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The Impact of Institutional, Instrumental and Interpersonal Underpinnings on Network Dynamics and Outcomes

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ABSTRACT

Networks form a key part of the infrastructure of contemporary governance arrangements and, as such, are likely to continue for some time. Networks can take many forms and be formed for many reasons. Some networks have been explicitly designed to generate a collective response to an issue; some arise from a top down perspective through mandate or coercion; while others rely more heavily on interpersonal relations and doing the right thing. In this paper, these three different perspectives are referred to as the “3I”s: Instrumental, Institutional or Interpersonal.

It is proposed that these underlying motivations will affect the process dynamics within the different types of networks in different ways and therefore influence the type of outcomes achieved. This proposition is tested through a number of case studies. An understanding of these differences will lead to more effective design, management and clearer expectations of what can be achieved through networks.

Introduction:

Networks in their various forms are a cornerstone of the policy development and service delivery infrastructure for many countries and are likely to remain so for the duration (Agranoff, 2003; Agranoff & McGuire, 2001, 2003; Huxham, 2000; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Mandell, 1994, 2001a). Networks are a governance mechanism to link and order the efforts of dispersed actors and organisations (Brown & Keast, 2003; Cordero- Guzman, 2001). Through their collective efforts networks enable participating agencies to overcome issues of scale and scope, tap into partners’ opportunities and develop innovative solutions to complex and intractable problems. Not surprisingly, given the variations in purpose a wide array of network configurations has eventuated (Agranoff, 2003; Brown & Keast, 2003; Keast et al., 2007; Mandell & Steelman, 2003; O’Leary & Bingham, 2007).
For all networks there may be different underlying motivations that govern the behaviour of participants in networks. Some participate because of interpersonal reasons such as ‘doing the right thing’ and commitment to the group. Others are more instrumental or pragmatic in their uptake and use networks viewing them as a means to an end. That is, as an effective, cost reducing alternative approach to achieve goals. Other networks are more institutionally driven, in which the behaviour of members is influenced and shaped by a dominant framework developed and supervised by the initiating agency or organisation. Following Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) these three different perspectives of what motivate the formation of networks and inform how they will operate have been called interactive or interpersonal, instrumental and institutional. In this paper we refer to these perspectives as the 3Is. Categorising the motivation for network endeavour into the 3Is is argued to facilitate a better understanding of the motivations that drive networks and establish a coherent framework in which to direct requisite effort and attention to networks.

A substantial body of evidence and understanding of networks has been amassed on how networks work (Agranoff, 2003; Brown & Keast, 2003; Huxham & Vangen, 1996, 2005; Kamensky & Burlin, 2004; Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007; Keast et al., 2004; Kickert; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Mandell, 2001a, 2008a; O’Leary, 2006; Provan & Milward, 1995, 2001; Vandeventer & Mandell, 2007). These studies have all contributed to unpacking the previous ‘black box’ of network structure and functioning. Missing from this conceptualisation thus far has been an understanding of the relationship between drivers for network formation, the type of network formed, and the impact of the participants’ perceptions, attitudes, and values on the operational dynamics (implementation) and outcomes achieved.

The question raised in this paper in relation to the 3Is is whether the way a network is established and operationalised based on the 3 different perspectives makes a difference in their effectiveness. In other words, do the differences really matter? Or can other factors such as implementation, also influence the functioning of a network and its outcomes?

Early network literature explained the rise of network forms primarily on an inter-organisational perspective based predominantly around the desire to secure a stable flow of resources (Alter & Hage, 1993; Bardach, 1999; Benson, 1975; Goes & Park, 1997). More recent network literatures and theoretical perspectives reflect a more nuanced conceptualisation for the adoption and formation of network approaches. These include the search for legitimacy, complex problem solving and innovation, social inclusion and democracy (Powell, Kaput & Smith-Doer, 1996; Huxham, 2000; Mandell, 2008b, 2001b; Mandell & Keast, 2008). In this paper we have categorised this set of motivations leading to different types of networks under the headings – instrumental, institutional and interpersonal initially put forward by Kickert et al. (1997) to describe government approaches to network management. In setting forth this framework Kickert et al (1997) acknowledged the incomplete nature of their conceptualisations and highlighted the need for greater attention to the implementation and functioning of networks to ensure a more integrated perspective.

This paper therefore departs from the original application of the 3Is in that it extends its examination of network drivers beyond the government perspective and includes in
its focus other organisations as initiators or sponsors of networks. Further, it uses these three perspectives to examine how they might explain the drivers or underlying motivations for networked involvement and implementation processes that may affect their performance and outcomes. In the next section we give an overview of the 3Is and the implementation of them. This section also draws together and syntheses the growing array of literature that has clustered around and extended beyond the initial conceptualisations of Kickert et al (1997). This is followed by an analysis of six case studies that are used to answer the question concerning the impact of the 3Is on the operational dynamics and effectiveness of networks.

The 3Is

The instrumental approach - From this perspective networks are tools to be used and applied directly, not only by state institutions and actors, but also by community and other groups that have power and influence (deBruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 1997). In this context the network is used to secure the achievement of the preset goals of governmental (or other authoritative entities), especially in terms of making possible goals that might not otherwise be achievable. That is, the network is used to push through changes from the initiating entity; thus supporting the steering function of government or other authoritative entities. Moreover, in doing so, the instrumentally oriented network can draw on the power of authority to meet these goals. Not surprisingly, governments with their special roles and powers, have a strong predilection towards the instrumental approach. From this perspective, typically governments (and to a lesser extent other authoritative entities such as foundations) engage in networks only as long as they remain in control. Unless they are consistent with the goals of the state or foundation, the values and goals of non-state actors in instrumental networks are not considered to be significant and therefore can become secondary to the overall purpose.

Given its strong connection to the vertical axis of authority the instrumental approach often looks to draw upon formalised mechanisms to direct and regulate action. These processes can include the mandate of the leader, as well as the application of structured agenda, planning processes and reporting regimes. However, according to De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) these classical vertical control devices do not always apply to networks because they lack the necessary degree of flexibility and variety and are generally focused on directed rather than collective outcomes. In their place, De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof (1997) suggest that more ‘refined’ influencing instruments are recommended, such as incentives and different types of communication mechanisms.

By contrast to the instrumental approach and its emphasis on pre-set or centralised goals, the interpersonal and institutional perspectives focus on the development of a context for collective action. That is, unlike the instrumental perspective, it is recognised that no single actor/sector can drive a network reform process. Rather, the emphasis is on establishing an environment that enables participants to work together.

The interpersonal approach stresses the interactions between a range of actors as they work together to generate innovative responses and new and better service models (Mandell & Harrington, 1999; O’Toole et al., 1997; Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997). In this bottom-up approach, the focus is not about attaining or delivering pre-set external
goals but about contributing to and providing conditions for the process of finding a common purpose among a diverse set of interests. Within these interactions members draw on a suite of processes such as facilitating, mediating, and various training techniques to mould previously disparate positions into collective action. Through this process dense relations are built with an emphasis on collegiality re-enforced by a shared commitment to work together. It is not a case of the controller or the controlled, rather a collection of actors who exercise mutual influence. Strategies and goals can change as interaction between the actors creates and draws out common interests, clarifies points of interest and negotiates joint action. In this context new types of leaders, described as process catalysts (Mandell & Keast, 2009) emerge to play a central role in shaping the relations, mediating and negotiating outcomes, and helping to identify new solutions. In interpersonally orientated networks the primary focus is on the process of building new relationships rather than on achieving tasks.

For the institutional approach the emphasis shifts from the formation of interpersonal relations and interactions between actors to the establishment of embedded routines and processes that guide joint action toward specific goals (Schaap & vanTwist, 1997). Under the institutional approach there is less interest in the actual relations between actors or meeting specific goals. The objective is to develop the right structures and sets of rules to facilitate interaction rather than engage in the interaction itself (Kickert et al, 1997: 183-185). Instead, the focus is on establishing the rules of interaction as well as organisational frameworks that set the stage for ongoing interactions and strategy development. Through the establishment of embedded norms and routines practices emerge, which become institutionalised as ‘the way things are done” (Scott, 2001: 57). Adopting the dominant framework of network interaction and practice helps to legitimise participating organisations and enables them greater access to resources to assist their own organisational performance (Lowndes, 1996).

From the above, it can be seen that the interactive/interpersonal and institutional approaches emphasise processes over instrumental power. The interpersonal and institutional approaches also emphasise the importance of mutual adjustment of actors’ perceptions rather than a directive to comply. Another basic difference between these two perspectives is in the degree to which the participants establish their own rules of behaviour. In the institutional perspective, the agency or organisation that establishes the network is involved in developing how the network can operate. Although not in the controlling mode of the instrumental approach, the initiating agency or organisation still wants to make sure that the network operates within certain parameters, following prescribed processes. In the interactive/interpersonal perspective, the participants have relatively free reign to design the way the network will operate to achieve its goals. Since new ways of behaving are the main goal the participants are given wide latitude in how they deal with each other. Although they will still be aware of some constraints, the emphasis will not be on shaping the strategies and rules of interaction, but rather on finding new ways of working with each other.

This initial review of the literature demonstrates that each of the 3Is is different and has merit and application in certain contexts. Moreover, that they are underpinned and guided by different sets of operating assumptions and practices. Together the 3Is provide a basic framework to assist network architects and those charged with the responsibility for designing, managing and overseeing network activities. While these
idealised forms and schema serve to distil the dominant or presenting characteristics they can overlook the nuances that can occur in network formation and operation, (implementation) which may lead to sub optimal outcomes.

**The Implementation Issues of Networks**

Before the 1970s the implementation issue was considered to be unproblematic as it was assumed that once a policy or program was developed it would be carried through to completion (Howett & Ramesh, 1995: 153). The apparent shortcomings of rural and urban development programs of the mid 1970s brought attention to the obstacles in carrying through the execution processes designed to deliver policies and services (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). Initially focused on programmatic issues such as the clarity of goals and the level of resourcing dedicated to projects, the literature shifted to draw attention to the impact of time, the nature of policies and the level at which execution was to occur (Gogglin et al, 1990; Ryan, 1996; Blair, 2002). Within the later context, implementation was variously conceived as having either a top-down or bottom-up orientation (Ryan, 1996). The differential focus and driving forces of these layered approaches to implementation were considered to have practical consequences on the outcomes of initiatives. To expand, top-down approaches have focused on authority as the driver for implementation results, while bottom-up models have concentrated on the actors and institutions that plan, develop and carry out polices into services. Various attempts have been made to unify top-down and bottom-up implementation perspectives (e.g. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979; Hasenfeld & Brock, 1991). However, as Ryan (1996) points out it may be that context, rather than level plays an important role in the type of outcomes forthcoming.

Ongoing focus on implementation coupled with the efforts at unification of approaches brought the human dimension aspect of implementation in to greater consideration. That is, the impacts of social relations that can either enable or constrain change efforts (Blair, 2002). In this way it is argued that project actors, including network members have a level of ‘agency’ or control over the actual execution of the intent and the structures that are formed to facilitate outcomes. Along a similar line, Porter (1990) identified that the implementation structures (or the multi-institutional networks that formed to carry out an initiative) were separate or different to the design networks and therefore were open to ‘program drift’. As Porter (1990: 25) states: “the structural pose approach brings the individual back into the centre of implementation and action”.

Increasingly policy and services are being implemented through various networked arrangements which are formed by often diverse sets of organisations, with differential power relations. Despite the important role of networks in the achievement of social change, to date there has been limited attention directed to understanding the impact of implementation process on network operation. In particular, there has been limited attention directed to the overall frameworks or systems for network implementation (Blair, 2002) or the inter-relationship between implementation layers and their drivers.
Methodology

This meta study draws on six case studies to explore the relationships between network formation, operational dynamics (implementation) and performance. These cases are based on research undertaken in both Australia and the United States and include: Chief Executive Officers Forum (CEO) (Keast et al., 2006), Service Integration Project (SIP) (Woolcock & Boorman, 2003; Keast et al., 2004); Family Youth Connections Network (Keast & Brown, 2006), The Water Forum (WF) (Connick, 2006), New Futures (NF) (Annie E. Casey Foundation, undated; Mandell, 1994, 2001b; The Center for The Study of Social Policy, undated); and Life Services Systems (LSS) (Mandell, 1994).

Case Selection and Building

To understand the motivations for network formation (and its relationship to network processes) a cross- national and jurisdictional approach was undertaken. The network cases were drawn from multiple levels of government and community operation and from the international arenas of Australia and the United States. This purposeful sample of essentially homogeneous network cases (Patton, 1987) was coupled with a modified version of the most similar/most different case approach (Przeworski & Teune (1970) based on different levels of operation – strategic policy, administration and practitioner. Selecting cases located at different operational levels enabled the subtleties in terms of formation, operation and outcomes to be explored and exemplified. Table 1 provides a summary of the six network cases.

Semi-structured interviews were undertaken to build the six network cases. Interview respondents included network members as well as identified key informants within the service system. The use of a semi-structured interview approach allowed respondents to describe their understandings and experiences of the network; in particular the basis for the adoption of a network approach and its implementation, in their own words (Denzin, 1984). In addition, in the Australian cases, focus groups were used to gain additional information from participants on their experience in shaping and operating within networks. In all cases, a review of relevant written documentation, such as project reports and internal correspondence, was used to supplement the interview information.

Table 1 should go here

Case Study Findings

Both the WF and SIP cases were set up by government agencies based on the need to overcome a major crisis. In the case of SIP the network was formed in response to the violent death of an elderly citizen. The state government supported community demands that the agencies responsible for addressing the social and economic problems culminating in the incident should do something different in order to prevent this from happening again. In particular, there were calls for the agencies to move outside of their siloed service models to form a collaborative networked response (Keast, 2003, Keast et al., 2004; Woolcock & Boorman, 2003).
In the case of the WF the network was formed in order to negotiate an agreement on how to better manage the water supply in the northern California region and also to preserve the habitat. Prior to the formation of the network all parties (government agencies, private developers, environmentalists, farmers and community groups) were constantly fighting with each other in court as to how scarce water resources should be allocated in the region.

In both situations, the instrumental perspective appeared to present as the primary driver for the formation of a networked approach. However, this was not the situation. In both instances the government agencies involved realised from the outset that a traditional, authoritative approach would not work. That is, it was quickly apparent that the various governments could not mandate integration in either project case. Further, there was awareness that other processes were required to facilitate the formation of a network approach. As a SIP respondent noted: “It was recognised that we had to change the way we were working …. We had to develop stronger, more collegiate relations” (SIP Interview). For SIP and the WF instead of a top down imperative for change, new mechanisms were instituted by the projects to enable participants to work together in new ways and build stronger relations (an interpersonal perspective). In the case of the WF interest based negotiation (Connick, 2006; Innes & Booher, 1999, 2000; O’Leary & Bingham, 2007; Stepp et al., 1998) was used as the mechanism to establish improved relations and build a sense of common purpose. For SIP, the catalyst to building stronger relationships, collegiality and mutual commitment was a Graduate Certificate in Inter-Professional Development in which members established a common language and vision (Keast et al., 2004). In this way, across both networks there was a strong reliance on building better relations as a basis to collaboration and change, which occurred in both cases.

In both LSS and FYCN the networks were formed based on the desire for better coordination of the work of government agencies. With LSS the driving force was to insure that mentally disabled adults would not get “lost” in the social services system. This project was established based on a grant from the Michigan State Development Disabilities Program. The agency forming the network perceived their role as directing all participants to coordinate their efforts to realize this goal. In this regard, the institutional perspective to network formation has application. All agencies were able to follow their existing case management rules and regulations but had to work in a coordinated effort in their program. In order to remain in the program each agency had to agree to work with a case management framework set up by the lead agency. To the extent that the participants were able to better coordinate their efforts and work together more efficiently they were considered effective.

The FYCN was formed in response to a federal government policy stance requiring that previously independent services work together to develop a seamless approach to the youth homelessness service system. Under this initiative funding was directed only to those agencies demonstrating a networked approach to service delivery. Thus a concerted government policy direction and funding regime for integrated and especially networked service systems provided a strong institutional encouragement for agencies to participate. That is, to be legitimate recipients of funding, the organisations were required to band together into a collective unit displaying the required characteristics of collaboration. One agency took a lead role in establishing the network and developed a set of mechanisms to guide the interactions between the
participating agencies. These processes included preparatory workshops to set the conditions for ‘working together’ and other more ‘institutionalised’ linking mechanisms such as a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), joint case management arrangements and brokerage funding.

In the FYCN, while the primary impetus for a networked form was generated by government policy and funding, the idea of a set of agencies working together rather than in silos as was the case also had strong resonance for the members of this network (Keast & Brown, 2006). For many agencies the previously competitive practices were seen as detrimental to the overall quality of services for young people. A coming together of ‘like agencies’ was seen as a positive and progressive concept. Taking this agenda further, some participating agencies stressed that ‘far from being pushed into a network form by government funding’, they were motivated to do this ‘because it was the right thing for our clients and our agencies” (Keast, 2003).

Through their structured relations the FYCN members developed stronger interpersonal relations that provided additional support for the work that they were doing and enabled them to branch out from the ordered linkage arrangements to create new processes and outcomes. As a result of a growing commitment to working together, coupled with the embedded routines and practices, the FYCN contributed strongly to the local service system. In particular they developed a co-location model of service delivery, which aided joint case management and led to a number of effective cross agency projects (Ryan, 2004; Keast & Brown, 2006).

Such service success was not the case with LSS however. This network body remained in its competitive mode and used the grant to coordinate its efforts and work more efficiently together as its only requirement. The participants used the network format to solidify existing arrangements and to strengthen their existing case management strategies. The difficulty was that this was only the tip of the iceberg. As long as the participants did not see the need to change their behaviour and the way their organisations operated, the effectiveness of this program was limited. What was needed was a move to change the existing rules and regulations and to work in new ways as a new whole. However, they never worked on changing their relationships or learning new ways of behaving with each other.

In New Futures (NF) the aim was “to encourage a fundamental restructuring of the way [the communities in the program] planned, financed, and delivered educational, health, and other services to at risk-youth” (The Annie E. Casey Foundation, undated, p.v). The program was funded and directed by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. Because the emphasis of the program was on preventing truancy, funding went to the School Superintendent who assumed that the money should only go to improving programs for the schools, that is, doing the same work more efficiently. As long as new programs for the schools were approved, the program appeared to achieve success.

The motivations of achieving more programs for the schools (an instrumental perspective) became the dominant driver for the network due to the role of the school system as lead agency established by the grant. The difficulty was that the grant was meant to provide a means to develop new ways of serving youth across all agencies (governmental, private and non-profit) in the community. In order to do this, it was
necessary to try to change all existing systems (including the schools) and to develop a new whole. Such a task is largely dependent on the skills and processes facilitated by an interactive/interpersonal approach to network formation. This was never fully developed.

The rationale for the formation of the CEO was on establishing a whole-of-government approach to human services under the imprimatur of the state Premier (Menzies, 2002). A significant strategy for achieving this ‘cross-cutting’ goal centred on tapping into the CEOs’ personal relationships to engender a deeper understanding of each other and their work (O’Farrell, 2002). The formation of stronger interpersonal networks between the heads of departments was perceived essentially as a tool that the government could use to bring together a diverse set of resources. Although there was rhetoric of collaboration, in effect this network was focused on coordination through better alignment of resources and working more efficiently, rather than changing the system of service delivery (an instrumental perspective).

However, on their own initiative informal relations between the leaders of the departments proved to be insufficient mechanisms to achieve a coherent package of policy and service initiatives. In response, a more formalised, vertical top-down approach that drew on structured meetings, set programs of work and planned agendas was instituted to supplement the informal relationships. Extending this vertical focus the network also became subject to ‘management and oversight’ by a Secretariat reporting directly to the Premier of the state. To drive the agenda for cross-department working, salary incentives were introduced for CEOs. However, alongside this vertical relational emphasis, the CEOs continued to interact and through initiatives such as the Community Cabinet Meetings were able to gain deeper personal insights and build commitment to each other. Through this interpersonal approach they were able to push past some of the previous turf based impediments to integrated policy and service delivery and create small windows of collective outcomes (CEO Interviews; Keast & Brown, 2006).

The case reviews of each network reveal that although there was a primary or dominant driver to the formation of a network, it was generally supplemented by additional motivations that had an effect on the implementation, operational dynamics and outcomes achieved. Indeed, in some cases without the inclusion of a secondary driver, in particular the interpersonal perspective, the networks would have struggled (and in the case of NF, did struggle) to attain their objectives. This suggests that attention should be paid to the interpersonal aspect of network design and development as it seems to act as an anchor for the other mechanisms.

Specifically, the case studies highlighted the role that network actors play in shaping the actual operation and functioning of networks. In several of the cases it was apparent that although there was a specified direction for outcomes, the network members were able to influence the way in which the network operated to achieve mutual rather than state centric goals. The CEO network provides a good example of this.

Together these findings lend support to the paper’s proposition that motivation for the formation of networks does have an effect on the implementation and operational dynamics. However, it also demonstrates that networks are frequently more complex
and nuanced in their establishment and operation than expected and this points to a number of implications.

**Implications**

Although the above has demonstrated that there are a number of common motivators driving network formation, there are also some clear differences between groups. The most significant difference discerned within this set of cases is how the participants perceived and acted upon the restrictions placed on the network based on the dominant motivator/driver.

For the WF and SIP although both cases were initiated by formal bodies, the need for more innovative solutions than the ones that had been tried was recognised at the outset. Therefore in effect, the formation of both these networks relied primarily on an interpersonal perspective. That is, the members were motivated by more than being told what to do; they were acting on a commitment to each other as ‘people and service providers’ and the realisation of the need for systems change. For the SIP participants this situation was encapsulated by the following statement: “... we were doing this because it was the right thing to do” (SIP Focus Group). Over time some of these interpersonal processes became embedded or institutionalised into the operating ethos of the network and accepted as ‘the way we do work’ (SIP Interview). For the WF participants, it was the role of the outside facilitator who kept them focused on learning about each other and developing new ways of behaving.

In both cases, the instrumental perspective did not disappear. With SIP the instrumental shadow was apparent in both the strong attention directed to it by senior government representatives and the demands for ‘hard evidence’ of its cost/benefit impact. In the WF case, the participants had to report back each step of their progress to their individual agencies and/or organisations to secure their approval to proceed. This was to insure that the individual organisations’ goals and interests were kept in the foreground. Nevertheless, for both projects the primary focus was not on achieving tasks, per se, but rather finding new ways of dealing with each other. Once this was accomplished, the participants were able to focus on how to accomplish tasks in new ways.

In the case of the CEO network and NF both were based on the mandate of the initiating organisation to effect change. For the CEOs it was the oversight of the Secretariat reporting directly to the Premier. In the case of NF it was the authority given to the school superintendent by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. In both cases, these mandates, requiring network formation, was a critical motivation for their involvement and engaged action within the network.

In the case of NF the school superintendent used the authority given to him by the grant from the Annie E. Casey Foundation to act as if he was the “director” of the network. He acted as if he was in a top-down position of control. Although some of the other participants tried to work in a more horizontal fashion, this was not enough to compensate for the superintendent’s perception that he was “in charge” of the network. This, of course, was reinforced by the way the Foundation set up the grant. Instead of allowing for the freedom needed to build new relationships and develop new ways of working, the grant instead served to put the school superintendent in a
position of authority. In the end, this is what led to its eventually being disbanded and limiting the extent of its effectiveness. As Whetten (1977) pointed out, some networks, especially those prompted by legislation, are more vertical than others. Members in such a network may be forced to accept the authority of the ‘driver sponsor’ and the position of that person/or agency may influence the direction of the work.

In the case of the CEO network, however, although the dominant perspective led to an emphasis on a more structured approach to coordinating services, the perceptions of the participants of their need to also build better relationships led to the establishment of a collective social capital. This led to a form of network integrated by a deliberate mix of vertical authority and horizontal interpersonal relations and managed using structured processes. This allowed the participants to develop secondary strategies emphasizing working together horizontally as well as meeting the primary strategies of following the rules and mandates of the Secretariat. The augmentation and mix of approaches enabled the network to expand what could be done and thus to increase their effectiveness in developing new strategies.

Coupling the more formalised and mandated processes of the hierarchy with the informal relations provided the additional leverage necessary for the group to begin to achieve the changes sought. In this way the CEOs’ network initially sought to use the informal interpersonal relations between members as a ‘soft’ mechanism with which to better link the sectors. When this proved insufficient a more tried and trusted ‘hard’ instrumental approach was adopted, which included management strategies that created conditions under which goal-oriented processes can take place (De Brujin and Ten Heuvelhof, 1997). This allowed for the mix of first generation instruments such as rules and the power of mandate with second generation strategies such as pay incentives for CEOs demonstrating horizontal working. Together the instrumental and interpersonal network drivers created an environment that was largely effective in that through its efforts there had ‘begun to be some tentative inroads to cross-agency integration (O’Farrell, 2000; Keast, 2003).

For both FYCN and LSS, an authoritative government body stipulated a particular framework that was to be adopted by the network. In both cases the emphasis was on the need to better coordinate their services. For LSS, the state saw the need to coordinate services for the mentally disabled adults, but did not want to give up control of how this was to be done. The focus was only on how best to carry out existing services among the many agencies and organisations involved in this process. The participants were limited to the way they could implement the coordinated services and relied on the existing case management system to do this. The participants were comfortable with these limitations as they saw themselves as competitors and therefore they were not willing to change any of their existing ways of operating. To the extent that the participants were able to better coordinate their services, this program can be seen to have been effective. But as one participant pointed out, the heads of the agencies involved were never able to take the really critical step of changing their competitive mode and working together in new and better ways to deliver their services for fear of losing their authority and/or resources.

In essence, the institutional perspective allowed the participants to maintain the status quo.
In the FYCN although this network was also formed based on the institutional perspective, the participants saw the existing competitive mode as unproductive and used the network as a chance to change their relationships. Initially the members were oriented toward the formation of a collaborative network model. However, it was quickly realised that ‘this would not work as we had no common goal, purpose and no real trust” (FYCN, Interview 20 February). It was recognised that with a limited history of working together, few existing relationships between agencies and limited trust, it was necessary to spend time learning about each other’s organisation and trying to build rapport. This relationship building process took place and was facilitated around a regular schedule of meetings as well as a succession of workshops designed to develop joint initiatives. Relationship building and trust were further enhanced through closer casework management. Through these institutionalised linkage mechanism and the interpersonal capacity building undertaken the FYCN has been able to shift its operation and in doing so it has contributed significantly to the quality of service delivery in its service precinct (Keast & Brown, 2006; Ryan, 2004).

The implications of these findings are that as a first point it is necessary to have a clear and complete understanding of the network, including its set of drivers/motivators in order to be able to adjust, reconfigure and supplement the components to achieve outcomes. Monitoring of this mix should be a regular or ongoing process as it is likely to be shifted over time in response to emergent conditions and contexts.

Second, as the findings revealed, the form of network operation predicted by the driving motivation can often be disrupted or changed by the network actors. That is, regardless of the network type or drivers, network actors can over-run the original intent and re-establish new goals to better meet agreed purposes. As the findings demonstrated interpersonal networks appeared to provide a stronger connection to network outcomes. However, these were most effective when combined with institutional frameworks to anchor the interpersonal or relational processes, and in doing so, engender an element of sustainability to networks. In this way, it could be argued the coming together of two or more of the ‘Is’ positively impacts on the operational dynamics of the network and its implementation process. This finding lends support to the integrative implementation perspective (Blair, 2002) and suggests a stronger role for meso level implementation processes (i.e. between top-down and bottom-up) which are embedded at the institutional level.

Finally, the dominant perspective in a network is based on the motivation for establishing the network in the first place, and may continue or change over time. An interesting discovery for this set of network cases is that where the government or the funding agency appeared to have greater control of the operating environment there was a preference to use the interactive/interpersonal and institutional approaches. By contrast, where government or the funding agency lacked confidence in its ability to influence, or where the issue is so significant that change must be achieved, there was a greater propensity to adopt an instrumental approach that manipulates networks to achieve preset government goals. This result has resonance with Atkinson and Coleman’s (1989) strong-state and weak-state conceptualisation, where strong-state models are more prepared to cede some power to network actors while weaker-states have a need to retain a level of control over outcomes. This duality of approach has
also been described elsewhere (Keast, 2004) as the ‘hands-on and hands-off’ model of network functioning.

The various network formation drivers and mechanisms for each of the network cases are summarised in Table 2 along with the outcomes. Drawing these elements together provides a beginning conceptual framework for those charged with the responsibility for forming and managing networks.

**Put Table 2 here**

**Conclusion**

New pressures on policy making and service delivery have resulted in the uptake of a variety of networked forms to achieve previously out of range goals or to address complex social problems in new and innovative ways. Three key drivers for the formation of networks have been identified: instrumental, institutional and interpersonal. Each of these reflects some fundamental choices in the form of networks developed and the expected outcomes. There are a number of different reasons for selecting one approach over another. The approach taken can depend on the degree of the crisis that prompts a network to be established. It can also depend on the amount of risk the participants are willing to take. Finally it may be governed by political expediency, in other words, what is the quickest and most acceptable way to solve the problem(s).

The 3I’s provide a model for understanding the drivers and dynamics of the processes that occur within different types of networks. Although the 3Is were presented as ideal types, with each informed by a particular set of assumptions and functioning styles, the findings have distilled a much more nuanced rationale and approach to the formation and implementation of networks. In all cases there was evidence of more than one motivating force in play; with the interpersonal/interactional element acting to both anchor and shape network activities. The case studies therefore also revealed the role that network actors can take in shifting the implementation and operation dynamics of networks. Distilling these components also contributes to a better management of the network processes.

Classifying and responding to the networks based on their dominant characteristic can be useful to develop a base response. However to be able to fully understand, design and operate the network it is necessary to have a more complete picture of the suite of motivators, their overlaps and the impact of operational dynamics such as implementation. Based on this knowledge, those entities that establish networks can have some strategies in place to accommodate these nuances and in the end may be able to reach their goal of developing more effective networks.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Service orientation/goal</th>
<th>Operating Level</th>
<th>Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive Officers Human Services Network</td>
<td>Strategic Integrated Policy and Service</td>
<td>Strategic policy level</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officers of State government Human Services Departments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Integration Project</td>
<td>Community governance</td>
<td>Administrative/regional</td>
<td>Regional Managers of government and community agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Connections Network</td>
<td>Seamless Service Provision</td>
<td>Practitioner/base level</td>
<td>Community Service Practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Water Forum</td>
<td>Innovative solutions to existing policies</td>
<td>Strategic level</td>
<td>Heads of State Agencies; CEOs of private companies; City Managers; Heads of non-profit &amp; community groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Futures Program</td>
<td>Integrated policies &amp; services</td>
<td>Strategic level</td>
<td>City Manager; Heads of public agencies; CEOs of private companies; Heads of non-profit ^ community groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Services System</td>
<td>Seamless service provision</td>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Department heads; Service practitioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network</td>
<td>Formation Drivers</td>
<td>Linkage mechanisms</td>
<td>Outcomes</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>CEO Whole-of government coordination</td>
<td>Instrumental - More efficient use of resources, Interpersonal - Based on existing working relations</td>
<td>Imprimaturs of Premier Official Mandate, Tight agendas &amp; action plans, DPC (gov) Secretariat, Pay Incentive, Community Cabinet Meetings</td>
<td>Enhanced executive decision making, Joint policy initiatives – Crime Prevention, Joint projects initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIP Systems Change: Community Governance</td>
<td>Instrumental - Integrated service system, Interpersonal - Commitment to collaborative working</td>
<td>Tight Agendas, Government focus on results, Certification in Inter-professional Development, Relationship checking in meetings, Regular communication sessions (face to face), Relationship building activities</td>
<td>Tailored community specific program, Community social infrastructure enhanced, Whole of community approach operationalised, Stability of service delivery systems, Shared resources &amp; pooled funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYCN Seamless service approach</td>
<td>Institutional - Pressure to conform to funding, Interpersonal - Agreement to work together</td>
<td>MOU, Brokerage &amp; contracts, Case management, Regular workshops, Relationship building activities</td>
<td>Co-location of services &amp; shared administration, Seamless service delivery - joint case management model operational, Joint projects &amp; services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WF Develop innovative solutions</td>
<td>Interpersonal - Extending &amp; enhancing relations, Instrumental - Reporting back to parent organizations</td>
<td>Developing new relationships/behaviours, Outside consultant training using interest-based negotiations, Strong dense relationships</td>
<td>MOU committing all parties to new arrangements for next 30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NF Build new systems for youth</td>
<td>Instrumental - Better collaboration to find new solutions</td>
<td>Foundation grant authority, Informal meetings among some of the participants (limited)</td>
<td>Limited coordination initially, Eventually disbanded without achieving innovative solutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSS Better coordination of services</td>
<td>Institutional - Maintaining turf/resources</td>
<td>Case management, Use of existing agencies’ rules and regulations</td>
<td>Better coordination among all government agencies, No changes in existing rules and regulations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
REFERENCES


The Center For The Study Of Social Policy (undated). Building New Futures for At-Risk Youth. Washington, D.C.

