and employing postformal modes of cognition upon itself? The territory envisaged is vast; hence, at this stage, I can seek only to open up this avenue of thought—to tentatively start to develop a conversation. Yet such a direction has the potential to revise the very fabric of integral theory.

“There are two major waves to this second-tier thinking (corresponding to what we would recognise as middle and late vision-logic)” (Wilber, 2000a, pp. 51-52).

15 My tentative use of postformal operations in this article does not imply that Wilber does not enact particular postformal operations in particular ways with regards to AQAL. For instance, the breadth of territory covered in AQAL could be associated with postformal vision; the value of its mission potentially legitimised with reference to fuzzy logic and its “transcendent” relations, fuzziology and social fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002, p. viii); its systematisation can be viewed in relation to Michael Commons and Francis Richards’ Model of Hierarchical Complexity; the eight native perspectives can be seen to be a dialectical development of the four quadrants; Wilber’s purported methodology of orienting generalisations could be fruitfully linked to grounded theory, intuitive inquiry and other emerging academic methodologies; his style could be viewed in relation to certain postmodern affectivities; whilst the incorporation of holarchy via Hegel’s dialectical principle of sublation (Wilber’s “transcend-and-include”) can also be seen to emanate from a postformal perspective. In a similar way, both formal and pre-formal operations could also be identified. The degree to which Wilber explicitly reflects upon such postformal modes in relation to his writing also needs to be identified: he does this very little, relative to the objects of his inquiry.

16 The facilitation of such dialogue at this juncture will necessarily involve particular assessments which lean towards problematisations with a view to future reconstructions.
Postformal Thinking

Integral theory can be revised toward further coherence by way of postformal cognitive modes if the following turn is made: that these modes are reflexively embodied—enacted as modes of participation—rather than merely addressed (through the enactment of mapping). The operation of mapping can provide a first-stage conceptual reflexivity in certain contexts, and can evaluate participatory characteristics. But qualities of participation also have to be adequately regarded as an important theoretic feature and thus incorporated as part of integral theory. Addressing the developmental levels of engagement and participation could be a major consideration in postformal reasoning.\(^ {17} \)

Postformal thought is discussed primarily in three fields: developmental psychology, education and integral studies. After a very brief overview of some of the features of these three discourses, I will suggest ways to deepen and cohere the territory. I will then outline the way I will be applying postformal cognition to the object of inquiry, integral theory.

Reviewing Postformal Thinking

The term postformal first erupted within developmental psychology in reference to possibilities of going beyond Jean Piaget’s developmental stage of formal operations. Klaus Reigel (1973) was the first to posit a stage beyond formal operations.\(^ {18} \) He referred to it as dialectical operations. Two years later, Patricia Arlin (1975a) posited postformal operations as a variant theory. The term postformal has been in use ever since and refers to a number of theoretical approaches which seek to either (a) posit another stage or stages, level or levels, or complexity attractor(s), in addition to those elucidated by Piaget; (b) problematise Piaget’s theory but not developmentalism per se; or (c) problematise developmentalism as a whole.

Much of the discourse surrounding the term has been within developmental psychology, notably in the positive adult development research community. This has ranged from the mathematical representations of Michael Commons and Francis Richards’ (1984, 2002) Model Of Hierarchical Complexity to the critical reflections of John Broughton (1984). Various modes of cognition or operations, types of thinking, qualities, features and/or characteristics have been identified in this discourse as, or pertaining to, postformal. These include: complexity, dialectics, creativity, imagination, construct-awareness, problem-finding, reflexivity, dimensionality of systems thinking, contextualisation, holism, openness, unitary consciousness, dialogic consciousness, and wisdom. (Arlin, 1975a, 1975b, 1976; Basseches, 1980, 1984a, 1986, 2005; Benack, Basseches, & Swan, 1989; Benack & Basseches, 1989; Broughton, 1984; Commons & Richards, 1984, 2002; Cook-Greuter, 1990, 2000, 2002; Demetriou, 1985; Kegan, 1982, 1994; Kohlberg, 1984; Koplowitz, 1984, 1990; Kramer & Woodruff, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, 1990; Loevinger, 1976; Marchand, 2001; Pascual-Leone, 1984; Powell, 1980; Riegel,

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\(^ {17}\) A fruitful discussion here—beyond the scope of this article—would concern details of the relationship between postformal and formal. Suffice to indicate a working proposal of postformal sublating (transcending-and-including) formal, so that the reasoning mode of formal operations is appropriately honoured. (It has facilitated production of this very article, for example, and should form a significant part of its potential evaluation, too!)

\(^ {18}\) Due regard should be given to the ecology of forerunners to Positive Adult Development research into postformal thought. Notable here is Roberto Assagioli’s (1965/2000) Psychosynthesis, and Abraham Maslow’s (1971) Self-Actualization Theory including his developmental hierarchy of human needs.
1973, 1975, 1976; Sinnott, 1998, 2003; Sternberg, 1998; Wade, 1996). The literature also demonstrates a wide variety of conceptualisations regarding the theoretic legitimacy, number, positioning and/or relationship among postformal developmental levels.\(^\text{19}\)

The term *postformal* took on a somewhat different usage and meaning in 1993 within the field of education via Joe Kincheloe and Shirley Steinberg (1993) who posited a *socio*-cognitive theory regarding post-formal thinking, describing postformal thought as the *socio*-cognitive expression of postmodernism. In addition to features identified above with the developmental psychology discourse, they included: critical theory, genealogy, etymology, structuralism, metaphoric cognition, ecological thinking, deconstruction, nonlinearity, holistic causation, and power-awareness. This genealogical thread is still current in the educational literature and in significant ways provides a contrasting perspective to the developmental psychology discourse, although there is a small cross-over between the two fields (Hampson, in preparation).

Meanwhile, Wilber has been writing on postformal thought since 1977, notably in his 1995 *magnum opus*—*Sex, Ecology, Spirituality*—where he coined the neologism (analogous to postformal thought), *vision-logic*. Postformal thought forms a significant part of AQAL. Both *postformal* and *vision-logic* are used in integral studies discourse—see, for example, Meyerhoff (2006). Through referencing two other *magnum opa*—*The Life Divine*, by Sri Aurobindo (1914/1960), and Jean Gebser’s (1949/1985) *The Ever-Present Origin*—AQAL brings together psychological and socio-cultural components (though in a different way to the education discourse) associating *formal* (as in *formal operations*) with the *modern* worldview, and *postformal* variously with *postmodern* and *integral* worldviews via a developmental and holonic framework described as *integral*.

**Developing Postformal Thinking**

There are clearly many modes of thinking indicated here and it is beyond the scope of this article to report or discuss the manifold possible interrelationships among these.\(^\text{20}\) Yet to facilitate explicit enactments of thinking postformally, I posit that a deepening and a cohering of postformal qualities might be helpful. Both moves (deepening and cohering) can be seen to have affective (embodied) and mental (intellectual) aspects.

In terms of *deepening* postformal thinking—from an affective perspective, a relationship between self-sense and postformal concept could be developed through trust: an *opening up to* the postformal quality in question via affective embodiment (such as via intuition). The mental correlate of this would be to *open up* the postformal concept via the intellect.

For example, if we were to regard the postformal concept of dialectics, we might represent this procedure as:

(Beginning to) thinking dialectically \(\rightarrow\) engaging with literature on dialectics \(\rightarrow\) thinking (more) dialectically

The generic heuristic algorithm would be:

\(^{19}\) Although a discussion of these is beyond the scope of this article, my research does not readily support the regard of AQAL’s particular developmental framing of postformal modes as an *orienting generalisation* of the whole literature, but rather supports the viewing of AQAL’s framing as one (necessarily contestable) *type* of summarising perspective on it.

\(^{20}\) Further elucidation is given in “Thinking postformally” (Hampson, in preparation).
Thinking x-ly (n) \(\rightarrow\) engaging with literature on x \(\rightarrow\) thinking x-ly (n+1)

The example regarding dialectics would thus connect the psychological construct, dialectical operations, with the philosophical construct (in its varying interpretations and contestations), dialectics.\(^{21}\) A similar connection would be made between the identification of complexity as a construct complicit in psychological development, such as Commons and Richard’s Model of Hierarchy of Complexity on the one hand, and complexity theory—representing the philosophical dimension—on the other. (In this way, such a relationship between psychological and philosophical constructs could be used in the concretisation of postformal educational theory). The general case can also be seen as hermeneutic circling.\(^{22}\)

In terms of cohering postformal cognitive qualities—a similar framework could be helpful. Conceptual cohering could be facilitated through systematic consideration of the possible ecology of / dialogue among postformal features. A corresponding manoeuvre can be conceptualised with regard to the interpersonal domain, through such dialogic lifeworld practices as Bohmain dialogue and Gangadean’s (2007) Deep Dialogue. (Such schemas could also be seen as useful for intrapersonal work.)

The net effect of the above could be to better theorize the facilitation of embodying the central theme of this article: namely, to switch priorities from formally addressing postformal cognition (as an object of inquiry) to enacting thinking postformally (as a cognitive process of the inquiring or participating subject). Specifically, in relation to the postformal modes outlined in the following section, the following summaries could be given:

- **Deepening postformal thinking**: thinking creatively, reflexively and “embodiedly” about postformal cognition (dialectics, complexity, criticality, conceptual spacetime context)—regarding the object of inquiry (e.g., integral theory);
- **Cohering postformal thinking**: thinking ecologically (dialogically) about postformal cognition (dialectics, complexity, criticality, conceptual spacetime context)—regarding the object of inquiry (e.g., integral theory).

**Applying Postformal Thinking**

It can be readily seen that there would be many ways to enact postformal thinking. The types of postformal cognition I have selected for this article are related to, on the one hand, my knowledge of, and experience with, integral theory—notably, AQAL—and on the other hand, my research on postformal thought. It is intended to exemplify particular usage of postformal operations whilst facilitating a pertinent development of integral theory.

In terms of my research on postformal thought, I have included certain postformal items that feature strongly in the literature, and with which I have personally come into significant (and ongoing) relationship, namely: genealogy, conceptual ecology, dialectics, critical theory and critical theory and critical theory.

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\(^{21}\) Also see Basseches (2005).

\(^{22}\) *The hermeneutic circle* (as advanced by Schleiermacher) denotes the idea that the knowledge of the whole is to some extent already needed in order to understand the parts. A hermeneutic *helix* might perhaps be a better metaphor, as two conceptual dimensions are involved in the learning procedure: a *returning to origin* (represented by the circle of the helix—as viewed end-on) and an *advancement* (represented by the *linear*—if wavy—dimension of the helix, as viewed side-on).
complexity (see, notably, Basseches, 1984a, 2005; Commons & Richards, 2002; Cook-Greuter, 2000, 2002; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1993; Riegel, 1973, 1976; Sinnott, 1998; Sternberg, 1998; Wilber, 1995). Each of these have large and varied terrains, and it is beyond the scope of this article to elucidate such domains in detail. Mention, however, will be given to the following three points as markers for more detailed research. Firstly, at least two uses of the term, genealogy, can be found within postmodern discourse: one in reference to complexity theory (see Davis, 2004), and the other in relation to Foucault (see Scheurich & McKenzie, 2005). In this article, I am employing the former. Secondly, substantively different interpretations of the term dialectics can be variously identified—in relation to, for example, the following five major threads: Socratic (inquiry dialectics), Hegelian (dialectical method), Marxist (dialectical materialism), Daoist (Taijitu dialectics) and Derridean (the dialectics of deconstruction). In this article, I am demonstrating an instance of the use of dialectical operations through calling upon an amalgam—a particular conceptual ecosystem—of the above threads. I am using the metaphor of ecosystem (a complex adaptive system) to facilitate the quality of dialectics in my conceptual operations—my participatory engagement with the object of inquiry (in this case, integral theory). Complex dialectics would thus seem a suitable signifier for this.

In terms of integral theory, I have focused on particular issues that have not apparently been adequately addressed—notably, the following two concerns. Firstly, from a formal perspective—employing a Cartesian template based on formal Aristotelian logic—the theoretic basis of integral would most likely interpret the concepts of construction (or reconstruction) and deconstruction as adversaries. Whilst not denying the partial truth of such a perspective, dialectical operations can be used to realise finer distinctions. Secondly, formal/modern constructions of theory can be seen to be based on dualistic conceptual templates metaphorically derived from Aristotle, Euclid, Descartes and/or Newton, whilst postformal/postmodern theoretic constructions would be based on conceptual templates which sublate (transcend and include) the aforesaid formal ones (hence contestability over the relationship between theory and narrative from a formal perspective).

23 Numerous generative, transdisciplinary concepts are found within complexity theory (I am using the term broadly to encompass chaos theory). These include: emergence (and its relationship to, for example, bifurcation, creativity, nonlinearity, unintended consequences, the irreducibility of quality to simple “quantity,” and the identification of “ontological” levels), hysteresis (time lag, internal complexity, historical memory), simple holarchies and entangled holarchies, first cover, sensitivity to initial conditions (the butterfly effect), recursion, indeterminacy (dimensions of intractability, etc.), openness (permeability of boundaries), attractors (e.g., point, curve, manifold, strange) adaptation, autopoiesis (self-organisation), and dynamism (“life” / life). The complexity quality I am foregrounding in this article is recursion (fractals, holography, holonomy).

24 In relation to the five strands, one might say—at first blush—that: (a) it is an approach to Socrates-like inquiry (yet acknowledging both certain guidance and uncertain outcome); (b) it has the capability of being used as a Hegelian-like systematic method (yet where system is seen as complex rather than mechanical); (c) acknowledgment is given to dialectics identified in the material world (yet, again, where this is not held mechanically, but complexly; also where a complex dialectics is also identified between material and conceptual worlds); (d) acknowledgment is given to the spirituality, intuition, complex recursion, and interpenetrative dynamics of dialectics (yet avoiding the fundamentalisation of myth); and (e) the subtle dialectics of text is acknowledged (yet allowing for its enactment to be panoramic).

25 E.g., the question, “is it a real theory?” and comment, “it’s just a story” come from such an either/or perspective. Yet, that is not (necessarily) to say that what is left is an indistinguishable blurring: that conclusion would also come from an either/or perspective.
These two strands—namely, those aspects of postformal thinking that I am foregrounding, and those aspects of integral theory that I am foregrounding—result in the following sections in this article.

- Thinking Contextually about Integral Theory
  - Sharing Schelling: A Genealogy of Postmodernisms—reporting on a genealogy which links integral and postmodern philosophical tendencies via Schelling as bifurcation point;
  - An Ecology of Integrals—identifying a conceptual ecology of integral constituted by six genealogical threads, among which there are commonalities and contestabilities;

- Thinking Dialectically about Integral Theory
  - Deepening Vision-Logic—identifying dialectical operations in the concept of vision-logic, then developing this perspective;
  - Contra-Indications of Construction—exploring considerations which run counter to the formal default integral perspective regarding (re)construction and deconstruction;

- Thinking Critically about Integral Theory
  - Boomeritis: An (un)Critical Americanitis?—raising a question concerning the significance of cultural type—or marked national idiosyncrasy—in relation to postmodernism;

- Thinking Complexly about Integral Theory
  - Nanotextology (A Recursion of Content)—exploring a recursion of the theoretic component of “content” as related to (an interpretation of) a particular poststructuralist understanding of “style”; and
  - Holonomic Nonduality (A Dialectical Recursion)—exploring a recursion of nonduality (including the possible connection between this and a recursive dialectical template).

**Thinking Contextually About Integral Theory**

*It’s turtles all the way down* (Wilber, 1995, p. 35).

Space and time—and metaphorical resonances of space and time—can be used as loci to extend theoretic contextualisations.

Temporalising of the past can be extended in a linear fashion (already evident in integral theory’s apt consideration of pre-history, for example). Past times can also be more richly or adequately understood by adopting a genealogical approach (incorporating a bifurcating structure derived from non-Euclidean complexity theory). Possible futures\(^{26}\) can also be extended in a linear fashion (surfacing the ethics of long-term thinking: due speculative consideration of medium-term, long-term, far and distant futures). And correspondingly, possible future time can be regarded genealogically via conceptualisations regarding the bifurcation of future scenarios. Present time can be conceptually extended through spatial metaphors, via, for instance, the

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\(^{26}\) I draw attention here to the academic field of future studies. As excellent introductions, see, for example, Richard A. Slaughter (2005) and Sohail Inayatullah (2007).
postformal construct of conceptual ecology—a construct which not only enables the dialogical
consciousness of holarchical conceptual space, but also local temporality and the metaphorical
resonances of organicity and life.

In the first of two sections, a genealogy is described which philosophically links the integral
quest and the postmodern quest as two complementary branches. In the second section, a
conceptual ecology is identified which contextualises different interpretations of integral. A
particular relationship is then chosen to exemplify a pertinent contestability: that between the
integrals of Wilber and Gebser.

Sharing Schelling: A Genealogy of Postmodernisms

A starting place to view a less adversarial relationship between integral and postmodern than
that connoted by Wilber and some members of the integral community, is to consider their
shared genealogy. Philosopher Arran Gare (2002) has done just that. He presents the following
picture: As scientific materialism began to increase in societal power in late 18th Century Europe,
a “postmodern” countertradition arose in the footsteps of Giambattista Vico and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Johann Herder led the way, identifying: suffering caused by abstractions; the need for
self-realisation; an appreciation of cultural plurality; the importance of the particular, the
sensory, the active; and a purposeful nature. This thread led—via Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe—to Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. Like Rudolf Steiner, Wilber (1995), and
Jennifer Gidley (in press), Gare identifies Schelling as an inspiration, and a pivot in history. He
highlights Schelling’s dialectical method and also his understanding of that, that we are: an
“unthinkable Being” which precedes all thought and is presupposed by it. Gare then identifies
a historical bifurcation stemming from Schelling. One branch leads to the poststructuralists
(“poststructuralist postmodernism”), the other to a high-order quest for coherence
(“cosmological postmodernism”).

In addition to the dialectical nature of the philosophy that lies at the root of the two branches,
the branches themselves can be seen as a dialectic between Schelling’s alignment with Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel on the one hand, and his critique of Hegel, on the other.

The branch that proceeds from Schelling’s critique of Hegel includes Friedrich Wilhelm
Neitzsche, Martin Heidegger, Michel Foucault (largely influenced by Neitzsche), Jacques
Derrida (largely influenced by Heidegger) and Gilles Deleuze (who retains more influence from
Schelling than the others). Somewhat resonant with Roland Benedikter’s (2005) seminal work on
postmodern spirituality, Gare proffers that, “poststructuralists require Schelling’s earlier
philosophy or developments of it to sustain their arguments” (Gare, 2002).

The branch which is more aligned to Hegel leads to Henri Bergson and Alfred North
Whitehead via Charles Peirce and also via Karl Ernst Von Baer’s evolutionary theory of nature.
Gare identifies this thread as a high-order quest for coherence. Such a quest for coherence is
surely central for any integral theory. But surely a greater integral quest would be to attempt to
respectfully honour both branches? Although the branches may seem somewhat
incommensurable from a formal perspective, a postformal perspective on integral might better
facilitate such a quest. But what is integral? A postformal approach to answering that question

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27 Consideration might be given here regarding the nature of the relationship between Gare’s genealogy
and Wilber’s (1995) bifurcation of post-Enlightenment as “Ego” and “Eco.”
might well address the conceptual ecology among different (connected and contested) uses and interpretations of the word.

An Ecology of Integrals

Integral—meaning, “of or pertaining to a whole”—entered the English vocabulary from the Latin, integer (via the French, intégral) in 1471. In terms of integral theory and correspondent developments, Sri Aurobindo Ghose (1914/1960) used the term to describe a type of knowledge or yoga, as published in The Life Divine. Unaware of Aurobindo’s usage, Jean Gebser (1949/1985, p. xxix) began using the term (as a conjunct to aperspectival) in 1940, culminating in its usage in The Ever-Present Origin in 1949. Meanwhile, Haridas Chaudhuri carried the term through from Aurobindo and founded the California Institute of Integral Studies (C.I.I.S) (n.d.) in 1968. Michael Murphy also brought through Aurobindo’s integral theory when he co-founded the Esalen Institute (2005) in 1962. He has since adopted the term integral with George Leonard, in their Integral Transformative Practice (2007). The most popular(ist) integral theorist—Ken Wilber (1997, 2000a, 2000c)—had started using the term by 1997 to describe both his own writing, and thence his institutional frameworks, such as the Integral Institute (2007) including Integral Naked. Global-outreach tertiary institute, Pacific Integral (n.d.), was founded in reference to this genealogical branch, as well as to William Torbert’s work. Wilber’s genealogical branch entered futures studies via Richard Slaughter (1998). Ervin László (2004) started foregrounding the term in relation to integral science in 2003, competitively using with the same turn of phrase as Wilber—An Integral Theory of Everything—in 2004. Global philosopher Ashok Gangadean (2006a) incorporates László’s work among others, to form his own dialogical integral approach. Gidley acknowledges Gangadean as part of her quest to “integrate the integrals,” notably an exploration of connections between Gebser, Wilber and Rudolf Steiner, the latter of whom she identifies as an integral pioneer (Gidley & Hampson, 2005). Meanwhile, others have furthered representations of C.I.I.S.’s mission, including Robert McDermott, Richard Tarnas (see, for example, 1991), and Jorge Ferrer, the latter of whom has identified a participatory integral approach along with Marina Romero and Ramon Albareda (Ferrer et al., 2005), directors of Estel, a centre for personal growth and integral studies in Barcelona (Albareda, n.d.). In addition, William Irwin Thompson (2003)—whilst acknowledging Aurobindo and Steiner—has, for some decades, been running with Gebser’s interpretation to foreground a certain artistry: integral performances that seek to generate new horizons; such alignment with creativity parallels both Bernie Neville’s (1989) Gebserian and archetypal

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28 As integral can be contextualised within “an ecology of integrals,” so an ecology of integrals can itself be contextualized within “an ecology of related terms.”

29 Alan Combs (2005) comments that it remains unclear as to the degree of influence Aurobindo had on Gebser, remarking, “the whole affair of Eastern influences in Gebser’s thought would be an excellent topic for an investigation” (§ The Inner and The Outer, ¶ 8).

30 Beck and Cowan (1996) address Esalen as Green vMeme.


32 To date, the nascent Integral University (2007) has not yet emerged.

33 Also see below regarding Cook-Greuter’s ego developmental model.
educational approach, and, substantively, Alfonso Montuori’s (1997) interpretation of *integral* as a form of disciplined *improvisation*, via the generative metaphor of jazz.\(^{34}\)

From this particular ecological perspective,\(^{35}\) there are six intertwined genealogical branches of *integral*: those aligned with Aurobindo, Gebser, Wilber, Gangadean, László and Steiner (in respective chronological order of first usage\(^{36}\)), among which there are varying degrees of commonality and contestation in various dimensions.\(^{37}\) As such, we may regard the above as an outline of some “semiotic attractors” within a (necessarily complex and dynamic) hermeneutic ecosystem.\(^{38}\)

Picking up one such inter-branch contestation, let’s turn to the relationship between the *integrals* of Wilber and Gebser. Thompson (1996) foregrounds a difference between the two in relation to Gebser’s “grand” European sensibility and loving attention to detail. Bonnitta Roy

\(^{34}\) Further—in addition to the integrally-oriented *ReVision* (co-founded by Wilber)—there has recently been an upsurge in integral journals—including *Kosmos* (2001), *The Journal of Conscious Evolution* (2005), *Integral Review* (2005), and *AQAL* (2006); there has also been the Gebser Society’s *Integrative Explorations Journal* (currently not in print).

\(^{35}\) Different perspectives are, of course, possible. For instance, although he doesn’t mention Gebser or Steiner, Daniel Gustav Anderson (2006) gives an alternate perspective that, “integral theory….remains Aurobindian from tip to toe inclusive of thinkers as diverse as Wilber and Thompson” (p. 63, n. 3). This can be seen to signify an ecology stemming from one root. Other perspectives might dispute inclusion and/or exclusion of various branches for various reasons (see following footnote, for example). Furthermore, I am not claiming this sketch is comprehensive, but rather, a reasonable point of departure. Every framework inevitably comes with a bias, and I apologise to any authors who may feel underrepresented by identifying / constructing this particular genealogy.

\(^{36}\) Noting that the Steiner branch is via the conduit of Gidley.

\(^{37}\) Most contestations occur in relation to Wilber’s genealogical branch. Possible causes for this include (a) the power base of each branch (see Appendix C), and (b) Wilber’s competitiveness over the term, *integral*. For example, the website for Wilber’s Integral University (2007) advertises itself with the tagline, “the world’s first integral learning community.” Apart from the tense-related misnomer regarding the fact that it is not yet in operation, such a claim has the quality of being decidedly competitive with regard to the term, *integral*, in relation to the ecology of interpretative uses of the term as described in this article. Specifically, Sri Aurobindo’s thread was established first, Gebser’s second and Wilber’s third. C.I.I.S was founded in relation to Sri Aurobindo’s *integral* (and this relationship has been in continual—if varying—reference to this thread ever since (Wexler, 2005). It would also be difficult not to interpret C.I.I.S., at least in part, as a “learning community.” In this way, it could readily be argued that C.I.I.S. was the world’s first integral learning community. Two questions arise here: (a) In what specific ways has Wilber (or The Integral University) honoured this understanding concerning C.I.I.S.’s Aurobindian—and thus integral—heritage? and, (b) Given the central utilisation of Aurobindo by AQAL, in what specific ways has Wilber (or The Integral University) detailed a differentiation between C.I.I.S.’s interpretive use of Aurobindo and his own interpretive use of Aurobindo to the extent that he can justify unilateral interpretative usage of the term, *integral*, in the manner described here? Also—although associated primarily with Wilber’s integral thread with regard to interpretive usage of *integral*—a further question could be asked with regard to the already-existent integral learning community at Pacific Integral: namely, Would they regard themselves *primarily* as being part of Integral University’s learning community to the extent that I.U.’s claim is understood as congruent with their own sense of identity? Such are some of the power relations (AQAL lower right quadrant identifications) regarding the term or meme, *integral*. For further discussion on the current status of *integral*, I would recommend Cowan and Todorovic (2006).

\(^{38}\) I note that, through publication of this article, I myself am participating in this ecosystem.
(2006a) adds to this line of reasoning. She makes the point that codification / categorisation, such as is dominant in AQAL, is a mental-perspectival (rational / formal) operation, and that we need to move beyond this into thinking, experiencing, and expressing in aperceptival (integral) ways.

Jean Gebser points out a critical distinction between the Rational Level tendency to codify perspectives, that is to arrange any number of perspectives according to their relations in systematic terms (aka, making maps) and the Integral Level which goes beyond the mapping of perspectives, beyond even the making of perspectives, into thinking and experiencing in a-perspectival ways (p. 28).

Yet, reminiscent of Wilber’s transcend-and-include, such “going beyond” still has to include the mental-perspectival structure of consciousness. But such inclusion can only take place when the structure—Rationality, in this case—has been mastered and given its rightful place, no more, no less—as Gebser (1949/1985) elucidates: “The various structures [of consciousness] which constitute [us] must…become transparent and conscious to [us]” (p. 99) and that we need to master the deficient components by [our] insight so that [we] acquire the degree of maturity and equilibrium necessary for any concretion. Only those components that are in this way themselves balanced, matured, and mastered concretions can effect an integration (p. 99).

Notably here, in order to “effect an integration,” Gebser refers to three necessary qualities in regard to the other structures of consciousness (such as the mental/rational structure), namely: insight, maturity and balance. I posit that each of these can be fruitfully regarded as conceptual portals (linking philosophical and psychological dimensions) which can facilitate integral modes of engagement—thus linking Gebser’s integral theory with Ferrer et al.’s participatory integral theory mentioned above. Moreover, insight, maturity and balance point to (or, perhaps, can be encapsulated as) the art of integrality. As Roy indicates, integration needs to be well-crafted: it needs to be artful; artful with a capital A.

A question regarding the art of crafting—or the craftiness of artistic licence, perhaps—arises when Wilber’s mapping of Gebser’s structures of consciousness is addressed, specifically in relation to the detail of the liminal territory between the modern/mental/rational structure and the integral one—the general area constituted by Wilber’s (2006b) Orange, Green, and Teal (a.k.a. Yellow) vMemes, “waves” or levels. This conceptual terrain is critical in that it potentially constitutes the transition between where we are now—the modern/rational/formal world(view)—and where we (presumably) want to go—namely, the integral world(view); and

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39 After Beck and Cowan parted company, Beck and Wilber developed Spiral Dynamics Integral for several years. Wilber’s reference to the “yellow meme” dates back to this period—a period Wilber refers to as “Wilber IV” (see Kazlev, 2007). After Beck and Wilber parted company, Wilber adopted his own coloured developmental level system based on the rainbow spectrum (thus negating the interwoven, DNA-like, Caduceus-like helix of cool and warm colours—the spiral in Spiral Dynamics—and instead established a straight rainbow-based topology). In this, some colours have stayed the same (e.g., Orange and Green); others have changed (e.g., Yellow has become Teal).

40 Of course, as Wilber (2000c) clearly indicates, where we are now is a very complex territory comprising the entire spectrum of socio-cultural developmental levels, variously manifesting across the globe. For instance, he places 40% of “the population” at the mythic level (having 30% of the power), and
so it behoves me, as an explorer of this terrain to describe the following. When Wilber refers to Gebser’s model, he often correctly identifies Gebser’s structures of consciousness. However, at other times, especially when he refers to Gebser in a context of other authors, and also notably in his more recent work, his text and charts are often substantively misleading\(^41\) (if one wishes to explore the particular territory rather than operate at the level of “orienting generalisations”\(^42\)). Consider the following indicative statement:

Jean Gebser [amongst others]…believe[s] that the general waves of evolution or unfoldment have included **archaic**, **magic**-tribal, **mythic**-traditional, **modern**-rational, **postmodern**-pluralistic—all of which together are often called "first-tier" waves—and **integral**-aperspectival—which is often called "second tier" (Wilber, 2006a, p. 5, emphasis in original).\(^43\)

This statement is incorrect. Gebser has not posited a postmodern-pluralistic stage. Unfortunately, Wilber reinforces this error in various charts and tables frequently propagated at face value by a significant proportion of the integral community. In an iconically glossy insert in Integral Spirituality (Wilber, 2006b, between pp. 68-69) for example, he identifies Gebser’s “pluralistic” stage as corresponding with the Wilberian Green vMeme. In an exacerbation of the situation, he also associates Gebser with a “super-integral” developmental level. Such errors also occur in the *Wilber-Combs Lattice*, a key feature in Wilber’s latest work (2006b, p. 90). Gebser only elucidated five structures: archaic, magic, mythic, mental and integral. No postmodern pluralism, no “super” marked-up\(^44\) integral. Gebser’s understanding instead is that the integral

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30% of “the population” at rational-formal (with 50% of the power) (pp. 9-10). Unfortunately, he does not specify what geographical territory is constituted by “the population,” nor does he specify how these figures were derived.

\(^{41}\) This is a view shared by Matthew Dallman (2006), once art director for Wilber’s Integral Institute and researcher into *the archetype of integral*. From evidence in the integral community’s blogosphere and elsewhere, he is concerned about “the growth of superficial thinking about matters of the world. Contexts are smashed together and collapsed. Entire fields of thought are skimmed over” (Part III: Absurdities & Superficialities, ¶ 12). Evoking postformal languaging as identified by developmental psychologist, Susanne Cook-Greuter, he says that “worldview” understanding requires cognitive depth and *nuance*; “in Gebser, worldviews are poetic, not scientific” (Dallman, 2006, Part III: Absurdities & Superficialities, ¶ 12).

\(^{42}\) This is the neologistic term given by Wilber (1995, pp. viii-ix) to refer to his “broad brush stroke” theoretical approach.

\(^{43}\) The use of the phrase, “often called,” is disingenuous in that (a) the terms were coined by Beck and Cowan, yet Wilber but does refer to Beck and Cowan in this text as part of his list of “leading theorists of consciousness evolution.” Indeed, there has been a substantive change from Wilber IV—e.g., (Wilber, 2000c)—to Wilber V—e.g., (Wilber, 2006b)—with regard to Beck and Cowan and their Spiral Dynamics in that, for example, AQAL no longer identifies developmental levels via the coloured vMemes of Spiral Dynamics; (b) Other than Spiral Dynamics, the only substantive referential point of the use of these terms is Wilber himself. But on what empirical research is Wilber now using these terms if he is distancing himself from the research of Spiral Dynamics? Alternatively, what legitimate justification might he have for disavowing Spiral Dynamics with regard to their research on vMemes yet still utilise that part of their research which distinguishes between two genera of vMemes?

\(^{44}\) Or super-marketed! (see below for discussion concerning Wilber and the Orange vMeme).
structure follows on, as it were, *directly* from the mental-perspectival (modern) one\(^{45}\) and that it has various unique attributes or characteristics which infer a “translucence” of—a certain (re)opening up to—*previous* structures rather than the theoretic construction of *further* stages beyond integral. (See Appendix A for further discussion).

An associated contestation between the genealogical branches of Gebser and Wilber’s *integrals* concerns the following. As noted above, Wilber often associates Gebser’s *integral* with his *vision-logic*, and he elsewhere differentiates *vision-logic* between *early* (relativist) and *later* (dialectical/integral)\(^{46}\)—a differentiation which has been identified in developmental psychological research, which Wilber references (2000a, pp. 21-22). Such research, however, does not carry a sufficiently unified voice for a call of “orienting generalization” to be legitimately made. There are substantive contestabilities. Piagetian commentator, Helena Marchand (2001), for instance, concludes from her review of the literature,

> The great diversity of theories, and of methodologies … presented by authors who postulate the existence of stages of development beyond the formal operations stage makes it difficult, if not impossible, to get a unified view of the characteristics of this level of thought (¶ 11).

She also cites Labouvie-Vief (1992), for instance, as presenting an alternate theoretic topology of postformal cognition: “The term postformal may not imply a progression in formal complexity. Instead, it could mean that for some individuals, formal thinking forms a base from which thought branches out into more nonformal domains” (1992, p. 221, cited in Marchand, 2001, § *What is the nature of postformal thought?* ¶ 6). Nevertheless, a significant theoretical thread shared by other researchers can indeed be characterised as a transition from relativist to dialectical stages, and it would indeed seem that there is validity in such identification. However, from a postformal point of view rather than an either/or one, this theoretic identification may represent only a partial perspective: this *relativist* → *dialectical* construction is not an understanding shared by all researchers on postformal thought and *may* form part of a greater understanding rather than be necessarily—or prematurely—put into a competitive conceptual arena. My research of the current state of play indicates that, collectively-speaking, postformal terrain is still (stimulatingly) work-in-progress (Hampson, in preparation).

However, even if we disregard such contestability, Gebser still cannot be legitimately used in this manner to support such a distinction in the socio-cultural (particularly lower left) AQAL quadrants regarding the status of postmodernism. As conversational openings, I see a number of options here. Either, (a) a convincingly detailed in-depth hermeneutic needs to be conducted between Gebser’s integral-aperspectival and Wilber’s theorizing of socio-cultural stages—this might involve, for instance, either (i) attempting to tease out a distinction between Green and Yellow (Teal) vMemes within Gebser’s integral-aperspectival structure, and/or (ii) attempting to tease out a distinction between Orange and Green vMemes within Gebser’s mental-rational

\(^{45}\) Via a complex process of decreasing “efficiency” in this structure as it overextends or intensifies via over-quantification—the ratio in rational leading to an undue rationing of consciousness—see, for example, (Gebser, 1949/1985, p. 95).

\(^{46}\) With confusing contradiction, Wilber states, “I use ‘postformal’ both ways (as the first major stage beyond formop—namely, vision-logic, and as all levels beyond formop), as context will tell” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 224, n. 14). In this statement, he denotes vision-logic solely with the Green vMeme and implies that vision-logic does not refer to subsequent vMemes, such as his “post-pluralistic” integral.
structure; (b) an appropriate refinement of AQAL holon theory needs to occur, perhaps involving
(i) identifying a relationship between Gebser’s understanding of 
deficiency and unbridled relativism,
for example (although there would be substantive implications for the linear
orderliness of Wilberian level identification here), or (ii) taking heed of Susanne Cook-Greuter’s,
Stanislav Grof’s or Jenny Wade’s comments (outlined below) concerning the radical reflexivity
arising from postconventional/integral development; (c) evidencing for this socio-cultural
transition should no longer include Gebser but instead should newly establish this territory via
other substantive reference (if such a reference were to be found); (d) Wilber’s conceptization
concerning the Green/Teal relationship should be abandoned; (e) a substantively pertinent
critique should be given of my analysis; or (f) a “craftful” combination of the above! If (d) is
identified, an alternative Wilberian concept, vision-logic, could be fruitfully used and developed.
Such development could use dialectical operations—a postformal mode of reasoning that has
even wider implications for integral theory than the deepening of vision-logic. It is this
postformal perspective I will now address.

Thinking Dialectically About Integral Theory

Dialectical operations\textsuperscript{47} can be used to both deepen and problematise integral theory. The
former can be achieved via the concept of vision-logic and the interpenetrative play of the
visionary logic embedded within the term; whilst the latter can be achieved through
counterpointing the default (conventional / formal, non-dialectical) view of the concept of
construction with a dialectical view regarding the concept of deconstruction.

Deepening Vision-Logic

In contrast to Wilberian conceptualisations concerning the sharpness of distinction between
postmodernism (as Wilberian Green vMeme) and integral (as Teal and beyond), vision-logic
straddles the Wilberian postmodern/integral divide (2000a). Wilber comments that “signs of the
emergence of vision-logic” would be constituted by “movements that would be ‘postrational’ or
together developmental psychology research on postformal, postconventional (but pre-
transpersonal) thought with corresponding socio-cultural perspectives, thus covering both
individual (upper quadrants) and collective (lower quadrants) aspects of one holon.\textsuperscript{48}

Vision-logic is a neat term (in both senses) as it creatively embraces a number of postformal
features simultaneously, evoking a “magic synthesis” (Wilber, 2000a, p. 259, n. 27). Gidley
(2006) indicates that academic research often privileges logic over imaginative vision and
consequently does not achieve such a “psychoactive” outcome. It’s perhaps also a
quintessentially postformal term in that it is a neologism constituted by a dialectic between two
contrasting formal concepts—vision and logic. It is thus variously analogous to William Stern’s

\textsuperscript{47} Wilber (2000a, p. 22) indicates that dialectics itself is an important characteristic of postformal thought.
This view is supported by Helena Marchand (2001) who concludes that, “the dialectical and the relativist
models stand out, because of the influence they exert on the bulk of the conceptualisations of postformal
thought.” Benack and Basseches (1989), in line with Susanne Cook-Greuter (2002), Wilber and others,
identify dialectical thinking as more advanced than relativist thinking.

\textsuperscript{48} For Wilber’s interpretation of holon theory, see Wilber (1995).
unitas multiplex, Benedikter’s (2005) productive void, Goethe’s delicate empiricism (Seamon, 1998), Foucault’s (2003) epistemologico-political, Dewey’s (1919/2004) end-in-view, Bussey’s (2006) critical spirituality, Gangadean’s (1993) meditative reason, Steiner’s (1910/1983) spiritual science, and also, perhaps—in more condensed or expanded forms—to Derrida’s différance (as dialectic between difference and deference), Gebser’s (1949/1985) integral-aperspectival, Hafiz’s God in drag (1999) and Zhuangzi’s (n.d.) Transformation of Things (as exemplified by Zhuangzi’s dialectical narrative regarding a person’s dream that they were a butterfly, in question with an alternate understanding that the butterfly was dreaming the person). The term is inherently “unstable” from a formal perspective, but paradoxically generative and vitalising from a postformal perspective in that it can facilitate a spark of cognitive transformation in the reader if the context of the reader is such that the concept is sufficiently trusted and given space to internally reside, so to speak. Regarding the logic of “cognition” and the vision of “integration,” Wilber (2000a) refers to various researchers on postformal thought:

Commons and Richards, Fischer, and Sinnott tend to emphasise the cognitive component of vision-logic (and often its extreme developments), while Basseches, Pascual-Leone, Labouvie-Vief, and Deirdre Kramer highlight more of its dialectical, visionary, integrative capacities. Arieti stressed that vision-logic is an integration of primary and secondary processes—fantasy and logic—and thus it can be very creative (p. 259, n. 27).

In addition to the overall dialectic of the term, Wilber interestingly attributes dialectical thinking itself as belonging to one side of the term—the vision side. A complementary understanding would be that dialectics is a type of postformal logic and can therefore be found in the logic side of the term: such is the imaginative generativity of the term.

Wilber (2000a) says that “vision-logic can be applied (as can most cognition) to any of the major levels (or realms) in any of the quadrants” (p. 261, n. 27). Applying vision-logic as a postformal lens upon itself (through visionary-rational extension), the following possibilities open up:

Vision variously connotes, among other things,

- Seeing as understanding
- Visionary futures-thinking
- Both the sharp focused detail of central vision, and the wide-angle, panoramic—“big picture”—soft focus of peripheral vision
- Spatial literacy
- Art
- Sensory-perceptual phenomena
- The differentiation of qualities
- Imagination

whilst connotations of logic variously include,

- Rationality
- Reason, explanation
- Correctness, rectitude, right
- Logos, The Word, words
- Decision-making
- Pattern, form
- Formalism, formality
- Mathematics: the “play” of quantities

Additionally, from a more linguistically-oriented or creative postmodern angle, a characterisation might be to assign logic the role of Wilberian horizontal translation, the “flatland” of the plan view of ex-plan-ation; and, conversely, vision the role of Wilberian vertical transformation by means of identifying the (Erotic49) creativity inherent in the image of imagination (see Wilber, 1995, pp. 59-61). From this perspective, the neologism is metaphorically holonic which adds to its generativity. Meanwhile, from a dialectically-oriented mode of cognition, vision-logic can deepen into a plurality of vision-logics (a plurality still encompassed by the term as genus). This could include such domains as:

- Visions and versions of different logics—including:
  - many-valued logics (Malinowski, 1993), including
    - fuzzy logic (Novák, 1989; Zadeh, Klir, & Yuan, 1996),50
    - and the related: fuzziology & social fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002), and vagueness (Williamson, 1994)
  - dialectical logic (Adorno, 1990; Ilyenkov, 1977);
- The logic of different visions—the rectitude of plural imaginations51—including
  - (post)modern imaginations (Kearney, 1998)
  - the embodied imagination (Johnson, 1992)
  - the theoretic imagination (Weick, 1989)
  - the scientific imagination (Holton, 1998)
  - the geometrical imagination (Hilbert & Cohn-Vossen, 1952)
  - the sociological imagination (Mills, 1959/2000)
  - the philosophy of imagination (Warnock, 1976)

In summary, beautifully situated in the liminal world of a generative, postformal flux gestured by a postmodern-integral dialectic, Wilber’s vision-logic is an inspiring neologism which can facilitate cognitive transformation. The above demonstration of such a constructive facilitation—the production of a higher order of (integral) construction (or an intensification of resonance)—has, however, involved a certain (postmodern) deconstruction of the term. The demonstration above can therefore be seen to exemplify possible interpenetrative dialectics between construction and deconstruction.

49 Referring to Wilber’s AQAL placement of Eros as Creative force of the Kosmos (1995, p. 69; also see pp. 338-341).
50 In a somewhat reflexive move, I note that fuzzy logic—and thence (holonic) fuzziology (Dimitrov & Hodge, 2002)—could be useful for facilitating the justification of Wilber’s linguistic construct, orienting generalizations and other such “big picture” languaging inventions.
51 The correctness of realising imaginations as valuable—inspired by, for instance, the transdisciplinary imagination (Gidley, 2001)
**Contra-Indications of Construction**

From a postformal viewpoint, *construction* and *deconstruction* can dialectically interpenetrate each other in various ways. To explore this perspective, a *formal* or *conventional* view of the terms—that construction involves a putting together, and that deconstruction involves a taking apart—are taken as given and not further explored. Instead, this section explores contra-possibilities or counter-intuitions.\(^{52}\)

When we regard the terms, *construction*, *reconstruction* and *deconstruction*, what form of cognition are we using? From a pre-formal perspective we might feel a flood of emotive mythic resonances so that we conflate *construction* and *reconstruction* with *salvation*, and *deconstruction* with *destruction*. From a formal perspective, we might seek to carefully define exactly what the terms “actually” mean so that there is maximal differentiation; from the formal perspective, preformal conflations no longer apply, but *construction* and *reconstruction* still each stand in unequivocal semantic opposition to *deconstruction*. From a post-formal perspective, however, the situation may not (necessarily) be as clear-cut. A deeper understanding would beckon—one potentially calling upon any number of, or combination of, postformal approaches, epistemologies, ways of thinking and modes of expression, chosen (or happened on) by us to form a (non-relativist) “integrality.” Such postformal modes of reasoning include thinking complexly, creatively, reflexively, dialogically, ecologically, “embodiedly,” “constructivistically,” and dialectically. In the following discussion, dialectics is used as an overall structure, whilst attention is given to the constructed nature of language. A transcendence of a simplistic / formal / Orange perspective on *deconstruction* and *(re)construction* is thus effected. In so doing, particular texts from Wilber and Derrida—chosen for their contra-indicative properties—are developmentally assessed to problematise the premise that Wilber’s *(re)constructive* approach is necessarily operating at a more mature developmental level than Derrida’s *deconstructive* approach. Firstly, an example is given indicating inappropriate destruction in the guise of reconstruction, as text from Wilber is analysed. Secondly, the constructiveness of deconstruction is demonstrated, as text from Derrida is analysed.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{52}\) A metaphor here would be to consider the harmonics of a musical tone: *formal* semantic qualities could be understood as the fundamental frequency of the note, whilst the *postformal* dialectical semantics could be viewed as the harmonic overtones. Lest such a metaphor be consequently taken to necessarily signify the superfluous of dialectical semantics with regard to overall “pitch of meaning” (as it were), due regard should be given to the possibility of substantive change of “pitch of meaning” caused by particular intensifications of “postformal timbre”—as would be exemplified by the pitch of a note on a wind instrument reaching a bifurcation point and suddenly changing by an octave—through the practice of “overblowing.” Another example would be feedback from an electric guitar. Perhaps analogous to an intensification of yin leading to sudden yang (or *vice versa*), the subtler characteristics of phenomena such as musical timbre or dialectical semantics should not be assumed to lack substantive power: *details* regarding integral theory have the potential not only to join up the dots, but also to create qualitatively novel surprises with regard to what *emerges* once the dots are joined up.

\(^{53}\) The postformal approach I am employing is non-relativist in that substantive qualitative distinctions are made.
Destructive Reconstruction

Wilber uses the term *deconstructive postmodernism* and strongly associates it with AQAL’s Green vMeme—described by Wilber as the green “meme,” “level,” “stage” or “wave,” alongside the similarly strong associations of *pluralism* and *relativism*. Wilber (2000a) confidently asserts that,

the bright promise of a constructive postmodernity slid into a nihilistic deconstructive postmodernity when the pluralistic embrace turned into a rancid levelling of all qualitative distinctions. Postmodernity, attempting to escape flatland, often became its most vulgar champion (p. 160).

In this vignette, *constructive* is the hero, one associated with bright, hopeful promise; whilst *deconstructive* is the villain, associated with nihilism, rancidity and vulgarity. On the “vulgar” side of postmodernity, he identifies two features: denial of depth and denial of qualitative distinctions. He evidences this via sole reference to two American novels: Ellis’ *American Psycho* and Gass’s *The Tunnel*—he presents no evidence from non-fictional sources and no evidence from the viewpoint of other nations. He goes on to say that,

*Constructive postmodernism*…takes up the multiple contexts freed by pluralism, and then goes one step further and weaves them together into mutually interrelated networks. (…By whatever name, pluralistic relativism gives way to integral holism. See especially…Deirdre Kramer, Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Jan Sinnott, Don Beck, Clare Graves, Susanne Cook-Greuter, Kitchener and King, Blanchard-Fields, William Perry, and Cheryl Armon, among others) (2000a, p. 172).\(^\text{56}\)

This “one step further” infers the holarchy (or non-dominatory hierarchy) of Wilberian theory, AQAL (1995, pp. 32-78), where constructive postmodernism is the next holarchical level after deconstructive postmodernism. But to what, exactly, is Wilber referring, when he uses the term, *deconstructive postmodernism*? Is he perhaps denying the possibility of *depth* in deconstruction? Is he “denying a qualitative distinction” between *deconstruction* and *deconstructive postmodernism*?

To answer such questions, one might perhaps imagine that Wilber’s volume entitled, *A Theory of Everything* (2000c), would hold sufficiently adequate keys. In this, he associates the Green vMeme, *inter alia*, with Derrida,\(^\text{57}\) deconstruction,\(^\text{58}\) relativism, and the narcissism of—

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\(^{54}\) I will be not necessarily inferring the absolute lack of utility of the term, *deconstructive postmodernism*; I will rather be problematising its uncontextualised or reflexive usage, and in so doing, attempt to raise pertinent awareness.

\(^{55}\) Spiral Dynamics does not map Derrida, *deconstruction, poststructuralism, postmodernism, nihilism*, or *pluralism or relativism* (Beck & Cowan, 1996) in (or gravitating toward) the Green (or any other) vMeme. Therefore Wilber’s theoric use of the Gravesian terms, *first* and *second tier*, cannot legitimately be used in AQAL (e.g., Wilber, 2006b, p. 90) to make connective inferences regarding pluralism, postmodernism, deconstruction, etc.

\(^{56}\) The current article variously refers to most of the authors Wilber mentions here.

\(^{57}\) This placement of Derrida (published in 2000) would seem to contradict an earlier discussion of Derrida by Wilber, in *Sex Ecology Spirituality* (1995, p. 601). This is a discussion, I further note, left
and regression in—“boomeritis.” Connecting *deconstruction* with *boomeritis*, we can observe the following—potentially revolutionary but unfortunately unsubstantiated—cultural criticism of this developmental level—the Wilberian Green vMeme:

In green’s admirable attempt to go *postconventional*—it has often inadvertently embraced anything nonconventional, and this includes much that is frankly *preconventional*, regressive, and narcissistic. This strange mixture of very high postconventional memes with preconventional narcissistic memes is boomeritis. A typical result is that the sensitive self, honestly trying to help, excitedly exaggerates its own significance. It will possess the new paradigm, which heralds the greatest transformation in the history of the world; it will completely revolutionize society as we know it; it will save the planet and save Gaia⁵⁹ and save the Goddess; it will be the most extraordinary. … Well, and off we go on some of the negative aspects of the last three decades of boomer cultural studies. … Boomeritis has significantly tilted and prejudiced academic studies; it is behind much of the culture wars; it haunts almost every corner of the New Age; it drives many of the games of deconstruction and identity politics; it authors new paradigms daily (p. 27).

What should be made of such heroic words which caution us against war, haunting, and games of deconstruction? A call, it would seem, for boomers to turn from The Dark Side and acquire Wilber’s Brave New Paradigm. Yet in such an admirable attempt to “go integral,” certain shadow questions arise: Has Wilber unwittingly embraced the preconventional 

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unrevised for the second edition of SES (2000). Here, Wilber says that, “Derrida is often called on to support the notion that there are no transcendental signifieds at all (only sliding chains of signifiers and endless cultural mediation). But this is a misreading of Derrida. …According to Derrida, the fact that we can translate languages to some significant degree means that there are genuine transcendental signifieds … even if all contexts are situated, a great number of contexts are *similarly situated* across cultures. ‘Context’ does not automatically mean ‘relative’ or ‘incommensurable.’ *It often means ‘common’...*” (1995, pp. 601-602) In this, Wilber appears to infer that Derrida should *not* be mapped as a “relativist.” Wilber does not say in this discussion where Derrida *should* then be located. I have not found a reference where this apparent discrepancy is clarified. Notwithstanding discussion concerning the possible (though apparently unreflective) postformal embrace of such a paradoxical position, this article will follow the particular subjectivity in Wilber that voices Derrida as a relativist, for these reasons: (a) this particular voice or stance of Wilber’s appears to be later thinking; (b) it is expressed in the more populist of the two books; (c) it is voiced near the beginning in the main body of text rather than as an endnote.

I have not come across a discussion by Wilber differentiating “Derrida” from “deconstruction” in terms of AQAL mapping.

⁵⁹ Interestingly, Beck and Cowan (1996, p. 47) attribute James Lovelock’s ‘Gaia hypothesis’ to the Turquoise (highest level, second-tier) vMeme—two levels beyond Green. They also identify “Gandhi’s ideas of pluralistic harmony,” “theories of David Bohn [sic]” (see discussion below) and Wilber’s *Spectrum of Consciousness* each to Turquoise. (There is no reference to any other Wilber in this regard). The latter is an interesting choice given Wilber’s self-distancing from this work, coming as it does from the historical subjective identity he labels, *Wilber I (the Romantic)* (Kazlev, 2007). An implication here would be that Beck and Cowan might have a different theoretical perspective on what Wilber calls “Eco” or “Romantic,” and on “pluralistic harmony” and Bohmian theory, and instead attribute such qualities or approaches to the highest evaluation.
If such languaging can be theorized as part of a grand Magician’s art—the art of the Spiral (Dynamics) Wizard (able to call upon all vMemes), then why is the teaching of this art not enabled through patient and demonstratively reflexive visibility?

Perhaps this is such a game? Am I authoring a “new paradigm”? Phone 012-3π45-6789 for YES and 987-654π-3210 for NO. (N.B. “Extreme Postmodernists” can phone whatever number they like! whilst Reasonable Postmodernists can phone whatever number they like…within reason.)

The referenced link (Todorovic, 2002) requires a simple membership procedure. For access, follow: http://www.spiraldynamics.org/ Articles Advanced Resources (registration) “The Mean Green Hypothesis: Fact or Fiction?” Memes and vMemes in SD - the confused language of Spiral Dynamics”

My interest here is not in attempting to establish a formal answer through detailed research (even if that were possible, given the elusive nature of the concept) but in ascertaining what would be a reasonable assumption—on first blush. Derrida’s response to the question is given later.

Tom Murray also says, “the integral community, taking Wilber's lead, has a propensity toward informalism, pragmatism, and popularism” (Murray, 2006, p. 9) and I would add to this: the languaging ensemble that is Wilber’s style is no doubt an important reference point for expressivity mode; however, due consideration should also be given to the languaging modes of other integral theorists, whose chosen styles of communication may offer additional integral insights and languaging-template openings.

On the Wikipedia page for “deconstruction” (2007a), Derrida is the only person mentioned in the first paragraph and the only deconstructionist mentioned in the first two. Apart from eight other deconstructionists listed in paragraph three, we have to wait until the eighth paragraph before a deconstructionist other than Derrida is mentioned again. In total, Derrida’s name appears 73 times. The names of all other deconstructionists put together total 44.
deconstruction clearly indicates that it would be reasonable to assume that in the discursive realm in which Wilber mostly operates, deconstruction, first and foremost, refers to Derrida. And what is the object to which deconstruction directs its attention? Language. So, as an interpenetration of integral and postmodern, we might want to answer the following question: In what ways might languaging be mapped across structures of consciousness?

An integrally-oriented developmental psychologist whose work specifically concerns language is Susanne Cook-Greuter (1990, 2000, 2002, 2007). She identifies the language habit—the way in which we confuse our experience with our conceptualisations of our experience. Somewhat inferring Commons and Richards’ Model Of Hierarchical Complexity, perhaps, she refers to Kegan, Basseches and herself regarding, “the fundamental language problem inherent in meaning making and scientific theorizing no matter how many systems are integrated and at what level of hierarchical complexity” (2000, p. 234).66 She identifies the following features of the language habit:

- It is a universal for humans;
- It is innate but needs modelling in early childhood to emerge;
- It becomes unconscious once acquired;
- “It bundles the flux of sensory input and inner experience into labelled concepts shared with one’s speech community”;
- “It is so deeply ingrained that speakers of any given language are not aware of the reality construction imposed on them by their language”;
- “It can become a barrier to further development if it remains unconscious, automatic and unexamined” (2000, p. 228).67

As an opening for further research, a pertinent question arises here concerning possible relationships between Cook-Greuter’s identification of the language habit, her construct-aware developmental level (outlined below), constructivist theories, and the linguistic turn of postmodern philosophy, including Derrida’s déconstruction.

Drawing upon her doctoral research, Cook-Greuter (2002) identifies numerous developmental stages of language habits as part of her model of ego development, and corresponds these to stages in the Action Logics of William Torbert’s Leadership Development Framework. She groups the stages according to the following four levels: preconventional, conventional, postconventional, and transpersonal. Our primary interest here concerns the postconventional level.68 In this, there are three stages. In ascending order of development, these are:

66 She goes on to say, “except for those who study the limits of language professionally, only individuals at the second level of postconventional differentiation seem to appreciate the magnitude of humanity’s automatic and unconscious dependence on the language habit for all aspects of living” (Cook-Greuter, 2000, p. 234). She does not make clear here whether “those who study the limits of language professionally” (Cook-Greuter, 2000, p. 234) are solely constituted by linguist specialists, or whether this term covers poststructuralist philosophers, and/or writers and poets, for example.

67 Indeed, the following question is pertinent here: In what ways can one adequately examine language when the very tool one is using—language—is also the object under investigation? Perhaps, for instance, one needs to deconstruct as one goes—in a spirit of continual construct-awareness?

68 It is worth also outlining here languaging characteristics from the two most developed of the conventional stages, as these bear relationship to the orthodox style expected of academic writing such as this very text, or regarding integral community discourse. The first is the self-conscious stage (aligned to
- The Individualist stage—aligned to Torbert’s Individualist;
- The Autonomous stage—aligned to Torbert’s Strategist;
- The Construct-aware stage—aligned to Torbert’s Magician (a.k.a. Alchemist or Clown).

The Individualist stage she identifies as relativistic. She also relates this stage to deconstructive postmodernism, in which truth “can never be found. Everything is relative; there is no place to stand or judge from” (p. 21), whilst those at the Autonomous / Strategist stage “try to do justice to the complexity of life in their verbal expressions” (p. 26) and have “the capacity to see and accept paradox and tolerate ambiguity” (p. 24). Additionally, the shadow side of the self can be acknowledged to a greater degree and therefore a new integration and wholeness is possible” (p. 24); they walk the talk. Language clues include complex, flexible syntax, linguistic coherence, linguistic complexity. Lastly, at the most mature of these three postconventional stages, the Magician starts to realise “the absurdity or automatic limits of human map making in the representational domain” (p. 27); that, “all cognition is recognized as constructed” and there is the recognition of “paradoxes inherent in rational thought” (p. 27). And in terms of identifiable features, “the language of Magicians is often complex, vivid, authentic and playful...Magicians express a vast matrix of topics, concerns, questions, insights and commentary cleverly united into one complex sentence structure” (p. 31).

Given this schema, and given the aforementioned primary understanding that deconstructive postmodernism refers to deconstruction and thence to Derrida, one would reasonably assume that Derrida’s languaging would be adequately mapped within the relativist, individualist stage. So, Is Derrida an Individualist? Is deconstruction merely relativist?69 In a discussion regarding a preference between two different language habits—Edmund Husserl’s perspectival univocity and James Joyce’s relativist equivocality—John Caputo (1997) reports that,

Derrida is struck by the self-limitation of both ideas. For unbridled equivocality would breed such confusion that “the very text of its repetition” would be unintelligible, even as perfect univocity, were such a thing possible, would result only in paralysis and sterility…

Torbert’s Expert/Technician) (Cook-Greuter, 2002, pp. 15-16). Language habits at this stage indicate that the speaker regards themselves as “ultrarational”—that they have it all figured out. Value is place on the accumulation of facts. There is often a sense of superiority, of one-upmanship, often accompanied by a ridiculing or hostile tenor. The second (the one directly preceding postconventional stages) is the conscientious stage (aligned to Torbert’s Achiever) (pp. 16-20) Language habits at this stage include seriousness, earnest conviction, intellectual scepticism, recognition of complexity, ownership of responsibility, revealing “I” statements, an ability to listen and restate expressions without adding one’s own interpretation, asking questions such as “what does it feel like?”, suppression of one’s shadow through “positive” attitude, time-related terms have an emphasis on the local future and time effectiveness. Cook-Greuter comments that, at this stage, “formal operations are at their peak and rationality, progressivism, positivism and reductionism have their strongholds.” (p. 18) Summarising the conventional mindset, Cook-Greuter comments that its major limit “is the acceptance of facts and the external world as real and its blindness to the constructed nature of beliefs, especially the grand myth of conventional science. Although complex scientific analysis is applied, the underlying assumptions of any system are rarely questioned or made explicit. … knowledge, measurement and prediction are taken for granted as means to control nature, self and society” (p. 20).

69 My judgement at this point is not to attempt to differentiate the gamut of Derrida’s text from a notion of Derrida’s déconstruction.
Deconstruction—as usual—situates itself in the distance between these two. It does not renounce the constitution of meaning and the transmission of scientific ideas…(p. 183).

Caputo reports here that deconstruction is beyond equivocity, and so beyond pluralistic relativism. But what of Derrida’s (necessarily translated) languaging itself? Let’s consider Derrida’s (1987/1989) reading of Heidegger and the discourse surrounding Heidegger. In this, Derrida makes a judgement and takes a stand against something he identifies in the discourse. That certain something is a discrimination against Spirit:

Is it not remarkable that this theme, spirit, occupying…a major and obvious place in this [genealogical] line of thought, should have been dis inherited…No-one ever speaks of spirit in Heidegger. Not only this: even the anti-Heideggerian specialists take no interest in this thematics of spirit, not even to denounce it (pp. 3-4).

Judging this to be unjust, he asks, “why this filtering out in the heritage, and this discrimination?” (p. 4). He goes on to decisively comment: “This preliminary work has not yet been systematically undertaken—to my knowledge, perhaps not even envisaged. Such a silence is not without significance” (p. 5). Derrida here is operating with/in a hierarchy of values—favouring the value of work that is systematically undertaken over work which is not. Derrida then constructively elucidates three arguments concerning Heidegger’s avoidance of the term, spirit—arguments which give preference to certain perspectives over others. (pp. 4-6).

Derrida’s comments here are therefore not coming from a relativist perspective. He is making value judgments in favour of a discussion of Spirit and against Heidegger’s inappropriate silence on the issue. Furthermore, deconstruction itself is clearly articulated as being beyond the relativism of unbridled equivocity: Derrida sees relativism as self-limiting, confusing, unintelligible.

With regard to the following developmental stage, Cook-Greuter (2002) identifies “the capacity to…tolerate ambiguity” and “the capacity to see and accept paradox” as two features indicative of the Autonomous-Strategist (“constructive postmodern”) stage (p. 24). With regard to ambiguity, consider the following text from Derrida (1983/1985): “To deconstruct [is] a structuralist gesture… But it [is] also an antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity” (p. 2). With regard to paradox, consider the following from Derrida: “All sentences of the type ‘deconstruction is X’ or ‘deconstruction is not X’ a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false” (p. 4). These comments therefore align with Cook-Greuter’s Autonomous-Strategist stage (at least).

Lastly, in consideration of the most mature of the postconventional stages (i.e. the stages under consideration here)—the construct-aware Magician—consider the Cook-Greuter identifiers of this stage—authenticity, vividness, playfulness and complexity—with regard to the following two Derridean (1997/2001) quotes—the first with particular regard to authenticity:

In principle, there is no limit to forgiveness, no measure, no moderation, no “to what point?”… Forgiveness is often confounded, sometimes in a calculated fashion, with related

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70 From a formal perspective, it could be stated that this paper will be employing Cook-Greuter’s model as a heuristic, as it will not be conducting the type of sentence completion analysis she used as part of her methodology. It will, nevertheless, be conducting hermeneutic sentence analysis.
themes: excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription, etc...[but] forgiveness must in principle remain heterogeneous and irreducible (p. 27).

and the following single sentence with its complex structure:

For if, as I believe, the concept of a crime against the humanity is the main charge of this self-accusation, of this repenting and this asking forgiveness; if, on the other hand, only a sacredness of the human can, in the last resort, justify this concept (nothing is worse, in this logic, than a crime against the humanity of man and against human rights); if this sacredness finds its meaning in the Abrahamic memory of the religions of the Book, and in a Jewish but above all Christian interpretation of the ‘neighbour’ or the ‘fellow man’; if, from this, the crime against humanity is a crime against what is most sacred in the living, and thus already against the divine in man, in God-made-man or man-made-God-by-God (the death of man and the death of God would here betray the same crime), then the ‘globablisation’ of forgiveness resembles an immense scene of confession in progress, thus a virtually Christian convulsion-conversion-confession, a process of Christianisation which has no more need for the Christian church (pp. 30-31).

Here, in addition to Derrida’s vividness of language regarding concerns and insights into matters spiritual—with a sense of appropriate wordplay—we can also see Cook-Greuter’s identification of the construct-aware Magician where “concerns, questions, insights and commentary cleverly united into one complex sentence structure.” A plausible hypothesis, then, would be to consider that these comments from Derrida centre around the perspective of The Magician—a level beyond Wilber’s Teal / Integral / “post-postmodern” / Yellow vMeme.

In short, this evidence supports the hypothesis that the above text from Derrida is operating from the construct-aware stage. But what does Derrida (1983/1985) himself say about reconstruction? Is deconstruction negative?

The undoing, decomposing, and desedimenting of structures...[is] not a negative operation. Rather than destroying, it [is] also necessary to understand how an "ensemble" [is] constituted and to reconstruct it to this end (p. 3).

Derrida rationally differentiates deconstruction from destruction and indicates that deconstruction is a constructive activity. He also explicitly reflexes upon its subtle dialectical quality. His writing demonstrates a high level of developmental maturity, in which deconstruction is recognised and reflexively enacted in a post-relativist, dialectical, construct-aware mode. Derrida and deconstruction are clearly something Other than that signified by Wilber in his use of the term, deconstructive postmodernism.

**Thinking Critically About Integral Theory**

So, a question arises: What might account for such confusion between deconstruction and deconstructive postmodernism? Through attending this question, an anomaly stemming from Wilber’s universalising interpretation of the notion of deconstructive postmodernism can be seen...
to emerge, opening up a conversation concerning possible relationships between critical thinking and critical theory.\textsuperscript{71}

**Boomeritis: An (un)Critical Americanitis?**

Let’s turn firstly to Derrida (1983/1985) for an insight into this question: “It is true that in certain circles (university or cultural, especially in the United States) the technical and methodological ‘metaphor’ that seems necessarily attached to the very word deconstruction has been able to seduce or lead astray” (p. 3). The suggestion here is that the U.S.A. constitutes a substantively *special* case of being “led astray” by the term. Referencing Curler (1982), Ben Agger (1991) continues that there is a distinction to be had—perhaps between Derrida’s déconstruction and a certain metaphorical use of the term, or perhaps between Derrida’s text and a “methodology” called *deconstruction*—and that this strongly affects the U.S.A.: “Literary critics prise out of Derrida a methodology of textual reading called *deconstruction*. This deconstructive method has spread like wildfire through American humanities departments” (p. 112). Wilber (1995) develops this line of reasoning regarding deconstruction:

Here was a “literary criticism” made to order for the tenured radicals of the sixties: haven’t the wits to build a building? No problem, just blow one up instead. Thousands of Ph.D. dissertations in deconstructionist themes were issued by American universities…

Deconstruction as a movement never caught on in Germany or France or England (or anywhere else for that matter)…(pp. 721-722, n. 4).

Here, Wilber emotively reinforces Derrida’s and Agger’s more qualified comments, asserting that deconstruction as a movement never caught on *anywhere* other than in the United States of America.\textsuperscript{72} He also seemingly implies that the sensibility of the cultural movement was sufficiently violent to warrant use of—shall we say—a *weapon of metaphorical destruction*—namely, the metaphor of *destroying* a building by explosive detonation (rather than, say, carefully *deconstructing* the aforesaid building, should such demise be warranted).\textsuperscript{73} He furthermore implies that such destructive American deconstructionists were insufficiently *intelligent* to construct conceptual “buildings” or structures. An alternative understanding of deconstruction’s contribution is offered by integral commentator, Ray Harris (2004):

The major function of green is to consciously deconstruct values in order to reconstruct them as freely agreed principles. Green is actually a very moral stage. It is orange that is the most amoral. It is orange that tends to unconsciously and destructively deconstruct – green arises to repair the damage (§ *Misunderstanding postmodernism*, ¶ 18).

\textsuperscript{71} And possibly neo-imperialism

\textsuperscript{72} It is possible, of course, that Wilber meant “anywhere” in a non-literal, colloquial way—i.e. where he didn’t mean *all* places, just *most* places or *all places mostly*… or some variant. It is also possible that his intention was for the reader to take such utterances “with a pinch of salt.” But if this were argued, how would the reader be able to distinguish between “serious” intent and “throw-away” comments? Would it depend on the maturity of the reader? Even if such comments were not believed, what (metaphorical) non-verbal communication might be taking place here?

\textsuperscript{73} A forerunner to Derrida’s *déconstruction* was Heidegger’s “positive” *Destruktion*. Such a philosophical genealogy would beckon a yet finer distinction to be made than that being made here.
If this alternate understanding is true, then Wilber’s unevidenced text here could be seen as arising from the Orange vMeme, and could be interpreted as his substantive underappreciation of the Green vMeme. The idea that the Orange vMeme can be destructive in this way would be in keeping with Gare’s comment earlier concerning the destructive nature of modernity. Wilber, in turn, also substantively critiques modernity, yet his later writings do not foreground the destructive aspects of Orange in relation to those of Green (see Appendix A). A conversation opening here would be: How might we ascertain or evaluate such a distinction between modern-mental-rational and inclusive-integral levels?

American and Other Interpretations

From a slightly different hermeneutic perspective, the following question arises: From whence does such violence emanate? Which AQAL quadrants are implicated here? Lower right power structures? Lower left cultural values? Upper right bodily urges? Wilber’s upper left subjectivity? or something tetra-arising? One interpretation is that Wilber appears to be referring to an event occurring in (his) lower left quadrant—in American cultural values.

Interestingly, Ben Agger’s (1996) interpretation of the situation is both significantly convergent and significantly divergent from Wilber’s. In terms of agreement, Agger reinforces the hypothesis that there is something singularly wayward with America’s interpretation of postmodernism and deconstruction. In terms of difference, Agger suggests that, rather than being related to America’s excess of radical politics, it is actually American culture’s deficiency in radical politics that is the cause of wilful or careless “ignorance” regarding deconstruction:

the American reception of postmodernism has tended to ignore postmodernism’s stress on the linkage between discourse and democracy, a linkage that I contend is precisely the opening of Derrida’s critique of western logocentrism to radical politics. Put differently, the American reception of postmodernism suppresses (or simply never learned) the social and intellectual history of French postmodern theory, which emerged out of the 1968 May Movement as a critique of Stalinist and orthodox-Marxist authoritarianism in preference for a radical micropolitics of everyday life (later to emerge as new social movements theory). Far from turning away from politics, people like Derrida and Foucault viewed their own philosophical work as intensely and obviously political, contributing to the heterodox French left project, especially in ways that embrace the feminist and gay/lesbian movements (¶ 14).

Could an adequate interpretation of this instance, then, be that the American nation-culture constitutes a “pathological” aberration among the plurality of global nation-cultures, in that it, substantially alone, has interpreted postmodernism as a form of destructive violence against the radical politics of an authentic democracy? a masculinist straight-jacketing of meaning—from, shall we say, French fries (delicately-sautéed postmoderne)—to McGiveMeGiveMeGiveMeU.S.NewNewsNewsweakNewspeakFreedomNowNow “Freedom” fries?—contributing to an exponential escalation of the prison population of concepts?74—a suppression of freedom in the name of freedom?

74 Reviewing the prison population in countries of the world, consider the following statistics (figures show prison populations per 100,000 inhabitants): England and Wales 148; Australia 125; Canada 107;
Perhaps not. Perhaps, conversely—as Benedikter (2005) indicates—the U.S., including Wilber’s sizable contribution, leads the world in new thinking—in integrating, specifically, “Pacific” or “Eastern” conceptualisations. There is certainly strong evidence that points this way, too. Then again, does it have to be either/or? It is surely not the intention of well-respected American authors to perpetuate neo-imperialist languaging; but, if Wilber’s comment is true, and if integral theory, developmental theory or socio-cultural theory seeks to speak from a global rather than a local (i.e., American) perspective—and to a global rather than a provincial (i.e., American) audience—then note might be made that the rest of the world might not have substantively partaken of such a cultural fad as deconstructive postmodernism—or, at least, might not have substantively partaken of a “vulgar” interpretation of postmodernism. It would seem that the theoretic transition from modern to integral needs to take into account the importance of different cultural types—specifically addressing the 242 of the 243 nation-cultures that are not the U.S. of A. (regardless of how many subcultures the U.S.A. includes). If cultural type or state can skew the normalised theoretic structure of cultural development to the extent indicated above, then such straight linear interpretations of AQAL’s default theoretic hierarchy of significance between levels of development and cultural type and state become problematic or untenable. Instead, a much subtler, more complex theoretic structure needs to be envisaged, where cultural variants (such as the identification of the AQAL state of neo-imperialism regarding the current U.S.) can be seen to be a major player amongst integral elements—the AQAL ecology of types, states, lines, levels and quadrants / native perspectives.

Another view on this would be to address pertinent (lower right quadrant) global power structures. Notwithstanding such considerations, dominant discourse from Wilber suggests that obstacles to embracing Integral Transformative Practice “are not found exclusively in boomers or in Americans. Pluralistic relativism is a universally available wave of consciousness unfolding…” (2000c, p. 31).

This statement could arguably be supported by non-American integral research and/or concerning non-American concerns, such as Olen Gunnlaugson’s (2004) research regarding “unhealthy” Green—and its moment of (potential) transformation—in a Swedish college. And, indeed, a picture would seem to be emerging here that, regardless of first (Wikipedic or popular) impressions, an important distinction should be made between Derrida and deconstruction, in that the latter might have been appropriated (or somewhat forcibly prised out of Derrida—as Agger has intoned) by humanities departments both in the States—and elsewhere—to become something quite other than Derrida’s déconstruction.

Nevertheless, even where this cultural stage is identified in other countries, it would still appear to be the case that the “virulent” memetic strain of postmodernism seemingly constituted by the term deconstructive postmodernism is found in the U.S. in an unusually high ratio. According to Wilberian theory, this would suggest that the Green vMeme is significantly more

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Noting that this does not necessarily concern other features of postformal/postconventional development, whether in the US or elsewhere.

Notwithstanding its subsequent malaise.
prevalent in the States than elsewhere. Yet, Wilber (2000c) indicates that Europe’s memetic centre of gravity is more advanced than the U.S. and that it has a significantly stronger Green vMeme presence than in the U.S. (p. 119, fig. 6-2). But then, if this is so, why doesn’t Europe apparently suffer as much “boomeritis”? What might explain this anomaly, this inconsistency between the two features:

1. The difference between Europe and The States with regard to the strength of the Green vMeme and
2. The difference between Europe and The States with regard to the strength of the Green vMeme pathology of “boomeritis”?

How much is deconstructive postmodernism a function of “boomeritis”? How much a question of American-itis? No doubt, a complex question. But, as the above discussion has perhaps indicated, integral theory might still have a way to go if it is to adequately align, resonate, or become congruent with the complexity of the world. We need to start thinking complexly about integral theory.

**Thinking Complexly About Integral Theory**

If Jean Gebser and Sri Aurobindo were alive today we might guess that they would see in the wondrous emergent properties of complex adaptive systems…an opening for the invisible. And perhaps the science of the future will validate such thinking, finding in the influences enfolded in the implicate order or the quantum vacuum field the infinitesimally tiny whispers that pivot us toward our personal and collective fates (Combs, 2005, §Gebser and Modern Science, ¶ 9).

Both the butterfly effect of “pivotal whispers” and the “wonder” of complex adaptive systems can be theoretically encompassed by complexity theory. Perhaps if Jean Gebser and Sri Aurobindo were alive today, they might advance integral theory via complexity theory as an integral part of the artful science of the future, and not only validate such an opening into Mystery, but reflexively realize their participation in it through such theoretic evolution.

The considerations explored in the context below follow a specific interpretation of complexity: that of complexity theory with specific reference to the complexity characteristic of (fractal) recursion.

Recursion will first be applied in relation to the notion of substantive content, exploring the idea that qualities of conceptualization and textual style can be viewed as a theoretic recursion of larger “content parcels”; further, that this perspective can be facilitated by the ludic neologism, nanotextology, and that the substantive content of integral theory should be reflected at all (or most) fractal scales—an integral nanotextology.

Secondly, a recursion of nonduality is considered, in which connections between nonduality, dialectics and deconstruction are gestured toward. Address is also given to the relationship between complexity theory and quantum theory via holonomy and David Bohm’s explicate and implicate orders.77

77 For a scholarly critique on Wilber’s regard for David Bohm’s ideas (and thence for Jenny Wade’s), see Falk (2007).
Nanotextology (A Recursion of Content)

Many authors within both integral and postmodern discourse attest to the need to substantively regard languaging. Consider the following, for instance.

A critical poetics transcending both the empire of reason and the asylum of un-reason has ‘become an urgent concern…(Kearney, 1998, p. 9).

No matter how seemingly insignificant, every rhetorical gesture of the text contributes to its overall meaning. How we arrange our footnotes, title our paper, describe our problem, establish the legitimacy of our topic through literature reviews, and use the gestures of quantitative method in presenting our results—all contribute to the overall sense of the text (Agger, 1991, p. 115).

And following Whitehead’s call for the production of a diversity of metaphysical schemes, Arran Gare (2002) advocates for

the development of new abstractions that will allow us to understand the immanent dynamics, intrinsic significance, and the diversity of processes participating in the creative becoming of the world, including ourselves. This is the condition not only for an effective opposition to the destructive imperatives of modernity. It is the condition for overcoming it (p. 50).

Throughout his seminal work, The Ever Present Origin, integral theorist Jean Gebser (1949/1985) also refers to the impossibility of fully realising the integral structure of consciousness unless there is a close scrutiny of current concepts, attitudes and modes of thinking—languaging emanating from the mental (modern) structure. From such considerations as these, we can readily ascertain that in order to embody integral understanding, we need to be linguistically-aware. The formal semantic characterisations of the concepts, style and content, can evolve into a postformal conceptualisation which might not only view them as a dialectically interpenetrating pair, but also as in reference to different recursive scales of substantive “content transmission.” The alteration of “content chunks” might be the major communication conveyor—or “fundamental tone”—but the alteration of format, syntax and terminology can act as writing’s metaphorical non-verbal communication; and frequently, the “timbre” of such subtext may be such that the fundamental semantic message is substantively changed.78 (For instance, the hidden curriculum “timbre” of an education system might unwittingly dominate its purported “fundamental” mission, as per Gatto, 1992). And if, like Blake (1803/1960), one is able “to see a world in a grain of sand,” then one might be able to see an entire integral theory in just one word. Perhaps an integral micropsychology, an integral micropolitics; a linguistic recursion of integrality.

Wilber’s thinking can be arguably seen to be primarily conveyed by means of a high-order manipulation of “chunks” of “content.”79 Plausibly the most stylistically complex he gets is when he expresses “non-dual realisation,” notably his use of spiritual paradox—when he intones, for

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78 See footnote 52 regarding the metaphor of harmonics.
79 Content, as conventionally understood, can be seen as “chunks” whose interiors—e.g., semantics—remain (apparently) undisturbed, unaltered.
example: “Aware of color, you are colorless. Aware of time, you are timeless. Aware of form, you are formless.” The conscious employment of postformal paradox is also evident in Gebser’s writing—such as that between clarity and complexity (a \textit{clarity-complexity} \textsuperscript{80} dialectic \textsuperscript{81}), as follows:

Even where the measurements of contemporary methodologies are based primarily on quantitative criteria, they are all vitiated by the problem of the antithesis between "measure" and mass... Our method is not just a “measured” assessment, but above and beyond this an attempt at "diaphany" or rendering transparent (1949/1985, p. 7).

The content involves an explanation concerning the need for transparency, for clarity. Yet the linguistic style is unorthodox in (at least) three ways: firstly, through the use of quotation-marked “measure”/“measured,” secondly, through reference to a dialectic between it and “mass,” and, thirdly, through use of the neologism, “diaphany.” A take on this apparent paradox is that it remains unresolvable within a mental-perspectival structure but becomes transparent, congruent, within an integral-aperspectival one. The quest or calling for those who seek to move beyond the conventional structure is surely to be able to use such textual \textit{startlement} as a wake-up call rather than as a frustration. More is then said, however, concerning such transparency:

Our concern is with a new reality—a reality functioning and effectual integrally, in which intensity and action, the effective and the effect co-exist; one where origin, by virtue of "presentation," blossoms forth anew; and one in which the present is all-encompassing and entire. Integral reality is the world’s transparency, a perceiving of the world as truth: a mutually perceiving and imparting of truth of the world and of [us] and of all that transluces both (p. 7).

This “explanation” does not appear, however, to be an explanation from the point of view of the mental-perspectival structure of consciousness—a “rational” mindset. It is rather, to my reading, an explanation from an integral-aperspectival one. We might wish to pause here and ponder on the etymology of \textit{explanation}. It means, “to flatten out”—as in the \textit{flattening out} of a three-dimensional object to a two-dimensional drawing. Not only is such an “explanation” a reduction from three dimensions to two, but it is a two dimensional \textit{explanation}, a privileging of a “plan” or top-down view, in contrast to the different rendering offered by a side view, an “elevation” perspective. Questions arise: Is such a top-down view aligned with the false transcendence of a disembodied Cartesian thinker? and: What relationship might there be between a depth-revealing elevation and an integral-aperspectival structure of consciousness? A solution might seem to involve a resonance with Gebser’s use of a sphere as metaphor for integral consciousness. In particular, we should note his neologism, \textit{presentation}, and the unconventional syntax of the verbal configuration regarding \textit{translucent}. The former is suggestive of “making something (fully) \textit{present}” (rather than: absent; partially present; in the past or future; only \textit{apparently} present...). It is also suggestive of \textit{presence}, and \textit{presencing}—a concept which is foregrounded and theoretically extended by Otto Scharmer (2000, 2005). The latter also aligns with the privileging of verbs over nouns (relative to “conventional” discourse)
found in both poststructuralist and process (e.g., Whiteheadian) philosophies. Further elevated explanation, depth or diaphany concerning the complex clarity of integrality is perhaps offered when Gebser (1949/1985) states,

Whenever the linguistic structure is freed from the perspectival fixity without reverting to linguistic chaos, initial aperspectival, no-longer-rational but arational manifestations are visible. Where the stylistic inversion of rational syntax transforms the sentence...The achronon shines forth and its sustaining-in-truth presupposes that the rational is not just negated but overdetermined, whereby it necessarily foregoes its claim to exclusivity... The mental is reduced to its proper sphere of the conceptual, visible, palpable, and demonstrable, and can no longer function obtrusively, but must open the path, the leap towards verition... (pp. 503-504).

Here, neologisms include: aperspectivity, overdetermination, achronon, and verition. The rational can only go so far and should not be overused but rather be appropriately used as part of communication at an integral level. It could be said that his neologism, verition, is a vertiginous turn on the conventional, mental structure’s verity—“being in accordance with reality.” One could further “note” that accordance—from accordare—literally means “being of one heart” (noting two semantic harmonics of being) whilst an aphasis of such accord is a musical “chord.” “Verition” might suggest we should not (merely) quest “truth,” but rather, a heartfelt accordion of truth. Habits of our heart, harmonics of our text, de-/re-constructed. Gebser’s words are beautiful but, to many, they are also dense and difficult. Yet, as Agger (1991) says of Derrida: “[he] would defend his own density by arguing that difficulty educates. He would also say that simplicity brings false clarity” (p. 114). Such are the dialectics of clarity. It would appear Gebser might very well agree with him.

Another unorthodox languaging is that offered by integral-global philosopher, Ashok Gangadean (2002, 2006b). He distinguishes between two orders or “technologies” of perceiving, thinking, speaking, being: firstly, an egocentric one, and, secondly, an integral-holistic-dialogic one, and differentiates between these through novel typographical syntax. Namely, he uses “/…/” for egocentric languaging—as in /mind/—and “((…))” for dialogic-global-integral languaging—as in ((mind)). In this way, these textual marks can be used as a micro-integral transformative practice, a startling ((wake-up call)) to partake of an integral spirituality which can be identified in the ((logic)) of each ((word)). Moreover, Gangadean’s work explicitly connects integrality with urgent global concerns and spirituality, thus congruently aligning with worldcentric perspectives.

There is no doubt a plethora of postformal-postconventional-postmodern-integral languaging options. But to generalise, one might say that we need tools for our Wilberian left hand quadrants as well-crafted and powerful as those currently in operation—and those being exponentially developed—for our Wilberian right hand quadrants. We urgently need the linguistic equivalent of nanotechnology: we need an integral nanotextology. An example of its use might be demonstrated through postformally exploring the semantic ecology among deconstruction, dialectics and nonduality.
Holonomic Nonduality (A Dialectical Recursion)

In AQAL topology (for example, Wilber, 1979/2001, pp. 126-144), nonduality occurs at the final stage of (individual) development. Wilber arrives at this understanding through addressing nondual spiritual traditions, notably Zen and Dzogchen. When he writes about the nondual, he tends to do so as the blossoming poetic culmination of much theoretic prose. This format thus mirrors somewhat the model of spiritual development he explicitly discusses. In this release from Wilber’s dominant style, the realisation he expresses is in paradoxical reference to the many developmental waves he otherwise discusses—namely, “there’s only one wave, and it’s everywhere” (1979/2001, p. 142). Further wisdom flows: “It is always already undone, you see, and always already over” (p. 345), and, apparently aligning somewhat to Eckhart Tolle’s (2001) The Power of Now: “There never was, nor will there ever be, any time other than Now. What appeared as that primal moving away from Now was really an original movement of Now” (Wilber, 2001b, p. 143). In this context, he is also aware of the limitations of formal theory: “Galaxies rush through your veins while the stars light up the neurons of your night and never again will you search for a mere theory of that which is actually your own Original face” (Wilber, 2000c, p. 141).

This part of his writing has a substantially different quality to the rest of his theoretic writing, which generally has a less poetic, less paradoxical, more technical (and sometimes “polemic”) character. As such, his text displays something of a duality. And, although such a comment might appear to be insubstantive in that it refers to style rather than content, such a perspective, as we have seen, is not necessarily a postformal one. Moreover, a proposition I will be exploring below is that the theoretic conceptualisations concerning all stages prior to Wilber’s nondual are themselves generally embedded in a dualistic (Cartesian) template. Pertinently, I will explore the metaphoric value of this duality in positing that although Wilber addresses nonduality, his mode of theorising does not honour the potential contribution of nonduality. Moreover, I contend that this is because he has not fully actualised the import of postmodernity’s complexity theory—notably the component of recursion, fractality, holonomy.

But first, let’s turn to another type of discourse in which nonduality can be found: poststructuralist discourse. One could argue that Derrida’s address of the nondual binary of identity and the Other, for example, is central to déconstruction. The logistic structure of dialectics, also, can be seen as being based on a type of nondual premise. Wilberian theory sharply differentiates between final stage nonduality (individual enlightenment) and these other types of nonduality, which are mapped as forming part of the Wilberian Green vMemefractallistic postmodernism. But is such an absolute differentiation justified?

One of the developmental psychologists Wilber has called upon to support his theory is Jenny Wade. But Wade’s (1996) theoretic understanding of nonduality is significantly different from Wilber’s. Referring to the holonomic paradigm of explicate and implicate orders—a central contribution of David Bohm to quantum theory—she states,

The holonomic paradigm posits the existence of (at least) two dimensions of the same reality in a nondual whole—the material manifestation of energy as the explicate order, which is enfolded in, and emanates from, an implicate transparent order of pure energy,

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82 A cautionary note, though, is given by Roy (2006b) when she concludes: “Wilber’s AQAL model does not contradict Dzogchen thought per se; but…Dzogchen cannot be fitted into its framework” (p. 119).
which is infinite and absolute. … Their conjunction is like the two “sides” of a Moebius ring… (p. 201).

From this understanding, nonduality might not only be “found” at the final stage of individual development, but could permeate the whole integral model. And it would do so via a holonomic paradigm (holonomic signifying the generic conceptual template from which hologram is linguistically constructed). Holonomy can be seen to be in familial relationship with a non-Euclidean geometric principle found in complexity theory—namely, recursion: the production of fractals. In this way, a type of nonduality could be theorized at any developmental level of integral theory, including postmodernism. This would open a way to exploring, among other things, the theoretic relationship between Derrida’s déconstruction and the spiritual deconstruction of the ego. Such a theoretic venture would resonate with the seminal work on postmodern spirituality by integral philosopher, Roland Benedikter (2005), in which the spirituality of poststructuralists—notably, Derrida, Deleuze, Feyerabend, Foucault, and Lyotard is identified, explored and valorised.

Wade also elicits transpersonal researcher, Stanislav Grof (1985), as applying “holonomic metaphysics to developmental theory, beginning with a criticism of Wilber’s emphasis on linearity”—quoting Grof as saying,

As much as I agree with [Wilber] in principle, the absoluteness of his statements seems to me too extreme. The psyche has a multidimensional, holographic nature, and using a linear model to describe it will produce distortions and inaccuracies. … My own observations suggest that, as consciousness evolution proceeds [from Authentic to Transcendent consciousness] and beyond, it does not follow a linear trajectory, but in a sense enfolds into itself (Grof, 1985, p. 137, cited in Wade, 1996, pp. 201-202).

Grof seems to making two points here, both concerning holonomy. The first concerns “the absoluteness of…statements.”

The second concerns the nature of consciousness evolution from Authentic consciousness through Authentic consciousness to beyond Authentic consciousness which would specifically problematise Wilber’s theorizing of levels specifically for Green and beyond, whilst the former understanding—concerning the nature of statements—regards the linguistic fabric of theorizing: Wilber’s type of theorizing.

The relevance of an integral nanotextology can be identified here. Specifically, whilst from a formal perspective the issue of “theorizing type” may be regarded as being “merely style” and thus inessential, such simplicity is (most plausibly) untenable from a postformal perspective. Postformally speaking, the type of linguistic constructs employed—the particular qualities in statement construction—form part of the substantive “content.” Much poststructuralist discourse implicates the importance of such considerations; through the neologism nanotextology, I am attempting to bridge such consideration—formally seen as “style”—with more macro considerations—formally seen as “content”—via the developmental understanding that postformally, style and content are holonomically related and therefore both substantive—as,

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83 And I note here that Grof appears to be implying that all of Wilber’s statements are too extreme, thus falling into something of an absolutist text.

84 Constituents of Wade’s (1996) Authentic stage include identification of the Other, the desire for personal growth, postformal operations, empathy, and respect for diversity (p. 169, Table 9)—features regarded elsewhere as postmodern or Green. See, for instance, Beck & Cowan (1996, p. 260-273).
shall we say, *postformal content*. Such a statement, however, is not necessarily to relativistically give such micro and macro postformal content modes equal address, but rather posit that there can be a theoretic framing regarding their connection (or communion) and their difference (or agency). Using nanotextology in this instance, the framing of concepts or statements as *absolute* could possibly be seen as a type of Blue vMeme (conformist, technicist or mythic) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of *conceptual fundamentalism* or conceptual *technology*) or as a type of Orange (formal) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of conceptual *definition*), in contrast to, say a post-Orange (postformal) manoeuvre (a prioritisation of conceptual *ecology*).

From this postformal theorising perspective, other features of Wilber’s theorising could be problematised. An example would be his framing of the “Pre/Trans Fallacy” (Wilber, 1980) which *sharply* distinguishes between the pre-formal and the post-formal. Here, the imperative to distinguish sharply and non-paradoxically can be seen as a pre-postformal manoeuvre. In contrast, from a subtler, postformal perspective, Stanislav Grof comments, “the distinction between pre- and trans- has a paradoxical nature; they are neither identical, nor are they completely different from each other” (1985, p. 137, cited in Wade, 1996, p. 202). Here, both conceptual agency (or difference) and conceptual communion (or mutual identity) are foregrounded.

A framing that Wade uses in relation to either/or (pre-postformal) thinking is constituted by the metaphor of Newtonian physics: “Regression and transcendence are neither opposite nor the same, though they may appear to be in a Newtonian conceptualisation—and it may be useful to speak of them in those terms there” (p. 202). Elaborating on this, a developmental hierarchy of conceptual templates based on developments in physics can be imagined: using Einstein’s theory of relativity and then quantum mechanics as metaphorical templates for types of conceptualisation. Developmental psychologist Jan Sinnott (1998) has made such a move—at least in relation to Einstein. She compares his theory to postformal *relativistic* thought. Although Piagetian commentator Helena Marchand (2001) critiques Sinnott’s use of metaphor, I would contend that such a judgment emanates from a *formal* mindset which does not appreciate the theoretical significance of metaphor—such appreciation can be seen as coming from postformal understanding. The theoretical significance of metaphor is indicated, for example, by Alfred North Whitehead—a philosopher whose work sits at the very core of AQAL’s evolutionary theory (Hargens, 2001; Roy, 2006b, p. 123; Wilber, 1995, pp. 42, 49, 78). Arran Gare (2002) valorises Whitehead’s recognition of the primary role that metaphors play “in thought, language, philosophy, and science” (p. 48). The postformal understanding of the role metaphor plays in languaging, including that of theory, is substantively explored in the seminal work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003; 1999). Their research, which has substantive implications for the sublation of formal thinking, convincingly demonstrates that, “the traditional view of metaphor is empirically false” (1999, p. 118) in that, “metaphorical thought is what makes abstract scientific theorizing possible” (p. 128). From a postformal perspective, metaphor is not mere linguistic ornamentation, but rather, is (varyingly) implicit in the very fabric of all communication.

Given this, an apt metaphor for dialectical thinking might well be quantum theory—connoting an integrative-but-fluxing dialectic between wave and particle. But the window of possibilities here can be seen to extend beyond such physiospherical metaphors to biospherical

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85 I am referring to Eros / Creativity as the universal “drive to integration” (or transcendence) here, and to holon theory. Gertrude Blanck and Rubin Blanck also make a central theoretical contribution.

86 Sinnott (1998) does refer to quantum theory but does not make the particular distinction I am making here.
ones. Much fruitful research in this direction could seed new vital(ising) ideas, “living” concepts, “organic” templates. Jenny Wade can be seen to refer to such a postformal conceptual template in her discussion regarding the theorising of relationships between regression and transcendence or between the preformal and the postformal via a holonomic paradigm:

The regression/non-regression argument is resolved because it is placed in the context of epistemology outside historical time. This creates a heterarchical conceptualisation of development employing both linear and nonlinear paradigms that alters the structure of developmental theories that purport to address these levels (Wade, 1996, p. 202, emphasis in original).

Such a template based on complexity rather than duality could have incisive repercussions for AQAL. Consider, for example, the following constitutional AQAL point of departure:

If the Kosmos is not holistic, not integral, not holonic—if it is a fragmented and jumbled affair, with no common context or linkings or joinings or communions—then fine, the world is a jumbled mess the various specialities take it to be. But if the world is holistic and holonic, then why do not more people see this? And why do many academic specialities actively deny it? If the world is whole, why do so many people see it as broken? And why, in a sense, is the world broken, fragmented, alienated, divided? (Wilber, 2000c, p.41).

Here, Wilber constructs two opposing camps: (a) the camp of fragments, jumble, mess, breakage, alienation, division; and (b) the camp of holism, integrality, holons, linkages, joinings, communions, wholeness. This construction is dualistic: no interpenetration between the two camps is allowed for. But why does it necessarily have to be either/or? A complex-aware theoretic template could embrace both camps. Through this, the world could be identified as: whole and jumbled, holonic and entangled, broken and linked—in varying ways. Differentiation could then be identified between contexts where Wilber’s general argument is valid and those contexts where it is not. For example, whilst a panoramic perspective might display the suitability of various AQAL orienting generalisations, a local (detailed) perspective—with its specific requirements—might even display the very inversion of these same generalisations. As an apt metaphor, consider the following. A traditional dance whose general advancement forward is constituted by the specific (“local” / detailed) algorithmic routine of one step back, two steps forward, is substantively constituted by both advancement and retreat—though at different recursive scales. From a macro (AQAL-like) perspective, the one step back phenomenon would appear as a messy datum interfering with the theoretic elegance of

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87 Perhaps inspiring and/or apt metaphors regarding the potential significance of possible alteration of conceptual templates might include (a) Edgar Morin’s (1999/n.d.) principle regarding, “the mole that digs underground and transforms the substratum before anything is changed on the surface”; (b) Sohail Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis where the myth / metaphor layer is seen to underpin the worldview layer which in turn underpins policy and litany layers respectively; (Sohail Inayatullah, 2000, 2004); and (c) the following: Imagine a vector applied near the circumference (“surface”) of a wheel; imagine an equivalent vector applied near the centre (“core”) of the wheel; even though each vector is similar to effect, the one applied nearer the centre of the wheel will effect a greater rotation of the wheel than the one applied nearer the circumference.
advancing forward; perhaps something even to be eliminated. Conversely, the substantive interest of a dance teacher with a dance student whom was only *stepping forwards*—failing to take a step back each time—would be to focus (perhaps repeatedly) on the instruction to *go backwards*. If this was a common problem, perhaps an academic might then assist in the matter through conducting a detailed investigation into the failure to go backwards among dance students. The whole context here would be the goodness inherent in going backwards, and the inappropriateness of moving forwards. In other contexts, however, Wilber’s thrust of argument would be highly pertinent. The issue is one of context and of recursive scale. An integral theory explicitly based on a complexity template could adequately accommodate such differentiation; an integral theory based on a non-complex or non-dialectical complex template could not so readily. Moreover, even where Wilber’s general argument is appropriate—as in the indication above that academia could benefit from less specialisation and more transdisciplinarity—complex cross-currents can be identified. Wilber frequently derides Cultural Studies, for example, yet this young academic field has partly arisen via a similar evaluation to the one Wilber makes himself, namely, insufficient connectivity. Cultural Studies is transdisciplinary. And Integral Studies is transdisciplinary. Both are appearing to attempt to counter “traditional” academia’s tendency toward specialisation. There is no need for antipathy here.

To summarise: Through embracing a complex-aware template, specific AQAL features can be problematised or deconstructed, constructively leading the way to higher orders of integration. Wilber’s (1980) Pre/Trans Fallacy, for example, can itself be seen as a (partial) fallacy in the way it is currently conceptualised. The implications of such postmodern theorising for integral theory in general and Wilberian theory in particular are wide-reaching. As Wade (1996) indicates: “The linearity inherent in evolutionary models is a contextual convenience” (p. 200). Such an understanding might lead one to conclude that there is “no way out” from this poststructuralist statement to integral evolutionary theory. One might instead recognise, however, that the way to an integral evolutionary theory that moves beyond dualistic modes of theorising is through embracing the postformal modes of cognition found in postmodernism. In short, the way out is through.

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88 The interpretive stances constituted by such a template would most probably be in contrasted reference to the modern worldview which has extended and/or over-extended (a) the cosmological estrangement heralded by Copernicus and concretised by Newton, (b) the ontological estrangement initiated by Descartes, and (c) the epistemological estrangement instigated by Kant (see Tarnas, 1991, p. 416-422). Abstract theoretic mantras such as the yinyang-DNA-Ouroboros template elucidated by Clifford Matthews (2002, p. 220-226) could also be generative here.

89 Such a statement concerning the inadequacy of linear models of development as a whole could be seen to be aligned to Grof’s comment above regarding the inapplicability of linear modelling beyond the Authentic stage if one considers that both can be true from the perspective, say, of different quadrants—where Wade’s comment can be seen as a postformal left-hand quadrant understanding, and Grof’s as a postformal right-hand quadrant understanding—or perhaps of different levels, where Grof’s statement arises from a conventional level and Wade’s from a postconventional one. Another conversational opening, no doubt.
Conclusion—Ends-in-View

The soul sings of the glory of God inasmuch as it follows its own folds, but without succeeding in entirely developing them, since ‘this communication’ stretches out indefinitely (Deleuze, 1988/2006, p. 3).

An integral re-viewing of the developmental wave of postmodernism can highlight the current undervaluation of thinking postformally. Postformal cognition can be enacted in relation to a variety of concerns and interests including integral theory itself. Integral theory thus contains the means to develop itself—a participatory autopoiesis. In this way, the manifold contributions that Wilber has offered to integral theory and its panoramic horizons can be enhanced and reconfigured. The AQAL model maps contextualism, dialectics, and complexity as postformal features. Integral theory could more reflexively enact such ways of reasoning. By more consciously participating in the ecology of postformal modalities—including thinking contextually, thinking dialectically, thinking critically and thinking complexly—AQAL could be reconfigured, and its metasystematic or paradigmatic geist could be appropriately furthered in service of the dialogic evolution of integral theory. This article has demonstrated a few uses of such postformal cognitive modes. Regard for all dimensions of embodiment and the metaphoric nature of theorising also need to be duly considered, whilst shadow-work can be fruitfully brought into the fabric of integral theory via the dialectics of deconstruction. Below is a concluding elucidation and possible futuring of these ideas—ends-in-view.

Identification of Problems

In attempting to transcend postmodernism, Wilberian integral theory appears not to sufficiently include its contributions. AQAL’s current theoretic status of the Green vMeme and its relationship to post-Green conceptualisations is substantively problematic. It would appear this has led to the memetic propagation of myths concerning integrality. The following points can be made.

1. From a vMemetic theoretic perspective, the Green vMeme (postmodernism and postformal thinking) is accepted most strongly by the subsequent Yellow (Teal / integral) vMeme and is rejected most strongly by the Orange vMeme (including modernism and formal thinking), and is also substantively rejected by the Blue vMeme (absolutist thinking). The mean green meme can most adequately be identified developmentally as an Orange vMeme perspective. Blue vMeme attitudes can also be associated with the mean green meme meme.

2. Gebser does not posit a structure of consciousness between the current mental-perspectival one and the emerging integral-aperspectival one; he does not identify a deconstructive postmodernism. He cannot therefore be legitimately used in service of AQAL theory in this regard.

3. Uncontextualised association between relativism, deconstruction and Derrida is constituted by substantive mythic elements. Derrida and déconstruction can be legitimately identified as operating from an advanced developmental level. Derrida’s potential contribution to integral theory needs to be digested. The developmental maturity
and spirituality of postmodern philosophers such as Deleuze, Derrida and Lyotard need to be adequately addressed by integral theory.

4. There is an anomaly in current integral theorising regarding, on the one hand, the strength of the Green vMeme in the U.S.A. in relation to Europe, and on the other, the strength of the pathology of the Green vMeme in the U.S.A in relation to Europe. This might be evidence of a more endemic theoretic problem. Nation-cultures need to be more adequately addressed.

Summary of Re-view

Integral theory itself can be used to address these points, thus effecting an autopoiesis. Specifically, the way to a respectful and internally consistent integral approach can be seen as being through the myriad features postmodernism offers, not in substantive antipathy to it. Re-viewing postmodernism from an integral perspective can enhance the adequacy of AQAL, leading to an integral theory which is more internally consistent and respectful.

Whilst appropriately including many and various contexts and dimensions with regard to formal reasoning, postformal reasoning includes substantively different types of cognition to formal thought, including—thinking complexly, contextually, creatively, critically, dialectically, dialogically, ecologically, “embodiedly,” linguistically and reflexively. The reflexive enactment of such modalities may consequentially alter the conceptual template—the very fabric—upon which integral theory is based.

A Forward View

The primary intent in this article has been to open up particular conversations to further facilitate the appropriate evolution of integral theory. As such, the following could variously act as a guiding framework for further research.

Toward an Explicitly Linguistically-Aware Integral Theory

A central feature of the postmodern developmental wave regards the significance of languaging. Integral theory should take this contribution to heart, deepening its enactment. Notably, reflexive embrace could be given to the following understandings concerning the languaging of theoretic narrative:

a. Its constructed qualities.
   
i. Research could be undertaken, for example, with regard to possible relationships between the poststructuralist “linguistic turn,” constructivism, and Cook-Greuter’s “construct-awareness.”

   ii. Developmental constructs and theoretic topologies could themselves be addressed through differentiating between the linguistic signifiers (such as “developmental wave”) and the underlying topology or theoretic signifieds with which they are associated (for example, linear or non-complex topology).

b. Its metaphorical qualities.

   i. Research could be undertaken regarding the relationship of integral theory to Lakoff and Johnson’s work on conceptual metaphor and embodied philosophy.
c. Its complex dialectical qualities.
   i. Research could be undertaken concerning the operation of complex dialectics at
      the micro-scale of concepts—“integral nanotextology.”

d. Its poetic qualities.
   i. Further investigation could be undertaken with regard to the relevance of Gebser’s
      poetic density of languaging for integral theory.
   ii. Further exploration of the relevance of Gangadean’s novel typological syntax to
      integral theory might assist in the evolution of integral theory.

Theoretic narrative can be deepened through its participants (co-creating users, including you
and me!) becoming more linguistically-aware—as demonstrated or gestured by the deepening of
vision-logic offered in this article.

**Toward an Explicitly Ecological (Dialogic-Critical-Contextual) Integral Theory**

Further research could be conducted in relation to the following various dimensioning
contexts of ecological thinking:

a. Critical contexts
   i. Biospherical ecological contexts—at different scales of recursion, especially
      planetary.
   ii. Social justice contexts—at different scales of recursion. For example, the
      criticality of integral theorising could be addressed in relation to such power
      imbalances as those involving the over-extensions of Western, American, Orange
      vMeme, Anglophone or other hegemonic domains.
   iii. Other ethical, spiritual and futures contexts.

b. Conceptual ecological contexts
   i. Time—genealogies.
   ii. Space—geographies. Chinese integrals, Indian integrals, Spanish integrals, and so
      forth, could be identified as different types of integral, stemming from alternate
      genealogical threads.
   iii. Conceptual space—regarding both the conceptual ecologies in which integral may
      be appropriately identified (such as amongst holism, integration, transformation,
      spirituality, planetary consciousness, etc.), and the (more local) ecology of
      interpretive uses of integral itself (as demonstrated in this article).

c. Social ecological contexts—community-in-dialogue
   i. Voice-in-community—As part of acknowledging the potential role of my voice in
      this article in relation to the integral community, I have attempted to indicate
      certain openings to conversation and community dialogue. Further research here
      thus lies, in the next instance, beyond me.
   ii. Community-in-voice—I also acknowledge the community already in my voice, so
      to speak. I have multiple subjectivities; no-one can logically speak from a position
      of absolute authority. Consequently, I have attempted to allow a range of
      languaging here whilst variously maintaining a certain tentativity of tenor. There
      will necessarily be flaws in this text, so a space has hopefully been left in the

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90 See also Anderson (2006).
fabric of my text for the involvement of the Other (such as that you might variously identify).\(^9\)

As part of deepening critical awareness regarding integral theory, further research could be undertaken regarding a more comprehensive evaluation of the current situation than was within the scope of this article to conduct.

**Toward an Explicitly Dialectical Integral Theory**

Notions of *construction* and *deconstruction* as necessary adversaries can appropriately be seen to stem from an either/or mindset. Thinking dialectically, their relationship can fruitfully be rather understood as complexly interpenetrating. Deconstructive and reconstructive postmodernisms share one genealogy which itself has a dialectical underpinning. Hence contrapossibilities can be identified: that discourse under the mantle of deconstruction can be constructive and/or appropriate, whilst discourse under the guise of reconstruction can be destructive and/or inappropriate. Derrida’s work should not be regarded as antipathetic to an integral approach. There is evidence regarding the maturity of Derrida’s discourse; there is also evidence regarding a dissonance between the theoretic content of Wilberian theory and perspectives given toward that content by Wilber. Further research could be undertaken in these regards. Resultant conceptual bridges could further mutual understanding; and a greater, more cohesive (or paradoxically more stable) integral theory could result.

Paradoxical thinking is associated with dialectical thinking. For instance, other parts of my life\(^9\) are not directly congruent with the sensibility expressed in this article. I sit with the paradox contained within the ecology of these different “lines.”

**Toward an Explicitly Complex-Aware Integral Theory**

I have demonstrated a particular use of the complexity theory element, *recursion*—with respect to both *content* and nonduality in integral theory. Further research could be undertaken with regard to other elements of complexity theory such as emergence, bifurcation, hysteresis, sensitivity to initial conditions, indeterminacy, attractors, and dynamism.

Both differences and similarities could be identified between different fractal scales of construction, such as the construction of theories and the construction of terms; both differences and similarities can be identified between different fractal scales of *deconstruction*, such as Derridean déconstruction and the deconstruction of the ego.

A conceptual template based in part on complexity theory could facilitate an internally-congruent evolution of integral theory. Further research could explore, for example, in what appropriate ways *pre* and *trans* could be identified as distinct yet complexly interpenetrating.

\(^9\) As Edgar Morin (1999, n.d.) wisely points out: “The adventure remains unknown.” One could add: each word is a venture.

\(^9\) For instance, whilst I have been beavering away at this article, my body has suffered from insufficient exercise!
Toward an Explicitly, Dynamically Creative Integral Theory

AQAL places the concept of creativity as a core generic driver (“healthy” transcendence as characterised as Eros) in holonic development-evolution. Numerous theoretic perspectives on creativity could be given. One such perspective is that offered by Arthur’s Koestler’s (1970) triad of the Sage, the Artist and the Jester.

a. The Sage
   i. Research could be undertaken to facilitate a reflexively wise and compassionate integral theory.

b. The Artist
   i. Research into the art of integral might investigate the artfulness involved in all dimensions of participation.
   ii. Research could explore bringing more beauty into the good and true.

c. The Jester
   i. Ludic research could explore the transition from boomeritis to bloomeritis!

As Wilber (2000a, p. 3) says, “choose your big pictures with care.”

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to my mentor and fellow postformal researcher, Jenny Gidley. Our ongoing, passionate dialogues are co-inspiring, our ideas frequently co-arising.

References


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Appendix A: The Green vMeme Attractor—Big Mind, Kind Heart, Healthy Hierarchy

In an Integral Naked advertisement originating from Wilber’s Integral Naked website (Integral Institute & Davis, 2007), the following assertion is made concerning the Virginia Tech massacre:

Ken points out how extreme postmodernism (boomeritis, mean-green-meme) has contributed to an atmosphere in which…the two developmental waves responsible for most terrorist acts…are allowed and even encouraged to flourish. What’s needed is…[an] AQAL toolbox with which to be able to prevent, recognize, and effectively address malevolent and terrorist activities. Of particular interest to scholars will be Ken’s discussion of the difference between a merely deconstructive postmodernism a la Derrida, and a genealogical/developmental postmodernism a la Foucault, which paves the way to an Integral view, rather than blowing up the road. (§ Scholar’s Notes (for Advanced Students and Curious Listeners) ¶ "Postmodernism," emphasis in original)

The explicit foregrounding of association between the worst U.S. tertiary education massacre in history on the one hand, and Derrida on the other—via a (metaphorical) inference that Derrida blows up roads—perhaps indicates something of the nature of the propagation of the mean green meme. One might be tempted in this instance to proffer two questions: (a) Could the above advertisement be described as a “vulgar” or even “nihilistic” attack on Derrida? and—in the spirit of furthering inquiry into collective shadow-work—(b) Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the meanest of them all?

I shall explore such questions by investigating evidence concerning the Green vMeme and its alleged “meanness.”

Is the Mean Green Meme Construction a Mythic Meme?

A significant feature I have noticed in my ten or more years of research into Wilber’s work is that there is a significant emotive dissonance between, on the one hand, Wilber’s substantive focus on the negative aspects of the Wilberian Green vMeme (substantive in the sense that there is significant repetition and intensity of theme, and that such repetition-and-intensity is not given to any other vMeme by name) and, on the other, the emotive void caused by theoretic over-generalisation—in Wilber, in certain other texts, and in the integral community at large. An example of such text is evident from two quotes from an article in a new journal grounded in Wilberian philosophy. The first:

One of the main reasons why there is such a thing as Integral Studies, Integral Theory, Integral Psychology, Integral Business, Integral Consciousness Studies, and Integral Art can be understood in terms of multidimensional, multi-level thinking and, furthermore, being. As already mentioned, this is what Gebser calls integral-aperspectival, what Wilber calls vision-logic and what Beck calls Second-Tier (Saiter, 2005, ¶ 10).
And the second, regarding,

a ‘higher’ order of thinking (as in Wilber's vision-logic). As already mentioned, Jean
Gebser uses the term(s) ‘integral/aperspectival’ to refer to a similar state of high
comprehension. Don Beck follows suit when he describes the manifestation of Second Tier
thinking starting with the Yellow vMeme” (Saiter, 2005, ¶ 14).

In both these quotes, the Green vMeme is ignored.

Is vision-logic partly constituted by the Green vMeme? Is a perspectivality partly constituted
by the Green vMeme? Is Second-tier partly constituted by the Green vMeme? If the answers are
equivalent, this question might be of minor consequence. But the answers are not equivalent.
Wilber’s vision-logic is partly constituted by the Green vMeme; Spiral Dynamics’ second-tier is
not; whilst the Green vMeme is not addressed in Gebser’s aperspectivality (Gebser’s work
predates Spiral Dynamics). If the Green vMeme had not been given special treatment by Wilber,
then such lack of care as exemplified by these statements might, again, be of minor consequence.
But Wilber has emotively set up a deep conceptual division precisely in this liminal territory, a
division which is magnified by his popular appeal in the community—and power base (see
Appendix C)—so that such a device could divisively begin to assume a mythic (dismissively-
defended, under-analysed) status.

Such notion of an under-analysed but virulent myth of Integral would be supported by the
following casual perusal of an Integral Institute discussion forum on the “koolest” website,
zaadz. By way of explanation regarding the basics of AQAL, Julian Walker (2007)
enthusiastically introduces the audience to Wilber’s Pre/Trans Fallacy by way of drawing a
chart constituted by three levels: (a) “Preconventional; Prerational; Archaic/Magic/Mythic;
Sensorimotor/preop; Purple/Red/Blue” (b) “Conventional; Rational; Rational; Concrete
Operations; Orange/Green” (c) “Postconventional; Transrational; Integral; Formal
Operations/Vision Logic; Yellow/ Turquoise” (see Table 1).

Table 1. Walker’s Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preconventional</th>
<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Postconventional</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prerational</td>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Transrational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaic/Magic/Mythic</td>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Integral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensorimotor/preop</td>
<td>Concrete Operations</td>
<td>Formal Operations/Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purple/Red/Blue</td>
<td>Orange/Green</td>
<td>Yellow/Turquoise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numerous fallacies and misplacements are given even in this simple schema. These include
the equating of “Formal Operations” with both “Postconventional” and “Vision Logic,” rather
than with “Orange” / “Rational.” The most extreme is the conflation of “Green” with “Concrete
Operations”—a misalignment—to Green’s disadvantage—by a whole two stages. This, indeed,
would be something toward the antithesis of Wilber’s Pre/Trans iteration—namely, this young
teacher’s thinking that the Green vMeme was pre-rational when in fact it is post- or trans-
rational.93

93 I am using “transrational” to denote a sublation (transcending-and-including) of rational rather than to
make a distinction between transrational and, say, postrational. This usage I am making here is
congruent with the categories identified by Walker.
Of course, any student can get details wrong about anything they are learning, or even, unfortunately, about anything they are passing on to others as (informal) teachers. The specific discussion here, though, would concern the possible perpetuation of misunderstanding not through a student’s failure to understand something correctly, but because the more experienced teacher’s text was itself already confused, conflated, inflated. Wilber’s communication that the Green vMeme *transcends the rational* occurs substantively less frequently and less emotively than his stress on the idea that the Green vMeme is *pre-rational—regressive—and/or pathological*. As our specific hermeneutic interest here would concern the issue of an inappropriate attack on Green, suspicion would surely be raised by such evidence, and a hypothesis could be posited concerning, let us say, *the Green/Yellow Fallacy*.

Following on from the parting of company between Beck and Cowan, Cowan has been a keen supporter of maintaining the authenticity of Clare Graves’ work, on which Spiral Dynamics was originally based. He has furthered this work with new colleague, Natasha Todorovic. Her (2002) research into the Wilberian Green vMeme reinforces this suspicion. She statistically analysed data from over 600 profiles and found the following.

1. “Blue/Orange tends to avoid ambiguity by simplifying interactions into narrow categories” (p. 5).
2. “Individuals centralized in Blue, Orange and the Blue/Orange pairing appear to have a stronger tendency than other systems to reject the Green vMeme” (p. 2).
3. “It is those with high Orange scores who reject Green most strongly” (p. 3).
4. “Those centralized in the Yellow system reject statements describing the D-Q (Blue) system most strongly—NOT Green” (p. 3).
5. “Yellow accepts green more than any other system” (p.3).

She also notes that

6. Clare Graves had modified his view from “monumentous leap” between Green and Yellow to seeing them as more alike than he had previously realized (p. 3).
7. There is no evidence of substantive Green/Red pairing. In fact, “the data shows that when Green increases so does the rejection of Red” (p. 6).
8. There was a significant “yellow false positive” whereby “Selection of statements intended to elicit Yellow appear to be reflecting a more sophisticated form of Orange instead” (p. 3), and that,
9. “The dominant profile for those pegging falsely on Yellow came from the Blue/Orange pairing and from Nodal Orange” (p. 3). In regards to this, she says that, “this might explain much of the ‘second tier’ elitism coming from MGM [mean green meme] advocates. The Blue need to rank order combined with classism and right thinking minds at Orange, results in a drive to convince self, and others, of living at ‘second tier’ (if such a thing actually exists!”) (p. 3).

I think it is notable that a scholarly researcher investigating Clare Graves’ original data should doubt whether “second tier” actually exists. What justification could there be in the propagation of myths concerning second tier when detailed research problematises such type of propagation?
Coining the term, “Meme-ism”, as a form of spiral classism, Todorovic comments that, “the spread of terminology like MGM has weaponized the previously neutral SD colors and opened the door to prejudice, even hatreds…” (p. 10). She concludes that,

the most objectionable example of the MGM label in action has been as a capricious stereotyping tool. … This results in intimidation and promotes a habit of labelling then dismissing detractors with negative words wrapped in spiral dressing. MGM artificially closes doors to understanding. Inquisitors wield MGM as a coercive tool, forcing critics into defensive positions where they must either recant or be diminished through cheap name-calling. It diverts focus from the object or idea under investigation and shuts down important debate (p. 10),

…such debate as this article seeks to facilitate. In so doing, my intention would in no way be to problematise all problematisations against the Green vMeme—whether as an entire construct or in terms of its possible constituents—but to draw attention to its problematic use in a non-contextualised, and non-construct-aware fashion, and specifically to point to some—potentially—major theoretic obstacles to its employment as an “orienting generalisation.”

The wordplay “mean green meme” first appears in its own section in A Theory of Everything (Wilber, 2000c, pp. 122-125) in which Wilber quotes Beck (unreferenced) as saying, “green has introduced more harm in the last thirty years than any other meme” (p. 123). Wilber takes this to mean: “a culture that tries to ram pluralism and multiculturalism down everybody’s throat is going to come apart at the seams faster than you can say ‘deconstruction’” (p. 123-124). His claim is that Green has damaged Blue infrastructures by way of quoting George W. Bush regarding, “the soft bigotry of lowered expectations.” He speaks harshly of “the highly developed postformal [sic] green wave” which champions “any and every ‘multicultural’ movement;” and of “order-Left imperatives commanding everybody to be sensitive;” of the “nihilism and narcissism of extreme postmodernism;” of “the harsh intolerance of the politically correct thought police;” and says that, “the green meme has been in charge of academia, the cultural elite, and much of liberal politics for the past three decades, but it is now being challenged on all sides” (p. 122-125).

What should be my response to all this? As a concerned global citizen I should surely feel stirred by such righteous indignation; I should surely join a crusade against such evil. Yet, as a non-American, I am unclear as to what precisely he is referring: I have witnessed “mean” actions from some people, for instance, but they’ve tended mostly to be from dog-eat-dog or man-eat-man corporate careerists (if one had to coin a phrase) rather than liberal academics. And I can’t recall that I’ve ever had anything unpleasant rammed down my throat—at least, not to my knowledge! Moreover, as a novice liberal academic myself, I wonder whether I am unwittingly part of a nihilistic cult? Indeed, is this very article a highly developed but covertly narcissistic command to be “green-sensitive”?

But sadly, Wilber offers not one piece of evidence in this section on the “meme green meme” and so I am left none the wiser, though a tad more fearful.

A Discourse Analysis

The following discourse analysis below addresses the contents of the three pages constituting the last section of the first chapter of A Theory of Everything, entitled, “The jump to second-tier
consciousness” (Wilber, 2000c, pp. 13-16). From my research on Wilber, I consider this to be sufficiently indicative of Wilber’s general perspective toward the Green vMeme for the consideration below.

Green vMeme Features Identified

Wilber identifies the following features of AQAL’s Green vMeme. (This analysis also indicates the number of respective repetitions of these features within the text in question; and categorisations used for the associated Table 2 are given in parentheses).

- Features framed as substantively negative
  o “Narcissism,” “subjectivism,” “boomeritis” (narcissism)—10
  o Fighting or “accusing” higher developmental levels—such as against “holism” (competitiveness)—5
  o Inefficiency (inefficiency)—3
  o Competitive nature (competitiveness)—2
  o Expression of feelings (other)—1
  o Deconstruction (narcissism)—1
  o Inverted values (as in, “bend[ing] over backwards” to accommodate)—(other)—1

- Features framed as substantively partial
  o “Pluralism,” “relativism” and “pluralistic relativism” (pluralism, relativism)—15
  o Items related to the above—inclusivity, non-universalism, diversity, multiculturalism, antihierarchy, egalitarianism, anti-marginalisation, avoidance of exclusion, redress of social imbalances (pluralism, relativism)—12
  o Nobility (e.g., “noble intent”) (other)—2
  o Individualism (other)—1

- Features framed as substantively positive
  o Compassion, sensitivity, care (compassion)—4
  o Civil rights (civil rights)—1
  o Convinving philosophical critiques (worthy text)—1
  o Environmental protection (environment)—1
  o Richness of text (worthy text)—1

This is summarised in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Wilber’s Green vMeme identifiers (based on the text analysed)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifier</th>
<th>Occurrences in text</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism, relativism</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compassity</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inefficiency</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthy text</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A Contrasting Perspective on the Green vMeme

Whilst it is beyond the scope of this current presentation to conduct a comprehensive contextualisation of AQAL’s Green vMeme (as indicated above), it nevertheless behoves me to present a certain contrasting perspective as a point of departure for further research.

Noting that the Green vMeme denotes a memetic attractor regarding “green values,” it would seem to be an adequate “orienting generalisation” to employ a similar methodological tenor to that of Wilber (as previously described in this article). I thus turn to the Wikipedia for an “ordinary-yet-informed” perspective on what green values might signify.

Searching Wikipedia for “green values” produces 4 main results, each of which refer to the values of Green political parties. From this, two main sets of values are readily apparent—one from the U.S. Green Party (2000), and the other from general guidelines from European Green Parties.

The ten key values of the U.S. Green Party are

- Grassroots democracy
- Social Justice and Equal Opportunity
- Ecological Wisdom
- Non-violence
- Decentralization
- Community-based economics and economic justice
- Feminism and gender equity
- Respect for diversity
- Personal and global responsibility
- Future Focus and sustainability (Green Party of the U.S., 2000)

The “four pillars” of (many of) the European (and other) Green Parties are

- Ecology
- Social Justice
- Grassroots Democracy

It is clear from this presentation that there is no significant correlation between the two sets of articulations of Green values—those by Wilber and those by Green parties.

Whilst Green parties would obviously not intentionally present any negative aspect of Green values (and therefore, a discussion regarding Wilber’s critical hypothesis regarding narcissism and inefficiency, for example, could not be directly contextualised here), the contrast to the Wilberian Green vMeme is nonetheless striking.

Firstly, Wilber mentions “environmental protection” only once among the 61 items identified. This is, of course, in contrast to both the popular conception of Green values (where the environment would be identified as the major feature), and it also contrasts the sets of values by Green parties—again, where ecology / ecological wisdom is a major feature. Specifically, it constitutes 25% of the four pillars, whilst in the ten key values it is given approximately the same weight (the totality of “ecological wisdom,” a major share of “future focus and sustainability,” a share of “personal and global responsibility” and, perhaps mostly, “respect for diversity”). This orienting generalisation contrasts markedly to 2% identified in the analysis of Wilber’s text.

The next feature from Green Party values concerns social justice and economic justice. This term infers the ethics of considering others’ welfare. Wilber does not use this term. He refers to “civil rights” once (2%). He also refers to “diversity” once (2%)—a contrast to the clearly specified “respect for diversity” in the ten key values (10%).

Grassroots democracy, decentralisation and community-based considerations are identified as major players in Green Party values (25-30%), but Wilber does not address this dimension in any way.

Non-violence is also identified as a major Green Party value (10-25%). This contrasts with Wilber’s identification of the feature of “aggressive competitiveness” of the Wilberian Green vMeme (notably with regard to other vMemes). It could be argued, however, that many spiritual approaches align most strongly to Green values. By substantively foregrounding the Green vMeme as narcissistic and a major facilitator of global terrorism (see the Wilber-approved quotation associating addressing Derrida with terrorism above), is Wilber then inferring that the Quakers, for instance—whose approach can be reasonably seen to align with the four pillars of the Green party—are significantly associated with, or constituted by, such a terror-inducing meme?

94 Wilberian theory variously infers and asserts that Green values aggressively fight against Wilberian-identified higher levels of development, including particular dimensions of spirituality (see, e.g., Wilber, 2006b). It could be argued, however, that many spiritual approaches align most strongly to Green values.
1. The apparent core raison d’être of AQAL (in Wilber IV) to move “beyond pluralism” (Wilber, 2000c, p. 29);
2. Wilber’s recent (Wilber V) use of the term in his “Integral Methodological Pluralism;”
3. Such substantive considerations as being mindful of the relationship between anti-pluralism and totalitarianism (Montuori, 2005).

Regardless, Wilber’s “orienting generalisation” toward the Green value-Meme attractor is substantively different from the orienting generalisation of the Wikipedia public’s perspective on green values. The Green value-Meme attractor can, instead, be seen to be constituted by a philosophic vision of planetary wisdom (which could be characterised as “big mind,”), a substantive spirit of compassion (“kind heart”) and a hierarchy of values which clearly prioritises ethical considerations above egocentric financial gain and other vanities (“healthy hierarchy”).

Referencing

In the analysed section of Wilber’s text, the following references are made. Wilber refers to Beck / Cowan / Graves research (Spiral Dynamics) three times. I note that Wilber has since distanced himself from Spiral Dynamics, yet incongruently still substantively discusses (a) “memes” and (b) the generic distinction between “first” and “second-tier” thinking, a distinction which Cowan and Todorovic have indicated is substantively contra-indicated by Clare Graves’ later work. When he is discussing such phenomena, is Wilber still referring to Spiral Dynamics or not?

In the analysed section, Wilber also refers to Colin McGuinn (1977) once. This is made via reference to Wilber’s One Taste (2000b). Through this, the reference Wilber uses to critique academia (in toto) is from The New Republic, which is (a) a magazine, (b) politically neo-liberal, and (c) American.

Comments Regarding Mode of Participation

Wilber (2000c) states that “‘cross-level’ debates are rarely resolved” because “no amount of scientific evidence will convince blue mythic believers; no amount of green bonding will impress orange aggressiveness; no amount of turquoise holism will dislodge green pluralism” (p. 14).

The last point associates holism with the Turquoise vMeme as a contrast to the Green vMeme, yet holism is also one of the core features of the Green vMeme.\footnote{Wilber differentiates integral as a holonic/hierarchical type of holism from Green as a “flatland,” “monological,” non-holonic/hierarchical type of holism, (e.g., Wilber, 2000c, pp. 30-31) but does not directly evidence the substance of this connection between green holism and antihierarchy.} For example, in accordance with AQAL theory, Sean Esbjorn-Hargens implies that “integral” education (signifying education theory derived from AQAL) is developmentally beyond holistic education (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006), inferring holistic education is a Green vMeme approach. AQAL theory would be doubly problematic here in that Scott Forbes (2003) has argued in his seminal work on holistic education that the very raison d’être of holistic education is “Ultimacy” (p. 17) a concept substantively founded on a developmental hierarchy approach—an approach that AQAL substantively posits as antithetical to the Green vMeme.
With regard to the second point, my primary intent in this discourse analysis (or, indeed in this article as a whole) is not to engage in interpersonal bonding; this analysis cannot therefore be attributed to the Green vMeme as per Wilber’s comments above. Rather, I am conducting an analysis, which infers the Orange vMeme of Wilber’s first point (regarding “scientific evidence”). As such, if one presumes the legitimacy of Wilber’s comment, then if this current analysis fails to “convince” the reader, then the reader might well be operating at a Blue vMeme level in this regard—consequently strengthening the plausibility of mythic belief within the integral community. (Of course, Wilber’s comment might be misplaced, in which case the above deduction would not be applicable).

An End-in-View

Pending adequately referenced critical contextualisation, there is thus sufficient evidence to suggest the contra-indicative plausibility that (a) the memetic construction, mean green meme, is substantively mythic (transmitted more by the emotive dogma of received opinion than via the reflexivity of balanced reason), and (b) an alternate characterisation of the Green vMeme could be coined as, “big mind, kind heart, healthy hierarchy.”
Appendix B: The Seduction of Formal Academic Expectations

The seduction of formal academic expectations may have led to the following consequences:

1. My foregrounding of difference to, or differentiation from, Wilber’s approach in this article. Whilst this has its merits, it may not sufficiently express the commonalities I might share, nor adequately convey my appreciation of Wilber’s panoramic vision and courage. If this is so, I apologise. It is work-in-progress (and, in my defence, the purpose of this article is not to comprehensively address Wilber’s work but rather to explore in detail a certain—problematic—territory within it). I look forward to pertinent community dialogue, analysis, deconstruction.

2. Languaging which is less dialectical or deconstructed than I might otherwise have desired. Specifically, my authoring “voice of authority” is privileged over the voicing of uncertainty, tentativity, Mystery, Other.

3. An overall structure which is less complex and more linear than I initially believed would be congruent with my “content chunks.”

4. A de-emphasising of artistic and ludic dimensions.

Nevertheless, I have attempted to retain expression of:

1. A moderate variability in voicing—among various formal and non-formal (particularly postformal) modes.

2. A subliminal encouragement, perhaps, for the reader to slow down through the punctuation afforded by “generous” footnoting—such slowing being congruent with both the learning afforded by hermeneutic circling (or helixing) and also with the (e.g. Derridean) questioning of the default formal privileging of writing-as-speech above writing-as-writing.

3. A certain allowance or toleration of the loose, fuzzy and open-ended, amidst a formal textual landscape of the privileging of the tight, clear, and “buttoned-down.”

Furthermore, lest it be imagined that I engaged in an idealistically formal process in the researching and writing of this article—setting out with totally clear ideas about what I wanted to do and then methodically working my way to achieving them—I present the following points and musings.

1. This article was originally submitted to Integral Review as “Interpenetrating Integral and Postmodern Liminalities” and, compared to the current article, had more of an artistic experimental flavour, in my striving for an honouring of Arthur Koestler’s (1970) Jester-Sage-Artist creativity triad. Due to Integral Review’s wisely innovative submission process, however, whereby an initial editorial review is offered prior to formal peer-review, it was clear that the readership, in the first instance, would probably benefit more from a contribution in which the theoretic is foregrounded. Consequently, my “hermeneutic hovercraft” was vacated (!), my poetic density decimated and a more formal structure instituted.
2. One perspective on my process can be identified as a complex dialectic between reason and intuition. The sharp left brain requires the fuzzy right brain; fragrant roses require smelly manure; and certain method requires a certain madness. Apropos, /technologies/ and their theoretic counterparts reside within ((human complexity)), not *vice versa.*
Appendix C: An AQAL Contextualisation

A core concern of Wilber’s is the evaluation of the writing of others with respect to the degree to which they have addressed the AQAL dimensions of quadrants, levels, lines, states and types. Certain designations are then given by him, notably whether the writing is “integral”—connoting full approval by Wilber—or not; or whether the writing is “integrally-informed,” connoting partial approval.

I offer the following contextualisation to indicate my particular address of these AQAL dimensions. Given the conclusions of this article, however, it would seem that a new designation of “integrally-informing” might be in order—connoting attempts to assist in the cohering and evolution of integral theory.

Eight Native Perspectives (in Quadrants)

1. Upper Left Inside—I have foregrounded somewhat the concept of reflexivity (and its connotations of “know thyself”) in this article. I have also offered some personal self-reflections—see, for instance, Appendix B, and the current Appendix. I have attempted, however, not to fall prey to the Wilberian critique of (Green) subjectivism.

2. Upper Left Outside—(a) It could be argued that a main object of inquiry in this article—namely, AQAL—is a form of structuralism. (b) Could poststructuralism be fruitfully regarded as sublating (transcending and including) structuralism?

3. Upper Right Inside—I have attempted to enact an autopoiesis.

4. Upper Right Outside—An important marker of objectivity is careful attention to the details of the phenomena under investigation. With regard to physical phenomena, the procedures and particularities of scientific experiments facilitate such rigour. With regard to noospheric phenomena or noospheric signifiers of physical phenomena, the rigour concerning the discussion of ideas is facilitated in part by the procedures and particularities of scholarly conduct, including referencing. In this regard, I have attempted to reference adequately. I have also attempted to indicate where Wilber has potentially suffered through not employing such evidential rigour.

5. Lower Left Inside—I have attempted to weave hermeneutic considerations into the very fabric of this text.

6. Lower Left Outside—Further research could be undertaken regarding the propagation of mythic memes within the integral community.

7. Lower Right Inside—I am attempting to facilitate a social autopoiesis within the integral community.

8. Lower Right Outside—(a) If we regard global power structures, then we need to substantively address such identifications as (i) hegemonic / homogenous globalisation (ii) the critical (and shadow-forming) overextension of the Orange vMeme; capitalism; instrumental rationality; the United States’ current unique global positioning. (b) If we regard the current global influence of ideations, then we could regard both integral and postmodernism as underdogs, (c) If we regard integral theory, then we should address the dominant power position of AQAL across many contexts. In this regard, I note the following:
Power base of the six major genealogical memes whose identity is in substantive relationship with the term, integral

—as identified by the following analysis which shows number of texts (articles, etc.) which cite the first 20 pertinent listings identified by Google Scholar\textsuperscript{96} via the following phrase:

- Integral “Rudolf Steiner”: 21
- Integral “Ashok Gangadean” 39
- Integral “Jean Gebser”: 71
- Integral "Ervin Laszlo": 72
- Integral “Sri Aurobindo: 100
- Integral "Ken Wilber": 577

Levels

I have taken AQAL developmental levels as a substantive object of inquiry—notably Orange, Green and Yellow/Teal, and have adopted a developmental approach with regard to them. I have also demonstrated a particular usage of developmentalism toward (a) discourse (b) conceptual templates regarding theoretic narrative. To this degree, I have valorised developmentalism. I have also inferred particular value in the construct of holarchy.

I have made use of numerous AQAL-identified postformal modes of cognition, such as dialectical operations and complex-aware thinking, in addition to formal reasoning.

I have also made substantive use of text from the following authors—some of whose research form important aspects of AQAL theory (including Wilber \textsuperscript{V} AQAL), namely, (a) the cultural theoretic narrative of Jean Gebser; and (b) the developmental models of Susanne Cook-Greuter, Jenny Wade, and Spiral Dynamics (the latter with regard to e.g., (i) “memes” and (ii) “first-tier” / “second-tier” distinction).

I have valorised vision-logic.

I have also valorised certain postformal developmental perspectives—including those of theoretic narratives Wilber calls upon with regard to post-Orange levels. I have nevertheless substantively problematised (from different angles) AQAL theory regarding that which lies beyond Orange, notably regarding the theoretic narrative around the Green / Teal (a.k.a. Yellow) transition.

Lines

Could the following be fruitfully regarded as lines:

- Perspectives on postmodernism?
- Methodologies?
- Postformal cognitive modes?
- Nonduality?
- Deconstruction?

\textsuperscript{96} Retrieved 27 May 07
How might *interrelationships* between lines be adequately conceptualised? As conceptual ecologies?

What might the relationship be between *lines* and poststructuralist *subjectivities* (if we consider the bridging concept of *subpersonalities*, for example)?

**States**

I have identified *neo-imperialism* as a possible cultural *state* (from a lower right perspective). What other *states* might be identified in the lower quadrants?

The research process necessarily involves a host of gross, subtle and affective states. I particularly note entering creative *zones*; and also the alternation of active and passive states—such as in Otto Scharmer’s (2005) *Theory U*—across surprising timescales. Passion is a major mover for me. So is intuition.

**Types**

It might be helpful to regard global language regions—such as the Anglophone world—as a form of lower left *types*.

Perhaps postformal cognition modes can be regarded as *types* of cognition (at the postformal level).

I type the following: *I suspect I might be the type of person that loves to type.* ☺
Verse Two: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Verse Two: Futures of integral futures: An analysis of Richard Slaughter’s analysis of Causal Layered Analysis furthers the exploration of postconventional modalities with regard to Wilberian integral theory, strengthening postconventional integral studies, including that in relation to the field of futures.

Verse Two: Horizontal connections (from Verse One to Verse Two)

Whilst Verse One addresses Wilberian integral theory directly, Verse Two addresses Wilberian integral theory through the sub-field of integral futures,¹ a field spearheaded by Richard Slaughter. A prominent futures methodology is Sohail Inayatullah’s Causal Layered Analysis. This methodology analyses phenomena according to a vertical schema of four layers—from the most superficial to the deepest. The layers run as follows (from surface to depth): the litany layer, the discourse or policy layer, the worldview layer, and the myth/metaphor layer. The verse focuses on a section of a particular paper written by Richard Slaughter in reference to Causal Layered Analysis from a Wilberian integral viewpoint. The material triggers an extended discussion in which the hegemonic interpretation of integral theory is problematised in favour of postconventional directions, ones which lend support for Causal Layered Analysis.

Verse One’s conclusion indicates that integral theorising would substantively benefit from better addressing such features as ecology, languaging-awareness, complexity theory, dialectics and creativity. Verse Two extends some of these insights. Its detailed focus on a particular text can be understood in relation to the poststructural manoeuvre of detailed analysis and deconstruction. Such regard can itself be understood in relation to the dialectic between “orienting generalisations” (using Wilber’s term) and “gap-diving” (using Bonnitta

¹ Integral futures can be understood as a sub-field of both integral studies and of futures studies.
Roy’s). Construct-awareness is facilitated through such detailing. Complexity theory’s notion of open system is also brought into play when discussing the issue of “being systematic.” Additionally, the verse strengthens the countering of a monological and economistically branded (Orange) “Integral theory” (competing through such manoeuvres as overclaiming and marginalisation) to one which better honours the ecology of interpenetrating integral approaches—Wilberian integral in deep dialogue with other integrals. Indeed, the verse indicates that such an ecology accords with the element of Wilberian types if types is used reflexively² upon integral itself. In so doing, it is also indicated that “types” is an unduly marginalised AQAL element. In service of the poststructural countering to such marginalisation (effecting necessary re-alignment), a furthering of types is then explored, including the address of Jungian archetypes.

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² Reflexivity is itself a postconventional modality.
Hampson, G. P. (2010)

“Futures of integral futures: An analysis of Richard Slaughter’s analysis of Causal Layered Analysis”

*Futures: The journal of policy, planning and futures studies*

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Verse Two is omitted for copyright protection.
Available at doi:10.1016/j.futures.2009.09.006
Verse Three: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Verse Three contributes to the regeneration of the post/modern juncture (in its own right and potentially with respect to integral theory) and also to the generation of postconventional theory. It does so via the (post-Orange) construct *postformal poetic ecosophy*, indicating the way in which it sits in critical (if holonic) contrast with such modern/formal (Orange) features as modern atomism and economism. Locating such a developmental shift *temporally* enables postformal poetic ecosophy to be viewed as contributing to possible eco-logical *futures* regarding humanity-in-biosphere.

Verse Three: Horizontal connections (from Verse Two to Verse Three)

Whilst Verses One and Two explore an ecosystem of postconventionalities in response to integral theory, Verse Three attempts to articulate one possible coherence of such an ecosystem (“postformal poetic ecosophy”), both in itself and in contrast to *that from which it moves beyond* (Orange atomism and economism). In so doing, it indicates the significance of such postconventional address beyond the apparent confines of integral theory to social, planetary and theoretical concerns at large: postconventional exploration can help facilitate the regeneration of human culture toward ecosophy, where ecosophy is interpreted as a dynamic non-absolute telos in relation to the well-being and well-becoming of biosphere, human society, and human individual psyche (or, better still, bodymind).

The verse critically identifies late modernism as suffering from “economies of truth.” In this identification, a poststructural or poetic manoeuvre is effected, one which plays on two meanings of “economy,” *(parsimony/frugality/contraction* on the one hand, and *economics*, on the other) indicating their connection (consolidated by discussion both of the substantive partiality of *homo economicus* and of contracted interpretations of *utility*). This ecological connectivity between the two meanings is indicative of a postformal poetic ecosophical lens in contrast to atomism’s interest in *differentiation without (sufficient) integration*. Economies of truth are contrasted with “complexities of truth.” Both are identified as metahoric.
templates, paradigms or sensibilities respectively underlying modern and eco-postmodern worldviews. Economies of truth thus pertain both to economicism (the undue valuing of economics over other considerations) and modern atomism, the latter underpinning such imbalances as technicism, scientism, disciplinism, and prosaicism/literalism.

In contrast, complexities of truth are explored in relation to ecosophy, poetics and postformal thought. These three can be understood as indicating a similar direction to the valorised features identified in Verse Two, such as ecology, languaging-awareness and postformal thought in general.¹ The verse further indicates that complexities of truth are able to holonically embrace economies of truth—in the style of the Wilber’s transcend-and-include which itself can be related (as part of the Neoplatonic integral stream) to the nuanced dialectical Hegelian concept of sublation.

¹ Each identification of that beyond modern atomism (eg. whether “postformal poetic ecosophy,” “an ecology of postconventionalities” or “that beyond modern atomism”) points to a similar signified whilst subtly shifting the revealing-and-concealing of different features.
Hampson, G. P. (In Press)

“Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy”

*Futures:*
*The journal of policy, planning and futures studies*
Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy

Abstract

A perspective is given regarding global mindset change: two key interrelated features underlying late modernity—economism and modern atomism—are critically contrasted with three key interrelated features underlying prospective “eco-logical” futures, namely, ecosophy, postformal thinking, and poetics. From a transdisciplinary or complex-integrative perspective, both economism and modern atomism are identified as suffering “economies of truth” whilst postformal poetic ecosophy is identified as involving “complexities of truth”—a better fit for an eco-logical future. The desirability of the following hierarchies is indicated: that the archetype of economy be aptly embraced by ecosophy, formal by postformal, and prosaics by poetics.

3.1. Introduction: Passion for the possible

It is hard to imagine a bottom line more significant than the destruction of Earth’s biosphere, one which hosts an extraordinary beauty of lifeforms including we homo sapiens and the myriad bedazzlements of our economic machine. Yet in the late industrial era—for the first time in the planet’s history—such destruction is now possible. Additionally, global economic inequality is accelerating whilst a variety of malaises upset the psychological well-being of many. The world seems to be crying out for global mindset change capable of facilitating a future preferable to the nihilistic endgame of business-as-usual [1] [2] [3] [4]. Such a transdisciplinary quest can be approached through a rich interpretation of Ernest Boyer’s scholarship of integration countering the current overextensions of the agendas of neoliberal economics and atomist-empiricist social science [5] [6] [7] [8].

This paper briefly outlines two key interrelated features underlying the dominant global mindset—namely, economism and modern atomism—and contrasts these with three key interrelated features underlying prospective “eco-logical” futures, namely, ecosophy, postformal thinking and poetics (complexly cohered as “postformal poetic ecosophy”). The approach is aligned to Causal Layered Analysis whereby metaphoric templates are understood as underlying worldviews which in turn underlay policy and litany layers [12]. The potential generativity of addressing metaphoric templates is indicated in figure 1.

1 In addition to the current usage, the term eco-logic is sometimes used to refer to that which pertains to environmental ecology (eg. [9] [10]), and sometimes to socio-cultural phenomena [11].
2 “Postformal poetic ecosophy” may be used as shorthand for the hyphenated (and process-oriented) “postformal-poetic-ecosophical.” Although the latter more accurately indicates the comparable status of each term and the complexity of their relationships, the foregrounding of ecosophy in the unhyphenated amalgam accords with the importance of the current ecological crisis. Furthermore, through unity-in-diversity, the three terms should be understood as implying both singular and plural possibilities.
3 From one perspective, modern atomism and economism (among others) can be seen as metaphoric templates underlying the late modern worldview, whilst from another perspective, modern atomism can be seen as underlying an economist worldview (which itself pertains to
Vector A (outer circle) representing engagement at the litany level

Vector B (inner circle) representing engagement at the level of metaphor

Figure 1.

The outermost and innermost layers of Causal Layered Analysis configured as concentric circles suggesting the efficacy of changing metaphors in relation to the same effort being applied at the litany level (a greater angle or circle sector is accomplished).

Both economism and modern atomism pertain to the undue influence of the principle of economy—through economics and economies (or contractions) of truth respectively. In contrast, postformal poetic ecosophy comprises complexities of truth, a paradigmatic vector more fitting for eco-logical futures. Modern atomism—the privileging of explanation through simple, homogenous units—can be understood as a metaphoric template underlying formal thinking, and can lead to such imbalances as technicism, disciplinism, and prosaicism as the modern worldview); postformal poetic ecosophy may similarly (“fuzzily”) be understood as (a) template(s) prospectively underlying (an) eco-logical worldview(s).
described below. Through such concepts as utility, modern atomism also underpins classical / neoliberal economics⁴ and thus also economism—the undue influence of economics in theory and/or practice [14] [15]. From an integrative, “big picture” or transdisciplinary perspective, modern atomism can be understood as an undue partiality or reduction, insufficiently attentive to complexity, multidimensionality or Gestalt considerations. The theoretical intention is not to critique the terrains of atom, formal thinking, economics, technology, or prosaics⁵ per se, but rather to critique their overapplication or misconfiguration. The global economic machine operates as if it is insufficiently aware that the planetary “organism” which hosts it might die—surely a wanton short-sightedness, a potentially fatal economy of truth.

In contrast to modern atomism and economism sit ecosophy, postformal thinking and poetics—broad and somewhat open domains, able to act as semantic “strange attractors” that resist wholly technicist interpretations. Such balance between semantic solidity and openness accords with the new paradigm(s) they indicate. In brief, ecosophy refers to Felix Guattari’s three ecological registers of environment, human culture and psychology; it also refers to Arne Naess’ understanding regarding personal orientations toward deep ecology [17,18]. In psychology, postformal thought refers to developmental levels beyond Piaget’s formal operations; whilst from education, it refers⁶ to the socio-cognitive expression of postmodernity [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]. Poetics identifies the art in phenomena by way of an open conceptual system. As such, it embraces such notions as artfulness, liminality, and ontological meaning [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33]. Lastly, the term eco-logical points not only to an environmentally sustainable future but to the metaphoric logic of ecology: ecologies of mind, dialogic consciousness, multivalent logics, etc. [34] [35] [36] [37]. Additionally, the normativity of eco-logics points to well-being in relation to human individuals, society and non-human life.

It is possible that the severity of the ecological crisis will lead to a revolution involving a change from late modernity’s economic fundamentalism to an environmental fundamentalism, a revolution perhaps akin to modernity’s reaction against medieval religious fundamentalism. In this “fundamentalist relay” scenario, the survival of humanity and the biosphere as a whole could perhaps be attempted through the quasi-totalitarian structures. But is this the best that could be imagined? Postformal poetic ecosophy suggests not: it seeks to counter the complexity reduction associated with fundamentalism and the totalitarian mindset [38]. Indeed, the three-term amalgam inhibits the potential fundamentalisation of any of the three individual terms.⁷ Rather, postformal poetic ecosophy—somewhat resembling Gidley’s postformal-integral-planetary [19]—more easily maintains “buoyancy” through resisting a foundational centre. Each term is variously capable of embracing the other two via an abundance of potential interrelationships (that are beyond the scope of this paper to explore). A key coherence is that postformal poetic ecosophy seeks to harness “passion for the possible” [39, p. 174].

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⁴ Neo-liberalism goes beyond classical economics (with its assertion regarding economics as a “natural” domain) in that it asserts that the free market must be actively supported by the government (and thus not left to “nature”) [13].

⁵ Indeed, a case can be made for the valorisation of prosaics against complacent interpretations of poetics [16].

⁶ It can also refer to alternatives to the formal, factory model of education [19].

⁷ Including such fundamentalisations as postformal thought imbued with insufficient indeterminacy, poetics as involving analysis through the template of a closed theory or system, or ecosophy as environmental fundamentalism.
3.2. Economies of truth

3.2.1. Economism

Economism\(^8\) can be understood as the undue influence of economics—whether in theory or practice. Regarding *theoretical* domination, it assumes that “the economy is everything, and that mainstream economic theory is true” [40, p. 89]. Underpinned by modern atomistic thinking—including contracted and biased forms of individualism [41] [42]—economism can be understood as a modern worldview, currently somewhat conterminous with the ideology of economic globalisation—see, eg. [43]. Regarding *practice*, at the policy level it refers to an overemphasis on economic dimensions at the expense of social policies. The litany level is similarly affected: for instance, a casual glance at the newspaper on the day of writing, reporting on the world economic recession refers to a “deteriorating world outlook” [44, p. 1] implicitly equating the entire “world” with the economy. Which world is deteriorating? Which ideology is speaking?

Ominously, even Adam Smith, “father of modern economics,” foresaw the dangers of economism or “unbridled capitalism” in the eighteenth century [45] [46]. Despite its rhetorical face, the current neoliberal economic agenda can be seen as *il*i*liberal* to the extent that the role of human agency is held as less important than that of the market or of technology [43]. It can be understood in relation to numerous “economies of truth” such as those pertaining to identities of human, polity, corporations, and value. With regard to the human species, mainstream economics purports to treat the construct *homo economicus* as a hypothesis, yet in practice employs it as a “taken for granted… obvious truth” [47, p. 3]. This ignores alternative imaginaries regarding our species such as *homo aestheticus, homo cogitans, homo complexus, homo faber, homo ludens, homo poeticus, homo politicus, or homo socians* [48] [49] [50]. Such an ecology of identifications rather points to a far more complex situation than mainstream economics would have us believe—a fecundity surely “responsible for human openness and adaptability” [51, p. 289].

The undue privileging of economic aspects of society over physical, biological, political and cultural dimensions has many repercussions. For example, social interactions are reduced to a single type, namely *trade*—a situation “bound to produce only trivial results” [40, p. 89] as trade “is neither a strong nor a lasting bond—not even in the business world” [40, p. 89], thus mitigating against meaningful social futures. Indeed, even in economic transactions, acquaintednesship *complexities* tend to be required [40]. Moreover, rather than understanding society as a complex adaptive system open to environment, politics, culture and psyche, economism imagines the entire social system as ultimately static, one unable to appreciate the value in *disequilibria* required for, “the trial and diffusion of unorthodox ideas and practices” [40, p. 89]. (Paradoxically, this closure stands in contrast to the mythology of ever-expanding *material* production and consumption.) It is perhaps not surprising, then, that economism is associated with “restrictions to democracy” [52, p. 23]; indeed, the neoliberal agenda is often achieved through undemocratic, military means [43]. Even the identities of corporations are tainted: sociological and micro-political analyses are ignored in favour of “black-box” approaches to organisations and “faceless” identifications of individuals [40]. Furthermore, the notion of a “self-regulating market” can be identified as an economy of truth, one riding

\(^8\) Or “economicism.”
roughshod over the fact that “the workings of the market are also planned and controlled, either by states or by other bureaucratic entities such as transnational corporations” [52, p. 23]. In short,

the economic approach to everything social homogenizes and flattens social science by reducing all social relations to exchanges, and all goods and bads to commodities, without regard to their specific functions. The approach does not and cannot work for families or clubs, schools or hospitals, scientific laboratories or artist’s ateliers, churches or charities, political parties or government departments, police stations or court rooms [40, p. 89].

A significant “economy of truth” in neoclassical / neoliberal economics can be seen in the construct of utility and its use in utility theory. Although the idea of utility maximization was formulated in the 16th century, it was Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism which brought utility to center stage; and it soon formed the backbone of economics [53] [54]. Utility is built upon a modern atomistic template such that it is potentially quantifiable through the measurement of “utils.” Whilst utilitarianism was originally used, for example, to advocate for women’s rights, homosexual decriminalisation, socialism and animal rights—over time it has tended toward a certain reductionism. (This need not be the case: the importance of prioritising the address of climate change could, for example, be supported by a rich interpretation of utility.) Notably, the concept was progressively “purged of psychological reference” [54, p. 3] by neoclassical economics, and happiness became reduced to consumer choice. Since Bentham’s time, the release from conservative norms has also been a mixed blessing in that utilitarianism had the unseen consequence of lifting the former religious ban on greediness [55]. The situation is not assisted by the tendency for utilitarian maxims “to subordinate cooperation to competition” [56, p. 36]. Arguably, its ethical heritage was severed by the rise of artificially stimulated economic demand. By the early 20th century in the U.S. for instance, production capacity had outgrown demand; demand was then artificially stimulated through marketing [55]. The emergent associated rise of corporation culture and the ideology of managerialism with its forms of accountability and non-futures-oriented “emphasis on short-term performance contracts” [57, p. 110] is also economically implicated. Who manages well-being? Who manages the managers? How much are we undervaluing the construction and empowerment of organisations dedicated to expanding our moral, literary, scientific and mystical imaginations [58]? Such vision requires a different order than economism or the modern atomism on which it rides.

3.2.2. Modern atomism

Modern atomism privileged explanation derived from simple, homogenous units—atoms—rather than complex entities. It can be regarded as an economy of truth, reducing the domain of truth legitimacies. Mathematics, the digital metaphysics of computing, and technology in general accord with modern atomism [60] [61] [62]. It also forms the basis of much modern scientific thought. Although the overapplication of mathematics can lead to a undue limitations regarding understanding [63], it would seem that the material successes of digitally-based knowledge and production—a situation catalysed by Descartes’ mechanistic philosophy—has seduced us into believing that more analogical modalities are fundamentally less valuable. Yet the make-up of our cerebrum rather seems to suggest an equal legitimacy—and interaction—between the more digital left hemisphere and

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9 Not to be conflated with ancient atomism (see [59]).
the more analogical right one. An analogy to such a relationship can perhaps be seen in Heidegger’s discussion of *techné* and *poiesis* [64]. Modern atomism forms a key basis for the principle of *techné* which involves constructions of pre-given atomistic components (whether material or ideational / linguistic). If *techné* is regarded without non-technical context or consideration, an incomplete event occurs—it loses sight of its own *poiesis*, its own creative poetry, so to speak: *techné* becomes downsized, made economic; meaning is reduced, and the limitations of the actuality and metaphor of *machine* introduced. Narrow science and conventional society remain disenchanted, unable to break free of the ratio template of “small r” rationality toward more holistic understandings [65] [66]. Yet “many concrete situations even in physics, in chemistry and in engineering are not amenable to a simple causal and experimental methodology… demographic, economic, political and social phenomena are still less understandable using only classical models” [67, p. 618] (added emphasis).

Modern atomism in the sphere of language can be termed *prosaicism* or *literalism*. This perspective states that “our natural language consists of fundamental terms characterized as atoms” [68, p. 143]. Undue value is given to the conventional, literal or “functional” over richer understandings and uses of language indicated by postmodernism’s linguistic turn. Logical atomism is implicated through the notion that “propositions [can] be easily divided into those with truth values which [are] descriptive, and those that [are]…value judgements” [54, p. 12]. In general, “ambiguity or any other sign of a lack of clarity and distinctness is understood to be nothing more than a problem that needs to be fixed through further purifications and severances” [69, p. 154]. It can be said that the fallacy of literalism, like the fallacy of objectivity and progress, derives from a society which can accord significance only to fact and figure, to testable unambiguous data and hard statistics [70, p. 95].

This includes the devaluing of metaphor which is often viewed negatively by many academics and administrators [71]. Yet language substantively involves the layered use of metaphor [72] [73]. Indeed, “metaphorical thought is what makes abstract scientific theorizing possible” [74, p. 128].

Another form of modern atomism is the undue influence of disciplinary approaches to knowledge. Etymologically, *discipline* comes from the Latin *discipere* (“to grasp intellectually, analyze thoroughly”—literally “to take apart”) via *discipulus* (“pupil”) and *disciplina* (“instruction given to a disciple”). Its etymological roots are thus entwined with separation and analysis—and so somewhat kin to *science*’s root, *scindere* (“to cut, divide”). “The standard image of [the] disciplinary order is that of a universe neatly divided in a large number of only slightly overlapping areas, each one being the speciality of a particular group of professional experts” [75, pp. 23-24]. As such, disciplinism classifies both the world and its observers through “the erection of rigid boundaries” [76, p. 104] in contrast to transdisciplinary approaches. Imagining disciplines as homogenous atoms, however, is not accurate. They are decidedly heterogeneous. Additionally, their inherent fuzziness is such that “sometimes arbitrariness is involved in calling one area a ‘discipline’ and another an ‘intersecting field.’ Geography, for example, might qualify for either list, as might education and linguistics” [77, pp. 60-61]. Such reductionism can occur both among disciplines and within them. With respect to the former, bibliometrics often provide misleading accounts [78, p. 2]; with respect to the latter,
up to the mid-twentieth century, most scientific disciplines obeyed the principle of
reduction of the knowledge as a whole to knowledge of its parts, as if the organization
of an entity did not produce new qualities or properties with respect to the parts taken
in isolation [48, p. 35].

In general, “disciplinarian thinking seems to be unable to cope with the complexity which is
overwhelming us” [79, p. 3]. Michael Finkenthal traces this back to Aristotle’s understanding
that disciplines sit in relation to the essential qualities of the objects of study [79]. However, a
question here would be: What if the “essence” of the particular object was multifaceted and
irreducibly complex? Such a possibility is enabled by postformal poetic ecosophy.

3.3. Toward eco-logical futures: Postformal poetic ecosophy

3.3.1. Ecosophy

Ecosophy was coined separately by Arne Naess and Félix Guattari, about 130 years after
Haeckel’s 1869 identification of ecology [17] [18]. Although Naess and Guattari did not refer
to each other’s usage of ecosophy, consideration of both interpretations together might prove
generative. Etymologically, the term’s root, eco- (also leading to economy) is derived from
the Greek oikos, signifying home, household, dwelling place, habitation; whilst -sophy (also
found in philosophy) comes from the Greek sophia, signifying wisdom.\(^{10}\)

For Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, ecosophy refers to particular personal orientations
toward deep ecology—he labels his own orientation Ecosophy T: his use of the term thus
points to an intrinsic pluralism [18]. He also indicates that ecosophy is differentiated from
ecology partly through the former’s incorporation of values. Regarding the distinction
between deep ecology and shallow ecology, Naess comments:

What characterizes the deep movement (in relation to the shallow) is not so much the
answers that are given to “deep questions” but rather that “deep questions” are raised
and taken seriously [81, p. 29] (original emphasis).

He notes that depth “must include not just systematic philosophical deepness, but also the
‘deepness’ of proposed social changes” [81, p. 22]. Naess’ Ecosophy T (further) indicates the
potential spiritual depth of ecosophies through his identification of the “fundamental norm” of
Self-realization. He states both “that the higher the levels of Self-realization attained by a
person, the more any further increase depends upon the Self-realization of others” [81, p. 52]
and that “plants and animals also have a right to unfolding and self-realisation” [81, p. 165].
Deep ecology can be understood as a quintessential futures-oriented approach in that it has “a
long-range maximal perspective of time and place” [81, p. 43], such that “any short-range
solution should cover at least the next fifty years” [81, p. 17], and indeed, “a thousand years
has…to do with the problem of today” [81, p. 19]. Ecosophy can also be understood as an
integrative approach in that it refers to a variously multi-leveled or hierarchical\(^{11}\) “total view”
[81, p. 17].

\(^{10}\) The archetypal Sophia is furthered in the spiritual-philosophical approach of sophiology
found in Vladimir Sergeievich Soloviev’s “Great Synthesis” of “‘integral reason and
sobornost [spiritual community]’” [80].

\(^{11}\) Naess’ embrace of hierarchical understanding adds to the problematisation of Wilber’s
conceptualisation of the Green developmental level (see [82]).
Whilst Naess’s *ecosophy* foregrounds that which is commonly identified as “environment,” Guattari’s usage (less common in Anglophone discourse) explicitly transverses three domains [17]. Guattari explains that ecosophy is “an ethico-political articulation…between the three ecological registers (the environment, social relations and human subjectivity)” [17, pp. 41-2]. These sit against a general disequilibria caused by “Integrated World Capitalism” [17, pp. 41-2]. Regarding environment, Guattari states that “if no remedy is found, the ecological disequilibrium…will ultimately threaten the continuation of life on the planet’s surface” [17, p. 27]. In relation to the socio-political domain, he identifies “Third World…pauperisation” [17, p. 29] involving the “long-term establishment of immense zones of misery, hunger and death” [17, p. 31], now also including parts of the materially developed world. He also identifies oppressive marginalisation and unemployment, noting that “young people…are crushed by the dominant economic relations” [17, p. 33]. Regarding the domain of the individual, he mentions such malaises as “loneliness, boredom, anxiety and neurosis” [17, p. 28] and identifies the prevalent standardization of behaviour as an “ossification” [17, p. 27]. He evaluates the whole crisis as a type of contraction and developmental regression—“a sort of general movement of implosion and regressive infantalization” [17, p. 27].

Spanning across the three domains of environment, socius and psyche a range of ecosophical features can be identified including artistry, complexity, creativity, dissensus, ethics, evolution, many-sidedness, mutuality, openness, and transversality. Guattari also explicitly *differentiates* the three domains. For instance, regarding *environmental* ecology, “anything is possible—the worst disasters or the most flexible evolutions” [17, p. 66]; *social* ecology “will consist in developing specific practices that will modify and reinvent the ways in which we live” [17, p. 34]; whilst *mental* ecology “will lead us …[in part] to search for antidotes to mass-media and telematic standardization, the conformism of fashion, the manipulation of opinion by advertising, surveys, etc. Its ways of operating will be more like those of an artist” [17, p. 35]—in other words, a poetic sensibility is called for.

Of the three ecological registers, Guattari identifies a significant undervaluation of mental ecosophy. The construction *postformal poetic ecosophy* seeks in part to rectify this; notably, both *postformal* and *poetic* substantively address subjectivity. In addressing this domain, Guattari valorises a host of features such as the *included middle* of postformal logic, organic and ecological metaphors, “creative proliferation” [17, p. 55], the drama of multiplicity (pluralism) and the baroque.

Ecosophy encompasses the notion of sustainable futures. From another direction, it has been suggested that futures studies itself be linked to sustainability [83]; however, “sustainability does not capture adequately the essence and complexity of the ecological crisis in its various dimensions” [84, p. 665]. Ecosophy, on the other hand, *does* embrace and facilitate the required complexity, through for example the identification of “green” knowledge, the ethics of *enough*, poststructuralist political ecology and the valorization of social technologies [85] [86] [87] [88]. It is possible, though, that “without postformal thought, the ecology movement, Gaia, and other views of the Earth are just new orthodox formal logical positions” [24, p. 299]: here, Jan Sinnott suggests that *postformal* perspectives are generative or even necessary to enhance ecological understandings—as indicated below.

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12 Somewhat akin to Sasha Kegan’s identification of sustainability as “the triptych of biodiversity, cultural diversity and human well-being” [this volume].
3.3.2. Postformal thinking

The term post-formal / postformal can be found in three discourses, namely, developmental psychology, education and integral / integrative studies. In the first it signifies an individual developmental level or levels beyond Piaget’s formal operations; in the second it is taken to mean the socio-cognitive expression of postmodernism, emphasising critical, social concerns (mostly framed non-developmentally) [26]. Regarding the third discourse, Ken Wilber, for instance, uses developmental psychology’s postformal as a core feature of his integral theory [89]—a theory (albeit critiqued [82]) which involves a developmental schema including both individual and social dimensions; whilst Gidley’s “postformal-integral-planetary” identification references psychological, educational and integral discourses [19] [also see Gidley, this volume].

Postformal researchers identify a variety of features including big-picture / contextual / integrative-thinking, complexity, creativity, dialectics, meaning / narrative, multiperspectivality, pattern-finding, problem-finding, reflexivity, and spirituality [20] [90] [21] [22] [19] [26] [23] [24] [25]. Space does not permit discussion of the potential significance and complexity of such signifiers and their interrelationships (see [82]). Nonetheless, note should be made regarding a postformal understanding of languaging such as indicated by poststructuralism’s linguistic turn, construct-awareness, deconstruction, etymology, and metaphor cognition [22] [26] [24].

Just as formal operations is associated with formal logic involving the law of non-contradiction [91], so postformal operations can be associated with postformal logics. These include fuzzy logic, probability logic, and many-valued logics (supporting multi-causality) [37] [92] [93] [94] [95]—modalities which valorise contingency and indeterminacy while rejecting the principle of a fundamentalised bivalence. Both the incompleteness theorem of mathematician and Platonist Kurt Gödel and the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein can be seen as lending gravitas to postformal reasoning, including apprehension of the non-mechanicist nature of mind[13] [96], effective thinking as comprising “an appropriate dialectic between the formal and the intuitive” [97, p. 372], and indeed the understanding that “one True Logic does not exist” [98, p. 280] (original emphasis)—for even “mathematical thinking is, and must remain, essentially creative” [99, p. 88]. Such creativity is valorised through a postformal interpretation of poetics.

3.3.3. Poetics

The term poetics stretches back to Aristotle’s Poetics—a work mostly addressing the structural characteristics of tragedy. In modern times it has been furthered in literary studies addressing questions such as What makes a verbal message a work of art? and more latterly in social, political, and cultural studies [100] [101] [102]. Whilst some significations of the term are technical and narrow, poetics can be said to be “still very young” [103, p. 5] despite its classical heritage. As such, extensive interpretations of the term are possible. Indeed, poetics can be understood as “passion for the possible” [39, p. 174], an impulse “persistently pushing at the very edges of…possibility” [29, p. 12]. Such an idea indicates that futures scenarios themselves (including eco-logical futures) rely on the poetic imagination. Broad identifications of poetics can also be understood as inherently transformative [104, p. 4],

[13] Which is not to say that the mind cannot enter into a mechanistic imagination.
facilitated by processes of defamiliarization, the intensification of awareness through palpability [105] [106], and a template of openness—poetics as “an open, ever-changing theoretical structure” [107 p. 14]. Poetics thus sits in accord with the complexity theory construct of open system, whilst contrasting the “intellectual aridity of a closed taxonomy” [101, p. 100]. Poetics identifies the art in phenomena by way of a fecund open conceptual system.

The sense of abundance in poetics contrasts markedly with the archetype of economy—whether as frugality or as economics (and its principle of scarcity). Indeed, as the art of life, poetics “may offer ethical resistance...[encouraging] us to begin again, and begin to remember a life that is governed by other than instrumentalist agendas” [108, p. 1176]. It can “counter the linguistic closure that arises as a result of the occlusion by the global economic language” [29, p.39] because, for poetics, the threat of difference is not domesticated. Instead, one might—poetically—say that the reflexive wile of difference rides with a wilful wildness, a wilderness habitat rich with semantic biodiversity. Such an entwinement between poetics and ecology indicates poetics as complex integration whereby harmonic convergences and disharmonic divergences cohere at more embracing levels as dynamic unities.

Poetics as liminal may also be identified. At the social level, this might involve, for example, the politician, educator or researcher as poet—a liminal figure bridging hegemonic and counter-hegemonic worlds [29], even, perhaps, holding sociology as an art [109]; whilst the transgressive quality of poetics may surface as “a politically committed, critical social poetics” [101, p. 203] “aiming to answer the big questions and issues” [110, p. 6], perhaps an “ecological poetics” [111, p. 12] facilitating appreciation of the strange-familiar like- otherness of other species, ecosystems as earthly poems, or language as ecology; a “poetics of resistance” [112] “disrupting the smooth functioning of technology” [113, p. 12] through community-founded “poetic dwelling”; or a poetics of transgression apprehending the significance of “the carnival, the circus, the gypsy” [114, p. 286].

The poetic paradigm is most strongly configured through poetics as ontology wherein the Cartesian split between internal reality and external appearance is problematised [104]. Instead lies a cosmic poetry which “pulls us into its question, its repose, its regard” [33, p. 91], an ontopoetics comprising a “field-likeness” between psyche, meaning and cosmos, a perspective opening up a “world hidden within the world” such that the world, the word and ourselves may come yet more alive [31].

3.4. Conclusion: Complexities of truth

Complexities of truth can be identified in relation to poetics, postformal thinking and ecosophy. This perspective contrasts with the economies of truth of modern atomism and economism. Economism, formalism and prosaicism each variously pertain to the modern atomistic attractor, whilst ecosophy, postformality and poetics variously comprise attractors of complexity. The term economies of truth indicates unacknowledged elements—hidden aspects, shadows, dialectics—and thus types of “false economy.” In contrast, the idea of complexities of truth includes synergistic, complementary and antagonistic relations; substantive (holonic) relations between atom and Gestalt (part and whole); and multilayered schemas such that complexity does not preclude spiritual simplicity (indeed, dialectical understanding intimates as such a juxtaposition) [115] [116]. Specifically, the desirability of
the following hierarchies is indicated: that the archetype of economy be aptly embraced by ecosophy, formal by postformal, and prosaics by poetics—as outlined below.

Regarding ecosophy, eco-nomy, eco-logy and eco-sophy all derive from oikos (household, dwelling, habitat). Whereas (classical / neoliberal) economics—“household management”—substantively ignores the nature of the “house” or habitat in which the management takes place, ecology and (especially) ecosophy explicitly include the nature of our global dwelling. This suggests that ecology/ecosophy are more capable of aptly positioning and containing economy than economy is of appropriately addressing ecology/ecosophy unless economics fundamentally reworks itself to institute “household” as (at least) meaning “this planet (and its medium and long-term futures).”

Regarding post/formal, formal logic can be held within postformal logics; it can be held in dialectic with other cognitive modalities such as creativity, intuition, imagination and inspiration. It can also be explicitly brought into relationship with values, both in terms of uncovering those hidden in apparently neutral discourse as well as those pertaining to our preferred futures. Formal operations can similarly be held within broader contexts such as our life-narratives (at whatever scale). In short, both formal logic and formal operations are important, yet undue regard should not be given to either: larger contexts of meaning surround and infuse (our use of) these modalities.

Regarding poetics, from a single lifetime perspective, words are mostly already-made; yet we can still make the world afresh with the already-made—bringing new life and meaning to each word as they relay anew, narrating new understandings, new lives. Bureaucratese, clichés or non-metaphorical understandings of language may deaden our sense(s) making it harder to regenerate the world. Conversely, the more resonant semantic “biodiversity” of poetics can open up spaces of “cosmic poetry,” potentially facilitating eco-logical futures. The ongoing regeneration of the word sits—or flows—in generatively metaphorical relationship with the ongoing regeneration of the world.

In general, the ontological scarcity of a fundamentalised Occam’s razor could give way to a more fecund unity-in-diversity regarding individual, social and biospherical well-being. Late modernity could eventually give way to one of a number of eco-logical futures.
MOVEMENT B:

Postconventional
Integral
Education

Verses:
Four, Five, Six
Movement B: Horizontal connections (from Movement A to Movement B)

Whilst Movement A’s focus is on integral and postconventional theorising in general, Movement B intensifies the postconventional-integral focus through address of the domain of education. To some degree this may be regarded as the manoeuvre of application, although Movement B is not limited by such a manoeuvre: through exploration it also contributes to generic considerations—such as via its development of ecosophy/ecology, notably through extending notions of genealogy and eco-logics (or that beyond modern atomism). In relation to ecosophy (as postconventional modality), whilst Movement A contributes to ecosophy through exploring its use by positing a conceptual ecosystem of postconventionalities through or within which a way\(^1\) (through *phronesis*) has to be navigated, Movement B contributes to ecosophy through exploring its use by way of *genealogy* (as extension of the metaphor of ecology) and *eco-logics*\(^2\) (as underlying topologised metaphoric template).

Movement B: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Movement B’s focus comprises postconventional-integral theorising in relation to education. Of its three verses, the first two address integral education theorising through using exploratory postconventional lenses, notably by way of extending notions of ecology (as part of ecosophy), including the interpretation of *genealogy as ecosystem-through-time*, whilst Verse Six consolidates understanding of the critical post/modern juncture without explicit reference to integral education theory (signalling postconventional/poststructural derritorialisation whilst still potentially contributing to integral theory). Movement B stands in service to regenerating education through generating postconventional-integral educational poetics. Additionally, *Appendix II. A critique of Wilberian integral education theory* supplements understanding regarding the study’s relationship to Wilberian integral education theorising.

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\(^1\) Or even a “way of wisdom” (and thus an ecosystem in relation to Sophia—ecosophy).

\(^2\) Even if deterritorialised or expressed differently as *that beyond modern atomism*. 
**Verse Four: Vertical connections** *(relations to overarching aims)*

*Verse Four: Western-Islamic and Native American genealogies of integral education*

generates integral education theory through exploring the postconventional feature of ecology, including genealogy as ecosystem through time. In addition to conceptual ecology, social ecology is foregrounded through adopting planetary consciousness with regard both to different types of integral and with respect to marginalised understandings. In the verse, such social ecology is exemplified by forwarding Native American integral education, and also by ensuring the Islamic contribution to the Western tradition of university education is identified.

Verses Four and Five form the first two chapters of the first book to take a transversal approach to integral education.

**Verse Four: Horizontal connections** *(from Verse Three to Verse Four)*

Verse Three moved beyond the (Orange) business-as-usual underaddress of possible and preferred futures by normatively identifying eco-logical futures. Verse Four moves beyond the (Orange) business-as-usual underregard for historical and philosophical foundations of the present and underenactment of planetary consciousness by indicating a panoramic identification of integral education both temporally and cross-culturally. Both Verses Three and Four problematise the valuing of narrow instrumentalist thinking in favour of broader understanding including substantive address of pasts and futures. Such broader address also includes degrees of deterritorialisation of integral discourse—extending discussion well beyond familiar reference points to explore the territories in more detail. Moreover, such exploration can *inform* integral theory and not only be *informed by* integral theory.

Verse Four is a somewhat dense work creatively pointing to a host of generative ideas.

Firstly, it asks the question: given that major uses of the term *integral* and *integral education* can be identified as Neoplatonist (eg. Wilberian) and Aristotelian (eg. Catholic), on what basis should these broader genealogical streams *not* be identified as “integral” or “integral education”? The verse works from the premise that such exploration is indeed legitimate, particularly in light of the undue contraction of the term *integral* in Wilberian integral
discourse. The exploration can thus be understood both neutrally and as a poststructural or
dialectical counterpoint.

Secondly, an exploratory use of the concept of genealogy is employed (see Verse 1, p.150: *Conclusion b. i.*)—one allowing for a “broad church” of thought—a conceptual ecosystem
within which there might be contestabilities as well as harmonies. This interpretation of
genealogy also allows for evolution, whereby the stream is not imagined as a fixed entity but
rather, temporally dynamic; such changes might include positive developmental changes; they
might also include regressions and disjunctures.

Thirdly, normative (critical) social ecology is furthered through planetary consciousness as
cross-cultural inclusivity (see Verse 1, p.150: *Conclusion b. ii.*). This is indicated both
through the valorising of Native American integral education and through the identification of
the contribution of Islamic civilisation to Western heritage, particular in light of the current
political climate regarding tensions between Western and Islamic spheres. The manoeuvre of
“confluencing” Islamic and Catholic approaches into the generic Aristotelian stream further
gestures deep dialogue between these spheres. A further playful but significant countermove
to a hegemonic integral is effected by noting that Native American integral education
identifies “four quadrants” as part of its approach.

Fourthly, the verse posits an integrative schema potentially contextualising integral or
integrative approaches as two of four general types of academic thought. Specifically,
integral-Neoplatonic and integral-Aristotelian are brought into relationship with empiricist-
atomist (synergistic with the modern framing of *science*) and contingent (synergistic with the
modern framing of *the arts and humanities*) modalities. Boyer’s scholarship of discovery
often accords with a modern science template, whilst (a non-reductive interpretation of) the
scholarship of integration can support integral/integrative approaches. Such a schema
contributes to transdisciplinarity discourse.

Fifthly, it identifies a series of four “renaissances,” each of which variously involved
intensifications of integrative/integral approaches. This conceptualisation thus further
valorises integral/integrative approaches whilst seeking to re-address underregard for the
three renaissances which are not conventionally labelled as such.
Sixthly, a link is provided between the use of the term *integral education* in the nineteenth century (discussed in Verse Four) and the Neoplatonic stream—by way of German humanism (German classicism, romanticism, idealism and anthroposophy). This foregrounds such essential integral education features as *Bildung* and the significance of Humboldt’s conceptualisation of the university for integral thought around higher education. Moreover, taking into account the ecosystem of Western-Islamic and Native American integral education approaches, it indicates the valorisation of a myriad (mostly postconventional) features.\(^3\)

Seventhly, it furthers Davis’ address of *gnosis in education* in service of a possible fundamental reconceptualisation of the academic landscape—inquiring into whether epistemology might be aptly complemented by gnoseology.

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\(^3\) Including breadth of understanding, care, community (intellectual and societal), complexity, depth (historical, philosophical, semantic), contemplative dwelling, creativity, ecosophy, embodied participation, ethical orientation, expressivism, freedom, friendship, *habitus*, harmony, an I-Thou pedagogical relationship, imagination, interconnectivity, knowledge–mystery dialectics, life, love, metaphor, nuanced developmentalism, paradigmatic aesthetics, perennial philosophy’s cosmic ontology and four fields of knowledge (Schumacher, 1977), play, potential, readiness to learn, spiritual philosophy, transdisciplinarity, the unique character of our singularities, unity-in-diversity, and wisdom.
Hampson, G. P. (In Press)

“Western-Islamic and Native American genealogies of integral education”

in S. Esbjörn-Hargens, J. Reams & O. Gunnaugson (Eds.)
_Integral Education: New Directions For Higher Learning_
Covering note for the electronic copy for online publishing

Verse Four is omitted for copyright protection
Verse Five: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

Like Verse Four, the following verse, *Elements of the underacknowledged history of integral education*, generates integral education theory via genealogy. Social ecological understandings are expressed through adopting planetary consciousness with regard both to different types of integral and to marginalised understandings, notably the foregrounding of European streams to provide a certain re-balancing to the North American bias of contemporary integral education discourse.

Verse Five: Horizontal connections (from Verse Four to Verse Five)

Whilst Verse Four indicates a panoramic view on genealogies of integral education—including address of the pre-nineteenth century situation in the West—Verse Five adopts a more focused address toward the genealogies of integral education arising in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe. The focus regards those approaches which have used the term *integral education*. Key genealogies identified (those re-aligning integral discourse beyond tendencies to unduly focus on Wilber and Aurobindo) comprise socialist (anarchist) and Catholic streams, the latter sitting in reference to the broader genealogical stream identified in Verse Four as Aristotelian. Gebserian and Aurobindean integral educations are also discussed. The verse ends with a summary of educational features arising from the above considerations. Educational features indicated include lifelong learning (and beyond), consideration of the whole human being (particularly focusing on inner qualities), myriad connectivities, address of the contemporary situation, respecting the uniqueness of learners, and a non-dogmatic, experimental sensibility.

One of the first general uses of the term “integral,” in the sense of an approach or worldview, was in relation to “integral education.” Should not contemporary identifications of integral not only take into account the origin of the term “integral” (in the sense of approach or worldview) but also duly note its early association with education? If education “led the way” in this regard, perhaps integral theory should better honour this heritage?
Verse Five is co-authored with Markus Molz: see *Front Matter: Statement regarding Contribution of Others* and *Appendix I* for details.

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1 Co-authorship can be understood as postconventional—see Montouri (1997).

“Elements of the underacknowledged history of integral education”

in S. Esbjörn-Hargens, J. Reams & O. Gunnlaugson (Eds.)
*Integral Education: New Directions For Higher Learning*
G. P. Hampson Ph.D Thesis

Covering note for the electronic copy for online publishing

Verse Five is omitted for copyright protection
Verse Six: Vertical connections (relations to overarching aims)

The last verse, *Education beyond modern atomism*, addresses education through exploring a critical contrast between modern atomism (conventional thinking / Orange) and that beyond modern atomism (postconventionalities / post-Orange). This can be contextualised as furthering the re-alignment of Wilberian interpretation of *Green and beyond* in that a rich conceptualisation of ecosophy (as a postconventionality) problematises the necessity of the Wilberian framing of the Green / post-Green juncture: ecosophy is both Green and post-Green. The aspect of ecosophy explored here is that of “eco-logics”: ecology topologised in relation to relationality (then expressed through the via negativa of that beyond modern atomism). Whilst atomism foregrounds units over connections, eco-logics values a balance between units and connections (and thus, from an atomist perspective, it foregrounds connections). “Relationality” or “connectivity” is here intended to act generically, implying all forms of “dialogue” between units (conceptual items, cultures, people, etc.). It thus accords with such approaches as deep dialogue. The verse can be identified as facilitating the construction of eco-logical education theory, where “eco-logics” signifies via positiva terminology for that beyond modern atomism. It also explicitly furthers import of the scholarship of integration.

Verse Six: Horizontal connections (from Verse Five to Verse Six)

Verse Six differs from the preceding two verses in two respects. Firstly, whilst the preceding verses focus on the historical situation, the forthcoming verse focuses on contemporary and possible future education. Focus does not imply containment, however. Verse Four’s discussion of Native American education pertains to both the historical and contemporary situation, whilst Verse Six’s focus is nonetheless grounded in relation to the historical legacy of Cartesian-Newtonian atomism. Moreover, the regeneration of integral education through genealogy has potential consequences for the present and future: it both provides a richer understanding of the identity of integral education and, from such reworking, could generate new future directions for integral education.
The second respect in which the following verse differs from the preceding two concerns a certain deterritorialisation of integral. Whilst it has been integral theory which has prompted inquiry into the criticality of the juncture between Orange and post-Orange and the configuration of post-Orange, the territory explored need not be framed with reference to integral theory.

Post-Orange is explored through a relatively topological imaginary, that of the quality of relationality or connectivity—eco-logics—in relation to three scales (although more could be envisaged). The plurality of scales can be understood in relation to both holon theory and complexity theory’s notion of recursion, the ensemble facilitating new directions for (mental) ecosophy. In terms of holon theory, smaller scales can be understood as both wholes in themselves and also parts of larger scales. In terms of complexity theory, different scales can be considered as elaborately varying fractals. That is to say: a fractal geometry indicates that a similar picture (such as modern atomism or eco-logics) occurs at different scales, whilst an elaborate fractal geometry indicates that such “similarity” should be understood as organic similarity (i.e. one with a particular range and distribution of variances) rather than as mechanical (invariant) similarity. In relation to eco-logics’ contribution to (mental) ecosophy, eco-logics intensifies one generic direction stemming from ecology, namely, ecology as relationality. This can contribute to the fuller “ecology” of mental ecosophical directions (including those less topological and more phenomenological or poetic). Such contributions to mental ecosophy (or “ecologies of mind”) can further add to the meta-conversations between Guattari’s respective three registers of mental, social and biospherical ecologies.

Moreover, the post-Orange characteristic explored (namely, relationality or connectivity) can have a bearing on the scholarship of integration and integral theorising given that such approaches imply connectivities: to integrate one needs to link things together (even if such links are themselves complex such that, dialectically-speaking, connections variously include contestabilities, indeterminacies, disjunctures). The question that arises here, then, is: May not integrative and integral theorising be identified as forms of thinking ecologically or ecosophically? Integral may well be able to “locate” (transcend-and-include) ecology, but ecology can likewise “locate” (transcend-and-include) integral. Postconventionally, they interpenetrate.
Hampson, G. P. (Submitted 3 December 2009)

“Education beyond modern atomism”

*Educational Philosophy and Theory*
Education Beyond Modern Atomism

Abstract

Modern atomism unduly constrains education. An interpretation of atomism and that beyond atomism is offered, and its relevance to education explored. A critical contrast between the two is addressed with respect to educational content, occasion, and system. An interpretation of Boyer’s scholarship of integration is employed, and a threefold theoretical schema is posited: one involving address of identity, relationality and contextualization. Atomist education is explicated as involving tendencies toward simple identities, arelationality and acontextuality (enabling default contexts such as technicism and economism), whilst education beyond atomism is explored as pertaining to complex identities, substantive relationalities and salient contextualizations. The quest is framed as concerning human potential, social justice and biospherical well-being, a coherence of which is indicated by Guattari’s “ecosophy.”

Key words:
Atomism, complexity, ecology, economism, scholarship of integration, technicism

“Our compartmentalized, piecemeal, disjointed learning is deeply, drastically inadequate to grasp realities and problems which are ever more global, transnational, multidimensional, transversal, polydisciplinary and planetary”  
(Morin, 2001, p. 29).

“All particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly constitute”  
(Polanyi, 1962, p. 59).
6.1. Introduction

We seem to be living “in times that are hostile towards meaningful learning” (Pardales & Girod, 2006, p. 309) in which “we know very much, but understand very little” (Max-Neef, 2005, p. 14). Concomitantly, education as currently framed and practiced seems unduly constrained, possibilities limited to a stale set of entrenched habits. Such tendencies limit education in myriad ways, thwarting the well-being and well-becoming of individuals, society and biosphere. This paper contends that a key underlying conceptual template in such constriction is modern atomism. Although this template is useful in certain contexts and has supported countless advances in areas such as technology, over-applications and enactments in inappropriate contexts have led to technicism (Beyer, 1986; Clacherty, 1993; Standish, 1997), scientism (Polanyi, 1962; Duschi, 1988; Sorell, 1994) and literalism or prosaicism (Abbs, 1989; Recanti, 2005; MacLure, 2006); economism\(^1\) (Henderson, 1996; Quinn & Browne, 1998; Welch, 1998; Gewirtz, 2000) is also implicated—whilst the (e.g. environmental) contexts in which technological advances have been made have been substantively under-regarded. Why is the well-being of human(ity) and that of the biosphere not identified as highly valuable outcomes of education? Why are education systems not sufficiently accountable to such big-picture concerns? It would appear that more integrative, ethical, complex, poetic types of thinking are needed.

This paper seeks to theoretically elaborate upon and extend a reading of the modern interpretation of abstract atomism,\(^2\) including an associated approach to that beyond atomism,\(^3\) and to explore possible relevance to several major educational domains arising from this. It argues from a (post-)critical,\(^4\) post-analytical perspective that in general

\(^1\) Through such features as economic utility theory (Henderson, 1996) and also as a default context—as described below.

\(^2\) In contrast to material atomism (Post, 1975).

\(^3\) A *via negativa* term is used here in preference to a *via positiva* term to enable various approaches to be included and to thwart tendencies of undue constraint regarding the potential territory beyond atomism. This is not to say that an affirmative term could not also be useful (albeit with its necessary semantic bias).

\(^4\) Two senses can be given: firstly, “critical” in the sense of foregrounding a normative contrast between modern atomism and that beyond, “post-“ in the sense of recognising the
education could be aptly regenerated by enacting post-atomistic templates and sensibilities. Generically, modern atomism aligns with formal logic’s law of the excluded middle, and with binary and digital thinking (Fuenmayor, 1991; Dusek, 2006). Contexts pertinent to the paper include critical / post-formal, environmental / ecological, integrative / integral / holistic, spiritual and postmodern / poststructural approaches to education. The paper also seeks to help rebalance the undervaluing of “semiotic and identity aspects” (Kenway and Fitzclarence, 1998, p. 663) of education.

The approach taken can be identified in relation to a range of post-atomistic ways of thinking including many-valued logics (Malinowski, 1993), postconventional operations (Sinnott, 1998; Cook-Greuter, 2000), ecological reasoning (Beggs, 1999), paradigmatic complexity (Edmonds, 2007; Morin, 2007), systems thinking (Fuenmayor, 1991), radical interconnectedness (Selby, 2002), meditative reasoning (Gangadean, 2008) and holistic cognition (Bohm, 1981; Dabrowski, 1995; Nisbett, 2001). The paper is intended to be understood as being a (Whiteheadian) “partial system[…] of limited generality” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 145); nonetheless it is hoped that such partiality offers “new inspiration and new directions” (Gare, 1999, p. 145) for educational theory: a fresh context could radically regenerate content. It is also hoped that the paper assists in exemplifying new directions and forms of reconstructive postmodernism (Gare, 2002; Grifin, 2002; Shaviro, 2009).

In keeping with this interest, an accordant modality of scholarship has been experimentally employed, namely, (a non-reductionist interpretation of) Boyer’s scholarship of integration (Boyer, 1990; Dauphinée & Martin, 2000). The focus is consequently on the creation of “new topologies of knowledge,” (Boyer, 1990, p. 19)—foregrounding lateral connectivities partiality of modern atomism whilst acknowledging its value; secondly, that offered by Polanyi (1962) as moving beyond Cartesian doubt.

5 The forward slashes here indicate semantic clusters.

6 The framework developed in the paper could also have import beyond education such as in facilitating ecological consciousness.

7 It could be argued that reductive Neo-Pythagoreanism (Gare, 2005) is an integrative form.
including the drawing together of a variety of discourses—meaning enhancement, and the seeding of ideas for further discussion, rather than on providing comprehensive exegeses of any particular detail (Boyer, 1990). Three expressions of the post-atomistic cohering of multiple discourses comprise, respectively, intertextuality as a “mosaic of quotations” (Kristeva & Moi, 1986, p. 37), substantive endnotes as offering numerous openings to further dialogue (as befits a topological schema), and a longer-than-usual reference list. Shaviro (2009) asks, “What if Whitehead instead of Heidegger, had set the agenda for postmodern thought?…What different perspectives might we be viewing the world from?” (Shaviro, 2009, p. ix) Whilst the current paper acknowledges both sources, its foregrounding of lateral intertextualities and multiple openings to dialogue—in addition to something of the creative and cosmological in its content—orient toward the Whiteheadean.

The interpretation of atomism that acts as the paper’s point of departure is that of Post (1975). His reading prioritises certain features of ancient atomism whilst minimising others. This could be regarded as a modern interpretation of atomism both in the sense of such a manoeuvre of essentialisation, and also in that interpretations of atomism in modern educational literature—e.g. (Miller, 1986; Martin, 1987; Seddon, 1994; Barr & Tagg, 1995; Brown, Bull et al., 1997; Willmott, 1999; Li, 2005; Fielding, 2007; Olssen, 2008; Radford, 2008)—tend toward this more essentialised understanding rather than toward the richer philosophical import of ancient atomism. Post describes atomism as involving the aim to “explain everything…in terms of a denumerable number of identical invariant units, or at least units of limited variety” (Post, 1975, p. 20); in his account he de-emphasises such

8 With respect to discourses, the aim is to be indicative rather than comprehensive (even if that were possible). Additionally, given the nature of the scholarship of integration, it is likely that some included material may be familiar to the reader, albeit with fresh contextualisation.
9 A foregrounding of the lateral necessarily leaves (or, indeed, produces) many questions arising from the text.
10 The “interruptivity” of this “second layer” of extensive noting can be seen dialectically in the sense of introducing pauses suitable for (contemplative) “indwelling” within the linear (mechanical) flow of the main narrative—features as discussed below. Extensive footnoting can also be contextualised in relation to Derrida’s understanding of the undue privileging of writing as speaking rather than writing as writing (Derrida, 1967 / 1997): a topological structure can perhaps be more easily “pictured” than brought into verbal conversation.
atomistic features as “the void” and “perfect hardness.” He indicates that atomism’s preference is toward the standardization of units, and that it follows a paradigm of simplicity such that a singular—the hierarchically lowest—ontological level is legitimated as explanatory. Post (1975) also summarises the main problem with atomism as being its insistence on the lack of interdependence among the postulated units.

The current paper extends this interpretation by Post which foregrounds the generic feature of interdependence or connectivity (or lack thereof). It does so by exploring three (neutrally) hierarchical levels or scales in relation to the atomistic unit—as follows:

1. micro: “identity”—degree of connectivity (complexity, richness) identified within, or subordinate to, the unit;
2. meso: “relationality”—degree of connectivity identified among units (“horizontally”); and
3. macro: “contextuality”—degree of connectivity identified beyond, or superordinate to, the unit.

Through this lens, modern atomism involves tendencies toward:

1. micro: simple identity—simplicity of unit identification;

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11 Notwithstanding “intermediate atomism” (Post, 1975).
12 Other readings of ancient atomism can offer somewhat antithetical readings to the elucidation of modern atomism presented here. For example, Michel Serres’ (2001) study of the atomism of Lucretius indicates its alignment with complexity theory through interpreting atomism as focusing on themes of flow and nonlinear dynamics (Webb, 2006).
13 “Interdependence or connectivity” is intended to act as a generic marker which embraces terms such as relationship (Pratt, 1988) and dialogue (Camic & Joas, 2004; Wells, 1999)—terms which share family resemblance (Wittgenstein, Anscombe et al., 2001). Such semantic manoeuvres can be found elsewhere in the paper.
14 The scales can be understood both by way of complexity theory’s notion of a scale-free geometry of elaborately morphing fractals (Davis & Sumara, 2006) and by way of holon theory (Checkland, 1988; Koestler, 1972). Additionally, in practice, distinction between levels may be fuzzier and/or more interpenetrating than indicated in this simplified schema.
2. meso: arelationality—the privileging of identifying units over connections; and
3. macro: acontextuality, the minimisation of contextualisation.

In short, atomism partakes of the “paradigm of separation” (Morin, 2008, p. 24). In contrast, “that beyond atomism” may be identified as tendencies toward:

1. micro: complex identity—complexity or richness of unit identification;
2. meso: relationality—a balanced address of both units and their interconnections; and
3. macro: contextuality—substantive contextualisation.

Simple identities facilitate standardisation across units, whilst complex identities facilitate (degrees of) diversity across units—see e.g. Peters (1998). In this regard, Apple (2004) notes that

the atomistic, positivistic, and strict empirical frame of mind so prevalent in our thought…has difficulty with the critically oriented notion of the necessity of a plurality of, and conflict about, ways of looking at the world. (Apple, 2004, p. 124)

This critical import is taken up by Smeyers and Burbules (2009) who identify, for instance, that “one size fits all” kills “the creative and unruly nature of authentic teaching and learning” (Smeyers and Burbules, 2009, p. 586). One might also note in this regard the general abuses with respect to templates of normalization—see. e.g. Fendler and Muzaffar (2008).

Additionally, the degree to which “the remainder” (of that insufficiently addressed by atomism) is under-regarded accords with the degree to which it is left unconscious or in “shadow”—extending Jung (2006). Shadow can be understood as unconscious part\(^\text{15}\) of a dialectical\(^\text{16}\) “whole.”\(^\text{17}\) In terms of the aforementioned scales, such shadow comprises:

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\(^{15}\) Shadow theory here would indicate the significance of conscious address and apt inclusion of shadow, thus effecting an explicit dialectical identity.

\(^{16}\) Numerous interpretations of dialectics exist. Simply speaking, dialectic is in the current context is taken to be that which stands in contrast to yet simultaneously forms an intimate relationship with; a key quality is nuance and a sense of the non-mechanical. The focus here is not that of dialectical materialism (Lefebvre, 2009). Rather, the interpretation can be
1. micro: default, chance, or unconscious dialectical identity complexities;
2. meso: default, chance, or unconscious dialectical relationships;
3. macro: default, chance, or unconscious dialectical contexts.

To further clarify with respect to contextualising: whilst the minimisation of explicit contextualisation often tends toward implicit default contexts, an explicit focus on contextualisation is more likely to identify salient contexts, and also the idea of context as content (Recanti, 2005).

Regarding connectivities between atomism and that beyond atomism: in an panoramic sense, relations can be understood as pertaining to a two-level nested hierarchy whereby atomism is enfolded by that beyond atomism. In this way, atomism can be understood as a partiality: from a post-atomistic perspective, the part explicated by atomism comes with an unidentified

variously understood in relation to Chinese dialectical epistemology (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), shadow work (Miller, 2000), Bakhtin’s dialogism (Baxter & Montgomery, 1996), Socratic dialectics (Rowe, 2001), dialectical operations (Basseches, 1984) and interpretations of Hegelian dialectics (Beckwith, 1984/5); like Deleuze, a sense of the non-mechanical problematises the notion, for instance, that “initial” dialectical units or “problems are given ready-made, and that they disappear in the responses or the solution” (Deleuze, 1968 / 1944).

Acknowledging the dynamism and partiality of such “wholes.”

Here, simple identity comprises a special subset of complex identity; the (explicated) foregrounding of units over connections could theoretically comprise a subset of relational thinking (through arelationality as—negatively—addressing relation); whilst formally, acontextualism could be understood as addressing context (albeit in a negative way). It could also be argued, however, that atomism and non-atomism form a (more heterarchical) dialectical or interpenetrating unit such that, for instance, atomism would be identified (at a meta-level) as a type of pattern: “the connectivity of non-connectivity” or suchlike. The decision to use such a perspective can be understood as a context-dependent judgement. Additionally, one might note the degree to which atomism is enacted in the paper, notably regarding topology as an atomisation and to the degree to which clarity of argument includes literal (or near literal) features.
Relations could also be understood in a local or critical sense, in which case relations between atomism and that beyond atomism can be understood as antipathetic: atomism would be declared deficient through not employing complex identities, enacting relationalities or addressing salient contexts.\(^{20}\)

The main body of the paper is divided into two sections, namely, modern atomistic education and education beyond modern atomism, respectively. Within each section, the three respective foci of educational content, occasion and system are discussed; additionally, each focus is subdivided according to the aforementioned scale of connectivity (micro: identity; meso: relationality; macro: contextuality). This schema is not intended to delimit discussion but rather to adequately indicate the approach.\(^{21}\)

6.2. Modern atomistic education

In this section, modern atomistic education is discussed in relation to educational content (knowledge, curricula etc.), educational occasion (including actor identities and pedagogy), and education system.

6.2.1. Content and identity

Educational content can be addressed in relation to the three scales of connectivity pertaining to identity, relationality and contextuality, respectively—as follows.

\(^{19}\) It is tempting to identify the-part-with-the-unidentified-remainder as forming a whole. However, from a perspective which allows for both indeterminacy and ongoing development, “the whole” should perhaps be replaced with “that towards wholeness” or similar. With such softening of categories, post-atomism might be rather interpreted as offering significantly more connectivities than atomism.

\(^{20}\) This might be the case, for example, where insufficient justification is given as to why the more partial picture has been adopted. Regarding such insufficiency, one has to perhaps “ultimately” rely on judgment or phronesis.

\(^{21}\) Domains not considered here include educational research—see, e.g. Fendler (2006) and Smith (2006) and assessment.
Regarding the identity of conceptual material in education (knowledge, courses / programs, curricula, subjects, faculties), from a modern atomistic perspective there is a privileging of such features as simplicity and small scales, effecting standardisation and closed system (technicist) sensibilities. Small and simple items able to be handled technically such as data, information and knowledge-as-units-of-content are legitimised in preference to larger, more complex or nebulous items such as knowledge-as-capacity (Montuori, 1998), understanding (Maturana & Varela, 1987), or wisdom (Midgley, 1991; Beckett, 1995; Baltes, 2000; Sternberg, 2000; Kramer, 2003; Carr and Skinner, 2009). A corresponding approach to languaging can also be identified here insofar as bureaucratic discourse assumes a literalist (Lum, 2004) or representational paradigm regarding relations between signifier and signified. An intensification of this technicist sensibility has led curriculum theorist Pinar (2007) to bemoan the character and requirement of “curriculum guides to be covered as if they were so many…income tax regulations and procedures” (Pinar, 2007, p. 10).

Standardisation can be seen both in the increasingly common notion that courses can be standardised such that they can be taught by different educators, and by the idea of a universalised best practice (Brew & Boud, 1996; Adams, 2007). Additionally, the quality of stability or fixedness in knowledge and curricula allows for no alterations to be made in their identity arising from engagement. Rather, knowledge is seen as a closed system or “static information” (Soucek, 1994, p. 71): through this imaginary, information is intended only to inform learners; it has no room to be substantively informed by them. In short, modern atomistic identities of knowledge and curriculum build upon technological metaphors (Brown, Bull et al., 1997; Kelly, 2009).

6.2.2. Content and relationality

In terms of possible connectivity among units of knowledge or curricula, modern atomism signifies arelationality or aconnectivity—fragmentation and modularisation. Arelationality can be seen at all scales of conceptual material from knowledge (Soucek, 1994; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1998) through courses / programs (Bagno, Eylon et al., 2000) to disciplines and faculties (Dillon, 2007; Morin, 2008).

To the extent that understanding arises from more complex connections across phenomena, atomism’s arelationality can be understood as thwarting meaning (Pardales and Girod, 2006).
Moreover, arelationality can be seen as synergistic with failure to duly apprehend global challenges. Jardine, for instance, links such atomism with both the minimisation of meaning and the biospherical crisis, identifying that,

the disassembling of curriculum into disparate disciplines is all too akin to the ecologically disastrous and life-threatening disassembling of our Earth. And these foretell of a disintegration of spirit and character, a certain loss of a sense of where we are, a sense of the wholeness of our lives (Jardine, 2006c, p. 172).

Atomism’s minimisation of interpenetration can also be identified with respect to the quality of connectivity between knowledge and knower. Knowledge is inhibited from assuming the metaphoric identity of knower—a “living” knowledge—whilst knowers are assumed to not be capable of having unmediated access to knowledge: the possibility of intimate knowing is unrecognised (Jardine, 2006; Robbins, 2006). The devaluing of the subjective relative to the objective (Habermas, 2005) solidifies this situation.

In addition to such atemporal considerations, modern atomism also involves temporal arelationality: no recursive feedback loop is envisaged. Instead, as Bonnett notes, there is instead the employment of a “calculative model in which learning objectives are pre-specified independently of individual learners and are systematically pursued in the absence of full learner engagement” (Bonnett, 2001, p. 27). Knowledge becomes knowledge of the already-known (Montuori, 1998), whilst “topics to be learned [are] parsed into…sequential tasks to be completed” (Davis and Sumara, 2006, p. 132) along a non-recursive conveyor belt. This has a profound effect on the sensibility of education: a “‘topic’ that is ‘covered’ cannot be ‘settled into,’” (Jardine, 2006f, p. 177). Instead of deepening and ripening understanding through indwelling (Burwood, 2006) and hermeneutic circling (Heidegger, 1927/1962), technicist “speed culture” (Gottschalk, 1999) instead sets the conditions for the malaises of hyperactivity (Jardine, 2006a): attention surely benefits from patient and considered engagement with material; its deficit is surely complicit with the somewhat inhuman demand to come into quick relationship with small, semi-random items.
6.2.3. **Content and contextuality**

With respect to possible contextualisation of curriculum and knowledge, modern atomism involves tendencies toward acontextuality. Atomistic curricula involve “decontextualized bits of information” (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1998, p. 5). Links to pertinent theory, greater purpose, history, possible futures, institutional culture, values or ideology are minimised; big-picture psychological, social, and environmental concerns are marginalised (Orr, 1991; Giroux, 2000); courses in education dealing with broad contexts are “either eliminated or technicized” (Giroux, 2000, p. 56).

Such minimisation of contextualisation enables default contexts to come into or remain in operation. These tend to be local, technical or economic contexts (themselves relying on atomistic templates). For technical contexts, knowledge of what and how is privileged over other considerations. The marginalisation of intrinsic worth and undue valorisation of narrow identifications of utility and instrumentality have led to entire wings of the academy becoming problematised—as Phamotose and Kissack note:

> Faculties of humanities…are often depicted as otiose, because the content of these disciplines does not make a clear and incontrovertible contribution towards the promotion of the utilitarian and instrumental reason (Phamotse and Kissack, 2008, pp. 49-50).

Utility is often linked to economic instrumentality (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004; Willinsky, 2005)—a “double instrumentalism” (Barnett, 1994, p. 165)—such that there is an undervaluing of disciplines, research and evaluation not immediately connected to economic production (Soucek, 1994; Bullen, Robb et al.). Higher education, for instance, is often contextualised as the “engine room of global competitiveness” (Marginson, 2004, p. 162) or suchlike.

Such technicist and economistic defaults de-emphasise or even delegitimise a host of possible lines of inquiry including those indicated by the following questions. What about reasoning which is instrumental to the well-being of the world? Could there not be utility for the soul? In what way is, say, consuming a hamburger an intrinsic (economic—and thus “self-evident” and unjustified) “good” yet art activities (Koopman, 2005) or receiving an education not? Is
not usefulness *in service of the big picture* the most efficacious of all? The current interest in the value of *efficiency* (Callahan, 1964) is presumably in service of The Good. Yet humanity is currently *efficiently* engaging in ecocide (Broswimmer, 2002) and climate change (Jones, 2009; Morgan, 2009). What “good” is this? Does not the *outcome* of the global production of economic “goods” increasingly include an ecological “bad”? At this most fundamental ecological level, where is the system of due accountability?

6.2.4. **Occasion and identity**

An educational occasion involves identifications of educators and educates, processes of teaching and learning, and apt contextualisations—as follows.

In terms of modern atomism, identities of educators and educatees tend toward forms of independence\(^{22}\) and standardisation. There is a sense of interchangeability with regard both to students and with respect to teachers; the self-managing (Peters, Marshall *et al*., 2000) “individualised person is a number in the mass” (Conroy, 2004, p. 6), an ahistorical *tabula rasa* (Wood, 1992). Teachers become “paid functionar[ies]” (Hansen, 2004, p. 121), deprofessionalised (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1999) “factory workers” (Pinar, 2004, p. 5), “managers of inert knowledge, distributors of pre-selected skills” (Abbs, 2003, p. 56). *Educator as technician* (Gray, 2007) segues into *educator as “homo economicus”* through the atomistic *human as “self-interested utility-maximiser”* (Burwood, 2006, p. 123). The question *who am I?* is marginalized in favour of *what do I have to do?* (Graham and Phelps, 2003). Educatees are similarly affected (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004, p.1): children are implicated as merely “‘natural resources’…with no being of their own, no reserve of character” (Jardine, Friesen *et al*., 2006, p. 90); the facilitation of citizenhood gives way to the production of consumers. Additionally, within the knower, a sharp distinction is identified between knowledge and feelings, idea and affect.

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\(^{22}\) Identities of dependence with respect to children notwithstanding.
6.2.5. **Occasion and relationality**

Atomistically, pedagogical\(^{23}\) processes between educatee and educator are similarly conceived through a technicist lens involving standardised procedures whereby qualities of relationship are minimised. From a Heideggerian—or Lao-Zhuang orientated (Parkes, 2003)—perspective, this approach bespeaks of a productionist metaphysics (Peters, 2009). From a Habermasian perspective, “emancipatory and practical knowledge are ignored” (Soucek, 1994, p. 75): there is no intent toward the facilitation of self-actualisation (Maslow, 1971) or similar. Teaching becomes a set of skills involving the mechanical transmission of information—a process of direct instruction and repetition (Doll, 2008) deemed to result in efficient learning. This mechanical imaginary “fail[s] to respect pauses, changes or peaks in the learning process” (Nava, 2001, p. 27). Beyond undue metaphors of economic trade (Bunge, 1999), fragmentation between educator and educatee might even take on that of siege, whereby “both the old and the young become understood only in their worst aspects” (Jardine, 2006f, p. 197) and potential liminality is forfeited in favour of over-differentiated embattlement (Jardine, 2006f). As Palmer succinctly indicates: atomised pedagogy involves “teachers who talk but do not listen and students who listen but do not talk” (Palmer, 1998, p. 66). Learning is fragmented (Downes, 2001).

6.2.6. **Occasion and contextuality**

Atomistically, contextualisations of educational occasions are minimised. If learning contexts are identified, they are imagined as (insubstantive) containers of content which do not influence content per se (Griffiths & Guile, 1999; Edwards & Miller, 2007). Otherwise, contexts—such as philosophy (Carr, 2004), theory (Bane, 1994), ideology (Giroux, 1981), institutional culture (Postman & Weingartner, 1971; Gatto, 1992; Tyack & Tobin, 1994) and architecture (Orr, 1991)—are under-regarded. Philosophy of teaching, for example, gets reduced to business-model “teaching philosophies” (Peters, 2009). Such under-regard allows for both undue context-independence or “false universalism” (Nguyen, Terlouw et al.,

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\(^{23}\) The term *pedagogy* is used in this paper to also infer *andragogy.*
2006, p. 4) and also for default contexts to operate such as “conventional practice” and what might be termed the “global economic machine”\(^\text{24}\)—as follows.

Regarding conventional practice, an overall sense of historical **constancy** can be identified (within which minor fluctuations have occurred). In this regard, Watkins and Mortimore (1999) identify “the secondary school setting—with its age-graded, subject-centred, self-contained classrooms” (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999, p. 6) and the problematisation of the notion that child-centred education once held sway in the UK (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999). This systemic constancy can be perceived by those operating within it as “everyday constraints of the classroom” (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999, p. 11). Such constraints include mostly unquestioned systemic components such as age-grouping and the compulsory nature of pre-tertiary schooling (Illich, 1976; Ireson, Mortimore *et al.*, 1999), and—notably in secondary schools—epistemological and temporal curriculum fragmentation.

Regarding the second (overlapping) default context—the global economic machine—an increasing historical trend can be identified since the early 1980s, one which overlaps with conventional practice through the shared feature of teaching as instruction. Failure to apprehend pertinent consequences arising from the acontextuality or the default context of *economic machine*-oriented pedagogy is indicated in Newson’s discussion regarding “technopedagogy and disappearing context” (Newson, 1999) which includes the identification of erroneous associations between cost efficiency and accountability on the one hand and good pedagogy on the other. Indeed, the performativity required from accountability is more likely lead to practitioner “terror” (Lyotard, 1984).

The cult of efficiency (Callahan, 1964) also expresses itself in the sensibility of **time as a scarce resource**—affecting pre-tertiary (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999) and post-secondary (Menzies and Newson, 2007) sectors alike. Additionally, an emphasis on competitive economic relations negatively impacts upon trust in social relations (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Watkins & Mortimore, 1999; Martínez-Alemán, 2007). Kenway, Bullen *et al.*, (2004) for instance, indicate that an atomistic culture of “techno-preneurs” might well “undermine the

\(^{24}\) The phrase “global economic machine” seeks to indicate a summary of three key features, namely, global expanse, economic orientation and a (technicist) *machine* metaphoric template.
ontological security of the academy which relies heavily on trust relationships” (Kenway, Bullen et al., 2004, p. 343). In relation to Maslow’s (1971) hierarchy of needs, mistrust can be understood as destabilising the fundamental levels of safety and belonging. If such levels are compromised, how can education expect to help facilitate the higher levels of esteem and self-actualisation in people?

6.2.7. **System and identity**

Education systems can be understood in relation to their identity, to relations among the domains of the system, and with respect to pertinent contexts—as follows.

Regarding the identity of education systems, from a modern atomistic perspective there is in the first instance a tendency *not* to regard the system as a whole. Legitimisation is given to specific domains rather than toward systemic thinking. Where the system is regarded as a whole, this tends to be framed through default technicist discourse (Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1999; Hoffer, 2000) whereby the denumerability of all significant educational items is assumed (Kerr, 2002; Kenan, 2003): quantifiability takes precedence over matters harder to quantify (Delanty, 2003; MacLure, 2006). A centripetal vector toward standardisation is effected (Kuno, 2002; Pinar, 2007), delegitimising the often “personal nature of many educational goals” (Hoffer, 2000, p. 529). As Horn (1999) indicates, a culture of standardisation also tends to support “ritualized job performance[s]” and “regimented attitudes” (Horn, 1999, p. 360). The imaginary of standardisation can also point to a lack of internal diversity of the orientations and values of the different educational domains such as disregard for academic values through the implementation of administrative or managerial values (Barnett, 1994; Bates, 1996; Peters, Marshall et al., 2000).

Additionally, atomism prioritises “short frequencies” of time, locality and meaning over more panoramic considerations regarding the long-term, eco-social issues and/or semantic depth. Outcomes include an institutional culture operating at a “manic pace” and an untoward “thinness” with respect to teacher education (Jardine, Graham et al., 2006). There is a tendency for the implied use of machine-oriented metaphor derivatives such as *education as engineering* (Kenan, 2003; Hansen, 2004), in which there is a valuing of technical efficiency over other considerations (including scholarly values), and outcomes interpreted through technicist templates. *School as factory* (Callahan, 1964; Gidley, 2001) is an associated
metaphor. Such technicism is implicated in the impoverishment of teacher education (Carr and Skinner, 2009). It also facilitates standardisation such as in the uniformity of schooling (North, 1987). The technicist default identity synergises with an economistic orientation which “both carries closure and promotes particular interests of the global economy and of the evaluative state” (Barnett, 2005, p. 788). The question arises: Is education a commodity or a public good (Grace, 1989)?

A corresponding linguistic paradigm—one might identify as “literalism” or “prosaicism”—is implicated (Van Niekerk, 1998; Lum, 2004) in which a technicist approach to educational languaging is assumed. Additionally, an atomist-positivist ideology—education as science (Duschi, 1988)—delegitimises non-empirical approaches: such scientism imagines evidence-based approaches in education to be wholly sufficient, without recourse to philosophical deliberation, for example (Biesta, 2007). Policy critique, case studies, and literary modalities are similarly delegitimised (Bridges, 2007). Instead can be seen the valorisation of control, prediction and certainty, quantification, instrumentalism, reductionism and rationalism and dualism between human and world (Van Niekerk, 1998; Kerr, 2002; Kenan, 2003).

Altogether, in atomistic education systems—as Abbs bemoans—“there is no room for charisma, only contracts. No room for radical questions, only ranked percentages. No room for aesthetics, only certificates” (Abbs, 2003, p. 60).

### 6.2.8. System and relationality

In terms of atomistic arelationality, education systems tend to be addressed with respect to their parts rather than in relation to the whole. Exemplifications at a broad level include discussion of post-secondary and pre-tertiary sectors without reference to each other (often leading to substantive schisms (Scott, 2009), administrative cultures and pedagogical cultures not brought into their possible interrelations (Delanty, 2003), practice divorced from theory (Bane, 1994; Rubenson, 2000) and no connection identified between physical architecture and the “conceptual architecture” of schooling (Orr, 1991, p. 113). Such structural fragmentation also occurs across decision-making levels (Giuliano, 1998). More deeply-seated atomisation can be seen in relation to age fragmentation—see (Balke, 1997). In terms of temporal atomisation, one may identify a general culture involving substantive lack of continuity (Bane, 1994) exemplified by fragmented staff development (Hassan, 2004). In short, one may surmise atomistic education systems as involving insufficient orchestration.
6.2.9. **System and contextuality**

With respect to the degree and nature of *contextualisation* characteristically identified in relation to education systems as a whole, from a modern atomistic perspective the tendency is toward *a*contextuality. This may be effected by naturalised narratives which imply that contextualisations are not required. Such a technicist mindset focuses on questions of “what works,” despite the fact that, as Biesta indicates, “an exclusive emphasis on ‘what works’ will simply not work” (Biesta, 2007, p. 22). Such narratives leave default contexts in operation, notably economics-oriented contexts with concomitant managerialist cultural templates (Jacob, 2003).

A substantive partiality in this regard (Beare and Slaughter, 1993) comprises a contracted interpretation of outcomes (Conroy, 2004). Economism, notably through managerialist / audit culture (Power, 1997), tends to exclude external collective costs (Bates, 1996), whilst so-called “accountability” is “divorced from broader considerations of ethics, equity, and justice” (Giroux, 2000, p. 48); such approaches do not tend to *account* for their part in eroding social solidarities (Lipman, 2004) or in the degradation of the environment. Such responsibility is marginalised (Burwood, 2006). Indeed, accountability systems do not even facilitate the systemic capacity-building fundamental to achieving ascribed policy aims (Gunzenhauser and Hyde, 2007). Despite inherent contradictions between the market and the collective good (Giroux, 2000; Peters, Marshall et al., 2000; Delanty, 2003), the ideological basis of partiality toward corporatism is mostly left unexplicated (Watkins, 1994). Indeed, theoretical contextualisations as a whole are deprioritised (Bane, 1994; Rubenson, 2000); reference is not made to psychological, social or biospherical outcomes (Orr, 1991; Kincheloe and Steinberg, 1998), or those pertaining to the long term (Soucek, 1994; Karmel, 1995). In short, one might say that an atomistic education system lacks sufficient vision

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25 Technicism and economism combine in *work* metaphors and centralised organisational networks (Davis & Sumara, 2006) fuelled by the scarcity paradigm of mainstream economics.

26 Mainstream economics itself relies on denumberability, *homo economicus*, and tends to imagine itself without reference to contexts of a psychological, social, biospherical or long-term futures nature.
regarding “a self-critical inventory about its own ideology and its effects on society” (Giroux, 2000, p. 48).

6.3. Education beyond modern atomism

The following section employs the same schema as that developed in the preceding section, namely, a threefold focus of educational content, occasion, and system. Again, for each focus the three respective scales of identity, relationality and contextuality are discussed.

6.3.1. Content and identity

Post-atomistic identities of educational content at different scales such as knowledge and curriculum entertain substantive complexities or “intra-relationalities.” Ways to describe these are manifold. The following explores such complexity in relation to dialectics (Narain, 1973; Ilyenkov, 1977; Tian, 2005), diversity, dynamism and polysemy.27 Specifically, dialectics moves identity from a condition of singular voice to one which also bears the mark of that to which it is complementary; diversity problematises accounts comprising undue standardisation; dynamism shifts static identity to one which grants temporal variation; whilst polysemy allows for a non-technicist semantic approach, one duly accommodating types of linguistic “fuzziness”—as follows.

Firstly, through dialectics, knowing forms an intimate union with not knowing in various ways and to varying degrees (even if slight). Arguably supported by Gödel’s incompleteness theorem pointing to inherent indeterminacies (Perloff, 1981; Wang, 1996), this may take the weak form that “everything we know is subject to error and illusion” (Morin, 2001, p. 17)—an allowance for “uncertainty, confusion, and ambiguity” (Montuori, 1998, p. 7)—or stronger forms involving the inherent play of mystery within knowledge (Finkenthal, 2001; Caranfa, 2004; Chapman, 2007). Dialectics can also be seen in other ways—in knowing as simultaneously involving both discovery and construction; in knowing as simultaneously involving both interior and exterior components (Nicolescu, 1999; Max-Neef, 2005); in knowing as being intimate with caring (Foucault, 1984/1986; Noddings, 2003); and in

27 Other ways may also be insightful. See Dillon (2000) for a discussion regarding complexity, poetics and poststructuralism, for example.
knowing and feeling operating together, such as in the roles of passionate engagement and intuition in understanding (Agyakwa, 1988; Noddings, 1998; Birgerstam, 2002; Semetsky, 2004). The postmodern interest in engaging with the Other (Lévinas & Cohen, 1972/2006) could also be included here (despite poststructuralist contestation regarding the term dialectics). Broadening through dialectics can lead to the broadening implied by diversity or ecology—including the notion of a diversity of knowledges.

Diversity of knowledges can be seen in a variety of forms including that oriented by cultural and linguistic diversity (Nieto & Bode, 1992; Meenakshi & Dey, 2003). This includes indigenous knowledge (Abdullah & Stringer, 1999; George, 1999; Semali & Kincheloe, 1999; Nandy, 2000; Harrison, 2005; Berkes & Berkes, 2009) including that of Native American traditions (Cajete, 1994; Deloria, 2001) and knowledge oriented by Islam (Dangor, 2005). It also includes transversal forms such as those “recognising the arbitrariness of the bifurcation of the world into the natural and non-natural” (Bachelard, 1958/1994, p. 6; also see Mathews, 2007; Barnacle, 2009); and more generic identifications such as the radical supplementation of knowing-how with knowing-how-to-imagine (Nuyen, 1998).

Regarding dynamism, viewing material as a complex adaptive (i.e. open) system (Olssen, 2008) empowers processes responsive to context: a dialogic or “living,” curriculum becomes currere (Horn, 1999; Pinar, 2004), such as might be exemplified by the “emerging curriculum” of the Reggio Emilio approach (Wright, 1997). Consequently, a due theoretical direction for curriculum would be to find a dynamic balance between centripetal integrity and centrifugal creativity—“a modest rigidity with a structured flexibility” (Doll, 2008, p. 202) (original italics).

Lastly, post-atomistic educational content can be identified as polysemous (Ricoeur, 1969/2004; Nerlich & Clarke, 2003)\(^{28}\)—in this way knowledge is complex (Allen & Torrens, 2005). In terms of the relationship between unequivocal and polysemous terms, one could perhaps imagine a dimension of “technicisability” where one end might be connoted by Polanyi’s category of logical unspecifiability (Polanyi, 1962) such as “knowledge that exists only in use” (Burwood, 2006, p. 128) (original italics). From a critical perspective attendant to

\(^{28}\) On the understanding that polysemy is “merely” hermeneutic, Derrida takes this vector further through the term dissemination (Derrida, 1972 / 2004).
technicism, this would be the undervalued end. The dimension would allow for concepts to act like (complexity theory) attractors (Francois, 2006). Found at the unspecifiable or nebulous end might be terms such as wisdom, love (Nava, 2001; Gidley, 2009), creativity (Craft, 2001; Fasko, 2001; Ozolins, 2007; Villaverde, 1999), archetype (Jung, Adler et al., 1921/1981; Neville, 1989; Mayes, 1999), soul (Kessler, 2000) and, indeed, God (Hart, 1998; Alexander & McLaughlin, 2003). Although not easily formulised, are these not some of the most valuable things that could be associated with education? Inherent fuzziness in educational material problematises the expectation that everything can be technically or bureaucratically articulated. Perhaps a more complex, creative (Semetsky, 2008), poetic (Peritz, 1993) metaphoric (Way, 1994) or poststructural (Holmes, 1998) sensibility is called for in educational languaging? Linguistic richness surely accords with ontological richness.

6.3.2. Content and relationality

Post-atomistic sensibilities substantiate relationalities among educational material—whether at the scale of knowledge, courses / programs, disciplines or faculties. Such connectivities of “thinking the world together” (Palmer, 1998, p. 61) may be seen to operate through such metaphors as dialogue (Bakhtin, 1982; Bohm, 2003; Gangadean, 2008), balance, harmony, organism (Griffin, 1993) and ecology (Griffin, 1993; Hill, 2004). The first three tend to indicate functionality with regards to the whole—such as might be identified in classical orchestral music—whilst ecosystem broadens out the range of possibilities to include apparent disharmonies or dissensus that nonetheless can be understood as contributing to an aesthetic or ecological whole (Sawada & Caley, 1990), as vernacularly identified as the case in much twentieth century orchestral music or perhaps in baroque music’s “bringing together independent voices” (Kwa, 2002, p. 29). To continue with music metaphors, the dynamism in post-atomistic relationality might be represented by the improvised sensibility of jazz performance (Montuori, 2003), an adaptability that can be linked to Whiteheadian process philosophy (Doll, 2008). The overall picture is one of complex coherence involving diversity and recursivity in which “positions can be ‘entertained’ together” (Montuori, 1998, p. 30), potentially toward the embrace of “all possible harmonics” (Montuori, 1998, p. 30)—such as Aoki’s notion of hearing curriculum in a new key (Pinar, 2007). This pedagogy of connection (Dillon, 2007) can be identified as being in accord with “the already existing interconnections

29 Re-evaluating Bröckling’s (2006) brainstorm as legitimising creativity.
of things themselves” (Jardine, 2006c, p. 172). Having looked at the general picture, address will now be given to relationalities regarding knowledge, discipline / curriculum, and faculty, respectively.

With regard to knowledge relationalities, the first question would be to identify the different types of knowledge that might be brought into relationship—as indicated by the following integrative ecologies. Firstly, consideration can be given to non-Western types of knowing (as indicated above). Secondly, Habermas’ (2005) differentiation among technical, practical and emancipatory forms of knowledge is pertinent. Next, arational knowing such as tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962; Gill, 2000) and intuition (as referred to above) could be addressed. Lastly, a range of holistic, or integral identifications including embodied (Ignatow, 2007) or “connected knowledge” (Latta and Buck, 2008) can be considered. This includes Shumacher’s (1977) “four fields of knowledge” and a range of holistic (Forbes, 2003; Miller, 2007) (Miller, 2000) and integral meta-perspectives (Esbjorn-Hargens, 2006; Ferrer, Romero et al., 2006; Gidley, 2007).

In terms of discipline and curriculum relationalities, at the pre-tertiary level post-atomism involves the notion of an integrated curriculum (Pring, 1971; Shoemaker, 1989; Clark, 1996), one that is “rich, recursive, relational, and rigorous” (Pinar, Reynolds, et al., 1995, p. 501). At the higher education level, connectivity involves substantive dialogue among disciplines (Vosskamp, 1986), often generically identified as interdisciplinarity (Klein, 1990), although transdisciplinarity30 (Jantsch, 1972; Morgan, 2000; Klein, 2004; Montuori, 2005; Re, 2008) and postdisciplinarity can be identified as differentiated from interdisciplinarity. The field of ecology and cross-disciplinary theory in general (Moran, 2002) also pertain to substantive relationalities.

Regarding faculty relationalities, one might cite Nicolescu’s transdisciplinarity (Nicolescu & Voss, 2002) and its employment of the “logic of the included middle” (Brenner, 2008; Nicolescu, 2008) as seeking to facilitate “harmonic accord” between “the two cultures” (Snow, 1959) of science and the arts (Conroy, 2004; Chapman, 2007). Transdisciplinary

30 A transdisciplinary perspective has even been described as perhaps being vital to individual psychic survival (Judge, 1991). Also see Phamotse & Kissack (2008) regarding the value of the humanities.
ventures might also address relations between other faculties including that of religion. To enable such meta-conversations, perhaps we require a poetics or “aesthetics of knowledge” (Rancière, 2006)?

6.3.3. **Content and contextuality**

Post-atomistic perspectives on educational material include salient contextualisations (Haggis, 2008). Salience implies “pertinent knowledge” (Morin, 2001, p. 31) in which normativity is implicated (Van Goor, Heyting et al., 2004). Perhaps such knowledge might variously involve consideration of the following directions (as richly interpreted):

- Philosophy—what?
- Purpose—why?
- Power—for whom?
- Participation—by whom?
- Place—where?
- Period—when?
- Process—how?
- Price—how much?
- Presence—how deep?
- Pattern—what coherence?

Such an ecology of inquiry vectors would move beyond technicist and economist approaches which tend to emphasise “how,” “how much” and contracted interpretations of “what.”

Salient contexts of educational material include address of social ethics and metaphysics. Contexts of social ethics might take the form of “troubling knowledge”—a type that can be “disruptive, discomforting, problematizing” (Pinar, 2007, p. 64); one that can give courage to dissuade us from avoiding controversial topics (Wright, 1997; MacLure, 2006). Such courage may stem from apprehending the ethical basis of knowledge as indicated by linking knowledge with responsibility (Willinsky, 2005) whereby knowledge might even be identified as a “fearful thing” (Orr, 1991, p. 17). Examples of metaphysics as context include the “new metaphysics” of postdisciplinary curricula (Ford, 2002, p. 75), and the context of
Gaia (Lovelock, 2000; Okoro, 2003), *anima mundi* or world soul (Lewin, 1991), including that through cosmosophy (Siena, 2005).

An approach that includes both social ethics and new metaphysics is Guattari’s ecosophy (Guattari, 1989/2000; Peters, 2002; also see Naess, 1989). Involving Bateson’s (1987) *ecology of mind* as one point of departure, Guattari’s nuanced integrative schema draws together considerations of three ecological registers of biosphere, society, and psyche, respectively, identifying parallels and differences among them. An example of interrelationship between two registers would be positive psychological consequences arising from regard toward the biosphere in an apt manner. Orr, for example, suggests that the Earth can teach us “silence, humility, holiness, connectedness, courtesy, beauty, celebration, giving, restoration, obligation, and wildness” (Orr, 1991, p. 126). One may also wish to address historical / “big history” (Christian and McNeill, 2004) / evolutionary (Gidley, 2007) contexts and contexts of possible and preferred futures (Voros, 2008). In the latter regard, Orr intones: “a constituency able and willing to fight for the long-term human prospect must be educated into existence” (Orr, 1991, p. 126).

### 6.3.4. Occasion and identity

Post-atomistic identifications of those involved in educational occasions—as befits human individuals in general—realise a certain richness and complexity. Beyond the limitations imposed by an undue focus on economistic *homo economicus* (Gintis, 2000) or technicist *homo faber* (Illich, 1976), a reconstructive postmodern concept of self can be identified (Sankey, 2007): we are *homo complexus* (Morin, 2001) involving a myriad orientations including *homo aestheticus, homo cogitans, homo ludens, homo poeticus, homo politicus,* and *homo socians, homo sui transcendentalis* (Nicolescu and Voss, 2002). We are embodied, affective, social, sexual, gendered, cognitive, and differently-abled; we can be identified holistically (Nava, 2001), with our various aspects interrelating—see e.g. (Hansen, 2004)—perhaps as a harmony (Carter, 1991). We perhaps even partake of a “quantum intimacy” (Zohar, 1991, p. 107) involving “the relationships that I am” (Zohar, 1991, p. 107). Such richness facilitates identification of social diversity in which the uniqueness of each of us is honoured (Conroy, 2004): we carry unique stories that we bring to each moment. As a consequence of such generic identifications, the student becomes a “text of complexity” (Berry, 1999, p. 340), even (calling upon fractal geometry) “a microcosmos, active in the
various dimensions of reality and expressing them through her personality in an individual way” (Puolimatka, 2008, p. 381). Simultaneously, the complexity of the teacher can be envisaged through an assemblage of archetypes: teacher as Trickster (Jung & Francis, 1953/2003; Garrison, 2009), poet (Conroy, 2004), wise (Arlin, 1999) “cultural guardian and initiator into the symbolic life…connector…water diviner” (Abbs, 2003, p. 17) “discloser, reflector and inverter” (Conroy, 2004, p. 9), “gourmet soul chef” (Gidley, 2009, p. 542), “releaser, a midwife, aiming to give birth to existential acts of learning and spiritual engagement in the student” (Abbs, 2003, p. 15), an identity even beyond teacher as sculptor or teacher as gardener (Baptist, 2002; Tubbs, 2005) which may nonetheless involve friendship, mentoring (Forbes, 1996), and “the time-honored image of an older, prepared, and sympathetic human being serving as a guide to a young and hopeful being” (Hansen, 2004, p. 121).

6.3.5. Occasion and relationality

As with the above account, identity, complexity and richness also applies to post-atomistic understandings of pedagogical relations in educational occasions. Such relationality will be addressed below in three ways: as a whole, from the point of view of teaching, and from the perspective of learning.

With respect to pedagogical relations as a whole, a good place to start in considering the importance of the—necessarily communicative (Habermas, 1987)—richness of practice and relation (Day, 1999; Beckett & Hager, 2002) is perhaps Buber’s valorisation of I-Thou relations (Buber & Kaufman, 1923/1970; Hendley, 1978), a key aspect of which is the foregrounding of the second person over the third person perspective. Such an orientation facilitates the authentic pedagogy (Tubbs, 2005) of “real interactions with real people” (Burwood, 2006, p. 128); even a pedagogy of love (Cho, 2005). It has a disciplined quality; perhaps even that of discipleship (Wringe, 2009); it also has a radically open quality. In this regard, Bonnett, calling upon Heidegger, affirms “a teacher-pupil relationship envisaged as…an open space which constantly takes its start from the quality of the learner’s engagement…and arises as a free though not undisciplined response to that engagement” (Bonnett, 2001, p. 25)—relationship poetics (Bonnett, 1996). Peters (2009) furthers that the template required is not that of techné or the technicist hyle (the raw matter of production); rather, “this is a pedagogy understood by analogy with physis, where ‘morphe is to be paired
with self-creating and self-emerging \textit{physis}” (Peters, 2009, p. 4). The fullness of the conversation between educator and educatee can be understood as involving an “interlocking consciousness” (Davis, 2004, p. 178) involving “hermeneutic listening” (Davis, 2004, p. 177) or “intuitive listening” (Dunn, 2006), often with a “Socratic, dynamic and collaborative” (Abbs, 1989, p. xiii) character. A window into the complexity of relations is also offered by Conroy and Davis’ (2002) development of the concept of liminality (or complex “inbetweenness”) with regard to pedagogy, such as occurring between adult and child, self and collective, and the cohesive and the critical (Conroy and Davis, 2002).

From the perspective of teaching, a general post-atomistic orientation is offered by Hansen’s (2001) incisive comment that “good teaching involves enriching, not impoverishing, students' understandings of self, others, and the world” (Hansen, 2001, p. ix). This accords with Conroy’s understanding that “the role of nurturing the flourishing of the other is a complex one, not easily amenable to formulaic prescription” (Conroy, 2004, p. 117). Such complexity suggests that a wide-ranging ecology of teaching metaphors might be apt. In this regard, Davis (2004) offers the following interrelated set: teaching as drawing out, drawing in, instructing, training, facilitating, empowering, occasioning, and conversing. Does not such an ecology indicate that teaching is inherently a craft (Watkins & Mortimore, 1999) or art in the broadest sense—a fluid performance (Burwood, 2006; Stillwaggon, 2008)? Nurturing the flourishing of another is also surely one that involves considerations of the educatee’s long-term (Pinar, 2004). It may well also be best understood in relation to a \textit{gift} economy (Martínez-Alemán, 2007).

From the perspective of learning, similar depth can be identified. One expression of this is that offered by the dialectics of learning—as exemplified below through four vectors, namely, those of determinacy, orientation, character and orderliness. In terms of determinacy, its certainty is complemented: learning becomes “an uncertain adventure” (Morin, 2001). Secondly, regarding orientation, to imagine learning only as an \textit{active} process is to perhaps fall into thinking that we are machines that do not need to rest or reflect; rather, post-atomistically, learning is an organic process which requires a certain ebb and flow, periods of fallow as well as fertility or activity (Ferrer, Romero \textit{et al.}, 2006)—for a variety of timescales. Learning must be “allowed to follow its own restless and distinctive rhythm” (Abbs, 2003, p. 41). We \textit{surrender} into learning as Jardine indicates: “To make our way into [learning mathematics] requires a momentary sense of loss, of giving oneself over to \textit{its} ways by

Thirdly, one may point to the passive principle of silence as complementing the active “noise” of learning. In this regard, Caranfa (2004) offers that “to base education and teaching on silence is to render the profitable, the useful, and the noisy subservient to life that has a purpose “beyond the limits of the expedient”’ (Caranfa, 2004, pp. 224). Indeed, such a perspective brings together “into a harmonious unity two opposing worlds: the mortal and the immortal. Discourse is of the mortal realm; silence or contemplation is of the immortal” (Caranfa, 2004, p. 217). Fourthly, the orderliness of learning can be identified as sitting alongside “learning through crisis” (Pinar, 2007, p. 65) or even learning through wounding (Cajete, 1994).

Additional identifications of learning beyond modern atomism include such directions as learning as the development of insight (Luntley, 2005); address of the imaginative relationality needed between pupil and subject matter (Dewey, 1998; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 1998); and learning as operating within a community of inquiry (Pardales and Girod, 2006), noting that such communality need not be *universalist*. People may be united as much by their differences as their similarities, and respecting these differences—while pursuing a common goal—can be an important part of the process of creating solidarity (Roberts, 2005, p. 491).

There is also the possibility of *collective* learning (Davis and Sumara, 2006).

### 6.3.6. **Occasion and contextuality**

Identifications of educational occasions beyond modern atomism involve the explication of salient contexts (Giroux & McLaren, 1994; Young & Lucas, 1999; Edwards & Miller, 2007). Such identifications might involve context-dependencies or hindrances to transferability among different contexts (Ireson, Mortimore *et al.*, 1999; Watkins & Mortimore, 1999). The

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31 Also see Visser (2001).
following account broadly locates contexts with respect to actor, socio-culture, and (other) conceptualisation.

In terms of the location of actor, stakeholder or voice, Watkins and Mortimore (1999) characterises the different interests and orientations of education researcher, practitioner and policy-maker in the following way:

- **Researcher**—high complexity *across* situations; *long*-term interests; *indirect* action;
- **Practitioner**—high complexity *within* situations; *short*-term interests; *immediate* action; and
- **Policy-maker**—low complexity for all situations; *short*-term interests; *indirect* action.  

Practitioners’ “vernacular” pedagogical orientations tend toward firstly *teaching as instruction* (imparting information and transmitting knowledge) and secondly, *teaching as facilitation* (of students’ learning) (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999). This accords with practitioners’ conceptions of learning—identified in terms of the following hierarchy: 1) getting more knowledge, 2) memorizing and reproducing, 3) acquiring and applying procedures, 4) making sense or meaning, 5) personal change (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999).

It is notable that only the last two step beyond the technicist imagination; a question here might be *What systemic features condition this hierarchy?* With respect to tendencies in the voice of policy-makers, Watkins notes a tendency toward prescription, simplification, and “a partial, mechanical, view of learning” (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999, p. 15). In terms of power among different groups of actors, it would appear that the voice of the policy-maker has been on the ascendant for three decades or so.\(^{33}\) Given this, perhaps the technicism in

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\(^{32}\) For the sake of reflexivity, one might perhaps wish to state the obvious that the perspective of the current paper is that of researcher or academic.

\(^{33}\) In an Australian national symposium on the purpose of education (St. James Ethics Centre, 2001) eleven types of stakeholders were invited. It is notable that there was a marked difference between a number of the stakeholder types in their general responses. That which distinguished the students was anger, cynicism and frustration; student voice is generally undervalued in education—also see Thornton (1996). That which marked both teachers and
policy directions substantively conditions the hierarchy of values teachers believe are necessary to function within the system?

In terms of socio-cultural locations, one can envisage both cultural locations from “macro” (global) through “meso” (regional/national/sub-cultural) considerations to the “micro” cultures of particular social localities; and sociological locations including educational institutions (divided into sectors), workplaces, and society in general. Firstly, let us regard culture. At all scales, due significance should be given to complexities within cultures (Ryan and Louie, 2007). With respect to macro-cultural considerations, the current ascendancy of globalisation and its impact upon educational occasions is pertinent. Regarding micro-cultural considerations, one might address discourse on the culture of educational institutions including such notions as the grammar of schooling (Tyack and Tobin, 1994) or hidden curricula (Lynch, 1989; Gatto, 1992)—“the norms and values that are implicitly, but effectively, taught in schools and that are not usually talked about in teachers’ statements of end or goals” (Apple, 2004, p. 78).

Regarding meso-cultural considerations—including “culturally appropriate pedagogy” (Nguyen, Terlouw et al., 2006, p.2) or “culturally relevant pedagogy” (Ladson-Billings, 1995, p. 160)—attention might focus across sub-cultures within a nation or across nations within a world region. An example of the former would be Minaya-Rowe’s (2002) address of linguistic diversity regarding US students. Also pertinent is Ladson-Billings’ (1995) comment “that one of the reasons [Native American] children experience difficulty in schools is that educators traditionally have attempted to insert culture into the education, instead of inserting education into the culture” (Ladson-Billings, 1995, p. 159). In terms of world regional consideration, the window into Confucian Heritage Cultures provided by Nguyen, Terlouw et al. (2006) is illuminating: differences to Western expectations are analysed with respect to such categories as degrees of collectivism, interpersonal monologicality, uncertainty avoidance, visual learning preferences and short-termism.

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34 Also see Barlosky (1996) on Sinic knowledge.
Secondly, regarding sociological locations, the default context\textsuperscript{35} for educational occasion is that of educational institutions. Within this, the most common subdivision for discussion of context-dependency is across (mostly age-related) sectors, for example, early childhood education (Siraj-Blatchford, 1999), primary schooling (Gipps and MacGilschrist, 1999), secondary schooling (Hallam & Ireson, 1999), further education (Young & Lucas, 1999), higher education (Barnett & Hallam, 1999), and lifelong learning (Hodgson & Kambouri, 1999). Beyond the educational institution, workplace contexts can be addressed (Beckett & Hager, 2002). Broader still, the educational context of society may be regarded (Jain, Miller et al., 2001; Edwards & Miller, 2007). Extending this vector, the question might be asked: \textit{Is the world learning adequately?}

Conceptualisations of context of educational occasion other than those given above include identifications of theory and purpose. There is, of course, a wide range of conceptualisations in such regards—from the gamut of educational philosophies, theories, ideologies, frameworks (Gutek, 1988; Apple, 2004) to such specifics as the importance of historical context in the understanding of the pedagogy of mathematics (Swetz, 1995). With respect to purposes, a critical dimension can be identified in that the question “‘What are we teaching for?’ is surprisingly seldom posed or answered” (Ireson, Mortimore et al., 1999, p. 213).\textsuperscript{36} Further perspectives may stem from implicated metaphors such as education as “gardens in which children grow” or education as “hospitals in which children are cured of their ignorance” (Watkins and Mortimore, 1999, p. 6). These in turn open up yet wider contexts such as possible relations between education and such items as entertainment (Kenway and Bullen, 2001), psychoanalysis (Hinshelwood, 2001), therapy (Rogers, 1969; Scott, 2008; Mintz, 2009), conversation, spiritual encounter (Glazer, 1994; Scott, 2004) and creative enterprise. From a different perspective, architecture as context (Giroux, 1991; Upitis, 2004; Vellani, 2004)—perhaps even ‘architecture as crystallized pedagogy’ (Orr, 1994, 1999)—may also be pertinent.

\textsuperscript{35} Including, I admit, that of the current paper.

\textsuperscript{36} This quote refers to the UK, although this can be understood as generally regarding the current global situation.
6.3.7. **System and identity**

Education systems identified post-atomistically involve richer, more complex conceptualisations than those offered by default technicist or economistic imaginaries. This may involve the articulation of pluralities, complexities and/or aesthetic understandings.

Regarding pluralities with respect to the university, for instance, Marginson explicates orientations beyond the economic as including

the University as site of political conflict and resolution; the University as privileged site for the workings of the scientific imagination; the University as community of scholars; the University as the fountainhead of culture and civilisation; the University as the arena of cultural diversity and global linkages; [and] the University as producer of common public goods (Marginson, 2004, p. 162).

Under the weight of such diversity, Barnett (2005) suggests that the old universalities of the university are no longer present. He states, however, that new universalities might be entertained, and offers the notion of *strangeness* (involving contestability, challengeability, uncertainty and unpredictability) in this regard. He indicates that such an idea is conditioned by “supercomplexity” (Barnett, 2005, p. 796). Perhaps complexity itself might be regarded as a new universal? If so, then what directions might be indicated by complexity *theory* (Mason, 2008)—particularly if used creatively (Kuhn and Woog, 2007)? Questions extending from this orientation might include: How has the system emerged? Around which attractors? In what ways is the system an open one? Does such a spirit of openness suggest education as an opportunity rather than as a service rendered (Pinar, 2004, p. 5)? Might a more vital open system not be oriented toward “initiating social change rather than just responding to it” (Delanty, 2003, p. 81)? What part does hysteresis or “system memory” play—does the weight of institutional memory produce untoward inertia? Do schools actually learn (Clark, 1996; Senge, 2000)? Should not education systems be “expanding the space of the possible” (Davis and Sumara, 2006, p. 135) within which “we constantly create and re-create ourselves” (Caranfa, 2004, p. 228) in the spirit of transformation (Mezirow, 1991)?

Complexity of identification of education system might also take a dialectical form such that

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37 Also see Samples (1988).
education is seen as “a game of knowing and unknowing, of learning and ignorance” (Zembylas and Michaelides, 2004, p. 210; also see Jain, 2003).

A further general orientation of rich identity is generated through aesthetic perspectives (Schiller and Snell, 1795/1954; Egan, 1997; Berchman, 2002) for which “philosophy of education is accordingly the art of understanding, developing and formulating the art of education in relation to its own times” (Kemp, 2006, p. 175). The resultant “poetics” of education would rely on an “aesthetic intelligence which perceives holistically” (Abbs, 1989, p. 177), employing such arational modes as intuition. This sensibility could have a marked effect upon the *habitas* or culture of education systems, perhaps helping to regenerate an overarching perspective of *bildung* for contemporary times (Oelkers, 2001; Løvlie, 2002; Conroy, 2004). As Smith asks:

Might what we think of as social science, and its research—and so educational research—be in some respects closer to the Arts in its approach than to the physical sciences? How might things look different if literary criticism, rather than physics, was our paradigm of knowledge? Or even if Darwin, rather than Newton, had been our image of the scientist? (Smith, 2008, p. 195)

6.3.8. **System and relationality**

Post-atomistically, there are numerous ways in which education system relationalities can be identified. Overarching terms regarding approaches which directly address such matters include *systemic* (Bunge, 1999), *holistic* (Nakagawa, 2000; Hansen, 2004; Schreiner, 2005), *integrative* (Hampsch, 1959; Kealey, 1990), and *integral* (Gebser, 1949/1985; Kostalevsky, 1997; László, 2004; Adams, 2006). Such integrality can be understood as an extension of the idealistic origins of the university—*universitas scientiarum* (a community of knowledge disciplines) and *universitas magistrorum et scholarium* (a community of teachers and students) (Klein, 1990). It could also be seen as an extension of the idealistic origins of the modern academy—Ficino’s Renaissance academy as comprising philosophic, artistic, and scientific “brothers in Plato” (Ciszewski, n.d.). Educational institutions could once again be understood as communities of inquiry (Pardales & Girod, 2006) wherein educator

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38 Including feminist vectors.
development would involve “the cultivation of self-reflexive, interdisciplinary erudition and intellectuality” (Pinar, 2004, pp. 2-3). Relationalities also extend beyond such matters. Morin, for example, indicates domains other than subject matter and collegiality that should be found in interrelation: he notes that education systems include the physical, biological and noetic so that such considerations as human bodies, institutional architecture, school cultures, administrative cultures, collegeground ecologies and a sense of place are addressed. An integrative vision would that of “‘symbiosophy’, the wisdom of living together” (Morin, 2001, p. 63).

Other relational vectors include relations among different types of schooling (North, 1987) including alternative approaches such as Steiner / Waldorf (Steiner, 1965; Childs, 1991; Gidley, 1998) and Montessori educations (Montessori, 1912/2008; Coulter, 1991), which themselves offer substantive interrelationships between domains such as between school and home in the case of Montessori education (Martin, 2001) or between science, art and metaphysics in Steiner education (Gidley, 2008). Might not new “basics” also be envisaged such as the ecology of identity, inquiry, interaction, initiative, imagination, intuition, and integrity (Stottard, 2003)?

6.3.9. System and contextuality

Identifications of education system(s) beyond modern atomism saliently contextualise. Pertinent in this regard are questions of purpose (Orr, 1991; Freire, 1992/2004; Mezirow et al., 2000; Aronowitz, 2001; Gouthro, 2002; Giroux, 2003; Noddings, 2003; Biesta, 2007; Dewey, 2007; Gupta, 2008). The valorisation of such big-picture ethical inquiry can be seen to form part of post-atomistic understanding. One might say in summary that post-atomistic contextualisation goes beyond default contexts of economic instrumentalism toward concern for the long-term well-being of individuals, society and biosphere. White (2007) offers the

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39 A multicultural epistemology toward ethics is possible—see, for instance Metz (2009).
40 Long-term considerations do not have to be complicated. For example, Biddle and Berliner (2008) state that, “reducing the size of classes for students in the early grades often requires additional funds. All students would reap sizeable education benefits and long-lasting advantages, however, and students from educationally disadvantaged groups would benefit
notion of well-being as indeed being pertinent in this regard, indicating that “the idea that education should equip people to lead flourishing lives and help others to do so is now becoming salient in policy-making circles” (White, 2007, abstract). Education as involving the flourishing, well-being or transformation (Takahashi, 2004) of the individual and of society has a venerable history, including substantive address by Kant (Dickerson, 2001) and Spinoza (Aloni, 2008), the latter indicating an intimate connection between the two domains (of individual and society) (Aloni, 2008). One range of perspectives on the well-being—and/or the “well-becoming”—of the individual is provided by postformal developmental psychology (Sinnott, 1998; Cook-Greuter, 2000) and the human potential movement (Maslow, 1971); whilst social well-being is often framed in terms of social justice (Kumashiro, 2004; Hytten, 2005; Eisenberg, 2006).

Educational purpose can also be identified in relation to the biosphere. Motivated by such urgencies that “humankind must soon choose between total destruction of the ecosystem or a new worldview” (Miller, 1990, p. 159), there is growing apprehension that it is insufficient for environmental education to be atomistically added to curriculum as an extra component, but rather that it should be regarded as a form of basic ethical responsibility (Greig, Pike et al., 1987), one in accord with a society which is likewise oriented (Schinkel, 2009). The well-being (and, indeed, flourishing) of the biosphere should form part of the fabric of a new educational worldview (Orr, 1991; Callicott, 1993; Clacherty, 1993; Scala, 2001) rather than be co-opted by economism (Sauvé, Brunelle et al., 2005). Bringing together biospherical and social concerns, Bowers (2000) states that “an eco-justice orientated curriculum that takes seriously differences in cultural ways of knowing and approaches to community cannot be based on the root metaphors that supported the Industrial Revolution” (Bowers, 2000, p. 16). As indicated above, Guattari (1989/2000) goes one step further in the sense of bringing together all three “ecosophical” domains—the individual, social and biospherical.

Perhaps such nuanced integrative schemas can be furthered to radically extend the notion of education outcomes beyond the local, technical and economic toward what might be termed “vectors of virtue” within an “ethical symphony” (adapting Mendus (2008))? Perhaps even more. Indeed, if we are to judge by available evidence, no other education reform has yet been studied that would provide such striking benefits” (Biddle & Berliner, 2008, p. 94).
education should be regenerated through “newly returning” to its relationship with *philosophy as love of wisdom*? (Is not “homo sapiens” our potential?) Yet, as Burwood (2006) indicates:

> wisdom is not something university teachers would want to have to defend as a specified learning outcome in teaching quality review, of course; yet by common assent it is the most important thing a student can learn (Burwood, 2006, p. 129).

Perhaps it is the most important thing that an education system can learn, too?

6.4. **Conclusion**

In summary, education seems beset by undue atomistic tendencies that thwart potential betterments regarding the well-being of human and biosphere. Atomism surfaces in myriad ways throughout the identities of educational content (knowledge, curriculum, discipline, faculty), educational occasion (educator, educatee, teaching, learning, pedagogical relationship) and education system. Although atomism is useful in certain contexts, its over-or misapplication has led to technicism, scientism, literalism and economism. Narrow interpretations of outcomes should give way to richer, more imaginative visions employing ethical, complex, poetic, integrative, postconventional, ecosophical thinking. The overvalorisation of atomistic “bits” of information, *homo economicus, education as engineering*, conveyor belt processes, pedagogy as transmission, techno-preneurs, Newtonian templates, and the positivist myth of neutrality would surely substantively benefit from post-atomistic enactments regarding *currere, homo complexus, education as art*, ecologies of knowledge, rich pedagogical relationships, cross-system engagements, and contexts involving *telos, theoria* and ecosophy.


Callahan, R. E. (1964) Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of the Social Forces that have Shaped the Administration of Public Schools (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).


Minaya-Rowe, L. Ed. (2002) *Teacher Training and Effective Pedagogy in the Context of Student Diversity* (Charlotte, NC, Information Age).


The Cadenza serves (as) the final flourish of the study. It comprises: a summary of the study; “Centripetus”—a perspective regarding one key line of argument running through the study; a perspective on the study’s significance; discussion regarding possible limitations of the study; an outline of possible research futures arising from the study; and ends-in-view.¹

7.1. Summary

The aim of the study has been to facilitate the (re)generation of integral theory and integral education theory through exploring and enacting post-conventional modalities or instruments. “Postconventional” has been interpreted in the broadest sense to encompass ecological and poststructuralism / postmodernism; the gamut of postformal thought including dialectics, multiperspectivality, context-dependence and construct-awareness (including conceptual metaphor and polysemy); and academic fields, discourses or vectors relating to such features.

The extent of postconventional possibilities is such that a comprehensive approach is not possible or appropriate. Indeed, the study has intended to indicate the inherent richness and indeterminacies of postconventionality. Apropos, the vectors that have been enacted have attempted to adequately indicate postconventional exploration. The general sensibility has not been one of the demonstration of containments but rather one of opening out to possibilities in accordance with the inherent complexity of the open ecosystem of postconventionalities.

An extensive Overture introduced the study as pertaining to the scholarship of integration from a reconstructive postmodern perspective. This included a legitimisation of integrative scholarship via genealogical consideration: that of Hermetic-Neoplatonic-Romantic-integral philosophy.

¹ From a conventional academic perspective, § 7.6: Ends-in-view ends the Cadenza. The postconventional option (inclusive of a more first person perspective) is available for the reader to consider Appendix III: Centrifugus: Dissipative structure as Coda to the Cadenza, specifically as it sits in dialectical relationship with § 7.2 Centripetus: Linear argument.
Verses One and Two explored in detail the regeneration of Wilber’s integral theory through “postconventionalisation” as arising from a critique and reworking of the modern-postmodern juncture and the content, structure and sensibility of post-Orange vMeme features. Verse Three elaborated on the criticality of the aforesaid juncture, theoretically contributing both to an understanding of “pathologies” involved in the Orange vMeme (modernism / formal thought) and to “healthy” directions beyond Orange (postformal poetic ecosophy in service of possible “eco-logical” futures).

Verse Four and Five generated integral / integrative education theory with respect to genealogy, including Hermetic-Neoplatonic (including German humanist), Aristotelian (including Islamic and Catholic), socialist-anarchist and Gebserian streams. Verse Six explored a pertinent integrative topologising of education with respect to the critical contrast between modern atomism and that beyond modern atomism; as with Verse Three, this can be identified both as enriching integral theory (through uncovering a substantial part of the metaphoric template underlying conventional and postconventional approaches) and also as a deterritorialisation of integral theory toward the detailed territory regarding modernity and beyond.

7.2. **Centripetus: Linear argument**

A key line of argument in the study as a whole runs as follows:

*The valorisation of complex coherence*

1. The study valorises integrative and integral approaches in general on the proviso that they are adequately non-reductionist. A key instrument here is the furthering of Boyer’s scholarship of integration.

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2 A dialectic to Centripetus: Linear argument, namely, Centrifugus: Dissipative structure, is provided in Appendix III.

3 A numbered format has been chosen in the style of such classical philosophical writing as that of Plotinus (270/1992), and Nietzsche (1886/2002).
The promise of Wilberian integral theory

2. Ken Wilber’s integral theory appears promising as “a theory of everything,” including the theorising of education and futures studies. A key feature of Wilber’s integral theory is that of developmental levels—appertaining to both individual and collective domains—including levels beyond the modern / conventional (Orange vMeme) level—the level at which rational discourse (apparently) operates. Beyond the modern / conventional level Wilberian integral theory locates such items as postconventional / postformal thought, postmodernism and deep ecology. As per one understanding in the postformal literature, Wilber’s schema involves a plurality of levels beyond Orange. A key text is Wilber’s *A Theory of Everything*. In this he identifies (after Spiral Dynamics) levels beyond Orange as comprising firstly Green then Yellow/Teal followed by Turquoise. Orange and Green are categorised as “first tier” whilst Yellow and Turquoise are labelled “second tier.” A sharp distinction is given in relation to the tiers; second tier is highly valorised whilst the Green vMeme is singled out as being significantly problematic: Wilber nicknames it the “mean green meme”—a development level suffering from “Boomeritis.” Postmodernism and deep ecology are located in Green and not beyond, whilst (from other texts) postconventional thinking is located at various levels in both first (Green) and second tiers (Yellow/Teal and beyond). A key theoretical understanding in Wilber’s approach to developmental levels is that each developmental level “transcends-and-includes” the preceding level by way of a holarchy (nested hierarchy).

Critique of Wilberian integral theory

3. Upon investigation, the study indicates that the structure and sensibility of Wilber’s theoretical manoeuvres regarding developmental levels arise in too large a part from the modern / conventional level, thus displaying “pathologies” of this level. Although Wilber’s theoretical schema identifies the need to transcend and include with respect to developmental levels, in the key instance of enactment, the study contends that

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4 It is used as a key text, for example, in the only course on Integral Futures (current at the time of writing)—that at Swinburne University, Australia.

5 Yellow was a “Wilber IV” iteration; Teal, “Wilber V.”
Wilber does not sufficiently transcend and include modern / conventional thinking. Specifically, although Wilber offers a meta-theory which suggests a postconventional approach, the meta-theory nonetheless carries an unduly modernistic (pre-postconventional) fabric or sensibility. Wilber employs, for example, a quality of regimentation regarding categorisation. Similarly, his languaging is insufficiently nuanced: indeed, it sometimes carries the undue mark of the pre-rational (pre-Orange) quality of absolutism (Blue / Amber). Economic trends are also identified.

4. The study’s argument regarding Wilber’s undue modernistic tendencies is strengthened by Wilber’s undue problematisation of the Green vMeme. This problematisation is best understood as an Orange manoeuvre, rather than one stemming from post-Green levels.

5. The study’s argument is also strengthened by the realisation that Wilber’s placement of deep ecology and postmodernism as pre-second tier is untenable. Deep ecology is second-tier—as evidenced (in Wilber’s terms) by its inclusion of hierarchical understandings, and that it operates as a “universal holistic system” (Wilber, 2000d, p. 13); whilst Derrida’s text—as exemplar of postmodernism—can is evaluated as operating at a “construct-aware” (second tier) level.

The value of accord between (postconventional) content and engagement

6. In sympathy with Wilber’s understanding regarding the need to transcend-and-include, the study—in keeping with Wade (1996)—problematises the ability to adequately discuss postconventional thinking using conventional structures and sensibilities. It contends that postconventional structures and sensibilities (which themselves nonetheless include elements of the modern and conventional6) are necessary to adequately engage with postconventional material. Theory becomes poetics.

7. The realization that integral theorising needs to become more postconventional is not one that can be easily appropriated—as in the case, for example, of Wilber or integral

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6 Aptness is ultimately a matter of judgment.
theorists merely stating that the Green vMeme is important, whilst nonetheless repeating the association between Green, relativism and ecology and keeping the post-Orange developmental structures intact (in a context-independent way\textsuperscript{7}). Indeed, such manoeuvres of appropriation would only serve to reinforce the charge of undue modernistic tendencies—in this instance through Orange economist tendencies regarding the over-inflation of a branded Integral Theory as (economic) product which involves, to paraphrase Wilber, “manipulating…resources for one’s strategic gains” (Wilber, 2000d, p. 10) including inadequately contextualising Wilberian theory, inadequately citing material sourced or inadequately reflecting upon changes of approach.

\textit{Toward postconventional integral theory}

8. As a consequence of the theoretical inconsistencies identified above, rather than reject integral theory as a whole (notwithstanding deterritorialisation), the study explores that which might arise from a postconventional approach to integral theorising, also pointing to implications for education.

9. The resultant exploratory “territory”\textsuperscript{8} is rich and nuanced. The study has attempted to honour such complexity in its structure and sensibility in addition to its content. This has included the valorisation of a diversity of perspectives toward similar material and a multi-scaled understanding of postconventional fabric stretching from the scale of the study’s structure as a whole (as complex) to that of terms-concepts (as complex). It has also involved substantive engagement with a variety of academic discourses beyond integral theory.

10. The resultant exploration does not only have a bearing on a narrowly conceived conception of integral theory, but rather pertains to those fields integral theory points to, including modernism / modernity, postmodernism, ecology, and integrative thinking.

\textsuperscript{7} A similar developmental schema might have its place in certain contexts. For example, the work of Cook-Greuter in this regard evidences substantively more nuance than that of Wilber.

\textsuperscript{8} How can one claim territory when horizons recede to infinity?
11. Consequently, the study pertains to both integral theory as territory and a
deterritorialisation of integral theory toward discussion of modernism and that beyond
modernism *in their own regard*. The education-oriented Verse Six, for example,
addresses a key metaphoric template underlying modernism, namely modern atomism,
and explores that which can be identified as beyond it. This discussion can contribute
not only to the conventional (atomistic) and postconventional (post-atomistic)
developmental level juncture in integral theory but can also contribute beyond the
“confines” of integral theory. Such manoeuvres are important to help thwart integral
from unduly contracting into its own neo-disciplinary silo.

12. Such extension is facilitated by consideration of genealogical ecologies of integral
including that of the Western Hermetic-Neoplatonic-Romantic stream. Through this
the role of such features as creativity, imagination and artistic sensibilities are
foregrounded.

*Eco-logics*

13. The multi-scaled relational / ecological structure explored as *that beyond
atomism*—dialogical consciousness, radical relatonicality or “eco-logics”—can assist in
further clarifying the fabric of postconventional thought. It is also an extension of
mental ecosophy, and thus can contribute to “new” (or re-iterative) ways in which
“the environment” (biospherical ecosophy) and society (social ecosophy) might be
addressed, e.g. “ecologies of mind” as dynamic elaborate fractals of biospherical
ecosystems.

14. The multiperspectival nature of postconventionality is also evidenced by *that beyond
modernism* as being represented or facilitated by the construct *postformal poetic
ecosophy*. The construct thwarts attempts to unduly fundamentalise *that beyond
modernism* whilst nonetheless providing helpful indications of its ontological /
epistemological vectors. Postformal poetic ecosophy can also be read as a sensibility
toward ecosophy, emphasising its complex, linguistic, postconventional nature.
15. Both postformal poetic ecosophy and the multi-scaled ecological structure of that beyond modern atomism can substantively inform discourses on both ecology and postmodernism, and can, perhaps more importantly, inform their ((complex coherence)) (to use Gangadean’s (n.d.) syntax).

In support of the arts and humanities

16. Eco-logics can also substantively inform transdisciplinarity through helping facilitate the meta-conversation between “science” and “art.”

17. A critical concern in this regard is to assist the regeneration of the humanities which are currently experiencing undue marginalisation. Such assistance is potentially offered by the study both through the above ecosophical (post-modern) formulations and through the schema of academic thought introduced in Verse Four, comprising empiricist-atomistic (“scientific”), contingent (“arts” and “humanities”), and (Hermetic-Neoplatonic and Aristotelian) integrative / integral (“science~art dialogical”) genealogical streams. From a multiperspective “viewpoint,” the heterarchical picture of these three can complement the perspective of the hierarchical framing of atomism / post-atomism. Both perspectives, however, problematise scientism (the overapplication of templates arising from the natural sciences); both can advocate for the humanities (in the current climate).

Education as pathological Orange

18. The study’s criticalisation of the juncture between Orange and post-Orange—in contrast to Wilber’s interest in the critical juncture between Green and post-Green—is highly pertinent regarding the state of education. It is not the case that education in general embraces Green vMeme understandings such that calls to that beyond Green would be apt. Rather, education quintessentially exemplifies the stuckness of culture in (late) modernism (Orange) with its intensification of pathologies regarding human bodyminds, culture and biosphere. It suffers from both the overapplication of the modern atomistic template and the overvaluing of economic considerations through the (illiberal) neoliberal ideology of late capitalism.
19. It could be argued that Wilberian integral theory actually hinders understanding of the current state of education and how to aptly assist in its transformation due to its post-Orange misalignment identified above. Unnuanced application of hegemonic Wilberian integral theory to education is thus problematic. Integral education theory needs to be generated from postconventional poetics.

*Engaging poetics of integral education*

20. Moreover, one cannot *deduce* a comprehensive set of educational insights from conventional or postconventional integral theorising. Thus the manoeuvre of application is insufficient. The theoretical schema in Verse Six, for example, involves expressions of creativity free from Wilberian thought but immersed in educational literature itself (in addition to awareness of postconventional features).

21. By employing the postconventional feature of reflexivity, the study indicates complexly integrative directions in relation to integral education theory. Firstly, it historically revisions integral education theory, contextualising Wilber’s approach within broader understandings. Secondly, it provides a working template of sublating the *fabric* of modern atomism in structure, sense and sensibility. Integral education theory becomes integral education poetics.

22. Engagements between integral theorising and academic fields other than education are also potentially informed by the study. Indeed, given that arising from engagement with the field of education, a *generic* critique could be given regarding the monological “application” of integral theory to fields. Rather, the postconventional call is for there to be *deep dialogue* (Gangadean, n.d.) between integral theorising and the fields in question such that integral theorising is a sufficiently *open* system to be informed by the aforesaid fields in addition to the application of integral theory to fields: from being “ integrally informed” to *integral engagement*.

7.3. **Significance**

Numerous contexts could be given regarding the study’s significance. These include:
• **Wilberian integral theory**—From a modern perspective the study critiques Wilber’s integral theory as suffering from undue internal inconsistency; from a postmodern perspective the study critiques Wilber for insufficiently addressing postmodern insights; from a Wilberian integral perspective the study indicates how Wilber’s theory unduly tends toward a modern framing whilst making the case for a more adequate postconventional approach through autopoiesis.

• **Integral studies**—The study furthers integral studies as a whole—by valorising the complex coherence of various integral approaches; by strengthening and developing the Western genealogies of integral; and through the scholarship of integration.

• **The scholarship of integration**—The study valorises and extends insight into the scholarship of integration, both theoretically and in relation to its genealogy. The study conceptualises such genealogy as a broad and evolving noetic ecosystem fed by Western and non-Western approaches. Regarding *Western* integrative scholarship, a new framing regarding modern atomist (empiricist), contingent and integrative threads is offered, the last of which involves an extension of Hermetic-Neoplatonic and Aristotelian orientations.

• **Postformal / postconventional thought**—The study provides insight on numerous postformal / postconventional modalities, indicating the inherent complexity both of their identities and of manoeuvres to cohere them. The study brings postformal thought into better conversation with postmodernism / poststructuralism and ecology, and with “post-formal” education (after Kincheloe). Moreover, the study attempts to enact postformality in terms of its very fabric. It indicates the potential value in establishing the academic field of *postformal or postconventional studies*.

• **Postmodernism**—The study contributes to the meta-conversation both between deconstructive and reconstructive (cosmological) postmodernisms (the latter including integral theory), and between postmodernism and postformalism (as mentioned above).

• **Complexity theory**—The study furthers links between complexity theory and postformal thinking; it uses the geometry of elaborate fractals as part of its theoretical
contribution toward eco-logics beyond modern atomism; it furthers the notion of open system; it valorises the emergence of macro-ontological levels (the Great Chain of Being) through complexity theory; and it explores research formatting in terms of complexity theory’s understanding of a decentralised(-as-robust) system.

- Ecosophy—The study brings Naess’s and Guattari’s ecosophies into closer conversation. It also develops the notion of eco-logics as a generic template which goes beyond modern atomism; eco-logics can substantiate ecologies of mind and thus foster new ways of thinking about biospherical and social ecologies.

- Futures studies—The study substantively contributes to the area of integral futures through postformalising integral theory; it likewise contributes to the futures methodology of Causal Layered Analysis through exemplifying its use in a novel way in relation to postformal integral theory. Additionally, it contributes to futures of education through addressing education beyond modern atomism.

- Philosophy of education—The study provides a theoretical contribution to the philosophy of education through elaborating upon the critical contrast between atomistic education and education beyond modern atomism. This can inform numerous fields of education including critical, ecological, postmodern, and holistic / integrative / integral approaches. With respect to integrative educational approaches, the study strengthens their legitimacy, contributing to theory, understanding and regeneration through both theoretical and historical address.

7.4. Limitations

The study is complex and ambitious, and therefore may attract charges against it. These could include a lack of comprehensiveness—whether toward Wilberian integral theory as a whole, toward postconventional thought as a whole, or toward integral education theory as a whole. It could also be argued that there is a lack of consistency—whether toward the study’s structure or toward the study’s languaging. It could also be argued that there is insufficient (postformal) liminality between Orange and post-Orange developmental levels.

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9 Is not the world in urgent need of ethical ambition?
In response to charges of inconsistency and incomprehensiveness, I would argue that the scope of the study *necessitates* certain “limitations” regarding both comprehensiveness and consistency. Indeed, Gödel’s incompleteness theorem indicates that there is—in significant “systems” such as scholarly research—always a choice to be made between consistency and comprehensiveness. The conventional atomistic *scholarship of discovery* favours consistency over breadth. The scholarship of integration (the scholarship modality enacted in the study) indicates the need to *point to* comprehensiveness. Yet absolute comprehensiveness itself (like absolute consistency) is surely impossible given (i) the *extensiveness* of postconventional (including poststructural and ecological) thinking and (ii) the *inherent openness* of postconventional modalities (following a radical interpretation of open systems from complexity theory). The study has thus attempted to *adequately indicate* comprehensiveness whilst maintaining as much consistency as possible, with the proviso that consistency itself from a postconventional perspective should be post-technicist such that there is both *conventional* languaging and *postconventional* deterritorialisation—depending on context (noting that context-dependence is a postconventional feature).

Specifically, with respect to the charge of sufficient address of Wilberian integral theory, the scope of the study is only intended to *focus* on the juncture between Orange (modern / formal) and Green (postmodern/ postformal / ecological) developmental levels rather than on integral theory as a whole. The focus does not, for instance, explicitly include pre-modern developmental levels or “subtle” levels (“beyond Turquoise”).

Although not a main focus of the study, certain address is nonetheless given to non-developmental aspects of Wilberian integral theory (following the understanding that focus from a postconventional perspective does not signify *containment* but *attractor*). This includes introductory comments regarding integral education in the Overture an Appendix II,

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10 Indeed, to deal with Wilber’s “bald ambition” (Meyerhoff, nd) one perhaps needs a certain *adaequatio*!

11 Eg. repetition of terms as uni-semantic—such as *(modern) atomism*

12 Whilst noting that, reflexively speaking, context-dependence is also context-dependent, thus catering for context-independence.
Verse Two’s address of types, four quadrants and eight native perspectives, and Verse One’s Appendix C which offers reflexive comments in relation to AQAL as a whole.

Regarding address of inconsistent languaging or unconventional format, the study neither seeks to embody modernistic languaging nor conventional formatting but rather seeks to offer a direction toward the inclusion of such technical interests within a greater poetic sensibility. For example, the manoeuvre between integral and integrative could be seen as slippage through a modern lens. From a postconventional position, however, it can be seen as deterritorialisation. This applies similarly to other terms-concepts.

In response to the charge of insufficient liminality between Orange and post-Orange, a critical (relatively non-liminal) contrast has been chosen with respect to Orange and post-Orange for reasons given above. I also note that reflexively, liminality can itself be liminal in that it can allow for a dimension ranging from the non-liminal to the fully liminal depending on context.

7.5. Futures

Possible future research includes such vectors as to:

- further conceptualise the scholarship of integration including elaborating on the study’s theoretical structure regarding types of academic thought;
- further develop ecosophy with respect both to the dialogue between Naess and Guattari and to the study’s three-scale formulation of eco-logics beyond atomism; and to also extend mental ecosophy through address of holarchies, rhizomes, animalisations, and other metaphors;
- further develop the complex coherence of postformal thought; specific postformal directions include the exploration of the relationship between postformal dialectics and interpretations of the Taijitu;
- further address the relationship between postformal thinking and postmodernism particular with respect to construct-awareness;
- further contribute to complexity theory in relation to the notion of open system, the emergence of ontological / epistemological levels, the relationship between elaborate fractals and thinking, and between research formatting and decentralised structures;
• explore the relationship between atomistic and Gestalt cognitive modalities and brain hemisphericality;
• further explore Wilberian types particularly with respect to Jungian archetypes;
• further explore the “origins” of modern thinking with respect to the Good, specifically with a view to re-vision economic theory to better embrace ecology and human potentials;
• extend insight into Hermetic-Neoplatonism and Renaissance thinking and their potential contributions to contemporary issues; and
• further elaborate on the contrasting relationship between integral education (as historically grounded) and contemporary mainstream education.

7.6. **Ends-in-view**

Wilber identifies creativity (Eros) as the driver of the evolution of the Kosmos. My study has sought to embrace this insight not only through valorising myriad expressions of creative becoming (as object(s)) but through *creatively enacting* (as process). It has also sought to strengthen resistance to undue hegemonies through developing complex coherences. It has been, is, and probably will be, a complex and worthwhile journey.

Poetically do we journey to pertinently further gnosis, intuition and the dialectics of knowing; the harmonic nanotextology of academic text as polyphonic music hearing wor(l)ds in a new key in which positions are gathered and entertained to-gether. We question the limitations of *what? how? and how much?* by additionally asking *why? for whom? and how deep?* Are we not the quantum intimacy of *homo complexus*, the relationships that I am, the Trickster, Thou? Do we not need a big picture, big history, big futures, big planetary, *big mind, kind heart, healthy education*, an education able to take leadership with respect to the ecological crises? Is the human world flailing, and failing to learn adequately? Do we not need to place a radically well-funded, well-thought-out education at the heart of our human culture, to radically expand the space of the possible, to step into the art of living, to realize this ethico-symphonic intensity, to (re)generate a cultural andragogy of love?
Yes.
• Regarding Verses Two and Three;
• Regarding Verses Four and Five
• Regarding Verse Six; and
• Co-authorship regarding Verse Five\(^1\)

as follows:

\(^1\) Markus Molz and I came to a joint understanding regarding our respective contributions to Verse Five—producing a joint statement such that effectively identical text can be found in Appendix I (Molz’s statement) and in the Front Matter (my statement).
Acceptance of paper by Gary Hampson for Futures Journal
4 messages

Ziauddin Sardar <ziauddin.sardar@btopenworld.com> 26 January 2010 17:40
To: g.p.hampson@gmail.com

To whom it may concern

This letter is to confirm the acceptance for publication in Futures: The journal of policy, planning and futures studies,
of an article from Gary Hampson, Southern Cross University. The paper is titled "Facilitating eco-logical futures
through postformal poetic ecosophy." The paper is expected to be published in late 2010 or early 2011.

Sincerely,

Ziauddin Sardar
Editor, Futures
1 Orchard Gate,
London NW9 6HU, UK
+044 208 201 3193

Gary Hampson <g.p.hampson@gmail.com> 31 January 2010 12:18
To: Ziauddin Sardar <ziauddin.sardar@btopenworld.com>

Dear Zia,

Thank you kindly for this.

One last thing: could you possibly confirm that I have permission to include my two following Futures articles in my PhD?
I am planning to submit in a week or so!

Thanks in advance.

Yours sincerely,

Gary


2. Hampson G. P. (accepted) “Facilitating eco-logical futures through postformal poetic ecosophy” *Futures: The journal of policy, planning and futures studies (Special issue: Global mindset change)*.

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Ziauddin Sardar <ziauddin.sardar@btopenworld.com> 31 January 2010 16:40
To: gary hampson <g.p.hampson@gmail.com>

Yes, you can include your two papers from Futures into your thesis.

Zia

---

From: gary hampson [mailto:g.p.hampson@gmail.com]
Sent: 31 January 2010 12:18
To: Ziauddin Sardar
Subject: Re: Acceptance of paper by Gary Hampson for Futures Journal

[Quoted text hidden]

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gary hampson <g.p.hampson@gmail.com> 31 January 2010 17:22
To: Ziauddin Sardar <ziauddin.sardar@btopenworld.com>

Thank you, Zia.

Gary

[Quoted text hidden]
To whom it may concern;

This letter is to confirm the acceptance of two chapters from Gary Hampson in the book *Integral Education: New Directions for Higher Learning*. One is titled *Western-Islamic and Native American Genealogies of Integral Education* and the other is co-authored with Markus Molz and titled *Elements of the Underacknowledged History of Integral Education*. The book is currently in press with SUNY and expected publication is summer 2010.

Sincerely,

Jonathan Reams, Ph.D.
Co-editor along with Sean Esbjorn-Hargens Ph.D. and Olen Gunnlaugson Ph.D.
Dear Gary

Your manuscript entitled "Education Beyond Modern Atomism" has been successfully submitted online and is presently being given full consideration by the reviewers, for publication in Educational Philosophy and Theory.

Your manuscript ID is EPAT-Dec-2009-0130.

Please mention the above manuscript ID in all future correspondence or when calling the office for questions. If there are any changes in your street address or e-mail address, please log in to ScholarOne Manuscripts at http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/epat and edit your user information as appropriate.

You can also view the status of your manuscript at any time by checking your Author Center after logging in to http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/epat

Thank you for submitting your manuscript to Educational Philosophy and Theory.

Sincerely
Susanne Brighouse
Business Editor
Educational Philosophy and Theory
To whom it may concern

Statement concerning the inclusion of a co-authored piece in the PhD dissertation of Gary Hampson at Southern Cross University

Gary Hampson and I co-authored the paper "Elements of the Underacknowledged History of Integral Education" that was accepted as a chapter by the editorial team of the book Esbjörn-Hargens, S., Reams, J., and Gunnlauson, J. (Eds.) (in press, 2010). Integral Education: New Directions of Higher Learning. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. I fully agree with its inclusion in Hampson’s PhD dissertation within the following framing:

"Elements of the Underacknowledged History of Integral Education" arose from a general background of collaboration involving an intense process of sharing, co-inspiring and co-designing, conditioning not only Elements but also the two solo pieces Gary Hampson and I contributed to the Integral Education book (Western-Islamic and Native American Genealogies of Integral Education on Hampson’s part and Contemporary Integral Education Research: A Transnational and Transparadigmatic Overview on my part). It also produced a draft of a general theoretical framing which cohered the approach taken by all three pieces (as yet unpublished). Hampson and I had devised a variety of ways of “cutting the cake” regarding the material as a whole, including offering the editors of the book an innovative “sub-book” entity involving five short pieces variously authored between Hampson and myself. Although this was not eventually accepted, its spirit nonetheless remains in the coherent nature of the three pieces. Both Elements and the unpublished theoretical piece were jointly authored, the former foregounding my work, the latter foregounding Hampson’s. Specifically, the general orientation of contribution toward the paper is as follows: the major part of the research of Elements was conducted by myself; the major part of the introduction, editing, languaging and design of Elements was undertaken by Hampson. Within that general orientation, research regarding anarchist-socialist (Bakunin / Kropotkin) and Aurobindean approaches was undertaken by each of us in similar measure: by coincidence this had occurred independently from each other prior to this collaboration and led to synergistic understanding and text regarding the respective sections.

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APPENDIX II

A Critique of Wilberian Integral Education Theory
Appendix II. A critique of Wilberian integral education theory

This piece mirrors the critique of Wilberian integral theory given in Verses One and Two; the current recursion, however, addresses integral theory specifically in relation to education.

The particular *post*-Wilberian nature of the current study’s orientation to integral education can be exemplified through forming a critique of Tom Murray’s (2009) theoretical paper on integral education, as well as matters arising from Gunnlaugson’s (In Press) reflective paper on an institutionalisation of integral education.

Murray appears to provide a useful perspective in defining and contextualising integral education. He identifies its

- addressing the many aspects of being human: body/mind/emotion/spirit;
- including multiple holonic orders: the individual, aspects/parts of the individual, the classroom, the wider community and society;
- allowing for multiple ways of knowing: in terms of "quadrants"– subjective, objective, intersubjective; and types – multiple intelligences, and so-called masculine and feminine modalities;
- giving full attention to both internal realities (values, visions, feeling, motivations, relationships) and external realities (measurement, action, physical health, educational infrastructure); and
- seeing knowledge in terms of the coordination of perspectives (including critical approaches to knowledge and power, epistemic or meta-knowledge, and dialogic approaches) (Murray, 2009, p. 100).

He also offers that “the” (Wilber’s) integral approach adds rigour to New Age thinking, and that it is

not so much to a new set of methods, but to a way (or ways) of coordinating, integrating, practicing, and embodying already existing specific methods, mostly from progressive approaches, but also including traditional (and "modernist") approaches,
as appropriate. Integral looks and feels like progressive methods applied with wisdom and “adequatio,” with an ego-aware and construct-aware consciousness (p. 126).

This description appears reasonable at first blush. However, upon further inquiry into that which Murray signifies as “progressive” and “integral,” problems begin to appear—ones, indeed, that form the basis of Verse One: Integral re-views postmodernism. My critique is that there is an overvaluing of post-Green vMemes (in this instance represented by “integral”) and an undervaluing of the Green vMeme (represented by “progressive”), producing a sharper differentiation between the two than appropriate. This situation can lead to (charges of) inflation of “self-regard” (where “self” is identified with Wilberian integral theory) such as found in marketing discourse regarding the process of branding (in this instance, the branding of Wilber’s integral theory as Integral Theory): this is an Orange vMeme pathology (using a Wilberian framing), one related to undue modernistic tendencies. Details of the critique in relation to Murray’s article are taken up in the following discussion.

Regarding an overregard for Wilberian integral, Murray’s paper, two directions can be identified. Firstly, there is a marginalisation of non-Wilberian interpretations of integral. In this instance, Murray fails to mention other integrals entirely, whether from historical or contemporary perspectives. An associated negligence concerns lack of address of other integrative or holistic approaches. Instead, his text contrasts (an implicitly Wilberian) “integral” with “progressive” (“alternative” or “reform”) approaches. One might argue that his use of progressive implies holistic approaches, yet this remains uncertain as no specific instances of progressive educational approaches are referred to. Secondly, inflated statements regarding Wilberian integral are given. The paper, for example, states “Ken Wilber's Integral Theory…is by far the most influential integral model” (p. 101, n. 6). No specific context is provided for the statement, so one would expect the general context of the paper as a whole—integral education—to be pertinent to this statement, particularly as no other relation between Wilber’s model and education is provided in this regard. Yet, given the longstanding nature and ongoing success of C.I.I.S., it could surely be argued that Wilber’s integral is not the most influential integral education model: rather that, in terms of use of the term, Aurobindean integral education is. In a broader understanding of integral it could be argued
that anthroposophical integral education (Gidley, 2008) is the most influential, given that it has been in existence for nearly a century,¹ and also given its increasing global impact.²

Regarding an underappreciation or misidentification of progressive approaches, five directions can be seen. Firstly, Murray (who associates “progressive” with the Human Potential Movement) states that “unlike most of the progressive pedagogies, the integral approach draws heavily from both developmental theories and transpersonal psychology” (Murray, 2009, p. 110). This is factually incorrect. A key player in the birth of The Human Potential Movement was Abraham Maslow (Walsh, 1994). His hierarchy of human needs is one of human development culminating in the transpersonal realm (Maslow, 1971).

Secondly, Murray puts forward the interpretation that “progressive involves identifying and describing the problems with traditional modes, leading to a critical attitude that is suspect of all claims and perspectives” (Murray, 2009, p. 105). This statement confuses progressive with a straw-man version of relativist postmodernism. The progressive educational approaches of John Dewey (1998) and Francis W. Parker (2009), for instance—also see (Graham, 1967)—clearly put forward their own “claims and perspectives.” Even if by “progressive” Murray means “postmodern,” Murray’s argument does not stand—see, for example, the claims and perspectives contained in Doll’s “postmodern curriculum” (Doll, 1993).

Thirdly, Murray claims that “progressive approaches do not incorporate principles from modern theories of dynamic systems” (Murray, 2009, p. 100). Surely the progressive educational approaches involving complexity theory (Davis and Sumara, 2006) are based on theories of dynamic systems?

Fourthly, Murray (2009) asserts that progressive approaches give

only vague advice or ends with acceptance or despair that things are so complex, unknowable, subjective, etc. An integral perspective, while not pretending to any easy or complete fix, does more to understand the nature of complexity itself, the nature of indeterminacy itself (p. 105).

¹ It was founded in 1919.
² It is present in sixty countries (http://waldorfschule.info/upload/pdf/schulliste.pdf)
Two questions arise: Is not the giving of “vague” advice consonant with the embrace of indeterminacy—noting that indeterminacy is a postformal feature? What is inherently wrong with “acceptance…that things are…complex”? Complexity is surely only perceived as wrong if a *paradigm of simplicity* (e.g. Orange scientism) is assumed. A postformal paradigm of complexity (Morin, 2007) allows for “acceptance…that things are…complex.”

Fifthly: *progressive* pertains to social progress; etymologically, *progress* refers to “growth, development, advancement to higher stages.” Is not a central feature of Wilber’s integral theory developmental progression toward higher stages? Is not Wilberian integral theory therefore inherently progressive?

In short, Murray’s (2009) text, as representative of what could perhaps be termed the *myth of Wilberian integral* (in this context), provides the following summary: “we say that Green has a problem with Blue and Orange” (p. 119). He fails, however, to more pertinently draw attention to the fact that Orange as expressed through Integral Theory has a problem with Green such that it substantively misconfigures the conceptualization of *Green and beyond* to aggrandize the self-importance of Wilberian integral.

A piece by Olen Gunnlaugson (In Press) can be seen as furthering this critique by describing an experiment involving the employment of Wilber’s integral theory at Holma College, Sweden. Gunnlaugson summarises Wilber’s main *contributions* to integral studies at Holma College as follows:

- “First, because we focused primarily on how Wilber’s work can be applied educationally, it was easier to introduce a shared language and discourse that in turn, helped establish a more coherent basis for shared meaning and communication with students than previous years” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 410).
- “Wilber’s work cultivated a useful comprehensive framework for interpreting our lives that aspired to avoid reducing, isolating or fragmenting our understanding of the world and ourselves” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 410).
- “Wilber and Beck & Cowan’s writings offered helpful developmental frameworks

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3 www.etymonline.com
for students and faculty to engage our journeys of transformation.” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 411) And “while it is questionable the extent to which learning spiral dynamics helped student’s make the proverbial leap to ‘second tier’ (Beck & Cowan, 1996), Beck & Cowan’s work was helpful in introducing everyone to the significance of being an evolving self with the possibility of embodying more complex and nuanced worldviews (i.e. embracing the dignity and limiting the disasters of each), in contrast to the previous binary orientation of setting out to simply adapt the new paradigm” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, pp. 414-5).

Gunnlaugson’s critique can be summarised as orienting toward the following vectors regarding AQAL imbalances (internal theoretical inconsistencies of Wilberian integral theory):

1. **Regarding levels: The overenactment of Orange:**

    1. **Undue agency** (insufficient communion)—Gunnlaugson identifies that, “for integral studies to continue to grow into a viable knowledge enterprise continued efforts are needed to critically and compassionately recontextualize Wilber’s work alongside the growing eclectic contributions of other past, present and emerging integral thinkers” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 417).

    1.2. **Undue universalism** (insufficient context-dependency)—Gunnlaugson reports that Integral Transformative Practice “was not helpful for everyone” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 413).

    1.3. **Undue simplification** (insufficient complexity)—Gunnlaugson critiques “Wilber’s initial oversimplified use of the spiral dynamics model as a tool to gauge the overall development of individuals and society” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 415). Furthermore, he indicates that there is a “necessity for future integral education projects to unearth more stable and comprehensive integral transformative ideals that are not simply striving to embody integral ideals at the proverbial leading edge, but are also grounding their educational concerns in service of overall development through the particular details, historical situatedness and particular unique contexts that comprise our paths of learning in daily life” (Gunnlaugson,
2. **Regarding quadrants: Overemphasis on structuralism** (Lower Right)—Gunnlaugson identifies that, “the pervasive tendency to interpret, assess and compartmentalize experience *structurally* through developmental and other meta-frameworks needs to be reexamined” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 416).

3. **Regarding lines: Overregard for the cognitive line**—Gunnlaugson reports that “experimenting with Wilber’s (2000) injunction to lead with the cognitive line (i.e., capacity to take more complex perspectives), did not always lead to desired outcomes. In fact, students and faculty interpreted this invitation as a pattern that reinforces the tendency to use cognition to control and manage our experience and to taking a perspective strictly within Wilber’s system of thought” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 418).

4. **Regarding types: Undervaluing of the archetype of descent**—Gunnlaugson notes that, as implementers of Wilberian theory, “our tendency was to either overlook or undervalue the archetypal path of descent and involution” (Gunnlaugson, In Press, p. 416).

To summarise: The critique of Murray’s article exemplifies the relationship between the current study and what might be termed a hegemonic Wilberian approach to integral education.
APPENDIX III

Centrifugus
Appendix III. Centrifugus: A dissipative structure

The academic mind, the philosophical imagination, has its dialectic.

The dialectic to centripetal (§ 7.2) requirements beckon traces of anOther vector: multiple lines of flight, fragile fragments for food for thought, (baroquely) a lighter and heavier touch. Quintessentially complex: a dissipative structure: We move from the poetically philosophical to the philosophically poetic: from the need to continually offer ex-plan-ation—the flat view—to “royal” (Brown, 1969, in Gare, 2005) depths or intensities where the mystery in knowledge comes more to the fore, where it is more up to the reader, too, to “join up the dots” and let new topologies of gnosis surface (perhaps in the Lower Left quadrant?). Derrida might say that all texts leave traces. What traces lurk within the study? And what can be traced here? What ecologies of mind do you trace? And in what ways might I leave a trace of my (original, ordinary, creative or becoming) face? The format chosen sits in reference to Peter Abbs’ (2003) Thirty-nine notes towards a new metaphysical poetry. The trumpeter announces a solo, and I (in first person guise) begin to let my hair down (that is, if I had any!).

Theory of Productive Intuition: Introductory Statement

Schelling, the philosopher, said:

*Descartes* the physicist said: give me matter and motion, and from that I will fashion you the universe. The transcendental philosopher says: give me a nature made up of opposed activities, of which one reaches out into the infinite, while the other tries to intuit itself in this infinitude, and from that I will bring forth for you the intelligence, with the whole system of its presentations (Schelling, 1800/1978, pp. 72-73).

These current segments spark centrifugally: currents of the productive void.¹

¹ See Benedikter (2005b).
Perhaps my adaptation of the first stanza of W. H. Auden’s *The Night Mail* (with title inspired by Kraftwerk’s *TransEurope Express*) might be of interest to transdisciplinarians?

>This is the Academy crossing the border,
Bringing new ways to scholarly order,
Letters for the weave, letters for the world,
Goodness, Beauty, Truth unfurled:
Together constructing a complex climb
To save our planet just in time.

Perhaps holistic educational assessment could involve an ecology of accountabilities oriented toward such vectors as creatively becoming:

- attentive, artistic, appropriate
- buoyant, beautiful, balanced
- creative, compassionate, communal
- disciplined
- ethical, equanimous, evolving
- focused, free, familial
- growing, good
- healthy, happy
- integrated, innovative, inspired, inspiring, insightful, intuitive, imaginative, intimate,
interested, interesting, investigative, intelligent

• joyful, judicious
• kind, klever
• literate, listening, loving
• mathematical, musical, mysterious
• non-adversarial, non-violent
• open
• polite, poetic, playful, physical
• questioning
• responsible, reflective, respectful, rational, relational, relaxed
• soulful, skillful, salient, sanguine, spiritual, secure, sensitive, self-motivated, systematic
• truthful, trustful
• understanding, unique,
• vital, vibrant, versatile, veracious,
• well, wise, willing
• xxx
• yogic
• zestful?

4

you learned me how to teach

words are spoken
perfect as they rise
hidden is the beauty
behind your pupils’ I’s

a flow streams around you
blessing as you go
turns learning into yearning
profanity to glow
following the track of no way  
each step with soul of foot  
to lure the lore that lights our play  
lest sacred stage mistook  

this class of your perspective  
makes room without a wall  
your secret body blesses you  
to bring the best in all  

5  
Title metamorphosis: An ecology of foregrounds  

The creative emergence of the study is perhaps indicated by the metamorphosis of its title from conception to birth:  

2004  
Vitality  
1. “Facilitating the vital emergence of (more) appropriate paradigms in global education”  

2005  
Vision  
2. “Helping facilitate appropriate transformation in education through visionary reconceptualisation”  

2006  
Transformation
3. “Helping facilitate appropriate transformation in education through conceptualisations arising from integral perspectives”

**Passion**

4. “On the forming of theory from following my passion, ‘to help facilitate appropriate transformation in education’: toward a systemic dialectics as a template for education arising from integral consciousness”

**Metaphor and therapy**

5. “A transcritical inquiry into the as if world of nine encounters between a psychotherapist and ‘education’: a heuristic journey to help facilitate transformation in education”

**Seaton’s thesis**


**2007**

**Sondheim’s musical Into The Woods**

7. “Into the epistemologico-educational woods: transforming the tale”

**Koyaanisqatsi**

8. “Beyond koyaanisqatsi education”

**Foucault’s epistemologico-institutional**

9. “Postformal epistemologico-expressivitico-educational (trans)formation”

**Gangadean’s ((…)) and Montuori’s creative inquiry**

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2 Hopi term for *life out of balance*
10. “Thinking postformally, educating postformally: a ((creative)) inquiry”

Heart and wisdom

11. “Education for a complex-eco-logical era: wisely transforming the heart of our system”

Economicist bedazzlements

12. “Education for an eco-logical era: transforming paradigms of complexity, wisdom and love beyond the incisions, hoodwinks and bedazzlements of the economic mania machine”

Eco-logics

13. “Education for an eco-logical era: transforming paradigms of complexity, wisdom and love beyond the bedazzlements of the (economic)∪(machine)”

Postformal poetic ecosophy


Deleuze’s baroque

15. “Toward paradigmatic and educational transformation beyond the ‘modern economic machine’: postformally cohering complexity, ecosophy and poiesis through Deleuze’s baroque”

Guattari’s ecosophy

16. “Education for an eco-logical era: growing Guattari’s three ecologies through postformal, complexity and poiesis for curriculum, pedagogy, and system”
Art and humanity

17. “Education for an eco-logical era: postformal complexity and the arts of human becoming”

2008

An ecology of fields

18. “Thinking postformally about education: the generation of a transdisciplinary knowledge topology animating creativity, ecology, dialogue, complexity, integration, poststructuralism, and criticality”

Boyer’s scholarship of integration


2009

Poetics of complex integration

20. “Toward the regeneration of education through the poetics of complex integration”

The post/modern juncture

21. “Regenerating the post/modern juncture and education: Postconventional explorations through the scholarship of integration toward ecosophy”

Regeneration

22. “Regenerating integral theory and education: Postconventional explorations toward ecosophy”
Ontopoetics of a fractal kosmos

To see a world in a grain of sand,
   And heaven in a wild flower
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
   And eternity in an hour.

(Blake, 1803/1960)

New language

Jon Anderson, whose birth-day is that of my own, speaks for me here:

A special trait is that I’ve tried to reach all feelings
   So I speak a new language of love
...
Is there something that I’m supposed to teach?
Is there something that I’m supposed to find?
...
Vision is racing so fast I can’t stop myself
Chasing the reason for all kinds of wondering
...
Translate creation
   To bring you salvation.

(Anderson, 1999)
A necessary Fool such as I, recently Up From Eden and originally Ever-Present, came across a bend in the seemingly straight path, a (s)light turn not easily noticed by a bounding hare. I could taste a trace of whispering nectar so I followed its melliferous meanders for a spell. On one side the land was green and carried several large flags: “first tier” “deconstructive” “postmodern” “pluralist” “relativist” “nihilistic” “boomeritis.” On the other side the land was yellow turning teal with flags reading: “second tier,” “post-postmodern” “integral.” And I realised I was in the perfect place: a world made of the Fool’s Spring colours of yellow and green, yet my path was in neither one land nor the other: I was dancing nowhere therebetween, loitering in liminality, bewitched in the aperspectival wilds. As I venture-veered further along this veritable verge I began to sing verses about this converging divergence, conversing the bees, collecting the nectar, becoming as I went.
Imaginal dialectic:

“Holding Soul” confluencing “Catching the Blossom”

3 Are such images relevant for this dissertation? What differences of interpretation toward them might occur between conventional and postconventional perspectives? What first, second and third person perspectives and worlds might these images gesture toward? I would suspect that my first person perspective on the second image, for instance, involves the signalling of the regenerative, postconventional vector, (baroque) exuberance as emancipatory. A dialectic of Image One’s (natural) liberation as contemplation, perhaps?

4 Photograph taken by Jenny.

5 Photograph taken by Chong.
Catching the Blossom

\( n+1 \)

dialectics of truth

(this is not the truth)
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